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Abstract

This dissertation examines how the Office of the Attorney General of
Thailand's mandates in reviewing state contracts might be improved in order to help
enhance greater FDI flow toward Thailand. International arbitration would be
stipulated within the "settlement of disputes" clause included in a state contract so as
to assure and gain foreign investor's confidence. This dissertation has been conducted
by examining all levels of relevant national legislation as well as international law,
especially those international obligations that Thailand has entered into. Based upon
such examination, there are at least two (2) problems and obstacles that make the
application of arbitration for state contracts in Thailand a continuous struggle: the
initial impediment to the arbitration system and the contradiction and inconsistency of
the arbitration system. Given the findings, there should be a mechanism, namely, a
Testing Process that would help differentiate a "state contract relating to qualifying
FDI" from others. Only the defined state contract relating to qualifying FDI subject
to the Testing Process will be governed by a proposed Uniform and Standard
Methodology of Arbitration, encompasing the ratification of the ICSID Convention
on part of Thailand; the establishment of the Special Method; and the modification of
the existing arbitration laws and regulations.
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Introduction

FDI is of great importance for Thailand since Thailand as a host state
needs foreign capital flowing into her territory. In Thailand, FDI can be found in
various forms but one of the most efficient means to promote FDI is often found
through state projects. To attract FDI, the State encourages private foreign investors
to participate in state projects that offer incentives and certain protection on
investments. FDI invested in state projects are likely operated through state contracts
(for example, construction contracts, concession contracts, or management contracts).
The OAG acting as a state attorney has authority to review drafts of
state contracts that Government Agencies are hoping to enter into with the private
parties. Therefore, the OAG must ensure that the terms and conditions of each state
contract serve the parties' agreement and accordingly, that those terms are binding
and enforceable under relevant laws and regulations. In addition, the OAG must
ensure that a state contract functions well according to its purposes.

This is

particularly true for a state contract carrying the function of FDI. With this regard,
the OAG must be aware that such a state contract contains FDI-friendly clauses to
facilitate and enhance FDI flow toward the country. If the state contract carrying FDI
functions well, the state contract could contribute to the influx of foreign investments
into Thailand.
This dissertation is, therefore, to seek how the

~AG's

mandates in

reviewing state contracts can be improved in order to enhance FDI flow into the
country. A well-written contract is not, however, the only answer to improve the
effectiveness and function of a state contract in carrying FDI incentives. A contract
must contain FDI-friendly clauses to assure and gain the investor's confidence. One
of the foremost FDI-friendly clauses enhancing FDI inflow is the availability of

1

arbitration (including international arbitration), that is included in the "settlement of
disputes" clause. The reason is that a method for dispute settlement becomes a great
concern among foreign investors who might be uncomfortable and reluctant to settle
disputes in domestic judiciary system - the cause of doubt for some foreign investors
skeptical about the impartiality of local courts and local administrative bodies.
Therefore, to help foreign investors gain more confidence in their investments made
in Thailand, Thailand is compelled to seek a measure to ensure that their investments
will be protected, especially when disputes arising out of investments occur.
As a consequence, there should be a method of dispute settlement that
satisfy foreign investors in terms of the impartiality and reliability of the methods
available for them. This dissertation proposes that there should be a Uniform and
Standard Methodology of Arbitration for disputes arising out of state contracts
relating to qualifying FDI available for foreign investors that is consistent and
compatible according to relevant domestic law as well as international obligations that
Thailand has entered into. If the effectiveness and efficiency of a state contract is
enhanced and promoted so as to bolster the investor's confidence, the state contract
relating to FDI would contribute to the flow of FDI moving toward the country to
greater extent.
Given the foregoing facts, presumption, and proposition, this
dissertation comprises:
Chapter one. This chapter provides the overview and relation of FDI
and Thailand's state contracts.

This chapter emphasizes the importance and

development of FDI (especially for the fact that the development of FDI was derived
from the state reponsibility rule and resulted in the emergence of current BITs). The
chapter also describes Thailand's state contracts, the Administrative Structure of the
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Government Organizations of Thailand, types of state contracts, FDI in Thailand, and
the involvement of the ~AG's in the review of state contracts.
Chapter two. This chapter describes the

~AG's

practice and process of

reviewing draft state contracts. This chapter explores how the OAG performs the
function of scrutinizing state contracts by looking at all levels of relevant legislation.
Basically, this chapter clarifies relevant domestic laws, regulations, cabinet
resolutions, and the

~AG's

internal practice together with relevant international

obligations that Thailand has entered into, especially UNCITRAL, the New York
Convention, the MIGA Convention, and Thailand's BITs with other countries.
Chapter three.

This chapter examines categories of state contracts

under the Thai legal system and finds that indistinguishable categories of state
contracts is the initial impediment to the arbitration system governing disputes arising
out of state contracts. In order to find a solution to this problem, the study considers
the meaning, scope, and expansion of the terms "investment," and "FDI" from
international perspective (both customary international law and modem international
instruments).

In this chapter, the dissertation proposes that the testing process

defining the terms, "state contract relating to qualifying FDI" should be established
rather than putting countless efforts to redefine and re-categorize the current contract
types in order to differentiate a state contract carrying or representing FDI from the
other. This is to ensure that a state contract carrying or representing FDI as a socalled "a state contract relating to qualifying FDI," whether or not it is named as such
shall be differentiated from other types and shall be accordingly treated appropriately
under relevant domestic and international law.
Chapter four. This chapter is the main focal point of the dissertation,
and is devoted to demonstrating that the arbitration for disputes arising out of a state
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contract is inconsistent, incompatible, and contradictory. This analysis is a result of
scrunizing arbitration law domestically and internationally.

Given the in-depth

analysis, it finds that the domestic arbitration law is not harmonous partly due to the
confusion of the jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the Administrative
Court over disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI. In
addition, it also finds that domestic arbitration law still stands in stark contrast with
the legal methodology for arbitration under international law: namely UNCITRAL,
the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, the MIGA Convention, and
Thailand's BITs with other countries.
Considering

Thailand's

international

obligations

under

these

conventions, it is surprising to find that Thailand signed the ICSID Convention in
1985 but that Thailand has not ratified the Convention yet. The non-ratification of the
ICSID Convention on the part of Thailand renders the arbitration system in Thailand
even more inconsistent and incomplete. What puts Thailand in an awkward and
unpleasant position is that Thailand has already committed herself to recognize and
enforce arbitral awards made outside her territory under the New York Convention as
well as that Thailand has already committed herself to comply with the arbitral
awards where MIGA is one of the disputing parties under the MIGA Convention but
Thailand herself is not eligible to submit a dispute to international arbitration under
ICSID due to non-ratification of the ICSID Convention even though ICSID is the
most appropriate means providing an investor-state settlement of disputes.
Chapter five.

This chapter proposes that a Uniform and Standard

Methodology of Arbitration governing disputes arising out of a state contract relating
to qualifying FDI should be established. The dissertation first proposes that Thailand
should ratify the ICSID Convention with a reservation and condition. Second, the
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Special Method governmg disputes arising out of a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI should be adopted.

Third, based upon the preceding proposals,

domestic laws and regulations on arbitration should be modified in a manner
consonant with the ratification of the ICSID Convention, the establishment of the
Special Method and the existence of the Administrataive Court.
Conclusion.

This chapter emphasizes the main purpose of this

dissertation, namely, to review the OAG's roles and mandates in scrutinizing a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI in order to improve and increase the effectiveness
and efficiency of the function of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI. In doing
so, the hope is to help promote and motivate FDI flowing into Thailand. To achieve
this, the OAG must ensure that in addition to a well-drafted contract concerned
(especially a state contract relating to qualifying FDI), the contract itself should also
provide a reliable and effective mechanism of a dispute settlement resolution for
foreign investors under a Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration as
proposed by this dissertation.

It is strongly believed that such a Uniform and

Standard Methodology of arbitration becomes one of the key factors that can help
stimulate and enhance FDI inflow into a country.
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Chapter 1 Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") and Thailand's State Contracts
1.

The Significance of FDI to Developing Nations like Thailand
1.1.

FDI and State Responsibility in respect of Foreign Investments

and the Use of "Self-Help" Measures

Foreign investments (including FDI) have been part of the history
smce ancient times, and flourished most notably between the eighteenth and
nineteenth century. During those periods, foreign investments often flowed from
imperial states to colonial states. Under the colonial periods, colonial states were not
required to provide protection of property owned by foreign investors because the
protection had been already given to them by their colonizing states. However, in a
case where foreign investments took place outside colonized countries, protection of
foreign investments became a great concern to foreign investors. As a result, any loss
of investment, especially in cases of "sovereign default," could give rise to an injured
state (a home state in terms of FDI) claiming the principle of "state responsibility"
against a host state (in terms ofFDI).
"Sovereign default" was a circumstance where a debtor state (a host
state) failed under its contractual obligations to repay debt due to nationals of a
creditor state (a home state). The sovereign default could be a cumulative event l or a
combination of factors that included a high level of foreign debt, sluggish domestic
growth, problems in domestic economic policy, rising interest rates, currency
devaluations, a collapse in commodity prices for commodity-exporting countries, or
instability of the domestic political situation.

lM. Miller, The Backgrounder: Sovereign Bankruptcy.

6

Under a circumstance of sovereign default, the injured state might
bring a claim against a host state under the state responsibility principle because the
injured state had power to protect its citizens outside its national boundaries where the
offending state failed to meet the minimum international standards for the treatment
of aliens. As a consequence, the injured state would exercise its power to demand
compensation or reparation for personal injuries (including loss of life, economic or
financial injuries) as well as loss of property of assets or property damages (including
loss of investments, expropriation, nationalization and requisition or confiscation of
property belonging to foreigners). Under such a circumstance, the home state could
apply any means (including the use of armed forces) against the host state to compel
the host state to pay debts owed to its nationals?
However, before the principle of state responsibility was raised, it was
a common practice and requirement that foreign investors had to seek their own
redress within domestic mechanisms of the host state. Only after local remedies had
been exhausted and foreign investors had ended up with nothing or inadequate
compensation, they would then tum to their respective government (their home state)
to pursue their claims against the host state by means of subrogation. 3 By doing so,
the individual claim by foreign investors would be passed on to their home state in
order to deal with the pursuit of justice for them.
Interestingly, in the eighteenth century, a method that a home state of a
foreign investor chose to deal with the pursuit of claims on behalf of its citizens was
military intervention. It was legitimately accepted during this era that in a case of
sovereign default, a creditor state --by giving protection to its nationals' investment in

2 Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law, 18
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J.821 at 823.
3 Sompong Sucharitkul, Mediation and Conciliation as Alternative Means of Settling International
Disputes, ICSID Review (1995).

7

a debtor country-- could use armed forces to intervene in a debtor state's territory to
collect default payment. From the creditor states' perspective, it was justified to do
so. The intervention in weaker states' territory by using military force to collect
default debt in the pursuit of justice for their citizens was a so-called "self-help"
mechanism used by states with greater military and economic strength.

4

Prior to 1907, the use of military force became common practice,
particularly for stronger states, known as the Northern states, in order to collect debts
owed to their citizens by weaker states. By such common practice, it seemed that
loans granted by nationals of the Northern states to the Southern states would be
guaranteed by government troopS.5 Furthermore, a legal interpretation that permitted
stronger states to intervene against weaker states for other reasons made a mockery of
sovereignty and independence; it made weaker states no better than colonies. 6
The justified use of force can be illustrated in a case where France sent
military troops to Vera Cruz in 1838 to collect debt owed by the Mexican
government. This continued during the periods between 1861 and 1863, as Britain,
Spain and France sent collective military troops to intervene in Mexico's territory for
the purpose of debt collection.

In this case, France had an ulterior motive for

intervening in Mexico since the French stayed and appointed Maximilian as Emperor
for a brief and disastrous reign in 1864. In 1902, Germany and Britain engaged in
joint military action to force the Venezuelan government to pay default debts incurred
by German and British corporations. By doing so, five (5) Venezuelan ports as well
as the mouth of the Orinoco River were blockaded by German and British ships.

Martha Finnemore, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, Sovereign
Default and Military Intervention, Address at the 1996 Annual Meetings of the American Political
Science Association, August 28 - September 1, 1996 in San Francisco, California, available at
http://www.stanford.edu/ciass/polisci243b/readings/vOOOO 113. pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
5 !d.
6 !d. at 3.
4
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Venezuelan gunboats and bombarded forts at Puerto Cabello were sunk by Germany
and Britain's action. When the case was brought to arbitration, the Hague Court
reaffirmed that the intervention of Germany and Britain was justified because their
intention to use military force was to secure justice for their citizens.
The turning point began in 1902 when Latin American countries
fought back by arguing that all states--weaker or stronger--had equal sovereignty over
their territories under international law.

With this regard, Professor Christian N.

Okeke, added, any nation was considered sovereign "if it governed itself, under
whatever form, and did not depend on any other nations.,,7 As a result, sovereign
equality of each state was seen as a fundamental principle of international law and
states should be restrained from using military force against other states except for
"self-defense."g

The most important critic of the prevailing state of affairs,

Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Drago, an Argentine ambassador in
Washington, asserted that the sovereignty must be reinterpreted in a way that the use
of force by military intervention could not be justified by the collection of debts.
Drago emphasized that the sovereign equality of states should be recognized and
adopted in all of modem law. The concept had been subsequently accepted as Drago
Doctrine.
Therefore, to put the forcible debt collection by military intervention to
an end, the creation of a mechanism in a form of compulsory arbitration to deal with
disputes arising from such trade and investment had been made a priority in the
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, which replaced the Hague Convention in
1899.

The 1899 Hague Convention had adopted institutional arbitration for the

Christian N. Okeke, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 27 Cal. W.
Int'l LJ. 311 324. See also S. Prakash Sinha, New Nations and the Law of Nations 13 (1967).
8 E. Malory Cousens, Self-Defense as A Justification for the Use of Force between States (1995)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with author).
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Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and established the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA),9 which was seen as the oldest arbitration body in the world. 10
Given such a long history of state responsibility regarding foreign
investment and the FDI, those concerns regarding minimum standard of treatment and
protection on foreign investment, capital and property, dispute settlement resolution
and so on have played an important part of negotiations between host states and home
states in various forums and on various levels. Some are seen in forms of bilateral
investment treaties or BITs whereas some are found in forms of multilateral
investment treaties or MITs. For example, the development of those negotiations on
investment protection can be found in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN"), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
("ICSID") and so on. Especially for the latter, ICSID is created to serve as dispute
settlement mechanism where one party is a host state and the other party is a national
of another state.
1.2.

Investment Treaties

The consequences of the "sovereign default," the "self-help" measure,
and the "sovereign equality" of all states in those days brought about the negotiation
between host states and home states and gave rise to international trade and
commercial treaties during the eighteenth century called the "Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation" ("FCN") treaties. ll However, the objectives and purposes of FCN
treaties were not confined to or exclusively aimed at investment or commerce. On the
contrary, they were extended to other concerns such as the use of military force, the
Rosenne, S. (ed). "The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration:
Reports and Documents." The Hague, T.M.C.; Asser Press 2000.
10 G. Biggs., Settlement of International Trade and Investment Disputes.
II KJ. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 1988,21 Cornell
International Law Journal 201.

9
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access and usage of internal ports and lands of a host state, charters on an alien's
exclusive rights to enjoy in a host state or criminal procedure when arrested. FeN
treaties in those days were seen as measures for spreading the influence of the major
powerful states in host states. For example, the United States made alliances with
other states of the world through FeN treaties. 12
Nonetheless, FeN treaties were considered to be the precursors of our
present bilateral investment treaties or BITs.13 FeN treaties came to be used with the
more specific purpose of investment and lead to the creation of bilateral investment
treaties or BITs due to social and economic changes after decolonization. Generally,
BITs are based on the notion of reciprocity and mutual interest between a host state
(capital-importing state) and a home state (capital-exporting state). As a result, they
are considered to be international legal instruments by which two countries set down
rules that would govern investments by their respective nationals in the other's
territory.14 Basically, the present BITs are agreements based on an "ad hoc" basis
depending on mutual interest, expectation and bargaining power between the host
state and the home state.
By means of an ad hoc BIT, both host and home states bring their
concerns to the table for negotiation. From the host state perspective, the capital12Id. at 209.
nd
l3 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 208 (2
ed. 2004) (1994).
14 The literature and doctrinal commentary on BITs are abundant and have expanded over the years as
the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") has grown. See generally, e.g., RUDOLF
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 225-76 (1994); U.N.
CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. ("UNCTAD"), BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 19591999, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIAI2 (2000), at http:// www.unctad.orglen/docsllpoiteiiad2.en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 29, 2009); UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID1990S, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITEIIITI7 (1998); K. J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992); Antonio R. Parra, The Scope of New
Investment Laws and International Instruments in Economic Development, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND LAW 27 (R. Pritchard ed., 1996). In addition, see
the website of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") for materials
on BITs, including the texts of many BITs, arbitration awards that have interpreted and applied them,
and a bibliography of books and articles commenting on BITs. See ICSID, ICSID Bilateral Investment
Treaties, at http://www.woridbank.orglicsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
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importing state uses a BIT to attract FDI, hence increasing the amount of capital and
associated technology that flows to its territory.

This is mainly to deal with the

promotion on FDI in the host state's territory. From the home state perspective, the
capital-exporting state uses a BIT as a means to protect the investments made by its
nationals and companies in the host state. In addition to protecting the investments of
its nationals, some countries, especially the United States, have had another objective
in negotiating BITs- to facilitate the entry and operation of these investments by
inducing host countries to remove various impediments in their regulatory systems. 15
Despite the fact that a BIT is normally a reciprocal agreement between
a capital-importing state (normally the developing country) and a capital-exporting
state (normally the developed country) where a BIT between them is founded on a
grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more
capital in the future/ 6 it also cannot refuse that a BIT can be found in an agreement
between developing countries as well as that between developed countries. Examples
of the former include BITs between Thailand and China and between Egypt and
Morocco. 17 The most notable example of the latter is the 1988 agreement between the
United States and Canada that created a free trade area between the two countries. 18

The Deputy United States Trade Representative stated the U.S. goals in negotiating BITs as follows:
The BIT program's basic aims are to:
(1) protect U.S. investment abroad in those countries where U.S. investors' rights are not protected
through existing agreements;
(2) encourage adoption in foreign countries of market-oriented domestic policies that treat private
investment fairly; and
(3) support the development ofintemationallaw standards consistent with these objectives.
Jeffrey Lang, Kevnote Address, 31 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 455, 457 (998). See also United States
Trade Representative, USTR Focus on Investment,
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Sectors/Investment/Section Index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
16 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, DO BITS REALLY WORK?: AN EVALUATION OF
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THEIR GRAND BARGAIN, 46 HVILJ 67 at 77.
17 AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS, P.R.C.-Thail.,
Mar. 12, 1985, available at www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china thai1and.pdf (last visited
Apr. 29, 2009); AGREEMENT REGARDING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF
INVESTMENT, Egypt-Morocco, June 6, 1976, available at
http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/egypt morocco arb.pdf(last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
18 See FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2,1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
15
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The basic structure of any BIT encompasses the following topics:
scope of application; conditions for the entry of foreign investment; general standards
of treatment of foreign investments; monetary transfers; operational conditions of the
investment; protection against expropriation and dispossession; compensation for
losses; and investment dispute settlement. 19
In addition to BITs, there have been attempts to enter into multilateral
investment treaties between several parties, but they have not been easily successful.
The first such effort was the Havana Charter of 1948, which would have created the
International Trade Organization with powers to promulgate rules on international
investmeneo but the Havana Charter failed to gain support from a sufficient number
of states. 21 The reason was that it was not easy for those parties to conclude all of
their concerns and issues by means of a single agreement. To reach such agreement,
the parties inevitably came across conflicts of interest between them (host states and
home states on behalf of their investors). This was a central reason why bilateral
investment treaties or BITs became more popular than multilateral investment
treaties.
Therefore, it is absolutely out of questions that BITs are of great
importance. In fact, the significant roles BITs play not only promote the flow of
capital from the home state to the host state but also enhance capital flows globally.
Without BITs, FDI flow would be obstructed. Without the incentives given to and
protections surrounding foreign investments granted by BITs, foreign investors are

19

20

Salacuse, supra note 16at 79.
[d.at 72. Also see Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc.

E/Conf.2178.

[d. at 72. Also see William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO 9 (Princeton Essays in International
Finance No. 16, 1952), cited in Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 541, 555 n.68 (1994).
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forced to rely on the host state's law alone for protection, thereby making it difficult
for foreign investors to be willing to invest their capital in the host state.

In a

common practice, the host state and home state will enter into a BIT agreement
creating favourable conditions and FDI-friend1y environments for greater economic
cooperation between both states and in particular, for the investments made by
nationals and companies of one state in the territory of the other state.

As a

consequence, when foreign investors make their investments in the host state, their
investments will be protected by the host state's domestic law (for example,
investment contracts or state contracts relating to FDI) as well as by a BIT between
the host state and home state. According to this practice, it seems that protections and
promotions of foreign investments depend on the two-tier level of investment
agreements. At the state level, it must appear that the host state and home state enter
into a BIT agreement granting the promotions and protections on investments made
by their nationals in the territory of the other state. As a result of such, foreign
investors (nationals of one state) shall be entitled to enjoy the promotions and
protections according to BIT's provisions.

At the second-tier level, foreign

investments (through investment contracts or state contracts relating to FDI) shall be
protected by the host state's domestic law (especially obligations under investment
contracts or state contracts relating to FDI). Only the latter circumstance is within the
scope of this dissertation.
To sum up, protections of and incentives for foreign investments derive
from two (2) sources or levels: international investment treaties or agreements
between a host state and home state (BITs) and an investment contract between a
foreign investor and a host state (defined as a state contract relating to FDI under this
dissertation). Under such circumstances, the host state is bound to abide by both

14

BIT's provisions as well as to those provisions found in any state contract relating to
FDI even when the state contract relating to FDI does not expressly spell out or refer
to protections of and incentives for foreign investments under a BIT in it.
Recently, international negotiations leading to these agreements (BITs)
are growing rapidly in both numbers and forms. There has been an extraordinary
proliferation of BITs. There are currently two thousand and five hundred (2,500)
BITs, compared to about five hundred (500) BITs in 1992. 22 One explanation behind
this phenomenon is that BITs and similar forms of agreements can bring failed issues
(particularly non-WTO issues) deriving from a multilateral negotiation level to
negotiations between a pair of interested countries (for example, FDI, competition
policy, movement of persons, visas and work permits, mutual recognition,
cooperation in specific areas and so on). Second, these agreements also provide the
opportunity for bilateral pairs to customize their agreement to the bilateral propensity
as to how to proceed. 23 Third, it seems that bilateral bargaining, which is free from
the constraints of multilateral rules and which restricts bargaining power (for
example, in the WTO), can offer more opportunities for mutual gain?4
As a result of these characteristics, bilateral treaties or agreements
therefore become more popular, creating a liberal, favourable and competitive
environment for FDI and strengthening cooperation and relations between a host state
and a home state, essentially bringing about greater globally sustainable economic
development.
1.3.

Sustainable Economic Development

Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles ofInternational Investment Law, Oxford, 2008, p. 2.
Also see UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2006) XVII, 26.
23 O. G. Dayaratna Banda & John Whally, National Bureau of Economic Research, Beyond Goods and
Services: Competition Policy, Investment. Mutual Recognition. Movement of Persons and Broader
Cooperation Provisions of Recent FTAs Involving ASEAN Countries 28 (2005).
24 [d.
22
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FDI is also considered the international capital flow that plays a more
significant function in the world economy. FDI not only serves the benefits for a
capital-importing state (a host state), which needs capital flowing into a country, but
FDI also benefits a capital-exporting state (a home state) and its nationals (foreign
investors). For example, FDI can allow levels of domestic investment in a country to
exceed the country's level of saving and also provide a means to invest in a country
where returns arising from FDI are higher than that at home?5
It cannot deny that foreign investors, host states (normally known as

developing countries or the third world countries) and home states (normally known
as developed counties or industrialized countries) have significantly playing roles to
encourage FDI as world capital flows. The achievement of sustainable economic
development is absolutely dependant upon and correlated with the performance and
relations of these actors. Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly, in the
Action Programme of the United Nations Development Decade II, called upon all
actors consisting of developing countries, developed countries and foreign investors
to be aware of how they might work toward building a better and more friendly
environment for investments:
Developing countries will adopt appropriate measures for
inviting, stimulating and making effective use of foreign private
capital, taking into account the areas in which such capital should be
sought and bearing in mind the importance for its attraction of
conditions conducive to sustained investment. Developed countries,
on their part, will consider adopting further measures to encourage
the flow of private capital to developing countries. Foreign private
investment in developing countries should be undertaken in a manner
consistent with the development objectives and priorities established
in their national plans. Foreign private investors in developing
countries should endeavour to provide for an increase in the local
share in management and administration, employment and training of
local labour including personnel at the managerial and technical
Robert E. Lipsey, National Bureau of Economic Research, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment
Capital Flows 13 (1999).
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levels, participation of local capital and reinvestment of profits.
Efforts will be made to foster better understanding of the rights and
obligations of both host and capital-exporting countries, as well as of
individual investors. 26

In addition to the Action Programme of the United Nations
Development Decade II pointing out the important roles of these actors, the United
Nations General Assembly also issued a series of instruments balancing the interests
of these actors.

Obviously, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, among

other things, was of significance in that the permanent sovereignty over natural
resources embodied and symbolized the conflict of economic interests between
capital-exporting nations and capital-importing nations.27

Therefore, the United

Nations General Assembly has highlighted the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence as fundamentals elements of states' rights into
the following instruments. 28

1.3.1. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII):
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
Resolution 1803 laid down the principles of permanent sovereignty of
each state over its natural wealth and resources and affirmed the principles by which
each state is self-determined by its people. Having said that, the right of peoples and
nation to permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources must be
exercised in the interest of its national development and for the well-being of the
peoples of a state concerned. The Resolution also suggested that the exploration,

26 The Guidelines for International Investment were adopted unanimously by the Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce at its 120th Session on 29 November 1972.
27 Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, DECONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT 22 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1 53.
See also Franz Xavier Perrez, The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and the Obligation
Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 Envt'l. L. 1187, 1190 (1996) (citing Milan
Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law: Progressive Development of the Principles of
International Law Relating to the New International Economic Order 269 (2d ed. 1993)).
28 G.A. Res. 29/3281, U.N. Doc. AlRES129/3281 (Dec. 12,1974).
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development and disposition of such resources as well as the foreign capital required
for these purposes should be in conformity with the rules and conditions that the
people and nation freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the
authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities.
Furthermore, foreign investment agreements (including BITs) as freely
entered into by or between sovereign states shall be observed in good faith; states and
international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of
peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations 29 and the principles set forth in the present Resolution. 3D
The violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural
wealth and resources shall be deemed contrary to the spirit and principles of the
Charter and hinders the development of international co-operation and the
maintenance ofpeace. 31

1.3.2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI):
Declaration on the Establishment of A New International Economic Order
("NIEO") and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI):
Programme of Action on the Establishment of A New International Economic
Order ("NIEO")
The NIEO was set forth in a Resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly, with its philosophy that the world was a "global village" (i.e., one national
society).32 The NIEO proposed a charter of economic rights and duties of states and a
programme of action on the establishment of a new international economic order
("NIEO"). Its goals went beyond merely alleviating poverty in an attempt to change
Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24,
1945 in accordance with Article 110.
30 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).
31 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 30, para 7.
32 Gabe S. Varges, The New International Economic Order Legal Debate, 1 (1983).
29
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the material relations of production in order to better the lot of persons in the third
world. 33 Among the demands were: increased exports from the third to the first
world, transfers of capital to the third world, transfers of technology to the third
world, a regime to control multinational corporations, as well as provisions for
increasing aid and to alter the international monetary system?4 Therefore, to establish
a NIEO, the sovereign equality of states, self-determination of all peoples,
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territorial integrity and non-interference in the
internal affairs of other states must be taken into consideration.
1.3.3. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281: the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX): the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States35 constitutes an effective instrument
towards the establishment of a new system of international economic relations based
on equity, sovereign equality and interdependence of the interests of developed and
developing countries, known as a New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). The
principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of states,
sovereign equality of all states, equal rights and self-determination of peoples are the
fundamentals of international economic relations. 36 This Resolution emphasizes that
each state, either a developed state or developing state that has been recognized as
having full and permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural resources and
economic activities, is able and free to choose its economic system and political,

33
34

!d. at 13.
I d. at 15-16.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) was adopted by the General Assembly at
its twenty-ninth session on December 12,1974.
36 G.A. Res. 29/3281, supra note 28, chapter I.
35
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social and cultural systems as well as to exercise its inalienable rights over its natural
resources in accordance with the will of its people. 37
Subject to the Resolution 3281 (XXIX), on the one hand, a developing
state as a capital-importing state is encouraged to exercise its sovereign and
inalienable rights to regulate and supervise foreign investment within its territory in
conformity with its people's interest as well as its national treatments and restrictions.
According to the Resolution, capital-importing states also can exercise of their rights
to nationalize, expropriate, transfer ownership of foreign property or take foreign
enterprises with appropriate compensation38 so long as such exercise of full and
permanent sovereignty of each state correspond with the self-determination of its
people. 39
On the other hand, a home state is also expected to cooperate with a
host state in the establishment, strengthening and development of its scientific and
technological infrastructures and its scientific research and technological activities to
help expand and transform the economies of a developing country. 40
The Resolution further states and emphasizes that the maintenance of
international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations,
and the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems in
the economic and social fields are issues that highlight the vital importance of the
Charter.
To sum up, the foregoing section demonstrates how FDI has begun to
play significant roles in promoting capital flowing from home states to host states as
well as global capital flows. Protection of foreign direct investments has gradually

G.A.
G.A.
39 G.A.
40 G.A.

37
38

Res.
Res.
Res.
Res.

29/3281,
29/3281,
29/3281,
29/3281,

supra note 28,
supra note 28,
supra note 28,
supra note 28,

art.
art.
art.
art.

1 and art. 2 para 1.
2 para 2.
7.
13 para 3.
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developed from the principle of state responsibility in those days to the emergence of
FCN treaties in the eighteenth century, and to the development of current BITs. With
this regard, the United Nations also emphasized how developing countries, developed
countries, and foreign investors can contribute to international capital flow to enhance
sustainable economic development. At the very least, the United Nations General
Assembly has issued the following Resolutions: the United Nations Assembly
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; the United
Nations Assembly Resolution 3201 and 3202 on Declaration on the Establishment of
A New International Economic Order and its Programme of Action; and the United
Nations Assembly Resolution 3281 on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States
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2.

Thailand's State Contracts
Before examining the significant characteristics of Thailand's state

contract, it is crucial to note that a state contract also is founded upon and originates
from ordinary private contract principles. Consequently, even if a state contract has
special characteristics, the principles of general contract law (such as contract
elements, contract formation, and so on) still apply.
Broadly defined, a contract is an agreement between parties whereby
one acquires the right to an act from the other, and the other assumes an obligation to
perform an act. 41 A contract normally comprises every description of agreements,
obligations, or legal ties, whereby one party binds himself or herself, or becomes
bound, expressly or implicitly, to pay a sum of money, or perform or omit to do a
certain act.

42

Contract elements include the offer and acceptance, consideration, and

mutual assent to terms essential to the formation of a contract. 43

Overall, the

definition of a "contract" embodies all of the essential elements of a legal contract,
enumerated as being: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a valid subject matter, (3) a
legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation. 44
In addition to contract elements, the doctrines of freedom and privity
of contract are of particular importance. The doctrine of "freedom of contract4S "
recognizes that people have the right to bind themselves legally-a judicial concept
that a contract is based on mutual agreement and free choice, and thus should not be
hampered by external control such as governmental interference.

Meanwhile, the

Minn.-Petition of Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
Iowa-Compiano v. Kuntz, 226 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa 1975).
43 Ala.-Ex parte Grant, 711 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 1997), reh'g overruled, (Feb. 20, 1998).
44 U.S.-Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110, 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2640, 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13036
(2d Cir. 1968); Joseph v. Donover Co., 261 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1958); Ram Products Co., Inc. v.
Chauncey, 967 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Ind. 1997). Ariz.-Savoca Masonry Co., Inc. v. Homes & Son
Const. Co., Inc., 112 Ariz. 392, 542 P.2d 817 (1975).
45 Black's Law Dictionary 664 (8th ed. 2004). Also see, C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 491 and Atiyah,
An Introduction to the Law of Contracts, p. 5 (3d ed. 1981).
41

42
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doctrine of "privity of contract,,,46 as an elementary principle of English law, provides
that contractual rights and duties only affect and bind on the parties in the contract (in
other words, not to non-contractual parties). As a result, a person cannot acquire
rights or be subject to liabilities arising under a contract to which he is not a party,
subject to certain exceptions. Such special features make the law of contract differ
from the law of property insofar as while true proprietary rights are "binding on the
world," contractual rights are only binding on, and enforceable by, the immediate
parties to the contract.
2.1.

Use of Term "State Contract"
Under Thai laws, there is no express and written definition of the term

"state contract." However, by its usage and characteristics, the term "state contract"
can be understood as a contract in which a government (or a government agency
acting on behalf of the State or exercising the State's power as the one party) enters
into an agreement or transacts with the other party. The other party can be any private
party, other agency, international organization or other state. So despite the fact that
there is no written or expressed definition, a state contract, even within the parameters
of the implicit definition, must be composed of these three (3) elements. 47 First, one
party of a contract must always be the State acting through its government agencies or
persons acting on behalf of the State. Government agencies can be one of the main
Government Agencies, (consisting of the Legislative Branch, Executive Branch, and
Judicial

Branch),

Local

Authorities

(Local

Independent Organizations, or State Enterprises.

Administrative

Organizations),

The detailed structure and

organization of the Thai Government and its agencies will be explained in the

Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (8th ed. 2004). Also see, Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of
Contract, p. 265 (3d ed. 1981) and G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, p. 538 (8th ed. 1991).
47 Nuntawat Boramanunt, Administrative Contract 105 (2003).
46
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forthcoming section. Second, individual Government Agencies must have authority
as designated by law to enter into a contract or transact with the other party. This is to
say that a contract type and transaction to be entered by those Government Agencies
must be within the scope, objectives, and mandates of their establishment.

48

Third, a

person acting on behalf of each Government Agency must be authorized or delegated
to exercise power by the law or laws establishing such a Government Agency.
A state contract is sometimes recognized as a government contract.
This dissertation, however, uses the term "state contract," instead of "government
contract" since the term of a "state contract" can provide broader scope insofar as a
state contract is a contract where any person or Government Agency acting on behalf
of the State enters into a contract with the other party. A person or Government
Agency can be any delegate from any type and level of Government Agencies: main
Government Agencies (consisting of the Legislative Branch, Executive Branch, and
Judicial

Branch),

Local

Authorities

(Local

Administrative

Independent Organizations, or State Enterprises.

Organizations),

On the contrary, the term

"government contract" is typically more narrowly defined in that it more commonly
refers to a contract where the Government as the Executive Branch enters into with
any person, other state or international organization. A government contract is likely
to represent transactions between parties at the international level such as a G to G
agreement (Government to Government agreement).

Therefore, this dissertation

prefers the term "state contract" rather than "government contract" to refer to a
contract in which one party is the State or involves exercising the power of the State.
By this definition, the meaning of a state contract seems very broad,
thereby nearly covering all types of contracts in which one party is the State. The
To find out the precise scope and objectives of individual Government Agencies, it is necessary to
look at the Restructuring of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2545 (2002)(Thail.) and Royal Decree
of individual divisions.
48
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types of state contracts can range from a simple transaction with a private party (for
example, a sale and purchase contract) to a complex transaction at international level
with other states or international organizations (for example, international agreements,
treaties, and conventions).
This dissertation, however, is particularly focused on those state
contracts involving the exercise of state's power as opposed to those state contracts
that are deemed to be private contracts and excludes contracts entered into with other
states internationally.

2.2.

Features of a State Contract
Even though the characteristics of a state contract are different from

those of an ordinary contract among private parties, the basic legal elements of a state
contract are, however, derived from contract law principles as intended to govern
transactions and contracts between private parties. Nonetheless, it is to be borne in
mind that not all principles of contract law apply to a state contract. The involvement
of a Government Agency acting on behalf of the State makes a state contract special
and distinctive from other contracts among private parties. It is also important that
even if the agreement between the State and a private party based upon the doctrine of
freedom of contract, this does not mean that the State resigns or gives up its sovereign
power by entering into a contract with a private party.49 On the other hand, the State
still has and reserves dominant power over private parties. Particularly for public
policy, the State always has full power to unilaterally amend or terminate contract
provisions whether or not these rights are spelled out in a contract. To put it in
another way, the State can declare public policy, interest, or convenience as grounds
not to abide by the contract so long as the State's contractual breach is implemented
49 Hector A. Mairal, Government Contracts under Argentine Law: A Comparative Law Overview, 26
FDMILJ 1716 1720 (2003). Also see, lD.B. Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities: A
Comparative Study (1954).
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to serve such public policy, interest, or convenience. In all circumstances, the State
always has superior rights over private parties. The following demonstrates certain
special features of a state contract (although not what would apply to a government
procurement contract):50

2.2.1. Public Policy
A state contract to certain degree always relates to public policy. At
the very least, the execution of a state contract is normally paid off by the national
budget, which arises from taxpayers.
As a result, contracts, which are contrary to public policy, are those
tending to be injurious to the public or against the public good, and as a result, they
are illegal, void, and unenforceable, whether or not actual injury results occur. 51 Even
by such a definition, determination of whether a contract is contrary to public policy
is not as easy as it appears. The term of "public policy" is vague and unclear in
practice. However, it is generally accepted that what constitutes a tendency to be
"injurious to the public" or "against the public good" can either be designated by the
policy of the law or public policy in relation to the administration of the law.

52

As a

consequence, a contract, which is derived from the doctrine of freedom of contract
that the parties enter into and which is contrary to public policy, shall be, in certain
special circumstance, overruled by the public policy principle.
Therefore, the Court must take all the facts and circumstances of each
case into careful consideration. To invalidate a contract between parties, the Court
must be aware not to infringe the rights of the parties of a contract, which is not

Certain types of state contracts under Thai law can be construed as administrative contracts under
French law.
5! Paul M. Coltonff, Sonja Larsen & Carmela Pellegrino, Contracts, 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 215.
52 Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 51 S. Ct. 476, 75 L. Ed. 1112, 83
A.L.R.1168(1931).
50

26

clearly opposed or contrary to public policy in particular. 53 Generally, a contract as
expressly prohibited by statute, condemned by judicial decision, opposed to public
morals, or having a tendency to injure the public or public interest constitutes grounds
to declare such a contract contrary to public policy. 54
In consequence, a state contract containing a provision, which is likely
to be harmful or contrary to public policy, will allow the State (or contracting
government agency) to violate its contractual obligations. Such a breach of contract is
legitimately justified but the State or a contracting government agency is often
obliged to compensate a private party for any damages or loss of such.

2.2.2

Amendment, Revision, and Termination of Contract

Clauses
As a general rule under contract law, a contract's terms and conditions
(including those of a state contract) are binding on the parties and the parties are
required to perform their contractual obligations under it. Despite, the contract law
principle does not prevent the State from exercising its dominant power according to
administrative law over the private party to unilaterally amend, revise, or terminate
contract clauses provided that the State may be liable for damages incurred to the
private party as a result of the State's act. To put it another way, the mere action of
entering into a contract with the private party does not infer that the State resigns or
gives up its sovereign power over private parties. In fact, this principle is derived
from the French administrative law.
Based upon the French administrative law, any contract falling into the
definition of an "administrative contract" shall not be interpreted as an ordinary

Ohio-Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183,34 Ohio Op. 73, 70 N.E.2d 447,169 A.L.R.
133 (1946).
54 U.S.-Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353,51 S. Ct. 476, 75 L. Ed. 1112,
83 A.L.R. 1168 (1931).
53
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contract and accordingly subject to the Administrative CourtS. 55 The determining
criteria of what constitutes an administrative contract is: 56 first, a contract that has
been expressly characterized as an administrative contract by statute; second, a
contract that can illustrate the presence or involvement of the public service or the
performance of public service; and third, a contract that either:
(i) includes clauses showing that the State or its government agency
wishes to exercise public law prerogatives with respect to the contractor (the
"exorbitant clauses");
(ii) is subject to a special legal regime that grants the State certain
regulatory or control powers (the "exorbitant regime"); or
(iii) entrusts a private contractor the performance of public service or is
intricately linked with the performance of public service so that such a contract is to
form the characteristics of the performance of public service, or constitute the
contractor's involvement in the performance of public service. 57
As a result, a state contract, which falls into the category of an
administrative contract, shall be interpreted by way of administrative law, thereby
giving the State privileges or superior rights over the private party in that the State
may violate its contractual obligations with the private party if it is necessary
according to the administrative law.

2.2.3. Breach of Contract by the State and State Responsibility
for Denial of Justice Rule
Whereas the foregoing sections in 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. demonstrate the
special characteristics of a state contract in the sense that the State has absolute
superior right over the private party in respect of breach of contract or amendment,
Maira1, supra note 49 at 1720.
[d. at 1723.
57 [d. at 1723.
55

56
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revision, termination of contract clauses so long as the State can raise the public
policy principle, this section, on the other hand, demonstrates that the State (the host
state) also has superior right over foreign investors in some exceptional cases.
Under the traditional rule of international law, the mere state's breach
of contract with a foreign investor is not automatically deemed as international wrong,
thereby not bringing about the state to be liable for any compensation to a foreign
investor. Only a breach of the state's contractual obligations together with additional
allowable grounds can raise the principle of state responsibility.
One of the common grounds that can make the state liable to a foreign
investor under international law is "denial of justice." Denial of justice occurs in the
context where a capital-exporting state (a home state) disputes with a capitalimporting state (a host state) on a minimum standard of treatment of foreign investors
and their property. The classic conception of the inability or unwillingness of courts
to adequately remedy an antecedent wrong that occurred outside the judiciary
constitutes a denial of justice. 58 For example, denial of justice can be raised against
the offending state where a court refuses a foreign claimant -

a procedural right-

including acts such as denial, unwarranted delay, obstruction of access to the court,
deficiency in the administration of justice, failure to provide guarantees of proper
administration of justice. 59

Consequently, denial of justice is likely a matter of

procedure: a failure to provide a national legal system with due process rather than
substantive law.
Additional justifiable grounds that can ralse the principle of state
responsibility under international law are, for example, the state's unfair manner or
58 Bradford K. Gathright, A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION: THE LOEWEN FINALITY
REOUIREMENT AND THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE IN NAFT A CHAPTER ELEVEN, 54
Emory L.J. 1093, 1110. See also Clyde Eagleton, Denial of Justice in International Law, 22 Am. J.
Int'l L. 538, 542 (1928).
59 !d.
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treatment to an investor, an allegation of discrimination, abus de droit, any other
international tort of the traditional type, or denial of justice. 60 Furthermore, breach of
the state's contractual obligations, where no reparation is made for the injuries
sustained after the remedies established by the laws of the country have been
exhausted constitutes a ground for denial of justice, and as a result, can raise the
principle of state responsibility. 61 Therefore, the state's contractual breach, which
imposes the state to be liable to a foreign investor must comprise additional
consideration of those elements, thereby constituting a ground of denial of justice by
the host state.
2.2.4. Cancellation of Contract by the Host State
Like the foregoing section in 2.2.3., this is to demonstrate the superior
right of the state (the host state) over foreign investors.

As to the contract law

principle, a contract as entered into between the state and a private foreign investor is
obviously binding on the parties according to the pacta sunt servanda principle,
thereby imposing the state to perform its contractual obligations therefrom.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that while the state is obliged to perform its
contractual obligations according to the pacta sunt servanda principle, the state also
has full and permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources in the
interest of its national development and of the well-being of the people of the state.
As a consequence, the commitment arising out of a contract should not prevent the
state from exercising its sovereign right to cancel a contract with a foreign investor.
Where cancellation of contract by the host state is to happen, like the
breach of contract principle, cancellation of contract by the host state also lies on and
60 F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. Int'l L. 572, 577 (1960); see also
CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL lAW, 194
(P.E. Corbett trans., 1957); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
547-51 (3ed. 1979).
61 K. Lipstein, The Place of the Calvo Cluase in International Law, 1945 BRIT.Y.B. Int'l L. 130,134.
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derives from the same principle of state responsibility as mentioned above in 2.2.3.
The mere cancellation of contract by the host state cannot bring about the state
responsibility principle unless the said cancellation of contract encompasses
additional circumstances of justifiable grounds as mentioned earlier. To substantiate
an international claim, it is necessary to prove that the respondent government has
committed a wrong through its duly authorized agents or that the claimant has
suffered a denial of justice in attempting to secure redress. 62 The failure of the host
state to fulfil a contractual obligation towards an alien does not automatically result in
a breach of international law unless such a failure is confiscatory or discriminatory in
nature. 63
Furthermore, in a case where cancellation of contract by the host state
constitutes, amounts to, or is tantamount to expropriation, such action of expropriation
(cancellation of contract) must comply with the conditions under customary
international law, namely for public purpose, as provided by law, in a nondiscriminatory treatment and with compensation as to be explained in the topic below.

2.2.5. Nationalization, Expropriation, Indirect Expropriation, and
. E xpropna
. t'Ion64
C reepmg
The terms "nationalization," "expropriation," "indirect expropriation,"
or "creeping expropriation" are unclear and indistinguishable under international law.
Generally, these terms are implicitly understood as governmental actions of taking of
foreign investments or property.

Of course, these terms are of great concern for

foreign investors so that every BIT often contains a clause assuring that investments
62

3 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1558 (1943).
Lipstein, supra note 61.
64 Expropriation is seen as a method in which the state takes over property belonging to individuals for
public interest of local necessity while nationalization is a special form of acquisition of private
property (whether it is national or foreign property) by means of compulsory transfer of the private
property to the state. The term of "expropriation" can, in some cases, be used as a substitute for
nationalization
63
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made by nationals of one state (a home state) in the other state (a host state) will be
protected as far as nationalization and expropriation are concerned. Due to the fact
that it is unlikely to draw the distinction of these terms, these terms, especially
"nationalization" and "expropriation" can, in some cases, be used in substitution for
each other in practice. Before exploring the implication of these terms, it is inevitably
to describe the following terms: nationalization; expropriation; indirect expropriation;
and creeping expropriation.
When looking at the history of nationalization during decolonization
period, nationalization referred to a situation in which a state embarked on a
wholesale taking of property of foreigners to end their economic domination of the
economy or sectors of the economy.65 However, nationalization in the present times
is seen very similar to expropriation and they are often used interchangeably. The
term "nationalization" is defined as the act of bringing an industry under
governmental control or ownership,66 whereas Kaj Hober views that nationalization as
the systematic expropriation of private property within one or more specific sectors of
a nation's economy within the framework of socio-economic or political reform. 67
Nationalization is likely based on the alteration of social-economic structure. Once
the nationalization of assets or businesses takes place, the state usually continues the
carrying out of business or the utilization of such assets as it has been previously used.
The nationalizing state will utilize the opportunities arising from the nationalized
assets or businesses created by the former owner.

Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 346.
Black's Law Dictionary (8 th ed. 2004). Also see C.J.S. International Law § 35.
67 Kaj Hober, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: RECENT CASES ON
EXPROPRIATION 14 AMRIARB 377 at 381.

65
66
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Expropriation is defined as a governmental taking or modification of
an individual's property rights,68 which normally gives to the person affected by the
expropriation a claim to full compensation. Expropriation not only means a direct and
formal taking of private property by a government but also includes some indirect
measures, whereby a state deprives an individual or enterprise of the enjoyment of
their property. The distinction between nationalization and expropriation could be
made in a context where nationalization leads to the wholesale of taking of foreign
property while expropriation targets a specific business belonging to foreigners. 69
Indirect expropriation tentatively introduces any measure that leads to
the deprivation by state organs of a right of property either as such, or by permanent
transfer of the power of management and control over it. 70 Consequently, indirect
expropriation can be found in various forms and measures, especially those measures,
which per se are legitimate but their cumulative effect can de facto give rise to an
expropriatory

nature

and

accordingly

those

measures

are

tantamount

to

expropriation. 7 ! Apparently, governmental actions, where the actual seizures of the
invested property by a host state totally and permanently deprive the fundamental
rights of ownership in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, is
considered as measures amounting to expropriation. 72 That also includes a dramatic
change of legislation that has the effect of depriving an investor of his investment,
even in the absence of an express governmental guarantee against such a change?3
Indirect expropriation can be exemplified in the following measures: restriction of
physical access to production facilities; labour legislation setting wages at a
Black's Law Dictionary (8 th ed. 2004).
69 Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 349.
70 Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 532 (4th ed. 1992).
71 Hober, supra note 67 at 382.
72 Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4.
73 Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Republic of Moldova, UNCITRAL (AWARD ON
JURISDICTION).
68
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prohibitively high level; denial of entrance of essential spare parts or machinery, tax
measure, or of visa for key foreign employees. 74
Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation, and may
accordingly constitute measures tantamount to expropriation. 75 By their very nature,
tax or regulatory measures, which are indirect but have the effect of an expropriation
over a period of time, could be characterized as creeping expropriation and may be
tantamount to expropriation. 76 Notwithstanding, it is still difficult to clarify measures
amounting to creeping expropriation in practice.

At the very least, creeping

expropriation, however, must proceed on the basis that the investment existed at a
particular point in time and that subsequent acts attributable to the state could erode
the investor's rights to its investment to an extent that is in violation of the relevant
international standard of protection against expropriation. 77
Despite the meaning of these terms, nationalization or expropriation,
which can be used in substitution of one another, on foreign property has long been
recognized and justified under customary international law. The existing customary
international law provides that the justification of expropriation must comply with the
following requirements; namely, taking of foreign investment for public purpose, as
provided by law, in a non-discriminatory treatment, and with compensation. 78

The Explanatory Note to the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens provides certain measures of indirect expropriation. Also see Louis B.
Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of
Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 549 (1961).
75 Marvin Feldman v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/l (AWARD).
The
Tribunal notes that the S.D. Myers tribunal (citing Pope & Talbot) effectively concluded that the words
»tantamount to expropriation« were designed to embrace the concept of »creeping« expropriation
rather than to »expand the internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation.« See S.D. Myers v.
Government o/Canada, Partial Award, November 13,2000, para. 286,
http://www .state. gov/ documents/ organizationl3 992. pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
76 [d.
77 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award (September 16,2003), para.
20.26, quotation in the Counter-Memorial, para. 911.
78 OECD, Working Papers on International Investment Number 2004/4, Indirect Expropriation and the
Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, (September, 2004), available at
http:www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup07/basicmats/oecd_report.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
74
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First, taking of foreign investment must be undertaken for public
purpose that is to seek the motive or purpose behind the taking.

Comparatively,

nationalization is more likely taken in pursuance of economic-socio reform; namely
for the purpose of reshaping and restructuring economic climate as happened in Latin
American countries during the post-colonial period. Nationalization took place in
Latin American countries in order to take control, take over wealth and natural
resources that had previously been in the procession of colonizing states and eliminate
the dominance and influence of powerful states over their resources. However, it is to
admit that the requirement of public purpose is a contentious one because the test of
public purpose is likely based on the subjectivity of each state. The Court therefore
has hesitation to review the legislature'S judgement by a state as to what is in the
public interest unless the judgement is manifestly without reasonable foundation. 79
At the very least, the surrendered property must be transferred to the state, or its
agencies, not a private person.

Second, the expropriation must be proceeded as

provided by law. Third, the expropriation must be based upon a non-discriminatory
treatment. Finally, the expropriating state is required to pay compensation to foreign
investors.
Interestingly, this justification also corresponds with the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 on permanent sovereignty over natural
resources providing that "nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be
based on grounds of pubic utility, security or the national interest with appropriate
com pensati on. ,,80
Given the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803, it can
be said that a host state is legitimately allowed to expropriate or nationalize foreign

79
80

James v. United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123.
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 30, para 8.
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property under customary international law provided that a host state complies with
those requirements. Specifically, a host state is required to pay compensation to a
foreign investor.
To sum up, a state contract (except for a government procurement
contract) has special characteristics different from ordinary private contracts in that a
state contract can demonstrate a threshold of public policy, thereby linking a state
contract to the exercising of the state's power. The state also has privileges over a
private party to unilaterally alter or terminate a contract's clauses provided that the
state may be liable for any damage or loss to a private party. Furthermore, a simple
breach of contract by the host state does not necessarily justify an international claim
against the host state unless such breach of contract amounts to denial of justice,
whereby the host state fails to provide a private party to access local remedy system.
Finally, the host state is allowed under customary international law to expropriate or
nationalize alien property, provided that a host state is required to compensate a
private party for such expropriation or nationalization.

2.3.

The Administrative Structure of the Government Organizations of

Thailand81
Under the Thai Constitutional law, the Kingdom of Thailand is known
as a "constitutional monarchy," whereby the King has full and absolute power
through the "Legislative Branch," known as the "Parliament," the "Executive
Branch," known as the "Royal Thai Government" and the "Judicial Branch," known
as the "Judiciary."s2 In addition to these three (3) branches, there are also two (2)
groups of Government Agencies: the "Independent Organizations," (one of which is
the OAG); and "State Enterprises."

81

82

Restructuring of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.).
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007).
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As far as the Executive Branch is concerned, it is divided into three (3)
levels: the "Central Administration" level; the "Regional Administration" level; and
the "Local Administration"

level (known as Local Authorities or Local

Administrative Organisations). Whereas the former two levels are seen as part of
bureaucratic administration system, consisting of twenty (20) ministries,

83

the latter is

a decentralized administration system. The Chart of the Administrative Structure of
the Government Organizations of Thailand is demonstrated in Appendix 1 of the
Appendices.
The administration below the Central Administration Level is divided
into two (2) levels: the Regional Administration Level; and the Local Administration
Level.

While the Regional Administration Level is part of the Bureaucratic

Administration System, the Local Administration Level is totally a separate and
autonomous administration, known as the Decentralized Administration System. Of
course, these two (2) systems work in conjunction with each other and the
geographical area of these administration systems are overlapping.
Within the Regional Administration System, there is a branch office
called "Changwat" that supervises the administration throughout a province.

In

Thailand, there are seventy-six (76) provinces (including Bangkok). In each province
there are a group of sub-divisions, called Amphoe, which consists of a number of
Tambol (a group of villages which are known as Moobarn).
As part of the Decentralized Administration System, the Local
Authorities (Local Administrative Organisations) are divided into two (2) forms:
Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Tourism and Sports, Ministry of Social Development and Human Stabilization, Ministry of
Agriculture and Co-operatives, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment, Ministry of Technology, Information and Communications, Ministry of Energy, Ministry
of Commerce, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Culture,
Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of
Industry.
83

37

general forms and special forms. As to general forms, there is a two-tier level. The
first one is called the "Provincial Administrative Organization," responsible for the
geographical area of the entire province. In Thailand, there are seventy six (76)
provinces (including Bangkok) but there are only seventy five (75) Provincial
Administrative Organizations because the province of Bangkok is governed in a
special form within the decentralized administration system; called the "Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration" or BMA. The second level of a two-tier decentralized
administration consists of the Municipal Organizations covering urban areas within a
province and Tambol Administrative Organizations covering rural areas within a
province.

The geographical areas of Municipal Organizations and the Tambol

Administrative Organizations collectively overlap the geographical areas of individual
Provincial Administrative Organizations. The Chart of the Administrative Structure
of the Government Organizations Within A Province appears in Appendix 2 of the
Appendices. In addition to these general forms, in Thailand, there are another two
(2) special forms: the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration or BMA that oversees
the entire geographical area of Bangkok province, and the Pattaya Administration that
is geographically a part of Chonburi Province and Provincial Administrative
Organization of Chonburi. A Summary of the Provincial Administration Structure in
Thailand appears in Appendix 3 of the Appendices.
Therefore, a contract entered into by these Government Agencies is
considered a state contract within the scope of this dissertation. The execution of a
state contract by the State or these Government Agencies is deemed to be an action of
the State. Therefore, to make a state contract legally binding, it must be the case that
each Government Agency acts in a legal capacity (i.e., there is a juristic person who
has legal status under national law). Furthermore, a Government Agency must have
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an authority granted by law in order to enter into a contract relating to its functions
and authority. Finally, a contract concerned must be within the scope, mandates, and
objectives of such Government Agency.
To seek the scope, mandates, and objectives of individual Government
Agencies, the authority, mandates, and objectives of a Government Agency at the
ministry level are stipulated in the Restructuring of Government Organization Act,
B.E. 2545 (2002). In a case where a Government Agency is operating in the
department level, the State's authority, mandates, and objectives will be stipulated by
the royal decree under the particular division of such Government Agency.

For

example, the OAG's mandates, objectives, and authority are stipulated in the Royal
Decree on Division of the Office of the Attorney General, B.E. 2540 (1997). For
Local Authorities (Local Administrative Organizations), State Enterprises and
Independent Organizations, their authority, mandates, and objectives will be
stipulated in their establishment laws.
2.4.

Types of State Contracts
In Thailand, a state contract is, in some cases, known as a government

contract. As mentioned earlier, a state contract is defined as a contract where the
State or its Government Agency as the one party, enters into with the other party,
which commonly belongs to the private sector regardless of the kind of contract
transaction. State contracts in the Thai legal system can be divided into five (5) types:
a government procurement contract, an administrative contract, a concession contract,
a state-joint venture contract, and other. Categories of State Contracts in Thailand are
illustrated in Appendix 4 of the Appendices.
2.4.1. Government Procurement Contracts
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A government procurement contract is a contract where a Government
Agency enters with the other party (most commonly within the private sector) in order
to acquire supplies and services with funds from national budget, loans, or grants.
Actually, a government procurement contract is simply considered a private contract
because the contract has no involvement in the exercising of the State's power. In
addition, it also does not carry the special characteristics of a state contract or being
involved in public service or utility. Therefore, a government procurement contract is
excluded from the meaning and scope of the term "state contract," which is the focus
of this dissertation. Basically, a government procurement contract is governed by
general rules of law, for example, the Civil and Commercial Code ("CCC"). From a
legal perspective, a government procurement contract is not different from other
private contracts, and is thereby treated in the courts as a contract among private
parties.
For all main Government Agencies (the Parliament, Government and
Judiciary) and some Independent Organizations, a government procurement contract
shall be governed by the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on
Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992) or known as the 1992 Regulation. 84 As a result, Local
Authorities (Local Administrative Organizations) and State Enterprises are
theoretically excluded from the 1992 Regulation's application.
Local Authorities (Local Administrative Organizations) and State
Enterprises have their own regulations on procurement, but they often adopt the 1992
Regulation'S model in practice.

Currently, the Local Authorities (Local

Administrative Organizations) have their own regulation on procurement: the
84 Clause 5 of the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992)
(Thai!.) provides that
"procurement" means self-production, purchase, employment, employment of consultants,
employment for design and supervision of work, exchange, lease, disposal and other steps specified in
the Regulation.
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Regulation of the Ministry of Interior on Procurement of Local Administrative
Organizations, B.E. 2535 (1992).
Under 1992 Regulation, government procurement contracts can be
categorized into the following five (5) groups:
(1)

acquisition of supplies, services and construction;

(2)

advisory services;

(3)

design and supervision of work;

(4)

exchange of supplies; and

(5)

leasing.

As far as a government procurement contract is concerned, when a
dispute from this contract arises, a case shall be brought to the Court of Justice, not
the Administrative Court. Only if a government procurement contract carries some
special characteristics of granting superior rights or privileges to the State or its
Government Agency, would the government procurement contract be subsequently
transformed from a private contract to an administrative contract, in which case, the
dispute would fall under the Administrative Court's jurisdiction. A procurement
contract, which confers upon the State exclusive and unilateral rights to alter terms
and conditions of a contract or to terminate a contract, is the only type of state
contract that will be the scope of this dissertation.
2.4.2. Administrative Contracts85

An administrative contract is a contract where the State or its
Government Agency86 as the one party enters into a contract with a private party. The
terms of the transactions in these types of contracts commonly relate to concessions,
85 Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999)
(Thail).
86 This includes all main Government Agencies (the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, the
Judicial Branch), Local Administrative Organizations, Independent Organizations and State
Enterprises.
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the provision of public service or utility, or the exploitation of natural resources.
Because of the nature of these transactions, such a contract inevitably involves in
"public interest," or public policy. As a consequence, the legal theory that has been
recently adopted from the French administrative law by the Thai Administrative Court
will apply.
The theory of public interest or public policy applies to a case where
the State or its Government Agency desires to assign a private sector to perform its
functions relating to the provision of public service or utility on its behalf by means of
an administrative contract. The theory of public interest consists of the following
principles: equality, continuity, and adaptation. As to the principle of equality, the
State must provide public service or utility for its people so that its people can use
such public service or utility equally. As to the principle of continuity, the public
service or utility must be provided and operated continually because the discontinuity
may cause trouble or inconvenience to its people or nationals. Therefore, a competent
Government Agency must supervise the performance of the private sector to ensure
that the provision of public service or utility or service assigned to the private party is
operated continually. As to the principle of adaptation, due to the fact that the State
(through its Government Agency) has its obligations to provide what its people need,
when the people's needs relating to the public service or utility have changed, the
State has to adjust its service in such a way that responds to its people's needs.
Under the Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative
Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999), administrative contracts 87 can be categorized
as follows:

87 The first three types of administrative contracts are defined and categorized by the Establishment of
Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) (Thai!.) whereas the
last two types are defined and categorized by Administrative Court's precedent. See Resolution of the
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(1)

a concession contract;

(2)

a contract relating to the provision of public service or utility;

(3)

a contract relating to the exploitation of natural resources;

(4)

a contract assigning a private sector to undertake or jointly

undertake the provision of public service or utility provided by State;88 and
(5)

a contract containing terms and conditions that confer

privileges or superior rights to the State. 89
Therefore, a dispute arising from these types of administrative
contracts will fall into the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, not the Court of
Justice.
2.4.3. Concession Contracts
A concession contract is a contract where the State, through a
Government Agency, authorizes or assigns a private party to provide public service or
utility on its behalf within a period of time in exchange for the private party's own
risk and expenses. By doing so, a private party will be eligible to collect charges from
users (known as users' charges) for its consideration.9o As mentioned earlier, the
State has its obligations to provide public service or utility for its people. Once a
private party is authorized to provide such public service or utility, the private party is
bound to perform obligations by himself. The obligations under a concession contract
are non-transferable unless it is approved by the State or its Government Agency.
During the contract term, the State has its authority to supervise the performance of
the public service or utility in order to ensure that the service operates continually.

General Meeting of the High Administrative Court No. 612544 (200n (Thai!.) dated October 10,2544
(2001).
88 Order of the High Administrative Court No. 2512545 (2002) (Thai!.).
89 Order of the High Administrative Court No. 10412544 (2001) (Thai!.), No. 12712544 (2001) (Thai!.).
90 Prayoon Kanchanadul, Administrative Law, 146 (1980).
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Generally, conceSSIOn contracts can be divided into two (2) types:
concession contracts according to the National Executive Council Announcement No.
58; and concession contracts according to specific statutory acts. Under the National
Executive Council Announcement No. 58, concession contracts normally relate to the
provision of public service or utility covering the following activities: trains, trams,
canal construction, airways, water system, irrigation system, electricity, pipe gasoline,
and sea shipping.

The criteria and requirements to obtain concessions under the

National Executive Council Announcement No. 58 have been subsequently explained
in Chapter 2.

For concession contracts according to specific statutory acts,

concessions relating to mining, forestry and birds' nests (harvesting of birds' nests)
91
·
are 0 f Importance.

According to the Establishment of Administrative Court and
Administrative Court Procedure, B.B. 2542 (1999), a concession contract is also
defined as an administrative contract, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Court. Therefore, the theory of public interest or public policy will
apply to a concession contract. Accordingly, the State has exclusive rights to alter
terms and conditions of a contract as well as to terminate a contract unilaterally but
the State also has an obligation to pay compensation to a private party.

2.4.4. State-Joint Venture Contracts92
A state-j oint venture contract is recognized and categorized as a
contract type according to the Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E.
2535 (1992). A state contract as defined and categorized as a state-joint venture
contract must be composed of the following elements:

Mine Act, B.E. 2510 (1967) (Thai!.), Petroleum Act, B.E. 2514 (1971) (Thai!.), Forestry Act, B.E.
2484 (1941) (Thai!.) and Bird's Nest Act, B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thai!.).
92 Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai!.).
91
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(1)

a contract

IS

entered into between a Government Agency

(including Local Authorities and State Enterprises) as the one party and a private
sector as the other party;
(2)

the characteristics of a contract transaction must involve in

state undertakings authorized by law, the exploitation of natural resources, or the
utilization of any asset or property of the State or its Government Agency;
(3)

the project concerned having its value in either forms of an

investment fund, asset, or property is worth at least one (1) billion Baht
(approximately equivalent to US$ twenty eight and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57)
million) or more; and
(4)

the private participation in state undertakings must be in a form

of either a state-joint venture with a private sector, or a private investment with an
approval, concession, or any exclusive right granted by a Government Agency.
Basically, a state-joint venture contract is governed by the Private
Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992). However, if a state-joint
venture contract can be simultaneously defined as an administrative contract under
Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E.
2542 (1999), such a state-joint venture contract will be also subject to the
Administrative Court's jurisdiction under the Establishment of Administrative Court
and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999); otherwise, it shall be within
the Court of Justice's jurisdiction.
2.4.5. Other

A state contract that does not fall into government procurement
contracts, administrative contracts, concession contracts or state-joint venture
contracts is governed by the relevant general laws such as the CCc. A contract as
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defined and categorized as the "Other" will not be, therefore, governed by those
particular statutes.
Upon such categories, it is noted that these five (5) types of state
contracts are divided and categorized by existing statutory acts establishing them.
Therefore, it may appear that a particular state contract that falls into one type of state
contract categories can also fall into another type of categories and thus there will be a
possibility that one state contract may be governed by several statutory acts.
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3.

Foreign Direct Investments in Thailand
3.1.

Agreements on Promotions and Protections of Investments in

Thailand
During the period when Thailand encountered the colonial domination
of Western powers, the relationship on commerce and investment between Thailand
(known as Siam at that time) and other states had been initiated since the Ayudhaya
era. The first Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was concluded between Siam and
Portugal in 1516. 93 Under its provisions, the Government of Portugal agreed to
supply Ayudhya with cannons and ammunition in exchange for allowing Siam to be
the residence of Portuguese nationals, and extending to these nationals the right to
engage in trade at Ayudhya, Ligor, Pattani, Tenasserim and Mergui as well as a royal
permission for Portuguese subjects to practice their Christian faith. 94 Later, the first
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty (an FCN treaty as a precursor of the
present BIT) between Great Britain and Thailand was negotiated and concluded in
1855, known as the Bowring Treaty named after Sir John Bowring, a British
ambassador to the Siamese Court in Bangkok. 95
Currently, Thailand has entered into several forms of agreements, such
as BITS, free trade agreement ("FTA") with many countries.

In October 2002,

Thailand signed a Bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement ("TIF A") to
initiate FTA negotiations with the United States. 96

The last round of TIFA's

negotiation took place in Chiangmai, Thailand in January 2006. Apart from TIF A,

Sompong Sucharitkul, Asian Perspectives of the Evolution of International Law: Thailand's
Experience at the Threshold of the Third Millennium, 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 527.

93
94

I d.

95Id.
96 In October 2003, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced the
intention to begin bilateral free trade agreement ("FTA") negotiations. The first round of FTA
negotiations were held between June 28, 2004 and July 2, 2004 in Hawaii. The second round was
scheduled in October 2004. The negotiation process was estimated to last approximately two (2) years.
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Thailand also signed bilateral trade and investment agreement with Bahrain, Australia
and India. 97 In order to establish a bilateral free trade agreement ("TIF A") with
Japan, Thailand also signed An Agreement of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership
with Japan to work out a framework ofFTA between these two countries.
As of August 15, 2008, Thailand has entered into forty two (42)
agreements on the promotions and protections of investments with other countries as
appeared in Appendix 5. 98 Terms and conditions found in those agreements on
promotions and protections on investments generally cover fair and equitable
treatment, national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment ("MFN"), reciprocal
treatment, definition and scope of investment, compensation for losses, expropriation
and nationalization, transfer, subrogation, and dispute settlement mechanism. The
existence of BITs and free trade agreements mentioned above can well demonstrate
and reaffirm that Thailand has enthusiastically participated in and contributed to the
sustainable economic development by promoting the flow of trading goods and
services as well as FDI globally.
3.2.

Investments and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis99
After the rapid economic growth and industrialization between mid-

1980s and 1995 led by a private sector, Thailand suddenly faced an abrupt end to the
economic growth in mid-1997, which subsequently developed and contributed to the
Asian economic crisis in 1997 and, in many ways, affected the world economy.

97 Thailand signed FTA with Bahrain on December 29, 2002, covering goods and services, Thailand
signed FTA with Australia on July 5, 2003, extending FTA with broader coverage beyond goods and
service trade, and Thailand signed FTA with India on October 9, 2003, creating free trade area between
India and Thailand.
98 The Netherlands, United Kingdom, China, ASEAN, Republic of Korea, Laos, Hungary, Vietnam,
Peru, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Finland, Cambodia, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Canada, Indonesia, Switzerland, Argentina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Slovenia, Sweden, Zimbabwe, India,
North Korea, Bahrain, Belgo-Luxemburg, Germany, Bangladesh, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Tajikistan,
Hong Kong SAR, and Jordan (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand on September 27,2005).
99 Business Handbook for Royal Thai Embassies and Consulates-General 2000, Thailand's Road to
Recovery (Thai!.), available at http://www.mfa.go.th/webI139.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
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Interestingly, one of the causes of the cnSIS was the exceSSIve
investment in high-risk sectors and poorly managed and unchecked capital in-flows.
It appeared that both Thai and foreign investors held high levels of investment in

high-risk and highly volatile property and real estate projects, thereby resulting in the
oversupply in the property and real estate sector as well as speculative purchases of
land, office buildings, and condominiums.

As a result, the phenomena of the

"bubble" gradually emerged in that assets in property and real estate were sold at
over-priced value. Finally, the bubble began to burst in 1997. In addition to the burst
of the bubble economy, the sharp drop of stock market, default loans and devaluation
of Thai currency all contributed to the economic crisis in Thailand and Asia.
Therefore, to regain macroeconomic stability and foreign investors'
confidence, the Government of Thailand decided to enter into an agreement for a US$
seventeen point two (17.2) billion assistance package with the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") on August 20, 1997.

The reform package also contained a

comprehensive rehabilitation plan encompassing five (5) main areas: financial sector
reform; monetary and fiscal policies; bureaucratic reform and privitization; industrial
and agriculture restructuring; and social and environmental agendas with the
assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank
("ADB"). Additionally, infrastructure investment projects were proposed in order to
attract private investment and FDI in a country. To achieve economic growth and
stability,

Thailand

has

built

a

friendly

environment

to

gam

foreign

investors'confidence and to attract FDI through a variety of means for example, tax
privileges, deregulation of domestic laws and so on.
3.3.

Importance of Foreign Direct Investments in Thailand
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Given the Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers delivered by
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to the National Assembly on December 30, 2008,
the Government has set up the national strategies in respect to investment into two (2)
levels: the internal affairs level and international level.
With the internal affairs level, the government policy is aimed to
develop a medium-term and long-term public sector investment that makes clear the
source of financing, types of investment, and support for an increased private sector
role as appropriate; develop tools and mechanisms for efficient capital mobilization
for large-scale projects, taking into consideration fiscal discipline and the burden on
the public budget lOO and to strengthen the capital market and system of financial
institutions to cope with global financial volatility and provide stable support for
investment and business by amending rules and regulations and putting in place a
regulatory system in line with financial innovataions; and encourage long-terms
savings as a basis for the country's future capital mobilization. 101
With the international level, the Government led by Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva is aimed to strengthen cooperation and strategic partnership with
countries that play important roles in global affairs as well as Thailand's trading
partners in other regions to maintain and expand cooperation in the areas of politics,
security, economics, trade, finance, investment and tourism, while searching for new
markets to promote cooperation on resources, raw materials, science and technology
and new knowledge. 102

100 Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Prime Minister of Thailand, the Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers
to the National Assembly (Dec. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.thailandoutlook.comINRIrdonlyres/B61 C5456-0AFA-4CDD- A63E8EC9174A1742/0/policy eng. pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
101/d.

102/d.
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Based upon the government policy, Thailand has issued a package of
incentives and privileges to attract foreign investors to invest their capital into
Thailand by focusing on:
The country's well-defined investment policies focus
Foreign
on liberalization and encourage free trade.
investments, especially those that contribute to the
development of skills, technology and innovation are actively
promoted by the government. Thailand consistently ranks
among the most attractive investment locations in
international surveys, and a 2006 World Bank report
indicated that Thailand was the 4th easiest country in Asia to
do business, and the 20th easiest in the world. 103
The government has placed emphasized on attracting
investment in six (6) key sectors that have been determined as
key to the country's developmental objectives. These (6) six
target industries include: agriculture and agro-industry,
alternative energy, automotive, electronics and JeT, fashion,
and value-added services including entertainment,
healthcare and tourism. 104

These excerpts illustrate that the Thai government has a strong belief
in and commitment to promote FDI in Thailand. By making it as part of the national
policy and assigning the Board of Investment ("BOI") to implement this task,
Thailand has created a friendly environment for foreign investors with a series of
incentive packages to develop good infrastructure, low-cost labor, tax privileges and
deregulation of immigration law, labor law and so on. Thailand not only considers
FDI a simple means to encourage capital flowing into a country but Thailand also sees
FDI creating new jobs as well as serving other social purposes like personnel
development, technology transfer, research and technology development. Therefore,
foreign investments, especially those that contribute to the development of skills,
technology and innovation are actively promoted and welcome by the Thai
government.
103 Board ofInvestment of Thailand, FDI Policies,
http://www.boi.go.th/english/whY/thailand advantages. asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
104 Id.
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In addition to the development of skills, technology and innovation,
liberalization, and free trade also are a crucial part of the national policy.
Consequently, any investment or FDI that can accommodate those international
obligations is all the most welcome in Thailand.
Currently, the Government has extended areas to attract investments in
six (6) key sectors. These six (6) target industries include: agriculture and agroindustry; alternative energy; automotive; electronics and ICT; fashion; and valueadded services including entertainment, healthcare and tourism. lOS
Given these incentive packages offered by the Government, Thailand
has been ranked among the most attractive investment locations in international
surveys. The 2006 World Bank report ranked Thailand the fourth in Asia and the
twentieth country in the world where capital could be most easily invested. l06
According to the Embassy of the United States of America

III

Bangkok, Thailand, the Thai government has long maintained an open, marketoriented economy and encouraged FDI as a means of promoting economic
development, employment and technology transfer. Thailand welcomes investment
from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on anyone country as a source of
investment. 107 By attracting FDI, Thailand launched many measures for economic
growth such as the Land Code that allows non-Thais to hold property ownership in
Thailand and the Alien Business Law that opens additional business sectors to foreign
investors.
It can be said that Thailand has long promoted FDI inflow into the

country and the BOI has been the main authority to perfonn the function in promoting

Id.
!d.
107 U.S. Commercial Service, The Embassy of the United States of America, Bangkok, Thailand,
Country Commercial Guide (Mid-FY 2004).
105

106
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and maximizing the benefits of investment in Thailand. Nonetheless, it is believed
that not only the BOI has mandates in promoting FDI inflows, but other related
Government Agencies can also contribute to the greater inflows of FDI towards
territory.
The OAG, which has the authority to scrutinize state contracts for the
Thai government and Government Agencies, is also aware of this policy. The OAG
not only has responsibility to scrutinize and check whether a contract concerned is
legally binding or whether there is any term and condition disadvantageous or
prejudicial to the State's benefits or public interest but the OAG also has the
responsibility of ensuring that a contract serves its objectives of promoting FDI in
Thailand in a way that corresponds to the government policy. Emphatically, a state
contract relating to an investment project is no less important than the investment
project itself. Therefore, when scrutinizing a state contract relating to investment or
FDI, the OAG must assure that a draft contract is fully legal binding and that there are
no terms and conditions disadvantageous to the country's benefit. The OAG is also
responsible for making sure that the contract concerned must serve foreign investors'
interest and facilitate them in running their operation and business in Thailand
sucessfully and smoothly. This dissertation will discuss as to how the

~AG's

roles

can help enhance FDI flows into a country in the forthcoming chapters.
3.4.

Private Foreign Investments in Thailand

Generally speaking, there are two (2) channels that private foreign
investors can invest their capital in Thailand. First, they can invest their capital in a
state project due to the invitation made by the Thai government. By this channel,
foreign investors and the Thai government (through its Agency) will negotiate and
conclude terms and conditions of the prospective transaction in respect to a particular
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state project. At the end, the selected foreign investor shall enter into an investment
contract with the State (through its Agency) and as a result, such a contract shall be
defined as a state contract insofar as it relates to FDI. The investment contract can,
for example, be found in forms of a concession contract, a management contract, a
turnkey construction contract, a state-joint venture contract, etc. Such a state contract
relating to investment or FDI is seen as a means of pursuing government policy. Most
foreign investment projects are tentatively ad hoc projects that the Government
solicits foreign investors to invest their capital in particular state projects.
As an alternative, foreign investors invest their capital in businesses in
which they are interested but not in state projects. By this channel, they can either put
their investment in a country with or without incentives provided by the Government.
If they decide to run a business without the Government's incentives, they are simply
required to comply with relevant domestic law.

However, if they would like to

receive certain privileges from the Government for their business, they need to
contact the Board of Investment ("BOI") as to how they can obtain such privileges
and incentives offered by the Government, or the Industrial Estate Authority of
Thailand ("lEAT") as to how they can utilize industrial estate facility with minimal
rent as provided by !EAT.

However, to enjoy those privileges and incentives,

prospective foreign investors are required to meet all conditions set forth by the BOI
and IEAT.
3.3.1. BOI108
the BOI, an official authortiy to promote investments in Thailand,
offers foreign investors as one-stop service for investors who desire to receive
incentives offered by the Government through the BOI, including services regarding

108

Board ofInvestment of Thailand, supra note 97
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visas and work permits. The BOI has its mandates to help investors in three (3) ways:
to reduce the risks associated with investments, to reduce initial investment cost and
to improve the overall rate of return on investments, and to provide support service.
Furthermore, the BOI is considered a central agency working with other Government
Agencies like the IEAT, the Department of Export Promotion, or the Customs
Department to facilitate and assist foreign investors to set up and operate their
businesses in Thailand smothly and confidently.
Through the BOI, the Government offers a range of tax incentives,
support services, and concessions on duty for a list of businesses that are regarded as
priority or promoted activities. Recently, there are no foreign equity restrictions in
the manufacturing sector, no local content requirements, and no export requirements,
as Thailand's investment regime is in total compliance with the WTO Regulations.
Nevertheless, the investment ventures that can enjoy privileges and
incentives provided by the Government through the BOI must be approved by the
BOI as entry requirements.
3.3.2. IEAT

109

The lEAT is one of the state enterprises under the supervision of the
Ministry of Industry. The Government uses the IEAT to develop and set up industrial
estates in various regions, apart from Bangkok and central areas systematically and
orderly.
The lEAT has its mandates to develop and set up its own industrial
estate for plant sites and factories, and to provide infrastructure and necessary facility
for industries (for example, roads, electricity, water system, drainage system, and so
on) as well as to promote and support other private industrial estates run by the
109 Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, http://www.ieat.go.thiindex thtest.php?lang=th (last visited
Apr. 21,2009).
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private sector. In addition to the provision of an infrastructure and necessary facility,
the IEAT also facilitates and provides other services for manufacturer-investors, such
as commercial banks, post offices, shopping malls, sport clubs and golf courses,
resident areas, gas stations, etc.

The investment venture receiving the BOI's

incentives is also eligible to apply for additional privileges as provided by the IEAT
provided that it has its business in an approved industrial estate. At the very least, the
rents and fees chargeable by the IEAT are considered a minimal cost.
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4.

Involvement of the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") in the Review

of State Contracts llO
4.1.

History and Principal Mandates of the OAG

The OAG was originally established on April 1, 1916 and named the
Public Prosecution Department under the Ministry of Justice. The Public Prosecution
Department was subsequently transferred to be part of the Ministry of Interior in 1922
but the Public Prosecutor Department was separated from the Ministry of Interior and
became an independent agency in 1991.

Since then, the Public Prosecution

Department has been renamed and existed as the Office of the Attorney General until
now. III
The OAG is the principal and independent agency responsible for
handling criminal prosecution, providing legal advice to the Thai government and
Government Agencies, representing Government Agencies in the matter of civil
litigation in court, and conducting international cooperation in criminal matters. It is
also entrusted with the duty to protect civil rights and to provide legal aid to the
needy. The purpose of its independent status is to ensure justice and prevent political
influence from interfering with prosecutorial functions. The OAG has set its vision
on becoming an intelligent and innovative criminal justice agency that represents the
State and the people fairly and equally. I 12
Overall, the authority, mandates, and functions of the OAG or
Director-General (including public prosecutors) can be divided into five (5)
categories: 113 criminal justice administration; safeguarding of national interests; civil

A government contract can be, in some cases used in a substitute of a state contract and vice versa.
Office of the Attorney Genera!, http://www.ago.go.th/aboutago/history.htm!(last visited Apr.
21,2009).
112 I d.
113 Public Prosecutors Act, B.E. 2498 (1955) (Thai!.) § 11.
110
111
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rights protection and legal aid prOVISiOn; international cooperation m crimimal
matters; and research and legal development.
One of the

~AG's

main mandates regarding the criminal justice

administration is to jointly conduct the investigation with the help of a psychologist,
social worker, or council as requested by young offenders in juvenile cases.

The

OAG is also required to jointly conduct investigation with officials of the Department
of Special Investigation ("DSI") in certain special cases like organized crime or crime
relating to influential people.

In addition, the

~AG's

responsibilities include

reviewing the investigation files as provided by inquiry officials, prosecuting an
accused, and proceeding criminal trial, and proceedings in a criminal court.
Second, the OAG is aware of the importance for safeguarding of the
national interest. By doing so, the OAG is required to provide legal advice to the Thai
government and its Government Agencies, to review draft contracts for Government
Agencies transacting with private parties, and to represent government authorities and
Agencies in both civil and crimimallitigation.
Third, with regard to the protection of civil rights of nationals, the
OAG represents and helps any person who is seeking a court order or permission to
endorse or grant his/her legal rights. For example, the OAG helps an heir to manage
and transfer the property of his ancestor who passes away or helps any person who
cannot afford to pay court fees such as in the case of child adoption.
Fourth, the OAG also plays a significant role m international
cooperation in criminal matters, extradition, and mutual legal assistance.

For

extradition in particular, the OAG is required to seek a court order for extraditing a
person to the requesting state as well as to make a request to foreign countries to
extradite any person or fugitive to Thailand.
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As of January 2005, Thailand has

entered into extradition treaties with ten (10) countries: namely, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Republic of Korea, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Regarding the provision of mutual legal
assistance, the International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act, B.E. 2535 (1992)
requires the OAG to provide certain types of assistance to other countries such as
locating persons, searching and seizing objects or documents, taking witness
statement, or confiscating assets situated in Thailand.
Finally, the Ministerial Regulation for Organization of the Office of
the Attorney General B.E. 2546 (2003) assigns the OAG to conduct legal research and
development. It also includes the task to propose new statutory acts and regulations
as well as to modernize outdated laws and regulations to ensure that Thailand stays
abreast to capture new legal issues that arises in the globally changing world.
Nevertheless, apart from these five (5) missions, the Prime Minister of
the Kingdom of Thailand also has power to assign the OAG or any public prosecutor
to perform any other functions as he considers appropriate. 114
4.2.

Historical Background of the OAG's Involvement in the Review of

State Contracts
Since the establishment of the OAG, there had been no express
statutory provisions granting an authority to the OAG to perform the function of
perusing a state contract.

The involvement of the OAG in this task had been,

however, authorized by the Executive Government in a form of a "Cabinet
Resolution."
Before B.E. 2491 (1948), the OAG was hardly involved in the process
of scrutinizing a state contract.

114/d.

During those periods, a contracting government

§ 17.
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agency would assign its lawyer, known as a state attorney who acted as an in-house
legal adviser, to revise a draft contract before a contracting government agency would
enter into a contract concerned. Under such a practice, it appeared that in many cases,
terms and conditions concluded in a contract concerned were prejudicial and
disadvantageous to a country or public interest and sometimes a contract was not fully
legal binding. Therefore, in 1948 (B.E. 2491), the Council of Ministers issued a
Resolution, known as the Cabinet Resolution dated March 31, B.E. 2491 (1948)
regarding a contract-making process, which provided that in a case where a
contracting government agency was to execute a contract or an agreement with a
private sector or a corporation and the competent Minister was of the opinion that
such a contract was very significant to a country or involved in mega projects, such
contracting government agency shall submit a draft contract to the OAG for the
scrutiny prior to entering into the contract. 115 However, this Resolution was not an
absolute imposition. On the contrary, it was left open to the Minister's discretion to
consider whether or not a contract needed to be submitted to the OAG for scrutiny. It
was also noted that State Enterprises were not, however, included in this Resolution.
The reason of the

~AG's

involvement in the scrutiny of a state

contract was that the Government needed the OAG to examine and check whether
terms and conditions of a contract concerned were legally binding or disadvantageous
to the national interest or public interest. More importantly, for a contract involving
public service or utility in particular, the OAG was required to take the theory of
public interest into consideration by weighing the benefits between public interest and
the private sector. Since then, the OAG has begun to play its roles in scrutinizing a
state contracts.
Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers, Urgent No. Nor. Ror. 33/2491 (Apr. 1,
1948) (Thail).

115
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At present, in addition to the prosecution authority, the OAG has been
officially authorized by law to give legal advice to the Government and all
Government Agencies on administration and domestic legal issues and that also
includes the responsibility of scrutinizing state contracts to be entered into by the
Government and all Government Agencies. 116

Such authority is stipulated in Section

46 (9) of the Restructuring of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) and
Section 4 of the Royal Decree on Division of the Office of the Attorney General, B.E.
2540 (1997), providing that:
The Office of the Attorney General has its authority and
mandates in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases,
carrying of civil litigation, and giving legal advice to the Government
and any Government Agency and also has authority as stipulated by
law.

4.3.

Channels of State Contracts to Be Reviewed by the OAG
Under the existing law, the OAG has authority and power to scrutinize

state contracts through the following three (3) channels.

4.3.1. A Review of State Contracts in Accordance with a Cabinet
Resolution
When the Thai government became aware that certain state contracts
were invalid and others contained terms and conditions disadvantageous to public
interest or policy (contracts that had been handed out by Government Agencies
without the scrutiny of the OAG), the Government issued the Cabinet Resolution
dated March 31, B.B. 2491 (1948) to lay down the rules regarding a contract-making
process applicable for Government Agencies.

116 Royal Decree on Division of the Office of the Attorney General, B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thai!.) issued by
provisions of the Administration of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2534 (1991) (Thai!.).
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The most updated Resolution regarding a contract-making process is
the Cabinet Resolution dated September 1, B.E. 2535 (1992).117

The Resolution

provides that in a case of main Government Agencies, all state contracts shall be
submitted to the OAG for scrutiny before signing a contract. In the case of State
Enterprises, only contracts falling into the following categories shall be required for
the scrutiny by the OAG:
(1)

a contract is to be entered into with a natural person, a juristic

person or an institution in which a nature of a contract concerned is not within a scope
of normal activities of such State Enterprise and in which it will be executed abroad;
or
(2)

a contract may lead to legal difficulty, disadvantages or non-

(3)

a contract is to be executed for specific purposes which do not

binding; or

constitute qualifying usual expenditure within a scope of normal activities of such
state enterprise.
Any decision about a contract that is outside these parameters falls
upon the Minister's discretion.

However, both Government Agencies and State

Enterprises are exempted to comply with these requirements if a contract type of a
contract concerned has already been in the consideration and the scrutiny of the OAG,
or in which the terms and conditions of the contract concerned are not substantially
material to a contract concept and disadvantageous to the benefits of such
Government Agency or State Enterprise. In addition, in a case of a contract to be
executed abroad, if a contract concerned has already been in the consideration and the

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 02051 Wor. 138 (Sept. 9,
1992) (Thai!.).

117
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scrutiny of legal expertise abroad, such a contract is not required for the scrutiny by
the OAG once again.

4.3.2. A Review of State Contracts in Accordance with the
Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. (Buddhist
Era) 2535 (1992)
Basically, this Regulation is only imposed on mam Government
Agencies, consisting of the Legislative Branch, Executive Branch (only Central
Administration and Regional Administration), Judicial Branch and some Independent
Organizations. Both Local Administrative Organizations and State Enterprises are
excluded. Moreover, this Regulation is only applicable to a government procurement
contract covering (1) acquisition of supplies, services and construction; (2) advisory
services; (3) design and supervision of work; (4) exchange of supplies; and (5)
leasing. Therefore, any state contract outside these categories is not governed by this
Regulation but it shall be governed by any other relevant statutory acts.
In addition to the 1992 Regulation's provisions,118 the Procurement
Committee 1l9 also provides a sample contract attached to the 1992 Regulation. If a
draft contract concerned contains terms and condition in accordance with the 1992
Regulation's sample contract, or a draft contract contains terms and conditions
different from those of a sample contract but they do not differ in material substance
and those terms are not disadvantageous to the national interest, such Government

Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai\,) clause
132.
119 The Procurement Committee consists of (1) Director-General of the Ministry of Finance (2)
Director-General of the Department of the Comptroller General (3) Authorized Representative of the
Ministry of Defence (4) Authorized Representative of the Office of the Audit General (5) Authorized
Representative of the Office of the Attorney General (6) Authorized Representative of the Budget
Bureau (7) Authorized Representative of the Office of the Council of State (8) Authorized
Representative of the Office of Prevention and Suppression on National Corruption (9) Authorized
Representative of the Office of the Prime Minister (10) Authorized Representative of the Office of
Fiscal Policy (11) Authorized Representative of the Office of Industrial Product Standardization (12)
not more than five (5) qualified persons as appointed by the Prime Minister.
118
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Agency is allowed to enter into a contract without submitting a contract concerned to
the OAG for scrutiny.
Furthermore, where it is impractical to conclude a contract concerned
as prescribed in the 1992 Regulation's sample contract, such a draft contract shall be
submitted to the OAG for scrutiny unless a draft contract, which is similar to the
original contract, has been previously reviewed by OAG.

For a lease contract

requiring additional payments other than rent or in a case where a head of a
Government Agency is of the opinion that a draft contract may give rise to an issue of
disadvantages to the national interest or contain invalid terms and conditions, such
contract must be submitted to the OAG for scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is noted that in
any circumstance, the Procurement Committee has its vast authority and discretion to
give an approval to any Government Agency an exemption from the rules stipulated
by this Regulation.
Subject to the 1992 Regulation, only main Government Agencies are
made to comply with this Regulation so Local Administrative Organizations and State
Enterprises are excluded. While the Local Administrative Organizations are required
to comply with rules as stipulated by the Regulation of the Ministry of Interior on
Procurement of Local Administrative Organizations Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), State
Enterprises are imposed to comply with their own regulations on procurement. In
practice, it appears that the Regulation of the Ministry of Interior on Procurement of
Local Administrative Organizations Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) and State Enterprises'
regulation on procurement adopt the 1992 Regulation as their own rules. Therefore,
when scrutinizing a draft contract of State Enterprises, the OAG must be aware that
laws concerning the establishment of those State Enterprises as well as their
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regulations on procurement are taken into an account for the OAG must assure that a
contract transaction is within their scope and authority of those State Enterprises.
4.3.3. A Review of State Contracts in Accordance with the Private
Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992)
Generally, this Act is imposed on all Government Agencies (including
Local Administrative Organizations and State Enterprises) and is only applicable to a
state-joint venture contract (a state contract falls within the definition of a "state-joint
venture contract," thereby being governed by this Act). The reason why this type of a
contract is to be governed with special implication is that a state-joint venture contract
has particular characteristics. A state-joint venture contract normally allows private
investors to take part in public activities provided by Government Agencies.
Moreover, such state-joint venture projects are, normally, worth millions and millions
of dollars. Therefore, a contract falling into the definition of a state-joint venture
contract must be submitted to the OAG for scrutiny and the OAG must assure that
such a state-join venture contract will be specifically treated, implemented and
administrated as provided by this Act.
Basically, a state contract falling into the definition of a state-joint
venture contract is required by this Act to be submitted to the OAG for a review
provided that a state-joint venture contract meets the following conditions. First, a
contract must be entered into between a Government Agency (including Local
Administrative Organizations and State Enterprises) as the one party and a member of
the private sector as the other party. Second, a contract's transaction must involve in
the state undertakings authorized by law, the exploitation of natural resources, or the
utilization of any asset or property of Government Agencies.

Third, the contract

project is worth at least one (1) billion Baht (approximately US$ twenty eight and
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fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million) or more in either form of an investment fund,
asset, or property. Fourth, the private participation in state undertakings must be done
in a form of either a state-joint venture with a private sector or a private investment

with an approval, concession, or any exclusive right granted by Government
Agencies.
Given such a definition, a state-joint venture contract could be
simultaneously defined as a concession contract and an administrative contract under
the Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure Act,
B.E. 2542 (1999), thereby being governed by the Administrative Court Act when
disputes arising out of those state-joint venture contracts occur.

The Table of

Legislation Regarding the Execution of State Contracts Applicable to Government
Agencies appears in Appendix 6 of the Appendices.
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Chapter 2 Practice and Process of Reviewing Draft State Contracts
The OAG reviews a draft contract through a series of procedures.
These procedures embody the ethics of the OAG's professional philosophy. As a
result, all public prosecutors are bound by these procedures because non-compliance
may be damaging to the State or it may otherwise entail serious unforeseen or
foreseeable adverse consequences. Therefore, the OAG is required to review a draft
contract consonant with these four (4) key rules: (1) the most updated laws,
regulations, Cabinet Resolutions, and international law and practice; (2) for benefits
of the State; (3) for public interest or policy; and (4) the OAG's internal practice.
As to the first rule, the OAG must ensure that a contract's terms and
conditions are subject to and consistent with the most updated relevant laws,
regulations, Cabinet Resolutions, and orders in order to ensure the complete legality
of a contract. Therefore, it is very likely in practice that a particular contract may be
governed by a set of relevant statutory acts, regulations, Cabinet Resolutions, or
orders.

It is the duty of the OAG to thoroughly look through all relevant laws,

regulations, Cabinet Resolutions and orders as well as international law and practice
when reviewing a state contract.
As a second rule, a state contract, especially a state contract involving
in the exercising of the State's power, must be executed for the State's benefit.
Regarding this rule, the OAG lays down a guideline of reservations on certain issues
in particular so that all responsible public prosecutors must be aware and take them
into consideration when reviewing a draft contract.

The following issues are

reservations made by the OAG: definite and inclusive contract pricing; fair and
reasonable purchased price; shipment by Thai Vessels' policy; terms of payment;
performance guarantee bond, etc. Terms and conditions that differ from the OAG's
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reservations require the responsible public prosecutor to provide his/ her supervisor
with a written explanatory memorandum.
As a third rule, the state contract granting private parties to provide
public service or utility must be executed to serve public policy or interest. Therefore,
the OAG is inevitably required to apply the theory of public interest to any contract
concerned.

As a result, terms and conditions of a state contract involving the

provision of public service or utility must reflect and correspond to public policy (for
example, a concession contract or construction contract). Especially when coming
across a state contract granting a private party exclusive rights to operate the project's
property, the OAG is likely to advise that a contract should apply the BTO ("BuildTransfer-Operate") term to ensures that when the project's facility has been
completely built, the ownership of the facility will be transferred to the State so that
the project's facility will not be able to be seized by a contractor's creditors.
However, it is noted that the application of these terms of BTO ("Build-TransferOperate") or BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer") is variable depending on the nature of a
contract transaction between the parties. The details of this rule will be discussed
later.
As to the fourth rule, the OAG also issues internal practice as a
guideline that responsible public prosecutors must follow from the beginning to the
end of the process. The details of these rules will be also addressed in forthcoming
section of this Chapter.
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1.

Relevant Laws, Regulations, Cabinet Resolutions and International Law

and Practice

When reviewing a state contract, the OAG has an obligation to ensure
that contract drafting remains consistent with the most updated laws, regulations,
Cabinet Resolutions, and international law and practice. This section addresses the
most important of these laws, regulations, resolutions, and practices.
1.1.

Relevant Laws

Basically, the OAG must examine two (2) main types of laws: general
laws and specific laws. As to general laws, when reviewing a draft contract, the OAG
needs to examine basic rules and principles of general laws, especially the Civil and
Commercial Code ("CCC") that provides basic legal principles of contract law, sales
law, corporate and commercial law, and so on. For example, for contract elements, it
is inconceivable to disregard basic principles of contract law, such as the freedom of
contract 120 or the privity of contract. 121 These are the foundations of contract law
from which parties cannot depart.
Under Thai law, it is advised that the basic principles provided by the
CCC are essential. For elements of a state contract, the CCC, for example, lays down
the principal rules regarding contract formation, contract interpretation, contract
modification, performance, remedies, assignment of rights, and delegation of duties.
The CCC also provides general rules regarding the capacity of both natural and
juristic persons, property and real property, prescription, obligations, unjust

120 Freedom of contract is considered by the U.S.Constitution as a basic right reserved to the people
(Art. I &10) that a state cannot violate even under sanction of direct legislative act. Springfield Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. V. Holmes, D.C. Mont., 32 F.Supp. 964, 987.
121 Privity refers to a direct relationship between two or more contracting parties. It was traditionally
essential for any action that privity exist between the plaintiff and defendant but the importance of
privity has currently declined drastically. Warranty statutes have largely pre-empted the importance of
privity. Further discussion of privity exceeds this paper's scope.
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enrichment, contract, sales, leasing, guarantee, agency, partnership and corporate, and
other foundational legal subjects.
Apart from these general law principles, the OAG is required to
consider the following specific laws in order to check whether a contract is governed
by any of these statutory acts.

1.1.1. Restructuring of the Government Organisation Act, H.E.
2545 (2002)
The Act was promulgated in 2002 to completely restructure the entire
Government Agencies in Thailand, particularly at the ministerial level. Currently,
there are twenty (20) ministries, including nine (9) Independent Organisations. The
Act also details the scope, authority, and functions of individual ministries. Whereas
competent ministers supervise and administer their respective ministries, seven out of
these Independent Organisations are overseen and governed by the Prime Minister.
The other two Independent Organisations, namely the Office of Money Laundering
Suppression and Prevention, and the OAG, are supervised by the Minister of Justice.
While the Restructuring of Government Organisation Act, B.E. 2545
(2002) establishes the structure of government organisations at the ministerial level,
royal decrees lay down the structure of government divisions within individual
ministries, as well as the respective scope, mandate, and functions of each division.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the royal decree of each division, in addition to
the Restructuring of Government Organisation Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) to determine the
clear and specific mandate, scope, authority and functions of each division.
To state more precisely, this Act performs the vital function of
examining whether a draft contract is within the scope and authority of a particular
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Government Agency. A contract executed outside the scope and authority of its
Government Agency is void, and therefore not legally binding on the parties.
This Act only pertains questions about the authority, mandates and
scope of main Government Agencies (the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch,
the Judicial Branch) and some Independent Organisations (for example, the OAG).
For Local Authorities 122 and State Enterprises, it is advised to check with their
establishment law.
1.1.2. State Enterprises' Establishment Law
Surprisingly, State Enterprises in Thailand can be found in various
forms: State-owned entities, corporations, divisions as partial sections of Government
Agencies, or independent institutions. Regardless of the form, State Enterprises have
historically originated from the State Enterprises Establishment Act, B.E. 2496
(1953), which conferred upon the Government the power to establish any State
Enterprise as responsible for providing public service or utility to its people, or to
carry on certain economic activities. By this means, a Royal Decree establishing such
State Enterprise was issued in accordance with this Act. 123
Currently, State Enterprises can be set up by any of these three
methods: an individual and a separate act, a Royal Decree in accordance with the
State Enterprises Establishment Act, B.B. 2496 (1953), and a corporation in
accordance with the CCc. Moreover, objectives for establishing State Enterprises are
no longer limited to the provision of public service and utility, or economic activities.
State Enterprises can be established to carry on other activities to serve the
government policy. For example, the Sports Authority of Thailand -

one of State

122 Local
Administration Organisations (Provincial Administrative Organisations, Municipal
Organisations, Tambol Administrative Organisations, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and
Pattaya Administration), and State Enterprises are excluded.
123 State Enterprises Establishment Act, B.E. 2496 (1953) (Thai!.).
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Enterprises -is established to promote sports and recreational activities for nationals
and residents in Thailand. Likewise, the Tourism Authority of Thailand functions as
the authority to promote tourism in Thailand.
Determination of the scope and authority of individual State
Enterprises requires the examination of statutory acts in relation to their
establishment. This establishment's legislation can be found in different levels: a
statutory act, a Royal Decrees pursuant to the State Enterprises Establishment Act,
B.E. 2496 (1953), and a memorandum of association under the CCc. These relevant
statutory acts will indicate whether a contract is within the scope and authority of each
State Enterprise as well as whether the proper authorization has been granted to enter
into a contract with the other party.
Determination of scope and authority of a State Enterprise can be
exemplified in the National Lottery Case. In fact, the National Lottery case provides
a sound answer to the question whether a contract entered into with the private party
is within the scope and authority of the National Lottery Office as the contracting
government agency. The National Lottery Office was established by the National
Lottery Office Act, B.E. 2517 (1974) in 1974 with its exclusive mandate to issue the
nationa110ttery. A lottery, as issued by the National Lottery Office, is a gambling
game where players buy numbered tickets at the National Lottery Office. Those
whose numbered tickets match the numbers drawn by the National Lottery Office win
designated prizes.
Later, due to a widespread two and three digit lotto game in the black
market, the Government under the leadership of the Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra was persuaded to lega1ise a two and three digit lotto game adapted from
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the black market. The Government subsequently requested that the National Lottery
Office issued a two and three digit lotto game, trumping the black market.
Due to such a policy, the National Lottery Office issued a two and
three digit lotto game and then entered into the On-Line Lotto Game System
Provision Agreement with Loxley G Tech Technology Co. Ltd. ("Loxley"). Based
upon such an agreement, Loxley was obliged to provide the National Lottery Office
with an online lotto system covering a two and three-digit lotto game, lotto, keno, and
sport betting (soccer). However, in the contract's initial terms, Loxley was required
to serve the National Lottery Office with an online two and three-digit lotto system.
The results of the system were to be directly referable to and dependant upon the
lottery issued by the National Lottery Office. In other words, a two and three digit
lotto game was a game providing a chance that resembled numbers drawn as in a
lottery that matched the numbers on a card. A person who had numbers appearing in
his card matching the numbers drawn as in a lottery would win (earning rewards
provided by the National Lottery Office).
After a military coup in Thailand on September 19, 2006, a new
provisional Government led by the Prime Minister Surayut Chu1anontha announced
that a two and three digit lotto game issued by the National Lottery Office was outside
the scope and objectives of the National Lottery Office's establishment. The National
Lottery Office Act, B.E. 2517 (1974) clearly provides that the National Lottery Office
has authority to issue lottery, print lottery, or do other activities relevant to, or for the
benefit of, the National Lottery Office. The Act does not allow the National Lottery
Office to issue a two and three digit lotto game. Therefore, the National Lottery
Office has no authority to issue a two and three digit lotto game.
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Nevertheless, after balancing the equities of having a two and three
digit lotto game, the new Government agreed to keep this lotto game due to its
popular demand.

However, the game required further legalisation to survive.

Therefore, the National Lottery Office Act, B.E. 2517 (1974) has been subsequently
modified to extend the scope and authority of the National Lottery Office to cover the
issuance of a two and three digit lotto game.
As a consequence, due to the fact that the two and three digit lotto
games by the National Lottery Office was evidently outside the scope and authority of
the National Lottery Office, the Online Lotto Game System Provision Agreement
between the National Lottery Office and Loxley was presumed to be invalid, being
ultra vires and thus outside the National Lottery Office's authority.

Hypothetically, if the Online Lotto System Provision Agreement
between the National Lottery Office and Loxley were to be considered unlawful for
the lack of the National Lottery Office's authority or excess of power, the National
Lottery Office would suffer a huge loss. Eventually, the State would suffer because it
would be required to compensate Loxley for the losses suffered.
1.1.3. National Executive Council Announcement No. 58
The National Executive Council Announcement No. 58 was published
on January 26, 2515 (1972) to regulate certain State activities in relation to the
provision of public service or utility, particularly for any service or utility in respect
of trains, trams, canal construction, airways, water system, irrigation system,
electricity, pipe gasoline and sea shipping. 124

Subject to the National Executive

Council Announcement No. 58, the private sector is not allowed to operate or provide
any public service or utility unless approved by a competent Minister.

124

National Executive Council Announcement No. 58 B.E. 2515 (1972) (Thai\,) clause 3.
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Whereas the Minister of Transportation has the power to approve or
grant a concession to a private party to operate trains and airways, the Minister of
Agriculture and Co-operatives has the authority to approve or grant a concession over
activities regarding canal construction and irrigation systems to a private party.
Activities involving the use of trams, water system, and pipe gasoline are within the
authority and discretion of the Minister of the Interior.
A private party, who is interested in operating these activities under the
the National Executive Council Announcement No. 58, is required to seek prior
approval from their respective Minister through a concession contract but the National
Executive Council Announcement No. 58 failed to provide practical guidance,
requirements, or conditions as to how a private party could obtain such a concession.
The National Executive Council Announcement No. 58 gave the particular Minister
the freedom to devise criteria for granting of an appropriate concession to a private
party. There were, in other words, no standard rules and criteria to which both the
competent authority and a private party were obliged to conform. The rules and
criteria set up by the respective Minister were seen very subjective and discretionary.
The Minister who happened to be in charge at the time could operate such an
agreement with any set of rules of standards.
The absence of standard rules and criteria in the the National Executive
Council Announcement No. 58 raised questions of transparency, good governance,
and corruption. As a result, the Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E.
2535 (1992) was enacted to address these problems. Nevertheless, even with the
promulgation of the 1992 Act, it is noted that the 1992 Act did not truly replace the
National Executive Council Announcement No. 58. On the contrary, provisions of
the National Executive Council Announcement No. 58 still remain effective. Having
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said that, activities listed in the National Executive Council Announcement No. 58
with their value less than one (1) billion Baht (approximately equivalent to US$
twenty eight and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million) are still governed by the
National Executive Council Announcement No. 58.

On the other hand, a project

having its value up to one (1) billion Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ twenty
eight and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million) or more shall be governed by the
1992 Act. Therefore, the OAG is mandated to ascertain whether a contract regarding
a particular area of activities would still be governed by the National Executive
Council Announcement No. 58 or the Private Participation in State Undertakings Act,
B.B. 2535 (1992).

1.1.4. Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535
(1992)
The Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992)
was adopted to stop irregular, unfair, uncertain, and ambiguous rules and processes
arising from the National Executive Council Announcement No 58. The 1992 Act
lays down clear and concrete rules for selecting a private party to take part, operate, or
jointly invest in state undertakings, activities or projects. Apparently, the 1992 Act
provides a private party transparency and formality of requirements and conditions as
to how to obtain an approval to participate in State projects.

It is believed that the

1992 Act would provide greater confidence for foreign investors, thereby attracting
FDI and foreign capital toward Thailand through State projects. Furthermore, the
1992 Act also guarantee that the private participation in State projects will benefit the
State in consonant with the government policy. The various ways in which this Act
benefits the State will be examined later.
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The 1992 Act provides standard rules and time frames for all relevant
processes from the start of the project to its completion. Furthermore, the 1992 Act
also provides the project's supervisory measure to ensure that the project will be
implemented and operated as contractually agreed upon and consistent with the
government policy. Especially on the occurrence of inconvenient or unusual events,
the selected private investor will be promptly provided with government assistance so
that the project will be successfully completed so as to fulfil the provision of public
service and utility.
The private participation in state undertakings can demonstrate the
involvement of the following characteristics: (1) state undertakings authorized by law;
(2) state undertaking in relation to the exploitation of natural resources; or (3) state
undertaking in relation to the utilisation of any asset or property owned by the State or
the Government or any Government Agency.
More importantly, it is noted that the 1992 Act applies to all
Government Agencies. There is no exception for either Local Authorities (Local
Administrative Organisations) or State Enterprises so long as the project value is
worth up to or more than one (1) billion Baht (approximately equivalent to US$
twenty eight and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million), thereby requiring the
contracting government agency to comply with rules and requirements provided by
the 1992 Act.
Compliance with the 1992 Act consists of three (3) stages: project
proposal, project implementation, and project supervision. The 1992 Act expressly
specifies detailed requirements as to its timeframe and as to the constituent members
of a committee that shall select and supervise the private party.
(i)

Project Proposal
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For a project with its value ranging from one (1) to five (5) billion Baht
(approximately from US$ twenty eight and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million to
US$ one hundred forty two and eighty-five hundredths (142.85) million), the
initiating project author (the contracting government agency) must prepare a project
feasibility study, as required by the Office of the National Economic and Social
Development Board ("NESDB") for a competent Minister in charge. 125 The Minister
must consider whether or not he/ she agrees with the project. For a project worth
more than five (5) billion Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ one hundred forty
two and eighty-five hundredths (142.85) million), the initiating project author must
have an independent and qualified consultant126 to prepare the project feasibility
study. Subsequently, upon the completion of the report, it will be submitted to a
respective Minister for consideration.
Upon the project study'S completion, the Minister considers the project
feasibility. If he/she agrees with it, he/she will submit the same to the NESDB for
consideration if it is a new project. 127 For an old project that already has any asset or
property, the project feasibility study will be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for
consideration. The NESDB or the Ministry of Finance are destined to consider and
give their opinion as to whether or not they agree with the proposed project within
125 Notification of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board. January 13,
2536 (1993) (Thai!.). This provides that the initiating project owner prepares the following: scope and
details of the project, rationales and necessity of the project, economic and social impacts, readiness of
the initiating project owner, financial status, project management and administration, and
implementation plan.
126 Notification of the Ministry of Finance, July 7,2537 (1994) (Thai!.). This provides that consultant
(s) must be independent and must not, either directly or indirectly, be involved with interested private
sector. Consultant (s) shall possess knowledge, capability, experience and work relevant to the project
concerned at least three (3) years.
In cases where consultants are foreign, there must be· Thai nationals joining a team of
consultants of not less than fifty (50) per cent of entire man/month consultants.
127 In consideration of the project proposal, the NESDB will take the following factors into
consideration: compatibility between the project and the government policy as well as the current
national economic and social development plan, suitability of the project, project impacts on
environment and community, politics and security, law and regulations, roles and contribution of
private sector to the initiating project author, benefits arising from the private participation in state
undertaking and activities.
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sixty (60) days prior to submitting the project proposal to the Council of Ministers for
ultimate consideration.
In cases where the NESDB or the Ministry of Finance disagrees with
the initiating project author, they will inform the initiating project author of their
disagreement within sixty (60) days. In such circumstance, if the initiating project
author disagrees, he/she will provide and submit additional information to a respective
Minister. The Minister will gather all necessary information and then submit a report
to the Council of Ministers for final consideration.
Where the NESDB or the Ministry of Finance agrees with the initiating
project author, the project will be proposed to the Council of Ministers for final
consideration.
(ii)

Project Implementation

After the project has been approved by the Council of Ministers, the
initiating project author (the contracting government agency) will select a prospective
contractor through a fair and transparent bidding method. For a project with value
ranging from one (1) to five (5) billion Baht (approximately from US$ twenty eight
and fifty-seven hundredths (28.57) million to US$ one hundred forty two and eightyfive hundredths (142.85) million), the initiating project author must prepare an
invitation notice, terms of reference ("TOR"), and contract terms and conditions. For
a project worth more than five (5) billion Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ one
hundred forty two and eighty-five hundredths (142.85) million), the initiating project
author must have an independent and qualified consultant 128 help prepare and draft

128 Notification of Ministry of Finance, July 7, 2537 (1994) (Thai!.), supra note 126. It provides that
consultant (s) must be independent and must not, either directly or indirectly, be involved with
interested private sector parties. Consultant (s) shall possess knowledge, capability, experience and
works relevant to the project concerned at least three (3) years.
If consultants are foreign, there must be Thai people joining a team of consultants of not less
than fifty (50) per cent of entire man/month consultants.
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these documents. The greater the project value naturally requires the more expertise
to offset the greater potentia110ss.
Meanwhile, the initiating project author must also appoint a Committee
consisting of constituent members, as required by the 1992 Act. 129 The Committee
has authority and mandate to consider and approve draft invitation notices, draft
TORs, and a draft contract. After approval by the Committee, the Committee shall
select a prospective contractor to participate or implement the state project or
activity. 130

Additionally, the 1992 Act authorizes the Committee to require the

selected contractor to provide the contracting government agency a bidding guarantee,
or performance guarantee or security bond subject to the terms and conditions
designated by the Committee. For example, the value of the bidding guarantee and
performance bond or the validity of the terms of these guarantees might be included
among the conditions. More precisely, the Committee is authorised by the 1992 Act
to supervise and ensure that the bidding method and all relevant processes are fair and
transparent to all potentially interested contractors.
The bidding method is comparatively the most suitable and effective
means to provide a fair and equal opportunity to all interested contractors for it can
provide full and open competition among potential contractors. However, in some
cases, if the Committee and the initiating project author believe that the bidding
method should not be used for a project, the proposal of such shall be submitted to the
NESDB and the Ministry of Finance for consideration. However, if the NESDB or

129 Section 13 of the Private Participation in State Undertaking Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai\,) provides
that the initiating project author is required to appoint a committee, consisting of an authorised
representative of a relevant ministry as a chairman, an authorised representative of the Ministry of
Finance, an authorised representative of the Office of Council of State, an authorised representative of
the OAG, an authorised representative of the NESDB, an authorised representative of the Budget
Bureau, two (2) authorised representatives from other ministries, not more than three (3) qualified
persons and an authorised representative of the initiating project author as a secretary.
130 Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), supra note 92, § 14.
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the Ministry of Finance disagrees with the Committee and the initiating project
author, the bidding will apply to a project. The question whether the bidding method
should be used for the project only arises when the NESDB and the Ministry of
Finance agree with the Committee that the bidding method is unsuitable. Under such
circumstance, the Council of Ministers shall consider the question for final
approval. 131 Otherwise, the bidding method will always apply.
In cases where the initiating project author disagrees with the
Committee on non-application of the bidding method, the initiating project author
must submit its objection to the NESDB and the Ministry of Finance. If the NESDB
and the Ministry of Finance agree with the initiating project author's objection, and in
cases where the NESDB and the Ministry of Finance cannot reach an agreement on
the bidding method, automatic application of the standard bidding method applies. 132
Finally, the 1992 Act requires for quorum at least three fourths (3/4) of
the total Committee members in attendance. \33

It also provides that a meeting

resolution issued by a Committee shall not be by less than two thirds (2/3) of the
Committee members attending the meeting. 134

(iii)

Project Supervision

Following the project implementation, once the contractor has been
selected and the contract between the initiating project author and the contractor has
been executed, the next step is ensuring both parties fully perform. To effectuate this
need, the 1992 Act provides that the initiating project author appoints the Project
Coordination and Follow-up Committee 135 with an authorised representative of the

§ 16 para 1.
§ 16 para 2.
§ 19 para 1.
§ 19 para 2.
135 [d. § 22. This section provides that the initiating project owner is required to appoint a Committee
called a "Coordination and Follow-up Committee."
The Committee consists of authorised
[d.
!d.
133 !d.
134 Id.
131

132
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contractor acting as a member of the Committee panels. These Committee panels,
operating as a tripartite committee, are unique by comparison. The 1992 Act requires
the Coordination and Follow-up Committee to follow-up and supervise both parties,
making sure that the contractor will perform the agreed contractual obligations. In the
event of unusual occurrences, this Committee is required to work with the parties to
remove all obstacles and ensure that the project will be completed punctually and
successfully.

Finally, the Committee must report on the stage of the project

implementation, including a progress report on problems and obstacles. This report
should include possible solution proposals to the respective Minister at least every six
(6) months.
1.2.

Relevant Regulations

In addition to relevant laws, the OAG must reView all relevant
regulations regarding a contract-making process before a contracting government
agency enters into a contract with a private party. The Regulation of the Office of the
Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992) (the "1992 Regulation") is not only
considered the most significant regulation on government procurement but it also
plays significant roles to other types of state contracts. The reason is that it has
become common practice for most Government Agencies to adopt the 1992
Regulation when legislating state contracts other than government procurement
contracts even though the 1992 Regulation is theoretically intended to apply to only
government procurement contracts.

representative of the initiating project owner as a chairman, an authorised representative of the Ministry
of Finance, an authorised representative of the NESDB, an authorised representative from the other
Government Agency other than the initiating project owner, an authorised representatives from the
contractor, an authorised representative from the other relevant ministry, authorised representatives as
approved by the initiating project owner of not more than three (3) qualified persons. As a result, the
Committee members must exceed nine (9) persons.
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Additionally, it is noted that the application of 1992 Regulation is
exclusively confined to main Government Agencies consisting of the Legislative
Branch, the Executive Branch (only the Central Administration Level and the
Regional Administration Level), the Judicial Branch and some Independent
Organisations such as the OAG. As a result, Local Authorities (Local Administrative
Organizations), Independent Organizations, and State Enterprises are excluded from
the application of the 1992 Regulation.

Nonetheless, the 1992 Regulation is

considered the paradigm for other Government Agencies outside the 1992
Regulation'S scope.

Most Government Agencies are likely to adopt the 1992

Regulation as their own regulations.

As a result, it is very possible to find that

regulations on procurement of many State Enterprises have similar provisions to those
in the 1992 Regulation.

Moreover, the Regulation of Ministry of Interior on

Procurement of Local Administrative Organisations, B.E. 2535 (1992) applicable to
all Local Authorities almost contains identical provisions as appeared in the 1992
Regulation.
Regardless of the fact that the 1992 Regulation may be adopted to other
types of state contracts, the 1992 Regulation is theoretically intended to only apply to
government procurement contracts, covering (1) acquisition of supplies, services and
construction; (2) advisory services; (3) design and supervision of work; (4) exchange
of supplies; and (5) leasing.

As a result, other types of state contracts are not

governed by this 1992 Regulation. Examples of other types of contracts include a
concession contract, a licensing contract, a state joint-venture contracts, etc.
As a mechanism of the 1992 Regulation'S provisions, the 1992
Regulation also authorize at least two (2) key persons to supervise the application,
interpretation, enforcement, and any related matters in respect to the 1992 Regulation.

83

They are the Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Procurement Committee. While the Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime
Minister assumes authority of the 1992's application, interpretation and enforcement
in general,136 the Procurement Committee acting as a Working Committee under the
Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister assumes authority in
handling all routine subject matter regarding a government procurement contract
under this 1992 Regulation.
As to the Procurement Committee, persons designated to serve on the
Committee Panels can be classified into three (3) groups: (1) representatives of
relevant Government Agencies; (2) independent and qualified persons; and (3) a
Secretary and Secretary Assistants.
Subject to these three (3) groups, the Committee Panels consist of (1)
the Director-General of the Ministry of Finance; (2) the Director-General of the
Department of the Comptroller General; (3) an authorized representative of the
Ministry of Defence; (4) an authorized representative of the Office of the Audit
General; (5) an authorized representative of the OAG; (6) an authorized representative
of the Budget Bureau; (7) an authorized representative of the Office of the Council of
State; (8) an authorized representative of the Office of Prevention and Suppression on
National Corruption; (9) an authorized representative of the Office of the Prime
Minister; (10) an authorized representative of the Fiscal Policy Office; (11) an
authorized representative of the Office ofIndustrial Product Standardization; (12) not
more than five (5) qualified persons as appointed by the Prime Minister as Committee
Panels; (13) an authorised staff of the Department of the Comptroller General as a
Committee Member and Secretary to the Procurement Committee together with not

136 Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai!.), supra
note 118, clause 4.
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more than two (2) persons as appointed by the Procurement Committee as Secretary
Assistants.
The Procurement Committee has a broad range of authority and duties
under the 1992 Regulation.

As a primary mandate, the Procurement Committee

interprets and issues rulings in a manner consonant with the 1992 Regulation.
Second, the Procurement Committee has discretionary power to grant any exemption
of the 1992 Regulation subject to limited level and scope to any Government Agency
if necessary.

The exemption of the 1992 Regulation above the Procurement

Committee's limited level and scope will be within the Council of Ministers'
authority. Third, the Procurement Committee is designated to consider a complaint
regarding the violation of the 1992 Regulation by any Government Agency. Fourth,
where the Procurement Committee comes across any irregularity of the 1992
Regulation in practice, the Procurement Committee is required to figure it out and
propose the solution to the Council of Ministers for consideration so that the Council
of Ministers shall issue an amendment to the 1992 Regulation accordingly. Fifth, the
Procurement is required to set up guidance, practice or process as well as a contract
sample and standard supplementary form to the 1992 Regulation in order to serve as
the reference material for all Government Agencies.

Sixth, the Procurement

Committee also has authority to propose the Work Abandoned Suppliers and
Contractors List to the Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister. The
list shall be subsequently circulated to all Government Agencies as soon as it has been
approved by the Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister. Any person
of the Work Abandoned Suppliers and Contractors List will be barred from tendering
an offer to any Government Agency. Likewise, the 1992 Regulation also prohibits
any Government Agency from transacting with a supplier or contractor whose name is
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listed. 137 In addition to these mandates, the Procurement Committee is also required
to set up any requirement or any term or condition of a contract concerned (for
example, percentage of supplies or materials used from Thai owned businesses, local
supplies and services,138 or maximum penalty rates) and as a result, ensure that a
prospective private party complies with these terms.
In conclusion, it is evident that the Procurement Committee is
considered a key person in terms of the application of the 1992 Regulation. The
Procurement Committee has a broad range of authorities and responsibilities covering
all matters in respect of the 1992 Regulation. Its powers, inter alia, include the
supervision of the application, interpretation, and enforcement of the 1992 Regulation,
creating the Work Abandoned Suppliers and Contractors List, determining local
content requirements, and setting penalty rates, amongst other duties. 139
The following is the concept of the 1992 Regulation and significant
rules set by the 1992 Regulation.
1.2.1.

The Concept of the 1992 Regulation 140

Rules and requirements provided by the 1992 Regulation ensure that
each step of the procurement is fair and transparent as well as provides open
competitiveness to all interested bidders, suppliers or contractors. In general, any
bidder is encouraged to tender an offer for any procurement project provided that one
bidder submits one tender for one particular project. If it appears that several bidders
are associated with other bidders or have mutual interest with other bidders and those

Id.
Id.
139 !d.
140 !d.
137

138

clause
clause
clause
clause

145.

16.
12.
15.

86

bidders individually tender their own offers to any procurement project, only one
tender can be used. 141
The Regulation defines the term "mutual interest" as a circumstance
where a natural or juristic person who tenders a bid for any particular procurement has
either direct or indirect mutual interest with other bidders' business owners who have
put a tender for bidding of the same procurement.
The term of "having direct or indirect mutual interest,,142 covers, inter
alia, the relationship of these bidders in terms of the management,143 capital,144 or
crossed relationships between management and capital.

The relationship among

bidders in terms of management is considered a relationship whereby a manager,
managing partner, managing director, executive director, or these persons of one
juristic person has power over other natural persons or juristic persons' business or
operation of which has already tendered for bidding on the same procurement.
The relationship of these bidders in terms of capital is a relationship
whereby a partner of an ordinary partnership, a partner with unlimited liability of a
limited partnership, or a major shareholder in a limited company or a public company
is a partner of another ordinary partnership or limited partnership, or a major
shareholder of another limited company or public company which has already
tendered for the same procurement. As far as these positions are concerned, spouses

I d. clause 15.
!d. clause 5.
143 The relationship of those bidders in terms of management is a relationship whereby a manager,
managing partner, managing director or executive director of one natural person or juristic person's
business or operation has power over another natural person or juristic person's business or operation
of which already put a tender for bidding of the same procurement.
144 The relationship of those bidders in terms of capital is a relationship whereby a partner of an
ordinary partnership, a partner with unlimited liability of a limited partnership or a major shareholder
in a limited company or a public company is a partner of another ordinary partnership or limited
partnership, or a major shareholder of another limited company or public company in which already
put a tender for bidding of the same procurement.
141

142
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and children of these persons holding such positions are included into the definition of
"having direct or indirect mutual interest."
To avoid bidders having mutual interests or associations, the
contracting government agency must examine all bidder qualifications. This critical
determination must precede the opening of a quoted price or bidding price. 145 This
process is known as "pre-qualification examination." To complete pre-qualification
examination, bidders must submit relevant documents to the contracting government
agency. In cases of natural persons or groups of natural persons, a certified copy of
the bidder identification card and a copy of partnership agreement (if any), as well as
a certified copy of identification card of partners will be submitted to the procuring
government agency.146 For juristic persons, authorities require a certified copy of
Affidavit of Incorporation, Memorandum of Association, lists of managing partners,
managing directors, persons with controlling power and major shareholders. 147 For a
joint-venture or consortium, a certified copy of a joint-venture or consortium
agreement and identification card of participants must be submitted to the procuring
government agency. If any participant of a joint-venture or consortium is not of Thai
nationality, a certified copy of passport of such participant is required. If a participant
is a juristic person, a series of the following documents is required: a certified copy of
Affidavit of Incorporation, Memorandum of Association, list of managing partners,
managing directors, persons with controlling power and major shareholders. 148 In
addition to these documents, a financial statement, a certified copy of a Commercial

145 Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thail.), supra
note 118, clause 15.
146 !d. clause 15.1.
147 I d. clause 15.2.
148 !d. clause 15.3.
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Registration Certificate, and a certified copy of Value Added Tax ("V AT")
Registration Certificate may be required. 149
1.2.2. Procurement Methods and Their Limits of Procurement
Value
The 1992 Regulation requires the procuring government agency (the
contracting government agency) to apply one (1) of these five (5) methods to acquire
supplies and services from a private party: Agreement on Price, Price Enquiry,
Bidding, Special Method, and Special Case Method. The application of each method
depends on certain conditions and the procurement value. 150 The application of the
Agreement on Price is limited to procurement value not exceeding one hundred
thousand (100,000) Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ two thousand eight
hundred and fifty seven (2,857)) per procurement. ISI

The Price Enquiry will be

applied if the procurement value as per one procurement is ranging from one hundred
thousand (100,000) Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ two thousand eight
hundred and fifty seven (2,857)) to two million (2,000,000) Baht (approximately
equivalent to US$ fifty seven thousand one hundred forty two and eighty-five
hundredths (57,142.85)).152 The procuring government agency is required to apply
the Bidding if the procurement value, per procurement, exceeds two million
(2,000,000) Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ fifty seven thousand one hundred

forty two and eighty-five hundredths (57,142. 85)).153 Regardless of procurement
value, if the procuring government agency chief reasonably believes that the Bidding
should be applied in a case where the value is less than two million (2,000,000) Baht
(approximately equivalent to US$ fifty seven thousand one hundred forty two and
I d. clause 15 ter.
Id. clause 18.
151 Id . clause 18.
152 I d. clause 20.
153 !d. clause 2l.
149

ISO
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eighty five hundredths (57,142. 85)), the Bidding method will apply. However, the
procurement value cannot be divided or split up to decrease the threshold of the
. order to avOl' d
' a partlcu
. Iar procurement meth 0 d . 154
procurement va Iue m
usmg
The Special Method applies in a case where supply acquisition exceeds
one hundred thousand (100,000) Baht (approximately equivalent to US$ two thousand
eight hundred and fifty seven (2,857)) and falls within one of these conditions. First,
the procured supplies are supplies to be auctioned by any of Government Agencies,
Local

Authorities

(Local

Administrative

Organisations),

State

Enterprises,

International Organisations, or Foreign Agencies. 155 Second, the procured supplies
need to be acquired urgently; otherwise, a delay may cause harm to the State. 156
Third, the procured supplies are to be used in the government intelligence service. 157
Fourth, the procurement repeats what is to be used for additional need in cases of
necessity, urgent situation, or for the benefit of such Government Agency.158 Fifth,
the procurement is to be acquired directly from abroad, or through an international
organisation. 159 Sixth, such procurement is specially required to identify the brandname of the procured supplies. Examples of such supplies are spare parts of certain
vehicles due to the nature and usage or technical limitations subject to Clause 60. 160
Seventh, the procurement is either land, buildings, or structures in special need. 161
Finally, the procurement is required to refer to the Special Method due to the failure
of other methods. 162

!d. clause 22.
I d. clause 23.1.
156 I d. clause 23.2.
157 Id . clause 23.3.
158 I d. clause 23.4.
159 I d. clause 23.5.
160 I d. clause 23.6.
161 I d. clause 23.7.
162 I d. clause 23.8.
154

155
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Likewise, as for services, the Special Method will apply in a case
where the acquisition of services exceeds one hundred thousand (100,000) Baht
(approximately equivalent to US$ two thousand eight hundred and fifty seven
(2,857)) and falls within one of these conditions. First, such service requires specific
craftsmanship, or special expertise. 163 Second, such service is required for particular
machines, machinery parts, mechanical devices, engines or electronics that need to be
disassembled in order to examine the defect or damage so authorities can estimate
repair cost.1 64 Third, the procured service is the work that needs to be acquired
urgently; otherwise, such delay may damage or harm the State. 165

Fourth, such

service is required for the State's confidentiality.166 Fifth, the procured service is a
repetition of a work order, which is to be used for additional need in cases of
necessity, urgent situation, or for the benefit of such government agency. 167 Finally,
the procurement is required to use the Special Method due to the failure of other
methods. 168
The Special Case Method is rarely used in practice.

This method

typically applies when the procured supplies and services are acquired among
Government Agencies (including Local Authorities and State Enterprises) and such
Special Case Method must be approved by the Prime Minister or where the Special
Case Method is allowed by any specific law or Cabinet Resolution. 169

1.2.3. Thailand Purchasing Requirements 170

!d.
Id.
165 !d.
166 I d.
167 I d.
168 I d.
169 I d.
170 Id.
163

164

clause 24.l.
clause 24.2.
clause 24.3.
clause 24.4.
clause 24.5.
clause 24.5.
clause 26.
clause 16.
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Like other countries, the national policy encourages Government
Agencies to purchase domestic supplies and services.

As a result, the 1992

Regulation requires a procuring government agency to use locally produced supplies
or supplies from Thai-owned businesses. The requirement of the purchased amount
is stipulated by the Procurement Committee. Additionally, the procuring government
agency cannot set up specifications that exclude local suppliers or Thai owned
businesses from tendering a bid on government procurement.
1.2.4. Advance Payments
As a general rule, the procuring government agency is not allowed to
make an advance payment to suppliers or contractors unless the procunng
government agency reasonably believes it is necessarily subject to particular
conditions.

The exemption of the 1992 Regulation happens in a case of a

procurement acquired from Local Authorities (Local Administrative Organisations)
and State Enterprises. In such circumstance, the procuring government agency is
allowed to make an advance payment of not more than fifty (50) per cent of the total
procurement value. 171
When the procurement

IS

acquired from or through an overseas

government agency, or international institution, or international organisation, or
where scientific appliances or other suppliers are specially designated by the
Procurement Committee and these supplies can be only purchased directly from
manufacturers or suppliers abroad due to urgent necessity, the advance payment can
be made. As a result, such an advance payment must be made in accordance with the
terms and conditions as approved by those overseas government agencies,

171

Id. clause 68.1.
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international institutions, international organisations, manufacturers, or suppliers. 172
For subscriptions to a series of magazines, books or databases on CD-ROM in which
they are issued periodically and the membership fee is required, the actual advance
payment may be made. 173
For procurement contracts awarded as a result of the Price Enquiry or
the Bidding, advance payment not exceeding fifteen (15) per cent of the total
procurement value can be made provided that such an advance payment is
conditionally required by the Price Enquiry or the Bidding. 174
For the procurement by a means of the Special Method, the procuring
government agency is allowed to make an advance payment of more than fifty (50)
per cent of the total procurement value.
However, when advance payments are required in cases of the Price
Enquiry, the Bidding or the Special method, the supplier or contractor must, in return,
provide the procuring government agency an advance payment guarantee or bond as a
condition before receiving the advance payment from the procuring government
agency.

The guarantee or bond can be a Thai government bond or a letter of

guarantee issued by a local commercial bank. In other cases, apart from the Price
Enquiry, the Bidding and the Special Method, advance payment guarantees or bonds
are not required. 175

1.2.5. Reservation Rights l76
Regardless of the terms and conditions stipulated in an invitation
notice, TOR, or draft contract, if the procuring government agency finds that the
interested supplier or contractor appears in the List of Work Abandoning Suppliers
172

Id. clause 68.2.
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and Contractors provided by the Procurement Committee, the procuring government
agency shall have the right to reject the successful bidder and avoid or invalidate the
procurement contract. More importantly, where the procuring government agency
finds out that any part of the procurement process has not been performed in good
faith, or in collusion with other bidders, the procuring government agency reserves the
right not to opt for the procurement with the lowest bidder and can also suspend or
cancel the procurement of supplies or services, regardless of the stage of performance.
1.2.6. Formality of a Government Procurement Contract 177

As a general rule, a procurement contract must be written in the Thai
language.

However, if necessary, it can, in some cases, be written in a foreign

language (e.g., English). Under such a circumstance, if a contract contains terms and
conditions as prescribed in a sample contract as the reference material provided by the
Procurement Committee, a Thai translation is not needed.

Otherwise, a Thai

translation must always accompany the foreign language version.
Where a Government Agency is situated abroad, a contract can be
written

III

English or a foreign language other than English, provided that it is

scrutinised by a legal expert abroad.
1.2.7. Contract Amendment and Modification 178

As a rule, once a contract between a procuring government agency and
a supplier or contractor is executed, it cannot be subsequently altered or modified
unless it is necessary and such alteration or modification will not disadvantage the
State. However, if the alteration or modification of a contract would benefit the State,
such alteration or modification is allowable. In all cases, the procuring government

177
178

Id. clause 132.
Id. clause 136.
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agency cannot alter the terms and conditions that have been executed only for the
private party's benefits.
1.2.8. Performance Guarantee and Bond 179
The 1992 Regulation requires a supplier or contractor to provide the
procuring government agency with a performance guarantee or bond ranging from
five (5) to ten (10) per cent of the total procured value. Such bond will guarantee that
a private party will fully perform his obligations. In the event of breach of contract by
the private party, the Government Agency shall retain the right to collect on this bond.
The performance guarantee or bond can be provided in various forms such as cash,
cashier cheque, letter of guarantee issued by local commercial banks, bank guarantee
issued by the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand ("IFCT"), a finance
company, a finance and securities company licensed by the Bank of Thailand (BOT),
or Thai government bond. However, in cases of an international bidding, a bank
guarantee issued by a recognised foreign bank will suffice. 180
Normally, when supplier's or contractor's obligations has been
discharged, the procuring government agency is required to return such performance
guarantee or bond to the supplier or contractor within fifteen (15) days from the date
of discharge.

In practice, the OAG however recommends that the procuring

government agency holds the performance guarantee or bond for the entirety of the
warranty period. In such circumstance, the performance guarantee or bond will be
held during the term of a contract and until the warranty expires. l8l
1.2.9. Penalty Payment l82
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The 1992 Regulation provides rates of penalty payment for damages of
non-performance of a contract by a private party. For supplies, daily penalty rates
ranging from one hundredths (0.01) to two tenths (0.20) per cent of undelivered
supply value must be contractually stipulated. For services, in a case where the
provision of contracted service by a private party must be completed at once, daily
penalty rates between one hundredths (0.01) and one tenth (0.10) per cent of the total
service value (the total project value), but not less than one hundred (100) Baht
(approximately equivalent to US$ 2.5) per day must be contractually stipulated. For
infrastructure construction or public work adversely affecting the traffic for public
users in general, the contractor will be liable to pay a daily penalty rate of twenty five
hundredths (0.25) per cent of the total service value to the procuring government
agency.
Regardless of these fixed rates, the Procurement Committee is however
entitled to stipulate the maximum daily rate different from these fixed rates
chargeable to the contractor but the maximum daily rate cannot exceed the rates
provided by the Regulation.
1.2.10. Submission of a Signed Contract to the Office of the AuditGeneral and the Revenue Department 183
Once a contract between a procunng government agency and a
supplier or contractor has been officially executed, the 1992 Regulation requires such
agency to submit a copy of the executed contract worth up to one (1) million Baht
(approximately equivalent to US$ twenty eight thousand five hundred and seventy
one (US$ 28,571) to the Office of the Audit-General and the Revenue Department.

183

I d. clause 135.
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The rationale behind this requirement is the need to ensure that the
Office of the Audit-General shall be able to follow up and verify whether the
procuring government agency has received supplies or services in accordance with the
contract. In a normal practice, the procuring government agency as the party of a
contract must remind and urge the supplier or contractor to perform obligations
according to the contract or otherwise, the procuring government agency must take an
action against the supplier or contractor, for example, claim for damages as a result of
breach of contract. If the procuring government agency fails to do so, the agency will
be accountable for such failure. It can be said that this mechanism is obviously
established to check on the procuring government agency's side.
In addition, the 1992 Regulation also requires the procunng
government agency to submit a copy of a contract to the Revenue Department. This
ensures the taxability of any payment or consideration made by the procuring
government agency to the supplier or contractor. By this means, it prevents a supplier
or contractors from attempting to evade income tax liability on earned income or
revenue received from the procuring government agency because the income earned
from the contract has already been in the Revenue Department's record.
1.2.11. Exemptions under the 1992 Regulation
Under the 1992 Regulation, it appears that on the one hand, the
Procurement Committee has the necessary authority to issue rulings on government
procurement. On the other hand, the Procurement Committee also has discretionary
power to give certain exemptions of the 1992 Regulation to the procuring government
agency if necessary. These exemptions are however determined on a case-by-case
basis.
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In practice, the exemption on the project carrying the government
policy is more likely to be passed on toward the Council of Ministers to give approval
of the exemptions of the 1992 Regulation. Some exemptions from the application of
the 1992 Regulation can be found in the Purchase Agreement of the Boeing Model
737-800 Aircraft between the Royal Thai Air Force and the Boeing Company. In this
case, Boeing requested that the Purchase Agreement shall be governed by the United
States law instead of Thai law and non-compliance on the counter-trade requirement.
As one of the only two aircraft manufacturers in the world, upon the Council of
Ministers' approval, Boeing had been exempted from complying with the 1992
Regulation, especially for governing law and the counter-trade requirement even
though these exemptions were very rare in practice.
1.2.12. The Work Abandoned Suppliers and Contractors List

As one of the significant mandates of the Procurement Committee that
could adversely affect interested suppliers and contractors in general, the 1992
Regulation empowers the Procurement Committee to prepare and propose a List of
Work Abandoning Suppliers and Contractors to the Permanent-Secretary of the Office
of the Prime Minister. After the List of Work Abandoned Suppliers and Contractors
has been approved by the Permanent-Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister, it
will be circulated to all Government Agencies, Local Authorities (Local
Administrative Organisations), Independent Organisations, and State Enterprises. 184
Based upon such List, all Government Agencies are forbidden from establishing legal
relations or conducting transactions with any of the named suppliers or contractors. 18S
To be placed on such List, any supplier or contractor who has been
selected as the winner of the bid, but failed to enter into a contract with the
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contracting government agency within the time limit as designated by the contracting
government agency, is considered to have abandoned work I86 For services, where a
supplier, contractor, or sub-contractor who has been approved by the contracting
government agency to sub-contract, fails to discharge his contractual obligations, will
also be placed on the List. 187
Moreover, for the purchase of supplies, any supplier providing substandard supplies will also be listed as a work abandoned supplier. For a service
provider, if the service provided by the provider causes any defect in the work within
the contractually agreed warranty period, the contractor's name will be also listed. I88
Likewise, in cases of infrastructure construction, if it turns out that the procured
supplies or materials provided by the supplier or work done by the contractor or subcontractor are below the standardisation as agreed in a contract, those persons will
also be listed as those who have abandoned work I89 Having been included in the
List, these people are barred from transacting with all Government Agencies and until
removed from the List.
1.3.

Relevant Cabinet Resolutions
Cabinet Resolutions regarding a contract-making process are of great

importance to all Government Agencies, especially those Agencies that are preparing
to transact with the private sector because there is no exception of Cabinet
Resolutions' application for any particular Government Agency.

Even though

Cabinet Resolutions are not technically law, thereby not binding on the people and the
public in general, they definitely bind all branches of the Government, including all
Government Agencies and authorities. Violation of Cabinet Resolutions by omission
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carnes personal accountability for any official.

Furthermore, an action could be

brought against a government official on the ground of non-compliance with
government disciplines and, as a result, could, in some cases, carry criminal liability.
Therefore, from the government officials' perspective, Cabinet Resolutions are as
significant as statutes and legislation because the enforcement of Cabinet Resolutions
effectively provides them with "law" in the sense that each violation carries personal
liability on criminal law.
Due to the link between personal accountability on non-compliance
with government disciplines and Cabinet Resolutions, the contracting government
agency and the OAG must take pre-caution.

Since 1948, Cabinet Resolutions

regarding a contract-making process have demarcated a unified system. Currently,
twelve (12) Cabinet Resolutions exist.

The OAG as a state counsel is required to

exercise constant care and to pay every attention to these Resolutions. The OAG
must examine the legality of a contract in accordance with Cabinet Resolutions before
any contracting government agency can conclude any contract with the private sector.
Some of those Cabinet Resolutions are considered general rules, laying out general
contract-negotiation rules. Some Resolutions are ad hoc, that are, rules for specific
projects. This complexity must always be considered by the OAG .
The following is a series of Cabinet Resolutions regarding a contractmaking process that both the contracting government agency and the OAG must
consider.
1.3.1. Overseas Training Program 190

As a basic principle, a Government Agency is required to set up its
own budget to cover yearly expenditures. The budget of any Government Agency
Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Sor. Ror. 0202IV or. 222 (Nov. 18,
1980) (Thai!.).
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must also include the expenditures for the acquisition of yearly supplies and services
as well as overseas training programs. Once the proposed budget has been prepared,
it will be submitted to the Budget Bureau for primary approval and subsequently to
the Parliament for final approval. Upon the Parliament's approval, a Government
agency will be able to only spend its budget as approved by the Parliament.
From the Government Agencies' perspective, compliance with such
rules seems confusing, complicated, and time-consuming. Furthermore, compliance
with the rule cannot guarantee full and unaltered approval. Particularly, some items
of expenditures, such as expenditures for overseas training program, will more likely
be removed. To avoid such inconvenience, certain Government Agencies came up
with new ideas by arranging with a private party who transacted with the Agency on
the acquisition of supplies or services.

Based upon the arrangement between the

contracting government agency and the private sector, it appeared that there was a
hidden cost of certain items in a contract value. The common arrangement between
the contracting government agency and the private party can be demonstrated in cases
where the purchase of imported supplies is necessary. The purchase of imported
supplies is often necessary when the usage and operation of these devices requires the
procuring government agency's staff to attend a training program abroad. Otherwise,
these machines and devices could not be run and operated correctly and efficiently.
Under such arrangements, the contracting government agency and the
supplier agreed to include the cost of the overseas training program for the contracting
government agency's staff in the cost of the procured supply. This resulted in a huge
increase in total contract value because the supplier likely added an excessive training
cost to the cost of the procured supply. Such arrangements also caused a further
problem in encouraging a Government Agency to open a loophole as well as
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promoting non-compliance with standard regulations in respect of the preparation of
its annual expenditures.

Inclusive pricing tempts officials to make unnecessary

business trip and personal reimbursements, thereby affecting the unnecessary increase
of the national budget.
The Cabinet Resolution regarding the overseas training program was,
therefore, issued in 1980 to prevent an improper arrangement between the contracting
government agency and the private sector. The Resolution strictly prohibits inclusion
of overseas training costs in the contract value. Nevertheless, where overseas training
program is necessary, the contracting government agency must follow the rule by
including it in the normal budget and accordingly asking for approval from the
Budget Bureau and the Parliament. Otherwise, a procurement including the overseas
training cost shall be specifically approved by the Council of Ministers on a case-by
case basis.

1.3.2. A Lump Sum Turnkey Contract by the Same Contractor 191
As a common feature, a lump sum turnkey contract allows a contractor
to undertake and deliver to a contracting government agency (a project's owner) a
completed and operating facility within a certain date for a fixed lump sum price. A
lump sum turnkey construction contract normally involves in millions of Baht in a
project value. In Thailand, a lump sum turnkey project is always found in a mega
project, which is likely a State project.

For the process of selecting prospective

contractor, the contracting government agency will normally have an independent
consultant help issue an initial design, set up specifications, and prepare for bidding
documentation. Once the contractor is selected, the contractor will be responsible for
undertaking both the detailed design and construction of the entire project.

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 02031V0r. 98 (July 15,
1983) (Thai!.).
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From the State perspective, it seems not to be better off for the
contracting government agency if the independent consultant and the contractor are
the same persons, or associated with each other. Therefore, the Cabinet Resolution
dated July 15, B.E. 2526 (1983) was issued to demarcate rules for a lump sum turnkey
construction contract. Importantly, the contracting government agency must ensure
that the independent consultant and the contractor are not the same persons, or
associated with each other. Furthermore, a turnkey project specially requires the
approval from the Council of Ministers before the contracting government agency
contracts with the private sector.

1.3.3.

Strict Compliance with Cabinet Resolutions l92

This Cabinet Resolution makes all Government Agencies and
authorities aware that they must strictly comply with the guidance as ruled out by any
Cabinet Resolution.

In cases where compliance with a Cabinet Resolution is

impossible or struggling, those Government Agencies and authorities must ask the
Council of Ministers to review the Resolution concerned. Otherwise, any government
authority who neglects to do so may be charged with non-compliance with
government disciplines.

1.3.4. State Enterprises' Regulations 193
Apparently, individual State Enterprises have authority to set up their
own regulations.

In practice, the Ministry of Finance has supervisory power to

provide guidance to these State Enterprises. The Ministry of Finance has been issuing
a series of regulations to increase the efficiency of these State Enterprises' operation
by relaxing some rules.

The guidance covers regulations regarding procurement,

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 0202IVor. 180 (Nov. 24,
1988) (Thai!.).
193 Letter of the Secretary General to the Cabinet No. Nor. Ror. 0202IVor. 156 (Sept. 19, 1991)
(Thai!.).
192
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asset distribution, asset depreciation, and the valuation of procured goods, raw
materials, manufacturing goods, and finished products. Upon such guidance, all State
Enterprises are supposed to adopt these recommendations.
Likewise, this Resolution also requires State Enterprises to strictly
comply with a regulation adopted upon the Ministry of Finance's guidance and
recommendation. As a result, this Resolution assigns the Office of the Audit General,
an in-charge ministry of individual State Enterprises, the managing director, and the
Board Committee of individual State Enterprises to supervise them closely so that
they strictly comply with all relevant regulations.
1.3.5. Preventive Measures for Collusive Business Practices 194

The Council of Ministers has been issuing preventive measures on
collusive business practices respecting government procurement.

Parts of the

preventive measures deal with contract execution by setting quoted referral
construction rates and a two-year warranty requirement. For quoted referral contract
rates, the OAG is required to check whether the itemised construction cost and the
total contract value are within quoted referral construction rates. The quoted referral
construction rates help give both the contracting government agency and the OAG an
idea whether the contract price is appropriate. Without the quoted rates, there would
be no clues how much the contract should cost.
As to a two-year warranty period, this Resolution requires that the
contract provides a warranty clause covering a two-year period following the contract
completion.

This requirement forces the private party to provide the contracting

government agency reasonable standardisation and quality supplies. At the very least,
these supplies should be able to last at least two (2) years following the contract
194 Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 0202IVor. 1 (Jan. 3,1994)
(Thai!.).
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completion.

Therefore, by this Resolution, the OAG, acting as a state counsel,

ensures that the contract value is within the quoted referral construction rate and the
contract provides the contracting government agency a two-year post-contract
warranty.
1.3.6. A State-Joint Venture Project 195
A state-joint venture project normally allows a private party to
participate in state undertakings or activities.

This project normally involves

III

millions of Baht in value. As its common characteristics, a state-joint venture project
is considered a means to implement the government policy, or to serve public purpose
or policy. A state-joint venture can be found in joint-investment between the State
and a private party, or by a means of concession. Due to the involvement in the
State's activities, a state-joint venture contract must be drafted and reviewed
cautiously. Legality and conformity with the national policy are of vital concern. The
OAG must scrutinize the whole contract and ensure compliance with the national
policy, along with basic legality.
As a result, the Cabinet Resolution dated October 9, 1995 provides that
the contracting government agency submits a draft contract, together with the project
details, to the Council of Ministers for final approval. In order to give an approval,
the Council of Ministers shall take all matters into consideration, including how the
state-joint venture project would benefit the State. Furthermore, this Resolution also
prohibits the contracting government agency and the OAG from inserting any clause
giving the existing contractor eligibility to renew the contract automatically, or having
priority over other prospective contractors in a State project.
1.3.7. Exemptions for the State Data Disclosure1 96
Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 0215/Vor. 209 (Oct. 9,
1995) (Thai!.).
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Whereas all Government Agencies are obliged to disclose what is
defined as "state data or information", in accordance with the State Data Disclosure
Act, B.E. 2540 (1997), Government Agencies (including the contracting government
agency), on the other hand, also have contractual obligations with a private party to
keep all information or data arising from the contract confidential. The contracting
government agency is prohibited from revealing information and data under the
contract to other persons. As a result, the obligations under the State Data Disclosure
Act make the contracting government agency face the dilemma of whether to disclose
information arising from a contract. To disclose the information or data arising from
the contract as provided by the State Data Disclosure Act may place the contracting
government agency in breach and require payment of damages to the private party.

In consequence, the Resolution dated December 1, 2000 was issued to
give suggestions regarding state data disclosure to the contracting government
agency. The Resolution suggests that prior to contracting with a private party, the
contracting government agency should negotiate with the private party to set up
certain exemptions allowing the contracting government agency to disclose
information and data arising from the contract to a competent authority.

This holds

particularly true when the disclosure is made on duty and in accordance with
conditions designated by the State Data Committee.
Nevertheless, if the private party disagrees with the proposed
exemptions, the contracting government agency should take the following factors of
the necessity, benefits, obligations, rights and duties and responsibilities arising out of
a contract into consideration and then proceed accordingly.

In other words, the

contracting government agency should balance the consequences between contracting

196

Letter of the Secretary General to the Cabinet No. Nor. Ror. 02051Vor. 182 (Dec. 1,2000) (Thai!.).
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with such private party without an exception clause and not contracting with such
private party. In a latter case, the contracting government agency is encouraged to
contract with any other private party who is more willing to agree with the proposed
exception.

1.3.8. Execution of International Agreements, Treaties and
Conventions 197
In a normal practice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered an
official authority on behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand that has mandate to deal with
international transactions or foreign affairs with other states or international
organisations.

Especially with regard to entering into international agreements,

treaties or conventions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorised to give legal
opinion of consequences, advantages, disadvantages, or impacts of possible
consequences from entering into a particular international agreement, treaty or
convention to the Government.
In fact, major parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' mandates are
similar to many of the OAG's mandates. The distinguishing feature of the mandates
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OAG is that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs mainly deals with international transactions, mostly at the state level whereas
the OAG advises matters in respect of legal transactions within territory. Therefore,
before Thailand enters into international agreements, treaties, or conventions, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have an exclusive authority of this matter.
However, in a case where entering into an international transaction is
not initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that the contracting government
agency is dealing with the other party (international agencies or organisations)

197 Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers (Urgently) No. Nor. Ror. 0504/Vor. 9
(Jan. 15,2003) (Thai1.).
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directly, this Resolution sets up the guidance for all Government Agencies preparing
to enter into international transactions without the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
involvement. This is particularly true for international transactions that legally bind
the parties according to international law. Under such circumstance, the contracting
government agency that will enter into an international agreement is required to
submit the subject-matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs shall consider and give opinion on such subject-matter and then submit the
opinion to the Council of Ministers for final approval.

In a case where urgency requires and submission of such subjectmatter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would cause a delay and prejudice to the
State, the contracting government agency is allowed to enter into international
agreements, treaties, or conventions without prior the Council of Ministers' approval.
However, entering into international agreements without the Council of Ministers'
approval requires certain conditions.

First, the contracting government agency is

allowed to do so only with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' consultation. This means
that the contracting government agency is technically required to work with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs internally. By doing so, it gives rise to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs supervision because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered an
authority, which possesses expertise in dealing with international affairs.

Second,

entering into international agreements without the Council of Ministers' approval
shall not constitute a legal rights and obligation toward the Government under
international law.

Third, even though the entering into international agreements

without the Council of Ministers' approval is allowed, the contracting government
agency is finally required to inform the Council of Ministers that it entered into the
international agreement.
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1.3.9. A Turnkey Contract 198
In addition to the Cabinet Resolution dated July 15, B.E. 2526 (1983),
the Council of Ministers has recently issued another Resolution dealing with the
execution of a turnkey contract. By this Resolution, the Council of Ministers has
issued a manual regarding a turnkey project for the contracting government agency to
comply with by adopting the concept and methodology of the Private Participation in
State Undertakings Act, B.B. 2535 (1992).
Normally, the Government discourages Government Agencies to refer
to a turnkey construction project. Government Agencies are encouraged to use a
turnkey construction contract only if other methods are unavailable. The opposition
to a turnkey construction contract is due to the comparatively expensive cost. A
turnkey construction contract is quite expensive due to the fact that the Government
has less opportunity for negotiation with the contractor.
Nevertheless, the application of a turnkey contract is still important
and needed, particularly for a mega project in which advanced technology and
skilfulness are aggressively required.

Under such circumstance, the contracting

government agency must comply with the manual, regarding the execution of a
turnkey construction project.
Subject to the manual, the term "turnkey project,,199 can be divided into
three (3) categories: design and construction; construction and project finance; and
design, construction and project finance. Like requirements and processes provided
198 Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers (Urgently) No. Nor. Ror. 05041V0r. 269
(Nov. 14, 2003) (Thai!.).
199 A turnkey contract or turnkey construction contract is a contract whereby the contractor undertakes
to deliver to the contracting government agency (the project's owner) a completed and operating
facility within a certain date for a fixed price. Under a turnkey contract, the contractor's obligations
consists of the design, engineering, procurement, construction, installation, start-up and testing of the
facility. In many cases, the contractor may be required for training the contracting government
agency's personnel and staffs as well as the maintenance so that after the facility completion, the
contracting government agency's personnel and staffs will be able to operate the facility and carry out
its maintenance.
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by the Private Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.B. 2535 (1992), the manual
also provides three (3) steps requiring compliance by the contracting government
agency: project preparation and proposal, project implementation, and project
supervision and follow-up.
For the project preparation and proposal, the contracting government
agency must prepare a project study covering the following items: necessity and
rationale for the project, scope and details of the project, economic and social impacts,
readiness of the contracting government agency, financial status, project management
and administration, and implementation plan.

These lists are, however, not

exhaustive; other factors could be deemed important and included in the study.
Subsequently, the contracting government agency shall submit the project study to the
NESDB, the Budget Bureau, and the Ministry of Finance for initial approval. These
authorities are supposed to consider it within sixty (60) days; otherwise, such project
shall be deemed to be approved by these authorities. Once the project proposal has
been approved by these authorities, the project, together with the project study and its
feasibility, shall be submitted to the Council of Ministers for primary approval.
Upon the Council of Ministers' approval, the project implementation
follows.

For this process, the contracting government agency will be obliged to

prepare the invitation notice, terms of reference ("TOR"), and terms and conditions of
a contract concerned. These documents are required to be reviewed by the OAG.
After that, the contracting government agency, together with several authorised
representatives from the NESDB, the Budget Bureau and the Ministry of Finance,
must select prospective contractors by a fair and transparent bidding method. Once
the contractor has been selected, the contracting government agency shall propose
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such prospective contractor, the bidding result, a draft contract, and all relevant
documents to the Council of Ministers for final approval.
Once the prospective contractor has been selected and a contract
between the initiating project author and the contractor has been executed, the next
step is ensuring that both parties properly discharge their obligations. The manual
provides that the contracting government agency appoints the Project Coordination
and Follow-up Committee 200 to urge both parties to properly perform.
Overall, this Cabinet Resolution has adopted the concept of the Private
Participation in State Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) to a turnkey contract.

1.3.10. Execution of a Concession Contract between the State and a
Private Party201
Having been on the losing end of an extraordinary arbitral award in the
Expressway case, the Council of Ministers recently issued a Resolution for dealing
with concession contracts that outlined the following conditions.
First, a contract shall not give rise to the parties' right to bring disputes
to be settled before arbitration.

On the contrary, disputes shall be settled by the

Administrative Court, or Court of Justice. However, in cases where the application of
arbitration is unavoidable, the contracting government agency must ask for the
Council of Ministers' approval as to whether the contract should apply an arbitration
clause.
Second, a concession contract, particularly for a main contract, shall be
written in a Thai language. In cases where any part of a contract is written in English,

200 The "Coordination and Follow-up Committee" consists of the Inspector General of the Office of
Prime Minister as a chairman, an authorised representative of the contracting government agency, an
authorised representative from the relevant ministry, qualified persons in fields of special technique,
finance and law as Committee members.
201 Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers (Urgently) No. Nor. Ror. 05041V0r. 31
(Feb. 9, 2004) (Thai!.).
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such part containing an English version shall only be referred to as its translation. In
other words, the main contract must be written in Thai but its annexes could be written
in English.
Last, there must be a specific clause explicitly providing that a contract
shall be construed and governed by Thai law.
1.3.11. Interpretation of the Cabinet Resolution Regarding the
Execution of a Concession Contract between the State and a Private Party202

Succeeding to the preceding Cabinet Resolution, it prohibits all
Government Agencies from concluding an arbitration clause in a concession contract
due to the disappointment of the arbitral award in the Expressway case. Given the
preceding Cabinet Resolution, it turns out that a contract concerned in the Expressway
case is not a concession contract. It is simply a construction contract. The analysis as
to why the contract in the Express case is not a concession contract will be carried out
later in Chapter 4. As a result, it raises a question among Government Agencies as to
whether such Cabinet Resolution shall only apply to a concession contract or other
contract types. The uncertainty of the application of such Cabinet Resolution cause
irregularities for Government Agencies in practice. Therefore, the present Resolution
was issued to reaffirm that conditions provided by the preceding Cabinet Resolution
Regarding the Execution of a Contract between the State and the Private Party are
only applicable to a concession contract.

Other types of contracts, such as a

procurement contract or construction contract, are excluded from the application of
such Cabinet Resolution.

Consequently, it means that other types of contracts can

use arbitration as dispute settlement resolution, or use English as contract language
between the parties.
Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 05041V0r. 100 (May 6,
2004) (Thai!.).
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1.3.12. Sub-Lease of the Radio and Television Broadcasting

Contract203
This Resolution was issued because it appeared that a leaseholder of
the radio and television broadcasting contract sub-leased his/ her rights to broadcast
radio or television according to such contract to other persons. As a result, it turned
out that the leaseholder was simply a broker and had no intention to produce radio or
television programs for broadcasting by himself/ herself. Under such circumstance, it
showed that the leaseholder (known as a broker) took advantage of the State and the
contracting government agency by subleasing a broadcasting contract to other
persons.

These persons usually paid the leaseholder much more than what the

leaseholder paid the contracting government agency.

In this case, the sublease

between the leaseholder and the assignee (the sub-leaseholder) brought about the legal
dispute because the sub-leaseholder was not the direct with the original party who
contracted with the contracting government agency.
Therefore, this Resolution was issued to prohibit the leaseholder from
sub-leasing the broadcasting rights subject to the contract to other persons.

The

Resolution required a clause prohibiting the private party or the leaseholder from subleasing the broadcasting time to other persons. Furthermore, the Resolution also
required that the private party as the leaseholder of the contract produces radio or
television programs for broadcasting by himself/ herself.

The Resolution also

prohibited the contracting government agency from extending or renewing the
existing contract to any leaseholder.

The renewal of the existing broadcasting

contract would be specially controlled by the Minister of Defence.
1.4.

International Law and Practice

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers No. Nor. Ror. 05041V0r. (Lor.) 11386
(Aug. 13, 2004) (Thail.).
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Apart from the practice and process of reviewing state contracts
provided by those domestic laws, regulations and Cabinet Resolutions, the OAG as a
state counsel must review international law and practice, especially those obligations
binding on Thailand. It appears that some international obligations arise due to the
membership of some international organizations, but certain international obligations
arise via custom.
The following lists of the GPA, UNCITRAL, ICSID, the New York
Convention, MIGA, and Thailand's BITs with other countries are international
agreements, treaties or conventions that are considered very significant to the
execution of a state contract (especially one relating to FDI) in Thailand.
Nonetheless, this section only touches on the overview of these international
agreements, which relate to the execution of a state contract in the Thai legal system.
The concept and detailed principles of these international agreements will be
thoroughly addressed in Chapter 4.

1.4.1. Agreement on Government Procurement 1994 ("GP A")
The Agreement on Government Procurement 1994 ("GPA") is one of
the "Plurilateral" Trade Agreements under Annex 4 to the Agreement Establishing the
WTO?04 The GPA was first brought into the negotiation among WTO members in
the Tokyo Round between 1973 and 1979. Initially, there were only twelve (12)
signatory members to the 1979 Agreement,205 coming into force on January 1, 1981.
The 1979 Agreement was subsequently amended in 1987 and its amendment entered
into force in 1988. Even with such amendment, it appeared that the parties have
Annex 4: Plurilateral Trade Agreements
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
Agreement on Government Procurement
International Dairy Agreement
International Bovine Meat Agreement
205 Grier, Jean Heilman, Government Procurement, http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogcloccic/gpa.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2009).
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consistently negotiated in order to expand the scope and coverage of the Agreement
since the Uruguay Round.

Eventually, the current Agreement on Government

Procurement 1994 with a wider scope and coverage has been signed in Marrakesh on
April 15, 1994, and came into force on January 1, 1996. As of August 17, 2009 there
were forty (40) signatory states to the GPA. 206
The GPA was initially created to encourage trade liberalization on
government procurement (similar to what the WTO has done for goods and services).
More precisely, it is suggested that GATT and WTO obligations, per se the rules of
non-discrimination consisting of the national treatment and most-favored nation
("MFN") treatment, should also apply to government procurement. At first glance,
the GP A requires that government procurement should apply the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment.

This means foreign suppliers should be given equal

opportunities as domestic suppliers. Second, domestic laws, regulations, procedures
and practices regarding government procurement should guarantee the transparency
of government procurement to interested suppliers, including foreign suppliers.
Third, there should be an enforceable mechanism with clear and certain procedures
for each step of government procurement. Examples of these mechanisms include
notification, consultation, surveillance, and dispute settlement that are at least fair,
prompt, and effective.
GPA scope and coverage is limited. Not all government procurement
is subject to the GP A. Only government procurement stipulated in Annex 1 to Annex
5 of the Appendix to this Agreement is subject to GPA rules. Upon the adoption of

Canada, the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, The Netherlands (including Aruba), Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, and the United States, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproce/memobse.htm (last visited Aug. 17,2009).
206
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this Agreement, the parties are required to provide Annex 1 to Annex 5 as part of
Appendix of this Agreement.

Whereas Annex 1, 2, and 3 are lists of procuring

entities,207 Annex 4 and Annex 5 provide positive lists of services and construction
services, respectively. In addition to lists of procuring entities and positive lists of
services and construction services, only procurement values within the GP A threshold
shall be governed by the GPA rules.
The GP A threshold varies according to the types of procurement and
the procuring entity. For central government entities, a procurement of up to one
hundred and thirty thousand (130,000) SDRs208 (equivalent to US$ one hundred
seventy-seven thousand (US$ 177,000)) in the case of goods and services and up to
five million (5,000,000) SDRs (equivalent to US$ six million eight hundred and six
thousand (US$ 6,806,000)) in cases of construction services is governed by the GPA
rules.

For sub-central government entities, the procurement up to two hundred

thousand (200,000) SDRs for goods and services and up to five million (5,000,000)
SDRs (equivalent to US$ six million eight hundred and six thousand (US$
6,806,000)) for construction services is subject to the GPA rules. For governmentowned enterprises (known as State Enterprises in Thailand), only the procurement of
up to four hundred thousand (400,000) SDRs (equivalent to US$ five hundred and
forty-five thousand (US$ 545,000)) in cases of goods and services, and up to five
million (5,000,000) SDRs (equivalent to US $ six million and eight hundred and six
thousand (6,806,000)) in the case of construction services, is governed by the GPA
rules.

207 Annex 1 is the central government entities list; Annex 2 is the sub-central government entities list;
and Annex 3 is the government-owned enterprises list.
208 SDRs are units of thresholds stated in terms of the IMF's accounting unit of Special Drawing
Rights. The dollar values mentioned above were set on March 1,2000 and remained valid until March
2002.
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Therefore, when dealing with government procurement on particular
goods and services, it is necessary to look at all of the following lists of procuring
entities, lists of services, and the value of government procurement.

Only the

government procurement on an item that falls into these three (3) main categories will
be a so-called "covered procurement," and subject to GPA's rules.
The GP A rules also provide explicit and thorough procurement
procedures. These procedures cover tendering procedures, technical specifications,
qualifications of suppliers, information for prospective suppliers, time limits for
tendering and delivery, award of contracts, post-award information, and dispute
settlement mechanisms.
Thailand has been a WTO member since January 1, 1995.209 She has
not yet acceded to the GP A despite the recommendation by the Trade Policy Review
Body ("TPRB") that appeared in the trade policy review of January 1996,z1O In
addition, the Bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement ("TIF A")
initiating FTA negotiations with the United States also requests Thailand to adopt the
GPA or alternatively, the United States requests provision of national treatment on
government procurement to the United States suppliers so that the United States
suppliers can bid similarly to domestic suppliers. Even though the GP A rules are not
binding on Thailand, it is possible that Thailand may be forced to adopt and abide by
these rules in the near future
1.4.2. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL")

World Trade Organization, htto:llwww.wto.org/English/thewtoe/countriese/thailande.htm (last
visited Aprl21, 2009).
210
World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews: Thailand (January 1996),
htto:llwww.wto.org/english/tratoo elto re/to22 e.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
209
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") was established by the General Assembly in 1966.211 The principal
mandate of the Commission is to promote harmonisation of international trade la~ 12
by tackling the problem of different state laws in relation to international trade.
Apparently, the Commission has also become the main the United Nations legal
institution for developing international commercial law.
The Commission consists of sixty (60) member states elected by the
General Assembly based upon geographic regions as well as their economic and legal
system. The Commission members serve for a six-year term. Every three (3) years,
half of the members' terms will expire. Thailand has been a Commission member
since June 14, 2004, and its term will expire in 2010. 213 Therefore, UNCITRAL
doubtlessly binds Thailand.
Apparently, UNCITRAL has issued a senes of texts and statutes
covering (1) International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation, (2) International
Sale of Goods (CISG) and Related Transactions, (3) Insolvency, (4) International
Payments, (5) International Transport of Goods, (6) Electronic Commerce, (7)
Procurement and Infrastructure Development, and (8) Security Interests. 214
For International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation

III

particular, UNCITRAL has also issued the following: (1) the 2002 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, (2) the 1996 UNITRAL Notes
on Organising Arbitral Proceedings, (3) the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on

G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), UN. Doc. A/6369 and Add. 1 and 2 (Dec. 17, 1966).
212 Id.
211

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/aboutlorigin.html (last visited Apr. 21,2009).
214Id.

213
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International Commercial Arbitration with Amendments as Adopted in 2006,215 (4)
the 1982 Recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other interested bodies
with regard to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, (5) the 1976
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and (6) the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award ("New York Convention,,)?16
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985), inter alia, have been recognised
worldwide and highly recommended. They have come to near universal application
in dealing with international trade and investment disputes. While the Arbitration
Rules are directed at potential (or actual) parties to a dispute, the Model Law is
directed at the States?17
On the one hand, UNCITRAL suggests that the contractual parties
should adopt the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as dispute settlement resolution
(a means in arbitral proceedings) conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL
Arbitration.

In addition, the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also provide a

reference in a dispute settlement clause to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the
UNCITRAL arbitration, or any other provision to the same effect as the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. Under these Rules, they can select the UNCITRAL rules either as
part of their contract, or after a dispute arises, to govern the arbitration.

Amendments to articles 1 (2), 7, and 35 (2), a new chapter IV A to replace article 17 and a new
article 2 A were adopted by UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006. The revised version of article 7 is intended to
modernise the form requirement of an arbitration agreement to better conform with international
contract practices. The newly introduced chapter IV A establishes a more comprehensive legal regime
dealing with interim measures in support of arbitration. As of 2006, the standard version of the Model
Law is the amended version. The original 1985 text is also reproduced in view of the many national
enactments based on this original version. Also see the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, available at
http://www .uncitral.org/uncitral/enluncitral texts/arbitrationll985Model arbitration.html (last visited
Aug. 17, 2009).
216 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, supra note 213.
217 I d.
215
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Nonetheless, UNCITRAL is not supposed to get involved in disputes,
directly or indirectly. UNCITRAL never acts or performs the function as an arbitral
tribunal, administers arbitration proceedings, or performs any function related to
individual arbitration proceedings, or any other system of public or private dispute
settlement.
On the other hand, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration offers a pattern, or model, that individual states can adopt it
as part of its domestic legislation on arbitration.
1.4.3. United Nations Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID Convention,"
or the "1965 Washington Convention")
ICSID was established in 1966 under the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States and entered into
force on October 14, 1966. As of November 2007, one hundred and fifty-five (155)
states have signed the Convention and one hundred and forty-three (143) states have
deposited their instruments of ratification and attained "Contracting States" status.
Twelve (12) states, including Thailand, have not yet ratified the Convention218 even
though Thailand became a signatory state ofICSID on December 6, 1985.
One of the principal objectives of ICSID is to deal with disputes
between a host state and nationals of another Contracting State. ICSID aims to satisfy
both foreign investors of a home country and a host country. From a foreign investor
perspective, international settlement dispute mechanism can provide greater
confidence that the investor's capital and profits will be protected. At the very least,
it ensures that their assets are not easily expropriated without just compensation.
ICSID, List of Contracting States And Other Signatories of the Convention (Nov. 4, 2007),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/TCSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingSta
tes&RegFrom=Main (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
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From a host state perspective, ICSID is also beneficial to a host state as it is seen as an
incentive for investment in terms of capital flows.

In the end, the international

cooperation for sustainable economic development at the state level could be achieved
through the establishment ofICSID. This is because ICSID, under the auspices of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), provides facilities
for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and
nationals of other Contraction States.
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The Centre offers two (2) panels for dispute settlement resolution. One
is the Panel of Conciliation, called a Conciliation Commission, and the other is the
Panel of Arbitration, called an Arbitral Tribunal. Persons designated to perform the
functions of both conciliators and arbitrators must possess high moral character and
recognised competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance.

They

must also exercise independent judgment. 220
For conciliation, the Commission may consist of a sole conciliator or
any uneven number of conciliators to which the parties will agree. Normally, one of
the three-conciliator panel will be appointed by each party and the third conciliator
will be the president of the Commission, to be appointed by both parties. 221 The
Commission will help the parties clarify the dispute issues and enable them to reach a
mutually acceptable agreement. Occasionally, the Commission may give the parties a
recommendation on a dispute concerned and as a result, the parties are expected to
take such recommendation into their consideration. 222 However, the recommendation
of the Commission itself is not legally binding. In cases of settlement agreement or

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
art. 1(2) opened for signature Mar 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
220 !d. art. 14.
221 Id. art. 29(2).
222 Id. art. 34.
219
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failure of the parties to reach mutual agreement, the Commission will close the
proceeding and submit a summary report to the Centre.
Similarly, arbitration may consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven
number of arbitrators appointed, as to which the parties will agree. Normally, the
tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators: two of them will be appointed by each party,
the third arbitrator will be the president of the tribunal appointed by both parties.223
The tribunal will consider disputes in accordance with rules of law as agreed by the
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the tribunal will apply the law of the
Contracting State party to the dispute and rules of international law to a case.224
Normally, the tribunal is allowed to determine any incidental or additional claims, or
counter-claims arising directly out of the dispute subject matter. This is provided that
these claims are within the scope of the consent of the parties, and within the scope of
ICSID's jurisdiction. 225 In addition, if the tribunal considers necessary, it may give
the parties recommendation on provisional measures, which should be taken to
preserve the respective party rights?26 Once the arbitral award is rendered, it is final
and binds the parties. This means the parties cannot appeal or seek other remedl 27
unless it has appealed on interpretation, revision, and annulment on defined and
limited grounds in accordance with Article 50, 51 and 52, respectively. As far as the
enforcement of arbitral awards is concerned, an arbitral award is enforceable either as
subject to the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention.
However, due to the nature of ICSID, which is closely associated with
the World Bank and IMF, it often appears that the parties, particularly for host
developing countries, comply willingly with ICSID awards. Compliance with the
Id.
!d.
225 !d.
226 !d.
227 I d.
223

224

art. 37(2).
art. 43.
art. 46.
art. 47.
art. 53.
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ICSID award is construed as giving cooperation, which may facilitate loan approval
by the World Bank or IMF. It is a reason that it is sometimes called the World Bank
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

228

1.4.4. Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the "1958 New York Convention," or the "New York
Convention ")
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention, was adopted on June 10, 1958,
and entered into force on June 7, 1959. The New York Convention was established to
facilitate and encourage international trade and commerce by creating mechanisms
recognizing a foundation instrument of international arbitration.
The Convention not only involves the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, but also the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The
New York Convention is also considered one of the most important achievements of
the United Nations in promoting a more effective and universal rule of law.229
Moreover, the New York Convention is further described as the single most important
pillar on which the edifice of international arbitration rests. 230 The Convention has
gained phenomenal acceptance by the international community.231

Due to its

worldwide application, the New York Convention also allows for the enforcement of
an award in a non-contracting country232 by conferring legitimacy upon awards
granted in any state (regardless of whether the awards are granted in a contracting

Biggs, supra note 10.
Martin Gusy, The History and Significance of the New York Convention, 4 VJ 147 (2000).
230 J. Gillis Wetter, the Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An
Appraisal, 1 AMER. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 91 (1990).
231 Kristin T. Roy, the New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy
Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 920,
920 (1995).
232 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 1(1), June 10,
1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].

228

229
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state nor whether the parties are subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting
states).233
As a means of enforcing arbitral awards, the Convention requires a
domestic court of the contracting state to give effect to the consent to arbitrate as
made by the contracting state.

The Convention also requires recognition and

enforcement of arbitral awards made outside the contracting state's territory.
Furthermore, one of the appealing characteristics found in the New York Convention
is that the Convention shifts the burden of proof from the party seeking enforcement
to the party against whom the enforcement is sought. 234 To request a domestic court
to enforce foreign arbitral award, the party looking for such the enforcement is merely
. d to present an arb'Itration
. agreement and award .235
reqmre
Nevertheless, the recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral
award may be refused provided that the opponent party can prove the following
refusal grounds: (1) incapacity of the parties,236 (2) improper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration itself,237 (3) lack of jurisdiction,238
(4) procedural irregularities,239 and (5) an invalid award based on the ground that the
award was not "binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which ... that award was made. ,,240 Moreover,
the foreign arbitral award may be rejected if the competent authority finds the

233 Cindy Silverstein, Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corporation: Was a Violation of Due Process
Due?, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 443, 454 (1994).
234 New York Convention, supra note 232, art. V.
235 Id. art. IV.
236 Id. art. V(1)(a).
237 Id. art. V(1)(b).
238 Id. art. V(l)( c).
239 I d. art. V(l)(d).
240 Id. art. V(l)( e).
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disputed subject matter incapable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country,241 or the arbitral award would be contrary to that country's public policy?42
To limit its application, the New York Convention allows the
contracting parties to make two reservations when adopting the Convention: the
reciprocity reservation and the commercial reservation. The reciprocity reservation
allows the state to declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in another contracting state when signing, ratifying
or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof. 243 On
the other hand, the state may declare the commercial reservation where differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, are considered as
commercial under the national law of the state making such declaration. 244 Whereas
the reciprocity reservation allows the contracting state to permit enforcement only in
the territory of other contracting states,245 the commercial reservation allows the
contracting state to limit the application of the Convention only to disputes arising out
of legal relationships that are considered "commercial" under its law?46 Thus, a state
may reserve the right to apply the Convention exclusively to commercial disputes, as
interpreted under its very subjective domestic law.
As of April 21, 2009, there are one hundred and forty-four (144)
parties to the Convention, including Thailand?47 Thailand ratified the New York
Convention on December 21, 1959, with no reservation.

Upon such ratification,

[d. art. V(2)(a).
!d. art. V(2)(b).
243 !d. art. 1(3).
244 !d. art. 1(3).
245[d. art. 1(3).
246 [d. art. 1(3).
247 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status of the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitra1.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitrationINYConvention status.html (last visited
Apr. 21,2009).
241

242
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Thailand is legally bound to recognIze and enforce arbitral awards made In the
territory of another Contracting State.

1.4.5. Convention

Establishing

the

Multilateral

Investment

Guarantee Agency (the "MIGA Convention")
The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency ("MIGA") entered into force on April 12, 1988. As one of the World Bank
Group,248 MIGA's mission is to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) into
developing countries to help support economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve
people's lives. 249 By doing so, MIGA provides its foreign investor clients three (3)
. k Insurance,
.
250 techn'Ica1 assIstance
.
251
.
key servIces:
po1"Ihca1 ns

and dispute

mediation. 252
As a rule, investors who can enjoy the coverage offered by MIGA
must be a national of a MIGA member country other than a host country in cases of a
natural person. For juridicial persons, the juridicial investor must be incorporated and
have its principal business based in a member country other than a host country. In
cases where the majority of a juridicial person's capital is owned by a member other
than a host country, the juridicial investor will be eligible to receive MIGA's
guarantee. Regardless of investor type, to be eligible to MIGA' s coverage, a juridicial

248 The World Bank Group consists of (1) the International Bank for Construction and Development
("IBRD"); (2) the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"); (3) the International Development
Association ("IDA"); (4) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID");
and (5) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA").
249 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Bank Group,
http://www.miga.orglguickref/index sv.cfm?stid=1588 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
250 Political risk insurance covers losses arising from currency transfer restrictions, expropriation, war
and civil disturbance and breach of contract as named in Article 11 of the MIGA Convention.
251 MIGA is claimed as the international organisation with global experience offers technical assistance
services that include investment promotion agencies, business associations, promotional departments
within sectoral ministries, other government and private sector organisations. MIGA also provides the
FDI Promotion Centre, an online resource for the delivery of technical assistance for foreign investors.
252 MIGA offers free mediation services to its clients, that have been proved an effective and amicable
dispute resolution tool for the parties. Also see the Agency A verts Claim for Power Project in China
and the Agency Helps Resolve Decade-Long Dispute in Sri Lanka.
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investor must operate its investment on a commercial basis. 253 However, the MIGA's
Board is entitled to extend eligibility to a natural person who is a national of the host
country, or ajuridicial person incorporated in a host country (or the majority of whose
capital is owned by its nationals).

This is provided that the assets invested are

transferred from outside the host country.254 The purpose of this innovative feature of
MIGA's coverage is to help countries to reverse capital flight.

255

In addition to its main functions, MIGA also promotes and facilitates
the conclusion of investment promotion and protection agreements among its
members (a host country and home country). Additionally, MIGA is expected to seek
to remove impediments in both developed and developing member countries to
increase investment flows to developing member countries, as well as to coordinate
with other agencies concerned with the promotion of foreign investment, in particular
the IFC. 256
As of January 19, 2007, there are one hundred and seventy (170)
member countries to MIGA; twenty-three (23) of which are industrialized countries
and the remaining one hundred and forty-seven (147) countries classified as
developing. Thailand is also a membership of MIGA and holds seven hundred and
forty-two (742) shares worth US$ eight thousand and twenty-eight (8,028) billion.257
Among these international agreements relating to the execution of state
contracts in Thailand, MIGA is the most important international agreement in that it
plays such a crucial function in the Thai legal system.

Its importance is highlighted

253 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, art. 13, opened for
signature Oct. 11, 1985,24 I.L.M. 1598, ICSID REV.-FOR INV. L.J. 147 (1986) [hereinafter MIGA
Convention].
254 !d. art. 13.
255 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA) and the Settlement,
477 PLI/Comm 345 (1988).
256 MIGA Convention, supra note 253, art. 23.
257 [d. Schedule A.
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by the fact that the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Compliance
with Arbitral Awards B.E. 2544 (2001) requires the contracting government agency to
comply with the arbitral award where the contracting government agency disputes
with MIGA.
1.4.6

Agreements

on the

Promotions

and

Protections

of

Investments between Thailand and Other Countries

Incentives for and protections of foreign investments (as mentioned
earlier in Chapter 1) derive from two (2) sources or levels: international investment
treaties between host states and home states (Thailand's BITs with other countries);
and investment contracts (state contracts relating to FDI) between a foreign investor
and the Government of Thailand (including its Agencies).
Currently, Thailand has entered into forty-two (42) agreements
regarding the promotions and protections of investments with other countries as
appeared in Appendix 5.

Most of these agreements contain similar structural

provisions. The following are principles and rules contained in these agreements:
definitions of "investment" and "investor;" requirement of MFN treatment and
national treatment; compensation for losses; expropriation; subrogation; settlement of
disputes between an investor and the host contracting party; settlement of disputes
between the Contracting Parties; and so on.
Therefore, before any Government Agency of Thailand enters into any
state contract representing or carrying the FDI's functions (a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI), both the Government Agency and the OAG must aware of the
existence and application of Thailand's BITs with other countries, especially with the
state in which the foreign investor holds the nationality. Terms and conditions to be
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concluded in a state contract relating to FDI must be consistent with those provisions
of those Thailand's BITs.
Here chooses the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom
of Thailand and the Government of Canada for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments258 (the "Agreement") to exemplify Thailand's obligations under it and to
urge the Government of Thailand to be aware of those obligations subject to
Thailand's BITs with other countries. The following are substantial concepts and
requirements of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand
and the Government of Canada for the Promotions and Protections of Investments.
First, for any foreign investor to claim the promotions and protections
as provided by the Agreement, the foreign investor making the investment must
qualify as an investor whose investment is defined by the Agreement.
The term "investor" means any natural person possessing the
citizenship of or permanently residing in Canada in accordance with its laws or any
enterprise incorporated or duly constituted in accordance with applicable laws of
Canada, who makes the investment in the territory of the Kingdom of Thailand, in
accordance with its laws and regulations, applied in a manner consistent with
paragraph 2 of Article IV. 259

Subject to this provision, it is noted that minority

shareholders also fall within the defined term "investor," whether or not they hold
shareholdings at least ten (10) per cent so long as they can demonstrate that they make

258 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of Canada
for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestments, Jan. 17, 1997, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/assets/trade-agreements-accords-commerciauxlpdfs/THAILANDE.PDF (last visited Aug. 6,2009).
259 !d. art I (g).
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the investment to acquire the participation in the enterprise, corporation, or whatever
fonn operating in the Kingdom of Thailand.

26o

The tenn "investment" means any kind of asset owned or controlled
either directly or indirectly through an investor of a third State, by an investor of one
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the
latter's laws.

The Agreement also provides a non-exclusive list of investments

provided that they are used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business
purposes.
Second, the Government of Thailand is obliged to accord investments
of investors with fair and equitable treatment subject to principles of international law
as well as full protection and security?61 It is to say that the Government of Thailand
is required to provide investors the national treatment and MFN treatment in that the
Government of Thailand shall provide investors any treatment or privilege no less
favorable than that it provides its own investors or nationals262 as well as the
Government of Thailand shall provide investors any treatment or privilege no less
favorable than that it provides to investors of any third state. 263
Additionally, in cases of losses of investments of an investor affected
by an anned conflict, a national emergency, or a natural disaster, the Government of
Thailand shall accord the investments in respect of restitution, indemnification,
While IMF and OECD require that an investor must hold at least 10 (ten) per cent of equity
ownership to qualify an investor as a foreign direct investor and accordingly shall be entitled to
minimum treatment standards under customary international law; otherwise such an investor will
simply qualify as a portfolio investor, this Agreement and most BITs, on the other hand, require that an
investor, who shall be entitled to the promotions and protections under this Agreement and most BITs,
must hold shares, stock, bonds or debentures or any other form of participation in a company, business
enterprise of joint venture. See also Walter Bau vs. Thailand. In Walter Bau vs. Thailand, the arbitral
tribunal reaffirmed than Walter Bau, a minority shareholder holding shareholdings 10 (ten) per cent in
Don Muang Tollway (DMT), is entitled to the protections under the Treaty between the Kingdom of
Thailand and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments.
261 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of Canada
for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestments, supra note 259, art.1I (2).
262 !d. art.IV.
263 [d. art. III.
260
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compensation, treatment, or other settlement no less favorable than that it accords to
its own investors, or nationals, or to investors of any third state.

264

Third, as to expropriation, the Government of Thailand shall not
nationalize, expropriate, or proceed any measure equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation unless such expropriation is undertaken for a public purpose, under due
process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner, and against prompt, adequate and
effective compensation?65 The valuation of compensation shall be based on the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before or at the time the
expropriation becomes public knowledge.

In cases of expropriation, the investor

affected shall have a right to prompt review by a judicial or other independent
authority under domestic law. 266
Fourth, this Agreement also adopts the concept of subrogation from the
MIGA Convention in that a Contracting Party or any agency thereof is entitled to be
subrogated to the investor's right against the other Contracting Party (the Host
Contracting Party), provided that the former already makes a payment to its investors
under a guarantee or a contract of insurance of non-commercial risks it has entered
.
. respect to such
mto
m
an'mvestment. ill
Fifth, as to settlement of disputes between an investor and the Host
Contracting Party (Thailand), the Agreement encourages the investor and Thailand to
amicably settle a dispute through consultation between them within six (6) months
since it was initiated.

Unless the dispute has been settled through consultation

between them, the dispute may be submitted to international arbitration under either

Id.
I d.
266 Id.
267 !d.
264
265

art. VII.
art. VIII (1).
art. VIII (3).
art. X.

131

the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. 268
According to this provision, Thailand as the Contracting Party to this
Agreement would agree to give consent to submit a dispute to international arbitration
whether or not the investment contract (state contract relating to FDI) provides as
such.269 Additionally, this Agreement requires that arbitration shall be held in a state
that is a party to the New York Convention and claims submitted to arbitration shall
be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes
of Article of the New York Convention?70 This requirement is to ensure that the
arbitral award arising out of this international arbitration shall be binding and
enforced by domestic courts of the state that arbitration is held and that both Canada
and Thailand are committed to apply the New York Convention in their territories.
Sixth, this Agreement also provides a mechanism of the settlement of
disputes between the Contracting Parties (Canada and Thailand) concerning the
interpretation or application of this Agreement. Likewise, the Contracting Parties are
invited to amicably settle their dispute through consultation as their initial dispute
settlement resolution; otherwise, the Contracting Parties shall submit a dispute to
arbitral tribunal where each party shall appoint its own arbitrator. 271 Then the two (2)
members shall select a national of a third state upon approval by the two (2)
Contracting Parties to be a Chairman of the arbitral tribunal. If the Contracting Party
fails to appoint its own arbitrator or the Contracting Parties cannot agree with such

[d.
[d.
270 [d.
271 [d.
268

269

art.
art.
art.
art.

XIII (1) and (2).
XIII (5).
XIII (6)(b).
XV.
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appointment, either Contracting Party shall invite the President of the International
Court of Justice to make such appointment. 272
Overall,

the

foregoing

section

demonstrates

substantial

principles laid down in a BIT between Canada and Thailand. A set of principles
becomes a common structural model and has been adopted by other Thailand's BITs.
Therefore, when reviewing a state contract relating to FDI, the OAG is required to
scrutinize Thailand's BITs, especially one with the state that the prospective investor
holds the nationality. The OAG must ensure that terms and conditions are concluded
in a state contract relating to FDI and are consistent without anything contradicting a
BIT's provisions. The reason is that even though a state contract relating to FDI with
the prospective investor does not spell out or adopt those principles in such a state
contract, the Government of Thailand is already bound to abide by those BIT's
provisions in addition to an investment contract itself. The Government of Thailand
cannot get away from obligations arising out of those Thailand's BITs.

The

protections of foreign investments granted by Thailand's BITs with other countries
can be exemplified in Walter Bau vs. Thailand.
In Walter Bua vs Thailand,273 Walter Bau AG (a German construction
group), which was a shareholder holding 10 (ten) per cent in the Don Muang Tollway
(DMT) , submitted disputes to international arbitration under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules against the Government of Thailand for its alleged repeated failures
to fulfil the obligations under the Thai-German Investment Protection Treaty and the
concession agreement for the project.

Walter Bua claimed that the State ordered

DMT to reduce the toll on an elevated road from Din Daeng to Don Muang districts
!d. art. XV (4).
The official arbitral award has not been published to public. See also Piyanart Sirvalo &
Watcharapon Thongrung, Govt must pay Bt1.4 bn to DMT, THE NA TlON, Published on July 29,
2009, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/worldhotnews/30 1085811Govt-must-pay-Bt 1.4bn-to-DMT (last visited Aug. 11,2009).

272
273
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from thirty (30) Baht (equivalent to US$ one and sixteen hundredths (US$1.16)) to
forty-three (43) Baht (equivalent to US$ one and twenty-two hundredths (US$1.22))
per vehicle to a flat rate of twenty (20) Baht (equivalent to US$ fifty-seven
hundredths (US$0.57)) and the State built a parallel road that diverted tollway traffic,
which was seen as the obstruction of the operation of Din Daeng-Don Muang
Tollway. On July 1, 2009, the arbitral tribunal awarded in favor of Walter Bau by
ordering the Highways Department of Thailand to pay twenty-nine million
(29,000,000) euros (equivalent to one and a half billion (1500,000,000) Baht) in
compensation to Walter Bau.
Given the arbitral award in Walter Bau vs. Thailand, the arbitral
tribunal reaffirmed that Walter Bau, although a minority shareholder holding ten (10)
per cent in DMT, was protected by a Thai-German investment-promotion treaty and
obligations under the concession contract granted to DMT and Walter Bau's rights
under such treaty did not require prior approval from DMT.

Nonetheless, the

Government of Thailand disagreed with the arbitral award in Walter Bau and prepared
to object this award.
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2.

For Benefits of the State
Even though the OAG has an obligation to review draft contracts

relating to legal issues, the OAG cannot disregard commercial issues or factual
concerns. When reviewing a draft contract, the OAG is supposed to take all relevant
factors into consideration. In addition, the OAG must be capable of anticipating legal
consequences or disputes. Once the OAG anticipates what might become potential
obstacles or disputes between parties, the OAG must find solutions or preventive
measures. Particularly, when the parties need to settle their disputes by means of
arbitration or lawsuit, the OAG must ensure that terms and conditions of a contract
are fully legal binding.

For disputes, there must be a complete set of witness

documents as evidence for the contracting government agency to support the claims.
Therefore, to prevent damages and losses that might happen to the State, the OAG
must be aware and ensure that the following issues have been handled consciously
and wisely.

2.1.

Contract Objects
For a sale and purchase contract, or service contract

contractor

IS

III

which a

required to provide materials for such service, the contracting

government agency will normally have its own specifications of objects, articles, or
materials that the seller or the contractor must provide. Under such specifications, the
seller or the contractor must provide these objects, articles, or materials that meet the
standard and requirements as specified by the contracting government agency. In
addition to these specifications, the OAG also requires the seller or contractor to
undertake that the contract object must be brand new and has never been used.
Terms and conditions in respect of the contract object are exemplified
as follows:
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The Seller guarantees that the Goods sold under the
Contract are of a quality not below that as stipulated in the
Specifications and must be brand new, never been put to use except
for testing.
In case of the purchase of Goods which will have to
be subject to tests, the Seller guarantees that the tests will prove
that the quality is not below that as stipulated in ................ 274
2.2.

Definite and Inclusive Contract Pricing

As a general practice, the contract value or contract price will normally
be paid off by the national budget. Therefore, before contracting with the private
party, the contracting government agency must ask the Budget Bureau for primary
approval and the Parliament for ultimate approval.

Upon approval, the Budget

Bureau must allocate the budget to cover the project cost for the contracting
government agency. As a result, the contracting government agency must abide by
such approval in that the contracting government agency cannot contract when its
terms and prices differ from what has been approved by the Parliament. To put it
another way, the contracting government agency as the one party of the contract
cannot pay the seller or contractor any amount over what the Parliament has
approved.
Therefore, the contracting government agency and the OAG must
ensure that the contract value is definite and inclusive in that the contract value must
cover all other expenses as well as additional taxes and charges. Examples of these
charges include excise tax, value-added tax ("V AT"), local tax, stamps and duties. In
cases where certain expenses incur unexpectedly, the OAG will ask the private sector
as the other party of the contract to bear these costs.
In practice, the private party normally dealing or transacting with
Government Agencies tentatively understands such practice and is already aware of
Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai!.), supra
note 118, Sample Contract: Sale and Purchase Contract, clause 3.
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the budget limitation by including all expenses, fees and any charges in the contract
value.
Terms and conditions in respect to the contract value are as follows:

The Seller agrees to sell and the Buyer agrees to buy
the goods as described and referred in the Contract Document as
"the Goods" at the total price of ............................... 275
Any export taxes, duties, fees or other charges of
whatsoever nature which shall be payable in countries other than
Thailand for Goods which are to be imported into Thailand under
the Contract shall be entirely the responsibility of the Seller. 276
The Seller shall pay all import duties, taxes, fees and
other expenses incurred in Thailand in supplying the Goods under
the Contract. 277

2.3.

Fair and Reasonable Purchase Price or Contract Value
It is assumed that the contract value arising from the bidding process is

reasonable and fair and the State is comfortable on what it spends within the national
budget. The reason is that the bidding process can give all potential bidders an equal
opportunity to submit a tender offer. However, under certain circumstances, where
the bidding process is not applicable, the OAG will not be in the position to determine
whether the contract value is reasonable. In this case, the OAG normally imposes
"the price guarantee clause" on the private party. This means that the private party
agrees to undertake the purchased price or the contract value at a reasonable price
(that is not much more than that offered to other parties) and is subject to similar
terms and conditions. If it turns out that the contract value is higher than the price
offered to other parties, it is deemed that the seller violates his contractual obligations,
thereby giving rise to the contracting government agency to terminate a contract and
seek damages.
Id. Sample Contract: Sale and Purchase Contract, clause 1.
!d. Sample Contract: Sale and Purchase Contract, clause 5.
277 !d. Sample Contract: Sale and Purchase Contract, clause 8.
275

276
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2.4.

Thai Vessels' Policy
As a matter of national policy, the Procurement Committee requires all

Government Agencies to use the shipment service provided by Thai vessels. In this
regard, the Procurement Committee has approved a shipment clause in the Sample
Contract as the reference material attached to the Regulation of the Office of Prime
Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992). Therefore, the OAG is obliged to assure
that in cases where the contract goods, objects, articles or materials must be imported,
these goods, objects, articles or materials must be shipped by Thai vessels unless this
obligation is waived by the Minister of Transportation, or prohibited by foreign
lenders.
Where these goods, objects, articles, or materials are not carried or
shipped by Thai vessels, the seller or contractor must either submit evidence showing
that the Thai vessel shipment requirement is waived by the Office of Mercantile
Marine Promotion Commission or the seller or contractor is obliged to pay a noncompliance fee.
Terms and conditions in respect of the shipment are normally found as
follows:

If the Goods to be delivered to the Buyer according
to this Contract are Goods which have to be ordered or imported
from abroad by the Seller and are to be carried by sea on the route
where Thai vessels are in carriage service and their space are
available according to the Notification issued by the Minister of
Transportation, the Seller must make arrangements for the
shipment of such goods to Thailand by Thai vessels or vessels
which enjoy the rights similar to Thai vessels unless permission
has been obtained from the Office of the Mercantile Marine
Promotion Commission before such Goods are carried by nonThai vessels or they are Goods which, according to the
Notification of the Minister of Transportation, may be carried by
non-Thai vessels.
The Seller must submit a bill of lading or its
certified copy to the Buyer together with the delivery of the Goods
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showing those Goods are carried by Thai vessels or vessels which
enjoy the rights similar to Thai vessels.
In a case where such Goods are not carried from
abroad by Thai vessels or vessels which enjoy the rights similar to
Thai vessels, the Seller must submit either an evidence to the Buyer
showing that permission has been obtained from the Office of the
Mercantile Marine Promotion Commission allowing the carriage
of the Goods by non-Thai vessels or an evidence showing that
payment of special fee has been made due to non-carriage of the
Goods by Thai vessels according to the law on Mercantile Marine
Promotion.
In a case where the Seller does not submit to the
Buyer either of the evidence mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, but nevertheless desires to deliver such Goods to the
Buyer without receiving payment for such Goods, the Buyer is
entitled to accept such Goods and will pay for the price to such
Goods when the Seller has properly fulfilled the aforesaid
requirements.

2.5.

Terms of Payment
Like other types of private contracts, the reciprocity principle is a

significant element of a state contract. This means that, on the one hand, both parties
are committed to discharge their obligations to each other. On the other hand, one
party is entitled to hold his obligations against the other party so long as it appears
that the other party is intended not to perform his obligations. As a result, it becomes
a general rule that when dealing with terms of payment, the State or contracting
government agency will not be liable to make any payment to a private party unless
the private party has fully discharged his obligations.
Furthermore, in cases where the payment has been broken down into
installments, the OAG will ensure that each installment made to the private party
covers the value of goods, objects, articles, materials, work or service for which the
seller or contractor has delivered to the contracting government agency. The State or
contracting government cannot make a payment to the private party exceeding the
value of goods, objects, articles, materials, work or service delivered by the private
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party to the contracting government agency. Otherwise, it is considered prejudicial
toward the State.
In addition, the contracting government agency is not allowed to make
an advance payment to a private party subject to some exemptions. In the event
where an advance payment is contractually required, the contracting government
agency shall make an advance payment to the private party even though the private
party has not yet delivered any contract goods or work to the contracting government
agency. The application of an advance payment can be commonly found in a contract
having huge contract value so that the private party will be able to spend such amount
to get materials ready before performance. In such a case, the contracting government
agency is allowed to make an advance payment up to fifteen (15) per cent of the
purchased value or the contract value provided that the private party is also required
to provide an advance payment guarantee or bond to the contracting government
agency in return of receiving the advance payment. 278
The advance payment guarantee or bond can be made in various
forms. The typical forms are cash, a bank draft, a letter of bank guarantee issued by
local commercial banks, a letter of bank guarantee issued by the Industrial Finance
Corporation of Thailand ("IFCT"), a finance company or a finance and securities
company approved and licensed by the Bank of Thailand ("BOT") or a Thai
government bond.

Therefore, when reviewing draft contracts, the OAG needs to

check whether terms of payment of a draft contract are consistent with these rules.
2.6.

Performance Guarantee or Bond

On the one hand, as a means to guarantee that the private party will
perform its obligations to the contracting government agency subject to the contract,

278

!d. clause 68.4.
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the private party is required to provide a performance guarantee or bond with its value
ranging from five (5) per cent to ten (10) per cent of the total contract value to the
contracting government agency.279

On the other hand, the State or contracting

government agency will never be required to provide such performance guarantee or
bond to the private sector as the other party, regardless of contract type. The reason is
that the contracting government agency has its creditworthiness due to acting on
behalf of the State. Simply having acted on behalf of the State can be considered a
guarantee in itself that the contracting government agency shall be obliged to
discharge its contractual obligations.

Therefore, in all cases, the contracting

government agency will never be liable to provide the private sector a performance
guarantee or bond.

2.7.

Compensation for Losses or Damages Payable to a Private Party
As mandatory requirements provided by the Regulation of the Office

of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.B. 2535 (1992), known as the 1992
Regulation, the State or contracting government agency will be entitled to claim
compensation against the private party in a form of penalty at respective rates for
breaches of the contract by the private party. For a sale and purchase contract, the
1992 Regulation requires the private party to pay the penalty, ranging from one
hundredths (0.01) per cent to two tenths (0.20) per cent of the contract object value
that has not been delivered to the contracting government agency. For a service
contract, the penalty shall be chargeable daily between one hundredths (0.01) per cent
and one tenth (0.10) per cent of the total contract value, but not less than one hundred
(100) Baht (equivalent to US$ two and eighty-five hundredths (2.85)) per day. In a

279

Id. clause 142.
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case of public work affecting traffic conditions, the penalty is chargeable daily of
twenty-five hundredths (0.25) per cent of the total value of the project. 280
Such penalty is considered minimal compensation for the contracting
government agency.

Therefore, if there are additional losses or damages (after

deducting the stipulated penalty as minimal compensation), the State is still entitled to
claim from the private party the remaining actual compensation. In addition to claims
for such compensation, the OAG will ensure that the contract allows the contracting
government agency to deduct any compensation or any amount owed by the private
party from the unpaid amount, performance guarantee, or bond given by the private
party to the contracting government agency.
The following is an instance of terms and conditions in respect of
penalty.

In claiming liquidated damages and damages from
the Seller under this Contract, the Buyer may be reimbursed by
way of deduction from the cost of the Goods including
reimbursable costs remaining unpaid to the Seller or by claming
against the bank issuing the performance security as the Buyer
may prefer.

On the contrary, in cases of breach of contract by the contracting
government agency, the State or contracting government agency cannot pay the
private party any fine or penalty. The State or contracting government agency is
merely liable to pay actual or real compensation to the private party, only as to be
proved by means of arbitration or lawsuit.
2.8.

Unilateral Rights
As one of its special characteristics, a state contract always gives

superior rights or privileges to the State or contracting government agency over the

280

Id. clause 134.
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private party. When reading state contracts thoroughly, it occasionally finds many
clauses granting privileges to the State, particularly for unilateral rights. It fact, it
does not really matter that terms and conditions granting superior rights to the State
(a contracting government agency) must be spelled out in a contract. Even the lack of
express unilateral rights, the State or contracting government agency is still superior
as the State and can accordingly exercise the State's power to wipe out the private
party's right so long as it is done to serve public interest or policy. In other words, the
State seems to have absolute rights to exercise its authority by putting the private
sector's benefits aside provided that the exercising of the State's authority serves the
public purpose, whether or not such rights are expressly written in a contract.
F or instance, as a rule, the State or contracting government agency has
exclusive rights to alter terms and conditions.

The State can even terminate the

contract if the State thinks that it is appropriate, whether or not the private party has
breached contract. However, under such circumstance, while the State is entitled to
alter or terminate the contract unilaterally, the State may need to pay compensation to
the private party for any damage or loss.
The sample clause of unilateral rights can be illustrated as follow:

The Contract may be terminated by the Buyer in
whole, or from time to time in part, in accordance with this Clause
whenever the Buyer shall determine that such termination is in the
best interest of the Buyer.
Aside from those places where terms and conditions appearing in a
main contract are inconsistent with those appearing its annexes or amendments, the
OAG requires that the private party shall comply with clauses to be affirmed or
determined by the contracting government agency.

Alternatively, in cases where

terms and conditions of a contract are in conflict, the OAG will place a clause
allowing the State or contracting government agency to consider what is most
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beneficial to the State, or purporting to the object of the contract. The contracting
government agency is entitled to choose the term and condition is in an effect, thereby
requesting the private party to comply. As a result, the private party must comply
with such an affirmative request.

2.9.

Turnkey Contracts
As a distinguishing characteristics of a turnkey contract, the value or

the cost of individual items of design, engineering, procurement, construction,
installation, start-up, testing and training, cannot be itemized. The value or cost of the
entire project is occasionally quoted in one fixed price. As a result, it is quite difficult
for the contracting government agency to determine whether the one fixed price of a
turnkey contract is reasonable, or whether it is too expensive because a turnkey
contract gives an opportunity to the contractor to quote one fixed price, which is often
comparatively very expensive. Therefore, as a precaution, the OAG discourages the
contracting government agency to enter into a turnkey contract, unless necessary or
approved by the Council of Ministers.
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3.

For Public Interest/ Policy
When dealing with a state contract, concession contract, or contract

involving in public service or utility, or natural resources in particular, the theory of
public interest becomes of great concern. This importance is because these types of
contracts affect the contracting government agency and the State one way or another.
Therefore, when reviewing these kinds of contracts, the OAG must pay great attention
to the public interest theory. The public shall be deemed to be the third party of a
contract for which the OAG must represent. The following matters are of particular
concern when the OAG reviews a state contract involving in public policy or interest.
3.1.

Ownership of the Project Asset
When coming across a draft contract involving in the provision of

public service or utility or granting the exclusive right to the private party to manage
or operate the facility or the project's property, the OAG encourages the contracting
government agency to negotiate with the private party to agree to transfer the
ownership of the facility or the project's property to the State once the construction of
the facility is completed. Such concept is recognised as a "Build-Transfer-Operate"
("BTO") term. The necessity of requiring the private party to transfer the ownership
of the project's property to the State is to prevent the facility that will be used for the
public service or utility from being seized by the contractor's creditors.
For example, the BTO term was used in the Sky-Train Project.

The

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration ("BMA") was a party of this project. The
OAG recommended BMA to use BTO terms in the project so that the ownership of
the poles and beams would be transferred to the State when they were completed.
However, the rails and trains were still in the ownership of the contractor.

This

agreement allowed the contractor to own and use its rails and trains for running the
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sky-trains.

In doing so, the burden of maintaining the rails and trains would be

imposed on the contractor.
However, where the term of BTO is not appropriate due to restrictions
stipulated by lenders or international grantors, the OAG alternatively advises the
contracting government agency to apply the "Build-Operate-Transfer" term ("BOT"),
instead of BTO to the project. However, for public service or utility'S purposes, the
OAG will recommend that there must be a clause prohibiting the private party as the
contractor from stopping or discontinuing the operation or service provision to the
public, as well as prohibiting the lenders from seizing the project's property that could
affect the provision of public service or utility of such facility. This is to guarantee
that the facility or the project's property used for the public service or utility will be
free from any encumbrance, whether or not the contracting government agency is
claimed in breach.

In the BECL case, the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of
Thailand (the "ETA") entered into an expressway construction contract with Bangkok
Expressway Company Limited (the "BECL"). When the expressway was completed,
BECL refused to deliver the expressway to ETA by claiming that ETA failed to share
the revenue as collected from the toll fee from expressway users to BECL, as
contractually stipulated. Such a refusal by BECL caused a delay for the expressway
usage, thereby causing inconvenience and trouble to public expressway users. In this
case, it was clear that the public interest was adversely affected. Therefore, ETA
brought the case against BECL to the Court of Justice and subsequently the Court
ordered BECL to deliver the expressway to ETA. The judgement was held on the
ground that the expressway was constructed for the public purpose or policy and as a
result, the question whether ETA violated its contractual obligations would be
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disregarded.

Therefore, BECL was imposed to deliver the expressway to ETA

whether or not ETA had failed to perform its obligations.
In consequence, the BECL case reaffirms that even with nonapplication of the BTO term in the project, the Court of Justice recognises that the
State, through ETA in this case, has superior rights to access and occupy the
expressway, which has been constructed for the public policy whether or not ETA
fails to perform its contractual obligations to BECL.

3.2.

User Charge Rates
Even though a question of user charge rates is considered a

commercial issue that is unlikely within the scope and authority of the OAG, the
OAG tentatively pays attention to this issue. The OAG pays attention to the issue
because the user charge rates can affect the accessibility of users or people to the
public service or utility.
In practice, the OAG rarely agrees that the private party should have an
exclusive right to increase user charge rates unilaterally and freely. In this case, the
OAG will recommend the creation of a review mechanism for the proposed increased
rates, probably in a form of a committee where a number of authorised representatives
from the Government constitutes the committee panel. Alternatively, the OAG may
advise the increased rate based upon certain formula as stipulated by the Government.
For example, one of common formula is to refer to the inflation rate, which will be
quoted by the Government. In all cases, a question as to whether or not the user
charge fee should be increased and how much it should be increased, will be reviewed
by the Government to ensure public accessibility.

3.3.

Revenue Collection and Sharing
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The most important feature of a concession contract, state-joint venture
contract, or contract involving in the provision of public service or utility or natural
resources, is the revenue sharing between the parties (the State and the private party).
For the State benefit, the OAG ensures that the contracting government agency will be
entitled to collect the revenue. Examples of revenue include toll fees or user charge
fees.

Then the collected revenue shall be divided and given by the contracting

government agency to the private party. This measure can give rise to the contracting
government agency taking charge of the whole project revenue.
However, if it is impossible to assign the contracting government
agency to collect the revenue, the OAG is expected to find a mechanism to supervise,
examine, and cross-check the collection system provided by the private party. This
also ensures that the revenue received from the private party is correct.
Additionally, the term "revenue sharing" becomes another concern
requiring the OAG to define the term explicitly and clearly in order to avoid any
argument between the parties of what constitute revenue sharing.
For example, the Telephone Organisation of Thailand ("TOT") entered
into a cell-phone network provision agreement with the private company.

The

contract provided that the revenue sharing between the parties was the revenue
received and any other benefits arising from the cell-phone operation.

Then the

question of whether revenue received from cell-phone repair service, spare parts
distribution, or interests arising out of the deposit guarantee would be considered
revenue sharing.

In such a contract, it was unclear, thereby bringing about an

argument between TOT and the contractor.

However, when the contract was

renewed, the OAG made it clear that those arguable items were included in the
definition of the "revenue sharing" between the parties.
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Finally, the OAG must find a measure to prevent the private party from
siphoning off its revenue or profits to its subsidiaries or affiliate companies in order to
decrease the revenue to be shared with the State.
Even the fact that the extent of the revenue sharing or the profit sharing
in which the private party will benefit from the contract is likely outside the scope and
authority of the OAG, the OAG is likely to ensure that the private party will not
receive an excessive profit or windfall from the State. In some cases, where it appears
that there have been too much unexpected profits or surplus cash flow, the OAG may
require the private party to distribute a proportional amount of the excessive profit to
the State, subject to an agreed formula.
Furthermore, after considering capital invested in the project and
standard profits which the private party should earn from the project, the OAG may
recommend that the contracting government agency quote or stipulate the ceiling
profit or maximum amount that the private party will be allowed to receive from the
contract. The reason is that, at the end, the private party should not receive any profit
more than the contractual figure.

3.4.

Relationship between the Bidder and the Contractor
Particularly for mega projects involving in large capital outlays, it

appears that the bidder is always a recognised and well-known firm with a high
reputation in its field. But when the bidder is selected, the bidder will normally set up
a new corporation to do the project, thereby signing a contract with the contracting
government agency. Such scenario is set up partly because the bidder does not want
its accounts consolidation with a contractor.
Under such circumstance, the OAG shall ensure that the new
corporation or contractor will be supported or backed up by the bidder so that the
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contractor will be able to discharge its obligations rightly. In practice, the OAG will
recommend that the bidder holds a certain ratio of the shareholdings in a contractor's
corporation throughout the contract term.

By doing so, there may be a clause

prohibiting the bidder from transferring or distributing its shareholdings in the
contractor's company for certain periods of time, or until the contractor completes the
facility and the facility is ready for the public service or utility. Furthermore, the
OAG may suggest that the bidder provides the contractor financial and technical
assistance.

3.5.

No Penalty or Fine to be Levied on the State
Due to the fact that the contract value is normally paid off by the

national budget, which comes from taxpayers, the OAG must ensure that the entire
contract will benefit the State, public, or people. Having said that, the OAG cannot
agree with any clause allowing the contracting government agency or State to be
liable to pay any penalty or fine to the private party where the contracting government
agency fails to perform its contractual obligations. As a rule, where the contracting
government agency or State violates its contractual obligations, the contracting
government agency will be liable to pay only actual or real compensation to the
private party, not punitive damages, penalties, or fines.
On the contrary, a delay or non-performance of a state contract in
respect of the provision of public service or utility could bring about inconvenience or
difficulty to people (or the "public"). Therefore, it is quite reasonable for the State to
penalize or fine the private party where the private party fails to perform its
obligations. The reason is that such non-performance by the private party not only
affects the contracting government agency as the party of the contract but it also
affects the public in general. Under such circumstance, the contracting government
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agency is still entitled to claim compensation arising from breach of contract by the
private sector, in addition to the stipulated fine.
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4.

The OAG's Internal Practice in Reviewing State Contracts

In addition to those rules mentioned earlier, the OAG also issues its
internal practice as a guideline when reviewing a state contract. Where requirements
under the internal practice are not met, the OAG may refuse to review a draft contract
and subsequently return a draft contract to the contracting government agency. The
following is the internal practice issued by the OAG when reviewing state contracts.
4.1.

Status of the Contracting Government Agency

Before the OAG reviews a draft contract, the OAG needs to check the
status of the contracting government agency that sends or submits a draft contract to
the OAG for a review. It must appear that the government official who makes a
request has full authority to do so on behalf of the contracting government agency and
that person must be at the level of the government agency chief, or in the top
management level of the agency. For the Central Administration Level, the agency
chief must be or equivalent to the director-general level.

For the Regional

Administration Level, the agency chief must be or equivalent to the provincial
governor.281 Therefore, if it appears that the person who makes a request or signs a
covering letter requesting the OAG to review a draft contract is an authority below the
director-general or the provincial governor, the OAG cannot review such a draft
contract and return the draft to the agency.
This requirement is very crucial. The reason is that subject to the
existing laws and regulations, it is not mandatory that all Government Agencies
submit a draft contract to the OAG for a review. The 1992 Regulation leaves it to the
Government Agency chiefs discretion to consider whether such a draft contract needs

281

[d. clause 5.
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to be reviewed by the OAG. 282 In addition, the OAG will be able to review a draft
contract only if all terms and conditions of a contract have been finalized and
approved by the agency chief before submitting it to the OAG. The OAG cannot
review a draft contract which its terms and conditions are not final.
It is to be borne in mind that only the contracting government agency

can request the OAG for reviewing a draft contract by signing a covering letter to the
OAG. Neither the private party nor its attorney can make a request, submit a draft
contract, or contact the OAG directly.

Apart from the contracting government

agency, the OAG never contacts or deals directly with any private party.
In cases where both parties of a contract are defined as between
Government Agencies, Local Authorities (Local Administrative Organisations), or
State Enterprises, any of these agencies can submit a draft contract to the OAG for a
revIew.

4.2.

Status of Documentation
When the contracting government agency submits a draft contract to

the OAG for a review, the contracting government agency not only submits a draft
contract, but also other documents to the OAG. Examples include terms of reference
("TOR"), specifications, or its annexes and amendments. In many cases, it appears
that a large set of documents are submitted to the OAG for a review. Therefore,
before looking at the content or substance of these documents, the OAG needs to
check the status of these documents to find out whether the OAG should accept them
for a review or send them back to the contracting government agency.
First, the OAG must ensure that a contract concerned, TOR, and all
amendments are still draft. In a case of a contract, the OAG must further check as to

282/d.

clause 132.
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whether such a contract has been signed. Otherwise, it will be useless for the OAG to
review a contract that has been signed and already binding on the parties because
under such circumstance, it is unlikely to alter or modify terms and conditions.
Therefore, in this case, the OAG is unable to review a draft contract, thereby requiring
the OAG to return the contract to the contracting government agency.
Similarly, where a draft contract has not been signed yet but its TOR
has been distributed or given to bidders, the OAG cannot review a draft contract for
the contracting government agency unless it appears that the TOR, which has been
already distributed to bidders, reserves rights to the contracting government agency.
These rights allow alteration of terms and conditions in a draft contract as to be
advised by the OAG. In this case, the OAG is supposed to review a draft contract
promptly.
It is also to be borne in mind that a draft contract must be final. A draft

contract submitted to the OAG cannot be in the negotiation process because a nonfinal draft is always changeable and negotiable. In this case, the OAG cannot review
a contract for a contracting government agency so the OAG will have to return the
draft contract to the contracting government agency to finalise it and subsequently
send it back for review.
However, in many cases the contracting government agency prefers to
have a representative of the OAG to participate in the negotiation process. In such a
case, the OAG will assign its staff to help the contracting government agency
negotiate with the private party, as requested by the contracting government agency.
Nevertheless, the participation of the

~AG's

representative in the negotiation process

does not give rise to an exception to the contracting government agency not to submit
a draft contract to the OAG. This is particularly true where it is required by law or to
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impose the OAG to agree or to be bound by tenns and conditions as drafted by the
~AG's

representative. Therefore, despite having the ~AG's representative in the

negotiation process, tenns and conditions appearing in a draft contract are not binding
on the OAG, thereby still giving rise to OAG the alteration oftenns and conditions.
More importantly, for particular projects, the OAG must ensure that
the project be approved by a competent authority beforehand.

Otherwise, a draft

contract must be returned to the contracting government agency to receive a proper
approval.

4.3.

Documents to be Reviewed
Only documents containing legal issues will be reviewed by the OAG.

The following is a set of listed documents to be reviewed: a draft contract, its annexes
and amendments, bidding documents, and others. It is to be borne in mind that a draft
contract must be final and has not yet been signed. While the main contract contains
general tenns and conditions, the annexes and amendments nonnally contain specific
conditions relevant to the main contract, and they will be treated as parts of a contract.
Examples of annexes and attachments include design, specifications, special
specifications, tenns of payment, and tenns of warranty. Furthennore, the bidding
documents nonnally consist of a fonn of invitation to bid, instructions to bidders, bid
fonn, contract fonn, fonn of letter of guarantee as bid security, fonn of letter of
guarantee as perfonnance security, and fonn of letter of guarantee as advance
payment. The other types of documents may be one of a letter of intent, notice to
proceed, letter to comfort, or memorandum of understanding.

4.4.

Languages Used
Before reviewing a draft contract, it is essential for the OAG to check

what language to be used in a contract by confinning with the contracting government
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agency. The OAG is supposed to review only a version to be used as a genuine
contract, not merely its translation. Where a contract will be executed in two (2)
languages, for example both Thai and English, the OAG will have to ensure contract
consistency in both languages. In cases of any divergence, the OAG should specify to
which contract the party will agree to comply, for example:
This Contract is executed in Thai and English. In case
of any divergence, the English text shall prevail.

4.5.

Scope and Authority of the Contracting Government Agency
As mentioned earlier, to find out whether the contracting government

agency has authority to contract with the private party, the OAG needs to look at the
Restructuring of Government Organisation Act, B.B. 2545 (2002) as well as their
royal decree of establishing divisions within individual ministries. To put it another
way, to find the scope and mandate of the main Government Agencies consisting of
the Legislative Branch (the Parliament), the Executive Branch (the Government), the
Judicial Branch, (the Judiciary) and some Independent Organisations, the OAG is
required to look at the Restructuring of Government Organisation Act, B.E. 2545
(2002), as well as their royal decree. For State Enterprises and Local Authorities
(Local Administrative Organisations), the OAG has to check with their establishment
law.

4.6.

Inquiry and Additional Information
In order to produce clear and concise contract terms and conditions

that meet what the contracting government agency is seeking, the OAG, in many
cases, will invite authorised representatives of the contracting government agency
who are in charge of the negotiating, drafting, and entering into a contract with a
private party for a meeting.

In a meeting, an authorised staff of a contracting
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government agency will be required to provide the OAG additional information, as
well as to submit relevant documents. Under such circumstance, the potential private
party or its representatives may be welcome to attend the meeting. The private party
is also welcome to give a statement and submit documents to the OAG, but only
through or on behalf of the contracting government agency. This is normally because
the OAG cannot contact or deal with the private party directly.
During the meeting, the

~AG's

responsible staff is required to keep

minutes of the meeting by stating who is attending the meeting, what additional facts
and information are given to the OAG, and what documents are submitted to the OAG
for consideration before reviewing a draft contract.
4.7.

A Key Concept of Reviewing a Draft Contract
After finding out the intention of both parties and considering all the

facts and documents, the
However, before the

~AG's

~AG's

responsible staff will start reviewing a draft contract.

responsible staff alters or changes any contract clause,

such alteration or changes to a draft contract must be better, clearer, and more concise
than the original version. Further, there must be an explanatory rationale to support
individual alteration or changes. Basically, the

~AG's

responsible staff is supposed

to alter a clause that is meaningfully material to the concept of the transaction, not just
wordings.
After finishing the review, in some cases, the OAG needs to make a
reservation together with the alteration.

The contracting government agency is

supposed to consider the reservation and alteration. The reason is that the contracting
government agency has vast discretion and is free to contract in a way it desires.
However, if the contracting government agency enters into a contract by ignoring the
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reservation or alteration made by the OAG, the contracting government agency must
be accountable for such ignorance.
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Chapter 3

Initial Impediment to the Arbitration Legal System

In the Thai legal system, there is a wide range of state contracts that
Government Agencies use as a means of entering into legal agreements with the
private sector. Under Thai law, state contracts are defined and classified based upon
the sources of their statutory acts that establish individual contract types.

Each

statutory act always sets its own elements and criteria for what constitutes a particular
type of contract.

Because state contracts are categorized and divided by laws

establishing them, reference to the sources of statutory acts is necessary to establish
the specific criteria for each contract. For example, to seek what an administrative
contract is, it is advised to look at the Establishment of Administrative Court and
Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999). Under the Administrative
Court Act, a concession contract, a contract relating to the provision of public service
or utility, a contract relating to the exploitation of natural resources, or a state-joint
venture contract can be defined as falling within the meaning of an administrative
contract and as a result, these contracts are governed by the Administrative Court Act.
The detail of the definition and categories of state contracts has been previously
addressed in Chapter 1. 283
The advantage of categorizing state contracts by using the sources of
statutory acts is, in particular, to find what kind of laws will govern a particular state
contract. Such categorization cannot however draw up dividing lines among state
contracts or distinguish one contract type from the others.

In fact, even though

individual statutory acts set up their own definition of each type of state contracts, the
definition of individual types of state contracts often overlap in practice. Therefore, it

In Chapter 1, it provides and explains the definition and categories of state contracts in the Thai law
system.

283
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is very possible to find that one particular contract may be defined and classified into
a few categories and accordingly be governed by several statutory acts.
Under Thai law, state contracts can be divided into five (5) categories:
a government procurement contract; an administrative contract; a concession contract;
a state-joint venture contract; and other. The following is a brief summary of the
significant characteristics of these five (5) state contracts.
A government procurement contract is a contract between the State
(through any of its Agencies) and a private party carrying forth a simple and
straightforward transaction. A government procurement contract more likely involves
the acquisition of ordinary supplies and services that are routinely necessary for the
administration and operation of a Government Agency. A government procurement
contract is principally governed by the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister
on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992).
An administrative contract is a contract that relates to or involves a
concession, the provision of public service or utility, or the exploitation of natural
resources, or a contract conferring privileges or superior rights upon the State. The
crucial ramification of any contract being defined as an administrative contract is that
any dispute arising out of an administrative contract shall be settled by the
Administrative Court, not the Court of Justice.

An administrative contract is

generally subject to the Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative
Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999).
A concession contract is not expressly defined in any statutory act.
Nevertheless, it is understood as a contract where the State through its Government
Agency authorizes or assigns a private party to provide public service or utility on its
behalf within a period of time with a private party's own risk and expenses. This
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means that a private party is accordingly eligible to collect charges from users (users'
charges) for its consideration. 284

Most concession contracts in Thailand are

principally but not exclusively governed by the National Executive Council
Announcement No. 58. Apparently, the National Executive Council Announcement
No. 58 regulates certain state activities, especially those involving in the provision of
public service or utility, particularly for any activity in respect of trains, trams, canal
construction, airways, water system, irrigation system, electricity, pipe gasoline, and
sea shipping. Apart from concession contracts under the National Executive Council
Announcement No. 58, some concession contracts relating to forestry shall be
accordingly subject to the Forestry Act, B.E. 2484 (1941). Likewise, a concession
contract relating to mining shall be governed by the Mine Act, B.E. 2510 (1967), or a
concession contract relating to state highways shall be under the State Highways'
Concession Act, B.E. 2542 (1999).
A state-joint venture contract is a transaction or an agreement between
the State and the private party that allows the private party to take part in the State
undertakings or activities.

The participation by the private party in the State

undertakings or activities must be authorized by law, or involving in the exploitation
of natural resources, or the utilization of the State's asset or property. A state-joint
venture can be found in the following forms: a state-joint venture with a private
sector; and a private investment with an approval, concession, or any exclusive right
granted by the State or its Government Agencies. By its nature, a state-joint venture
contract is very similar to a concession contract since both originated out of the
National Executive Council Announcement No. 58. The main distinction between a
concession contract and a state-joint venture contract is the value of a contract. While

284

Prayoon Kanchanadul, supra note 90 at 146.

161

a concession contract with its value less than one (1) billion Baht (equivalent to US$
twenty eight and fifty-seven (28.57) million)) shall be subject to the application of the
National Executive Council Announcement No. 58, a concession contract having a
value of at least or more than one (1) billion Baht (equivalent to US$ twenty eight and
fifty-seven (28.57) million)) shall be governed by the Private Participation in State
Undertakings Act, B.B. 2535 (1992).
A state contract under the "other" category is simply a contract that is
outside the other categories and, as a result, is not be specially governed by those laws
and regulations but by general rules of law as they appear in the CCC or other
relevant statutes (if any).
1.

Indistinguishable Definition of Each Type of State Contracts
Given the cursory look at the present contract types mentioned above,

there are five (5) contract categories according to their sources of statutory acts that
are unclear and indivisible. As a consequence, it is difficult in practice to differentiate
one contract type from the others because there are no hard and fast dividing lines
among them. In many cases, the definition and criteria of individual contract types
overlap.

Therefore, it always appears that one contract type can be defined and

categorized in different ways and this creates confusion because such a contract might
be governed by several different relevant acts and regulations.
The division of a state contract carrying the function of FDI from the
other is even more difficult to assess in practice. It appears that several types of
existing state contracts by their nature can represent or carry the characteristics of FDI
but they are not explicitly defined and classified as an investment contract or a state
contract relating to FDI under Thai law.

The failure of recognizing a contract as a

state contract as it relates to FDI in the Thai legal system could mean confusion over
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which relevant laws and regulations apply, especially for international arbitration law.
The reason is that under Thailand's BITs with other countries, foreign investors are
given the right to submit a dispute arising out of a state contract relating to FDI to
international arbitration where they are confident in its neutrality and impartiality.
The lack of a mechanism to differentiate a state contract relating to FDI from others
makes it impossible in practice that a dispute between the State and foreign investors
will be settled by international arbitration.
The lack of clarity surrounding each type of state contracts is therefore
considered a potential impediment to the arbitration legal system since it brings about
uncertainties of how state contracts (especially those carrying the characteristics of
FDI) should be implemented and governed. As a result, those state contracts, which
carry and represent the function of FDI, may not be treated and implemented in a way
that the Government of Thailand is committed to facilitate foreign investors to invest
their capital in Thailand under international law (for example, Thailand's BITs with
other countries).
Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate a state contract that represents
or carries the characteristics of FDI from others, whether or not it is named as such.
Only a state contract representing or carrying the characteristics of FDI as a so-called
"a state contract relating to qualifying FDI" will be specially governed by the Special
Method as proposed in Chapter 5.
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2.

Necessity for Establishing the Definition of "Investment" and "FDI," as

well as the Testing Process of "a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI"
Apparently, the term ofFDI has not been explicitly and legally defined
under Thai law. Furthermore, a state contract relating to qualifying FDI has not been
categorized as one of the contract types according to the sources of statutory acts.
Therefore, it is very doubtful and difficult to find what these terms are and what
constitutes elements of these terms under Thai law.
However, the lack of the definition of these terms does not suggest that
there is no FDI or a state contract relating to FDI in Thailand. On the other hand, FDI
or a state contract relating to FDI is commonly found in various contract types.
Certain contract types that by their very nature can represent and establish FDI are,
for example, concession contracts, state-joint venture contracts, and management
contracts.
The lack of definition around terms such as investment, FDI, and state
contracts relating to FDI has further lead to great confusion, discouraging of FDI
inflow toward the country, and untold legal battles.

Therefore, this dissertation

emphasizes the importance of defining such terms so as to distinguish a state contract
carrying the characteristics of FDI from the other state contracts whether they are
called by name as such. The dissertation also proposes that a contract, which carries
the characteristics of FDI according to the testing process, would be defined as a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI and accordingly, treated under the Special Method.
The justifications of the testing process of "a state contract relating to qualifying FDI"
that should be set up are demonstrated as follows:
First, as far as FDI is concerned, Thailand (the host state) is required
by international law to provide foreign investors some protection on FDI. At the first
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glance, Thailand is required to provide a mmlmum standard of treatment and
protection on foreign investment under customary international law. The failure of
doing so would require the opportunity of the home state to apply diplomatic
protection, raising the question of "state responsibility" for injuries to aliens against
Thailand as a host state.
In addition to Thailand's international obligations under customary
international law, Thailand is also bound by international obligations arising out of
international investment agreements into which Thailand has entered (for example,
BITs). At present, Thailand has entered into approximately forty-two (42) BITs with
other countries.

The List of Agreements on The Promotion and Protection of

Investments between Thailand and Other Countries appears in Appendix 5 of the

Appendices.
Therefore, Thailand is definitely required by either customary
international law, or international investment agreements, or both to provide foreign
investors certain protections and treatments on FDI.

The ignorance of those

international obligations will give rise to foreign investors to bring a case against
Thailand as previously mentioned in Walter Bau vs. Thailand. As a result, it is very
necessary to differentiate state contracts that relate to FDI from others, regardless of
what type of state contracts, or whether those contracts are termed investment
contracts or state contracts carrying or relating to FDI. Any state contract that carries
the function of FDI should be treated and implemented in a way that Thailand has
committed herself or is bound by international obligations.
Second, due to Thailand's international obligations as mentioned
above, the OAG must ensure that a state contract that any Government Agency enters
into with the private party and that relates to FDI must contain FDI-friendly clauses
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under customary international law and Thailand's BITs with other countries.
Therefore, there must be a tool that can differentiate a state contract carrying the
function of FDI, whether or not it is named as such from other types of state contracts
because a state contract relating to FDI is not defined and categorized as a contract
type under the existing legal system. Once a state contract relating to FDI has been
differentiated from the other, the OAG will then be able to ensure that such a contract
contains FDI -friendly clauses such as the availability of international arbitration.
Third, to encourage FDI flow to the country, the Government has
issued a package of privileges and incentives for foreign investors. In addition to
those privileges and incentives, the availability of international arbitration is the key
factor for foreign investors' consideration because it can assure that their investments
will be protected. The unavailability of international arbitration for a dispute arising
out of a state contract relating to FDI not only impairs the flow of FDI toward the
country but also affects the image of Thailand as a state in international level as it
happened to Thailand due to non-ratification of the ICSID Convention. Therefore, to
ensure that a state contract that relates to FDI, whether it is named as such, provides
international arbitration as an alternative means of dispute settlement for foreign
investors, it is necessary to differentiate a state contract that carry the function of FDI
from the other. Only a state contract relating to FDI should provide international
arbitration as an alternative settlement of disputes for foreign investors when they are
entering into a state contract relating to FDI with any Government Agency of
Thailand.
Fourth, subject to Thai law, dispute settlement resolution for each
contract type under the existing state contract categories is variable and inconsistent.
There is no uniform or standard treatment in respect to dispute settlement mechanism

166

for state contracts, especially those contracts carrying or relating to FDI.

It is

particularly true in terms of the existing arbitration laws and regulations, the
confusion of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the Administrative Court is
still unresolved, thereby resulting in the uncertainty in practice as to whether disputes
arising out of a state contract should be submitted to the Court of Justice or the
Administrative Court.

For example, while a dispute arising from a government

procurement contract shall be submitted to the Court of Justice, a dispute arising out
of a concession contract or a state-joint venture contract, shall be settled by the
Administrative Court.
Furthermore, before the Cabinet Resolution dated February 9, B.E.
2547 (2004)285 was issued, the possibility for arbitration for any type of state contracts
was allowed.

However, due to the disappointment of the arbitral award in the

Expressway case, the Council of Ministers issued the Cabinet Resolution dated
February 9, B.E. 2547 (2004) prohibiting all Government Agencies from including an
arbitration clause in a concession contract. As a result, the application of arbitration is
no longer applicable to a dispute arising out of a concession contract. In contrast, the
Cabinet Resolution requires a dispute arising out of a concession contract to be
brought into either the Court of Justice or the Administrative Court but definitely not
through arbitration.
The issuance of such Cabinet Resolution is understandable.

The

rationale behind the issuance of the Cabinet Resolution is that the Council of
Ministers is aware that the parties' obligations according to a concession contract
often involve the exercising of the State's power and can affect public policy in
general.

285

Therefore, it would be more appropriate that disputes arising from a

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers, supra note 202.
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concession contract shall be settled by judiciary consideration rather than through the
process of arbitration.

The reason is that in the arbitration process, the arbitral

tribunal is not required to apply the mandate of public interest or policy to a case even
though a concession contract grants a private party certain exclusive rights on the
provision of public service or utility or the exploitation of natural resources.
Overall, the foregoing justifications demonstrate the necessity of the
testing criteria of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI in order to differentiate a
state contract that carries the function of FDI from the other. The proposal is based on
the assumption that all state contracts carrying the function of FDI or relating to FDI,
whether they are named as such, should be treated equally according to both national
and international laws. The names and classifications of state contracts should not
make any difference in terms of legal treatment so long as they carry the same
function of FDI because they all play the same role in that by their nature, they
establish FDI in a country.
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3.

Use of Terms "Investment," "Foreign Investment," and "FDI" from

International Law Perspective
Before analyzing and defining the terms of "investment," "FDI," and
"a state contract relating to qualifying FDI," it is important to clarify the distinction
between foreign investment, portfolio investment, direct investment and FDI in
general terms from international law perspective.

Understanding these terms is

essential because it will help establish the definition and the testing process of "a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI" which is the core of this dissertation.

3.1.

General

Meaning

of

"Foreign

Investment,"

"Portfolio

Investment," "Direct Investment" and "FDI"
Foreign Investment
According to Professor Sornarajah, foreign investment involves the
transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into another country for the
purpose of generating wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the
assets. 286
In the Encyclopaedia of Pubic International Law, foreign investment is
defined as a transfer of funds or materials from one country (called the capital
exporting country or home state) to another country (called the capital importing
country or host state) in return for a direct or indirect participation in the earnings of
that enterprise. 287

Portfolio Investment
Portfolio investment is simply a movement of capital for the purpose
of buying shares in a company formed or functioning in another country. It could also

286
287

Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 7.
Encyclopaedia of Pubic International Law, vol. 8, p. 246.
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include other security instruments through which capital is raised for ventures.

288

Portfolio investment can be found in various forms of equity securities, debt
securities, bonds, money market instruments and financial derivatives such as
options. 289

Nevertheless, according to Robbins, portfolio investment can be

distinguished from FDI, in which the former does not maintain control over the
management or use of the invested assets. 290"
Direct Investment

The IMF defines the term of direct investment as the category of
international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity (a direct
investor) in one economy (a home country) obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise
resident (a direct investment enterprise) in another economy (a host country). The
lasing interest requires the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct
investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the
management of the enterprise.

Direct investment comprises not only the initial

transaction establishing the relationship between the investor and the enterprise but
also all subsequent transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both
incorporated and unincorporated. 291 The concept and definition of direct investment
as suggested by IMF lays the foundation of the definition of FDI as adopted in the
OEeD Detailed Benchmark, which will be subsequently discussed.

Sornarajah, supra note l3 at 7.
Lipsey, supra note 25 at l3.
290 Joshua Robbins, the Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties, l3 U.
Miami Int'l & Compo L. Rev. (2006) 407. Also see Alfred Escher, Current Development, Legal
Challenges, and Definition of FOI, in Legal Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment, (1999) at 21-22
(Daniel D. Bradlow and Alfred Escher, eds. 1999). Escher classifies ownership of over 10% of the
voting rights in a foreign company as foreign direct investment, since such a large voting block
indicates an interest in being able to influence the company's management decisions. Ownership of
less than 10% is considered portfolio investment for exactly the converse reason.
291 IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics and OECD Workshop on International
Investment Statistics, Direct Investment Technical Expert Group (OITEG), Issues Paper # 2 : Direct
Investment - 10 Percent Threshold of Voting Power/Equity Ownership, Employment (Apr., 2004),
available at http://www.imf.orglExternal/NP/sta/bop/pdf/diteg2.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
288

289
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Meanwhile, the United States distinguishes the difference of inward
direct investment and outward direct investment in that an inward investment was to
measure" ... all foreign equity interests in those American corporations or enterprises
which are controlled by a person or group of persons ... domiciled in a foreign
country.,,292

The term of "equity interest" covers all holdings of common and

preferred stock, advances and intercompany account.
On the other hand, the outward direct investment is defined as the
United States equity in controlled foreign business enterprises ... as statistically
defined for the purposes of the survey,,,293 covering:
(1) "Foreign corporations, the voting securities of which were owned
to the extent of twenty five (25) per cent or more by persons or groups of affiliated
persons, ordinarily resident in the United States ... "
(2) "Foreign corporation, the voting stock of which was publicly held
within the United States to an aggregate extent of fifty (50) per cent or more, but
distributed among stockholders, so that no one investor or group of affiliated
investors, owned as much as twenty five (25) per cent"
(3)

"Sole proprietorships, partnerships or real property (other than

property held for the personal use of the owner) held abroad by residents of the
United States" and
(4) "Foreign branches of the United States corporations"
Given the definition of outward direct investment, the second category
is unlikely considered "direct investment" because it includes publicly owned
companies with as little as twenty five (25) per cent of stock in scattered U.S.
holdings.

292

293

U.S. Department of Commerce, 1937, p 10.
Id. at 10.
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FDI
Following the definition of foreign investment as given by Professor
Sornarajah, he also adds that "there can be no doubt that the transfer of physical
property such as equipment or the physical property that is bought or constructed such
as plantations or manufacturing plants constitutes FDI.,,294 Therefore, FDI can be
established in either form of capital flowing into a host state or physical property like
equipment, machines, etc. brought into a host country so long as such an investment is
tentatively invested in long-term businesses to generate profits of such investment. In
this regard, Robbins emphasizes that "[T]ypically FDI involves the purchase or
development of productive facilities such as factories, mines, drilling platforms, or
offices, although it also includes ownership of subsidiary entities based in the host
state.,,295 Nowadays, the definition and scope ofFDI is much extended to cover other
items or instruments with economic value. Robbins further adds that "[I]n recent
years "intangible" forms of FDI such as patent, copyright, and trademark rights have
comprised an increasing portion of the value of total FDI flows.,,296

3.2.

Development

and

Expansion

of

FDI

under

Customary

International Law
The development and expansion of FDI have been historically derived
from the principle of "state responsibility" for "injuries to aliens" under customary
international law, that is, the host state is responsible for injuries to aliens (foreign
investors). The rule of state responsibility for injuries to aliens was considered as
justifiable grounds for applying diplomatic protection based upon the notion that the
injury done to the alien was deemed to be an injury done to his home state under

294
295
296

Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 7.
Robbins, supra note 290 at 407
[d.

172

customary international law. 297 This rule was also reaffirmed and adopted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice as follows: 298

In taking up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the
person of its nationals respect for the rules of international law. This
right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its own
nationals because in the absence of special agreement the bond of
nationality between the state and the individual which alone confers
upon it the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as part of the
function of diplomatic protection that the right to take up a claim and
to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged.

Subject to this rule, what made the state responsible for injuries to
aliens against a host state were wrongs done to aliens. For example, when there was a
situation where a host state failed to provide foreign investors a minimum standard of
treatment and protection under customary international law, a home state could claim
the rule of state responsibility for injuries to aliens against the host state and as a
result, could apply military intervention in the host state's territory. The use of armed
force by the home state to collect default debt from the host state was recognized as a
"self-help measure," and was justified subject to customary international law.
However, it is noted that the mere error in investigation or lack of
resources to investigate personal crimes was insufficient to bring responsibility upon
the host state. Only additional elements of the state's outrage, acting in bad faith,
willful negligence of duty, or insufficiency of governmental action (which was
considered so far short of international standards that any reasonable person would
readily recognize its insufficiency) could accordingly amount to international
delinquency of treatment, thereby bringing state responsibility upon the host state. 299

297
298
299

Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 138.
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (1939) Series AlB No. 76,16.
Sornarajah, supra note 13 at 151.
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Nevertheless, the use of military intervention for sovereign default was
opposed by host states, especially Latin American states. From their perspective, they
claimed that the principle of a minimum standard of treatment and protection under
customary international law was still arguable and as a result, a self-help measure for
sovereign default could not be the absolute satisfactory and appropriate means. They
argued that first, a minimum standard of treatment and protection under customary
international law could impose host states to provide standard of treatment higher than
that they provided to their own nationals. Second, as a result, the meaning and scope
of international minimum standard itself was vague and still arguable.

In

consequence, Latin American states (including developing states in Asia) disagreed
with international minimum standard, since those were perceived to be higher than
what was given to their own investors.

Third, given the principle of state

responsibility for injuries to aliens, the espousal was considered itself the dispute
settlement resolution among the parties (foreign investors, host states and home
states).
The espousal was a mechanism whereby an injured national's state
assumed the national's claim as its own and presented the claim against the state that
injured the national. 30o Once the home state stepped in by pursuing a claim against
the host state for its investor, the investor would lose control over the claim. It would
absolutely depend on the home state's discretion.
However, it was noted that the espousal itself was considered
unsatisfactory in that the national's state seemed reluctant to espouse a claim against
the host state because it could affect the relationship between the host state and home
state at the state level. Moreover, even if the espousal was to happen, the espousal

300

Vandevelde, supra note 11 at 159.
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process could eventually end up with the use of military intervention by the home
state in the host state's territory, which had been already challenged and opposed by
Latin American countries.
Therefore, the principle of "state responsibility for injuries to aliens"
seemed insufficient to guarantee that foreign investment or property in all forms, for
example, shareholders' rights vested in a company. The reason was that the principle
was not really designed to directly deal with issues in respect to foreign investment or
FDI in particular as can be seen in the Barcelona Traction Case.
In the Barcelona Traction Case,301 the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") laid down the rule that a shareholder's rights in a company could not be
protected through diplomatic intervention of the shareholders' home state. To put it
another way, the home state of the company's shareholders could not claim state
responsibility for alien injuries under customary international law on the shareholders'
behalf against the host state. ICJ rather viewed the shareholders' right in a company
as a vehicle of foreign investors. Therefore, according to customary international law,
the shareholders of the company did not have the same independent interests and
protection as the state did.

Only the state where a company (in which FDI was

invested) was incorporated would claim the responsibilities and obligations against a
host state.
As a consequence of the Barcelona Traction Case, the question arose
as to what the legal ramifications would be if FDI was operated through a company
incorporated under the host state's domestic laws and if the foreign investor was a
minority shareholder in a company. These questions had been brought into an intense
discussion among international law scholars but they had not been successfully

30l
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solved. However, to ensure that some sort of protection was provided for foreign
investors in a case like the Barcelona Traction Case, it was proposed that the same
minimum standard of treatment as provided by customary international law should be
alternatively given to foreign investors (including minority shareholders) in either
form of BITs or MITs, or FTA.

Put another way, the failure for providing treatment

and protection on FDI in the Barcelona Traction Case triggered and contributed to the
fact that the treatment and protection on FDI have been gradually developed and
expanded through BITs.
The tendency of the current BITs is not only to ensure the provision of
the minimum treatment standard as recognised by customary international law for
foreign investors but BITs also bring additional foreign investors' concerns into an
agreement between the host state and home state. The following are basic features of
BITs 302 : admission of investments; standard treatment (MFN and national treatment);
fair and equitable treatment; guarantee; expropriation and compensation; free transfer
of funds and repatriation of capitals and profits; subrogation on insurance claims;
dispute settlement resolution; transparency of national laws; and performance
requirement.
By means of BITs, the definition and scope of FDI have been
gradually expanded to include new forms of current investments. It appears that the
definition of investment and FDI is nowadays drafted in a way to provide for an openended definition of investment including an illustrative list of assets specially
protected by BITs (including all categories of assets, rights and interests). The openended definition is seen as wide enough to cover everything of economic value. 303

302 Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment
Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 NYILR. 3 (2005).
303 Id. at 4.
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From the present BITs model, the definition of FDI can be divided into
these five (5) categories: physical assets or property of foreign investors; shares in a
company (including minority shareholdings);

intellectual property (including

copyright and trademark); contractual rights; and administrative rights.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the extended definition of FDI and
investment in BITs was resulted from the need to ensure that a minimum standard of
treatment and protection on FDI according to customary international law was also
available for foreign investors (including minority shareholders). BIT is not the only
means to guarantee the protection, especially what was not covered like minority
shareholdings in those days for foreign investors but also to expand the definition of
FDI to include other forms of present investment, for example, intellectual rights,
contractual rights, etc.

3.3.

Development and Expansion of FDI under Modern International

Instruments
3.3.1. WTO Rules on Investment304
WTO is one of the most significant international instruments and it
raises issues about foreign investment or FDI. In fact, the key purpose of WTO is to
encourage and promote global trade liberalization and remove both trade (tariffs) and
non-trade barriers from the free market. Non-discriminatory treatment (consisting of
national treatment and most favored-nation ("MFN")) is a fundamental rule under
WTO. The application of the WTO rules can be demonstrated in trading in goods
under GATT 305 and trading in services under GATS?06

Somarajah, supra note 13 at 304.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,1947, LT/URlA1A1l1GATTIl [hereinafter GATT], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen browseDetail.asp?preprog=3 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
306 General Agreement on Trade in Services, LT/URlA-1B/SIl [hereinafter GATS], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen browseDetail.asp?preprog=3 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
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Even though WTO rules are mainly emphasized on trading in goods
and trading in services in general, it appeared that investment issues have been
initiated in WTO since the Uruguay Round. In fact, the WTO's instruments carrying
some investment issues have been found in GATS, TRIMs,307 and TRIPs308 but these
instruments are not intended to directly rule out legal framework and practice on
investment or FDI in particular. On the contrary, these instruments have been issued
to impose certain measures relating to investment in order to promote trade
liberalization rather than to promote capital flows through FDI. Nonetheless, it is
believed that when barriers and obstacles of trade in goods and services are removed,
free flows of capital and FDI will be automatically enhanced.
Therefore, the WTO rule as found in GATs, TRIMs and TRIPs can
enhance and contribute to the flow of FDI to certain extent. For example, GATs
provides some important measures for investor protection as FDI is seen as a mode of
supply ("commercial presence") as well as the movement of related skilled personnel
("temporary movement of natural persons"), thereby having
investments. 309

a direct bearing on

TRIMs forbids host states from imposing certain measures,

particularly for performance requirement on FDI, which could result in trade
distortion. Likewise, TRIPs requires state parties to provide certain protections on
intellectual property in which intellectual property is considered a form ofFDI.
Nevertheless, at its first Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, a Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment was set up and assigned to
conduct an in-depth study on the linkage between trade and investment. This working
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measure, LT/URlA-1A/13 [hereinafter TRlMs], available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen browseDetail.asp?preprog=3 (last visited Apr. 21,2009).
308 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, LT/URlA-1C/IP/1 [hereinafter
TRIPs], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen browseDetail.asp?preprog=3 (last visited Apr. 21,
2009).
309 Peter Nunnenkamp & Manoj Pant, KlEL DISCUSSION PAPERS, Why the Case for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment Is Weak? (Mar. 2003) 14-15.
307
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group was required to work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental
organizations (including UNCTAD), and through appropriate regional and bilateral
channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resource assistance to respond to
these needs. 310
In a study conducted by A Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment, it reveals that in terms of investment, the developing
countries would likely adopt and accept only long-term investment rather than shortterm investment in their countries. More importantly, they would prefer greenfield
investment more than mergers and acquisitions of existing ventures. They claimed
that a long-term foreign direct investment would benefit them as host states as well as
contribute to the expansion of trade liberalization. On the other hand, short-term
investment and portfolio investment, which could promote free movement of capital,
may be damaging to the economies of host states as previously happened in the Asian
financial crisis in 1997. It was believed that the Asian financial crisis was partly
triggered by the abrupt pullout of portfolio investment.

Therefore, from the

developing countries' perspective, they were confident that only long-term foreign
investment would contribute to trade liberalization and should be protected.
On the other hand, the developed countries preferred a broader, assetbased definition of foreign investment, which is known as an open-ended definition of
investment and includes small portions of shareholdings such as portfolio investments
and every kind of assets that have economic value.

WTO, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment To
the General Council, WT/WGTI/S (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http;llwww.intemational.gc.caltradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/S-en.doc (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
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3.3.2. The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investment3 !! and The 1998 Framework Agreement on ASEAN
Investment Area
The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investment
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("A SEAN") was
established on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok by the five (5) original Member Countries,
namely: Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand.

Brunei

Darussalam joined ASEAN on January 8, 1984, Vietnam on July 28, 1995, Lao PDR
and Myanmar on July 23, 1997, and Cambodia on April 30, 1999. Main purposes of
the Association are to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region and promote regional peace and stability through abiding
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region
and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The ASEAN

Community comprises three pillars, namely: ASEAN Security Community; ASEAN
Economic Community; and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.312
As to the Promotion and Protection of Investment, the ASEAN
Economic Community issues the end-goal of economic integration measures as
outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020 that is to create a stable, prosperous and highly
competitive ASEAN economic region, in which there is a free flow of goods,

311
AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENT OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM,
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, AND THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND FOR THE PROMOTION
AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS Manila (Dec. 15, 1987) [hereinafter the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestment].
312 ASEAN, Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last
visited Apr. 22, 2009).
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services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and
reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020. 313
As far as the definition of investment and FDI are concerned, the 1987
ASEAN Agreement applies an open-ended definition and provides an illustrative list
that is wide enough to cover everything with economic value.
In accordance with the 1987 ASEAN Agreement, the term of
"investment,,314 is defined as every kind of asset and in particular shall include,
though not exclusively:
(a)

movable and immovable property and any other proper rights

such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(b)

shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interests in the

property of such companies;
(c)

claims to money or to any performed under contract having a

financial value;
(d)

intellectual property rights and goodwill;

(e)

business concessions conferred by law or under contract,

including concessions to search for, cultivative, extract, or exploit natural resources.
Notwithstanding these lists, only the investment subject to the
following conditions shall be protected by the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments.
First, the investment shall be characterized as an inward direct
investment.

313

The inward direct investment is simply an investment brought into,

[d.

The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestment, supra note 311, art. I
(3).

314
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derived from or directly connected with investment brought into the territory of any
Contracting Party. 315
Second, for a new investment, a new FDI must receIve specific
approval in writing and registration from the host state. However, for the existing
investments made before the 1987 Agreement entered into force for the host state,
these investments must be specially approved in writing and registered by the host
state and upon conditions as the host state deems fit for purposes of this Agreement
. .

.

c

sub sequent m Its entry mto lorce.

316

Third, a company, which makes an investment in a host country must
be incorporated or constituted under the laws in force in the territory of another
Contracting Party and must have its place of effective management in that Contracting
Party. 317
The 1998 Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area
The 1998 Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area was
issued to establish a competitive ASEAN Investment Area ("AIN") with a more
liberal and transparent investment environment amongst Member States as well as to
enhance ASEAN attractiveness and competitiveness for promoting external direct
investments from non-Member States. The arrangement under the 1998 Framework
Agreement is to liberalize the movement of investment within the ASEAN area,
thereby enabling the free movement of investment in either form of capital, assets,
technology transfer, personnel among the ASEAN states as well as outside states.
Subject to the 1998 Framework Agreement, Member States are
encouraged to negotiate with other ASEAN states to remove internal barriers in order
to create a liberal common market. With the removal of internal barriers, outside
I d. art. II (1).
Id. art. II (3).
317 !d. art. I (2).
315

316
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investors may more easily take advantage of the diverse benefits of various ASEAN
states? 18 Therefore, it will encourage and attract non-Member States to put their
investment within ASEAN Investment Area. At the end, ASEAN will be capable of
negotiating a much more favourable agreement with outside states than would any of
the member states be acting alone. 319
Unlike the 1987 ASEAN Agreement, the 1998 Framework Agreement
is not directly intended to provide guidelines or any promotion and protection on
investment to Member States. On the contrary, it recalls the commitment arising from
previous documents, which has already entered into force.

The 1998 Framework

Agreement recalls Member States to their commitment to the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement and the 1996 Protocol to enhance investors' confidence for investing in
ASEAN, and to reaffirm the importance of sustainable economic growth and
development as enshrined in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN
Economic Co-operation signed in Singapore on January 28 1992. 320
Even though the 1998 Framework Agreement is not aimed to define
the terms of investment and FDI, it, on the contrary, designates the coverage of the
Agreement. It appears that the 1998 Framework Agreement however outlines the
scope of "FDI" to certain degree. At the very least, this 1998 Framework Agreement
excludes portfolio investments and matters relating to investments covered by other
ASEAN Agreements, such as the 1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
Joel Vander Kooi, THE ASEAN ENHANCED DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: DOING
IT THE "A SEAN WAY," 20 NYILR 1 20. Also See Terence 1. Lau, Distinguishing Fiction from
Reality: The ASEAN Free Trade Area and Implications for the Global Auto Indus., 31 DAYTON L.
REV . 453, 461 (2006); White, supra note 84, at 162-71; Shin-Yi Peng, Note, Economic Relations
between Taiwan and Southeast Asia: A Review of Taiwan's "Go South" Policy, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J.
639,647 (1998).
319 See Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992,31 I.L.M. 498; also see George O. White III,
Comment, From Snowplows to Siopao-Trying to Compete in a Global Marketplace: The ASEAN Free
Trade Area, 8 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 177, 195 (2000).
320 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter the 1998
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area], available at
http://www.aseansec.org17994.pdf(last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
318
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from the definition of "investment.,,321 Nevertheless, it is to be borne in mind that the
1998 Framework Agreement does not require foreign investors to receive specific
approval nor require them to have the effective management like the 1987 ASEAN
Agreement. 322

3.3.3. International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
According to the Balance of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition
("BPM5"),323 which adopts a narrow sense, FDI refers to an investment made to
acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor.
Further, in cases of FDI, the investor's purpose is to gain an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise. The foreign entity or group of associated entities that
make the investment is termed the "direct investor."

The unincorporated or

incorporated enterprise --a branch or subsidiary, respectively, in which direct
investment is made-- is referred to as a "direct investment enterprise." Some degree
of equity ownership is almost always considered to be associated with an effective
voice in the management of an enterprise; the BPM5 suggests a threshold of ten (10)
per cent of equity ownership to qualify an investor as a foreign direct investor. The
forms of investment by the direct investor, which are classified as FDI are equity
capital, the reinvestment of earnings, and the provision of long-term and short-term
intra-company loans (between parent and affiliate enterprises).324 The definition of
FDI provided by the BMP5 also corresponds with that defined by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD").

!d. art. 2.
!d. art. l.
323 IMF, The Balance of Payments Manual:
Fifth Edition (BPM5) (1993), available at
http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2009). Also see DECD,
Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment: Third Edition (BD3) (1996), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecdIl01l6/2090148.pdf(last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
324 UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), available at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3146&lan (last visited June 14,2009).
321

322
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3.3.4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD")
OEeD defines FDI in the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign
Direct Investment: Third Edition ("BD3") in that FDI reflects the objective of
obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy ("direct investor") in
an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor ("direct investment
enterprise"). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship
between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on
the management of the enterprise.

Direct investment involves both the initial

transactions between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between
them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. It also
includes a flow of lending to, or purchase of ownership in a foreign enterprise that is
largely owned (at least ten (10) per cent ownership, according to the United States
balance of payments accounts) by residents of the investing country.

Direct

investment implies full or partial control of the enterprise and, usually, the physical
presence by foreign firms or individuals in the host country. 325 A threshold of ten
(10) per cent of equity ownership is required to qualify an investor as a foreign direct
investor and this number makes the dividing line between foreign direct investors and
portfolio investors. Therefore, a foreign investor holding less than ten (10) per cent of
the ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise simply qualifies as a portfolio
investor and therefore does not entitle that investor to minimum treatment standards
under customary intemationallaw.

3.3.5. U.S. Model BIT

325

OEeD, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment: Third Edition (BD3) 7-8 (1996),

available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l0116/2090148.pdf (last visited June 23,2009).
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The United States currently adopts the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, which
also provides an open-ended definition of investment. According to the 2004 U.S.
Model BIT, the definition of "investment" is divided into three (3) categories: general
definition; non-exclusive list; and additional covered investment.
As the first category, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT defines the term of
"investment" as every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly,
that has the characteristics of investment.

Such characteristics include the

commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the
assumption of risk. However, the term of "investment" does not include an order or
judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action. 326
In terms of the second category, the Model provides the following
items in addition to the general definition of investment:

(1 )

an enterprise;

(2)

shares, stock and other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise;

(3)

bonds, debentures, other debt instruments and loans 327 ;

(4)

futures, options and other derivatives;

(5)

turnkey, construction, management, production, concession,
revenue-sharing and other similar contracts;

(6)

intellectual property rights;

(7)

licenses, authorizations, permits and similar rights conferred

Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America And the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection ofInvestment 4 (2004) [hereinafter the 2004
Model BIT], available at
www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Sectors/Investment/Model BIT/asset upload file847 6897.pdf (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009).
327 It seems that most forms of bonds, debentures, debts and loans carrying long-term obligations are
more likely considered an investment. On the other hand, even though certain forms of debts, such as
claims to payment that are immediately due and derived from the sales of goods or services are less
likely to have such characteristics of an investment, they could be however defined an investment. See
the 2004 U.S. Mode BIT, Footnote 1 p 3.

326
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pursuant to domestic law; and
(8)

other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property
and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and
pledges.

As to the third category, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT includes any
alteration of the form, in which the existing assets are invested or reinvested as well as
activities associated with the existing investment as "covered investment."

The

covered investment is defined as an investment in the territory of an investor of the
other Party in existence at the date of entry into force of this Treaty or established,
acquired or expanded thereafter. 328
3.3.6.

Thailand's BITs

From the BITs that Thailand has entered into with other countries, it
appears that Thailand also adopts the open-ended definition (i.e., a very wide assetbased approach), thereby being able to include almost everything with economic
value. The open-ended definition does not only provide the general definition of
investment but also encompasses items on the non-exclusive list, and additional
covered investment as can be found in the U.S. Model BIT.
As to the general definition of "investment," which also provides a
non-exclusive list, it appears that Thailand adopts the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for
the Promotion and Protection ofInvestment as a model in most of Thailand's BITs as
follows:
The term of "investment" is defined as every kind of asset and in
particular shall include, though not exclusively:

328

The 2004 Model BIT, supra note 326, art. 1.
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(a)

movable and immovable property and any other proper rights

such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(b)

shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interests in the

property of such companies;
(c)

claims to money or to any performed under contract having a

financial value;
(d)

intellectual property rights and goodwill;

(e)

business concessions conferred by law or under contract,

including concessions to search for, cultivative, extract, or exploit natural resources.
Regarding the additional covered investment, Thailand Model BIT also
includes any alteration of the form in which assets are invested provided that such
alteration does not affect their characteristics as investment and the alteration must be
consistent with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory
the investment were made. However, the portfolio investment is excluded from the
definition of investment under Thailand Model BIT.
With the open-ended definition, the definition and scope of the term
FDI seem variable and dynamic, having evolved to facilitate and cope with the
development of new economic derivatives or instruments.
Like the 1987 ASEAN Agreement, only the investment that meets the
following conditions shall be entitled to claim protections under Thailand Model BIT.
First, the investment shall be characterized as an inward direct
investment.

The inward direct investment is simply an investment brought into,
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derived from, or directly connected with investments brought into the territory of any
Contracting Party by nationals or companies of any other Contracting Party.329
Second, such FDI must receive specific approval in writing and
registration from the host state for the new investment.

As for the existing

investments made before this Agreement entered into force, these investments must
have been specially approved in writing and registered by the host state under such
conditions as it deems fit for purposes of this Agreement subsequent in its entry into
force. 33o This is a so-called the admission of investment.
In Thailand, only foreign investors who receive the Certificate of
Approval for Protection ("CAP"), as issued by the Committee on the Approval for the
Protection of Investment, will be eligible to enjoy rights and privileges as conferred
by Thailand Model BIT.

To obtain a CAP, foreign investors need to meet the

conditions and requirements as designated by the Committee.

Meanwhile, the

Committee is required to take into consideration the benefits in relation to the nation's
safety and security; economic and social development; technology transfer and
research for development; public order and good moral; art; culture and tradition of
the country; natural resource conservation; energy and environment protection; and
. 331
consumer protectIon.
Third, foreign investors can be either natural persons who are nationals
of another Contracting Party, or juridical persons. In cases of juridical persons, they
can form a company, corporation, partnership, or other business associations provided

The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, supra note 311, art.
II (1).
330 Id. art. II (3).
331 The Announcement of the Committee on the Approval for the Protection of Investment between
Thailand and Other Countries No. MFA 07041112003 concerning Foreign Investment Protection under
the Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of the
Kingdom of Thailand and Foreign Governments dated October 22, 2003.
329
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that they must be incorporated or constituted under the laws in force in the territory of
another Contracting Party wherein the place of effective management is situated.

332

To review, the preceding section illustrates the legal methodology
regarding FDI, emphasizing the importance of the definition and scope of FDI from
relevant modem international instruments. It explained how the terms of FDI and
investment have been gradually defined, developed, and expanded from the
perspective of customary international law to the perspective of modem international
law as found in BITs, MITs or FTA. Not only the definition of FDI and investment
have been expanded but the scope and application of FDI have been also extended. A
Summary of Definitions and Scope of "FDI" under Modem International Instruments
is demonstrated in Appendix 7 of the Appendices. The next section will seek to get
closer to explore the testing process of "a state contract relating to qualifying FDI" as
well as the definition of "investment" and "FDI."

332 The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestment, supra note 311, art. I
(2).
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4.

Testing Process of a "State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI"
After having explored the definition and scope of investment and FDI

from international law perspective, this dissertation proposes that the testing process
that sets up the criteria and conditions of a "state contract relating to qualifying FDI"
should be established as well as that the terms "state contract," "investment" and
"FDI" should be defined. The proposal is to provide the

~AG's

staff with guideline

and reference material in order to help them differentiate a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI from other types of state contracts.
The main purpose for establishing the testing process of a "state
contract relating to qualifying FDI" and the definition of "state contract,"
"investment" and "FDI" is to examine whether a prospective state contract to be
entered between the State (through its agency) and the private party carries or forms
FDI. In determining whether a prospective state contract is a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI, the OAG is required to take the nature and characteristics of a
contract concerned into account, whether or not it is named as such. If a state contract
establishes FDI, such a contract would be within the scope of the defined "state
contract relating to qualifying FDI," thereby being governed by the Special Method.
The Special Method would ensure that first, a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI that is to be transacted between the State or Government Agency and
foreign investors would be treated and protected appropriately under customary
international law and by the international investment agreements into which Thailand
has entered. The reason for this is that Thailand as a host state is required to provide a
minimum standard of treatment and protection on foreign investment for foreign
investors under customary international law and international investment agreements
or treaties into which Thailand has entered.
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Second, where a dispute from a state contract relating to qualifying
FDI arises, the Special Method ensures that the dispute would be amicably solved to
the satisfaction of both parties. The Special Method would provide a two-tier dispute
settlement mechanism for the parties.

At the initial resolution, the parties are

encouraged to settle their dispute between themselves within a period of time unless
they have failed in doing so.

Under such circumstances, the parties will be

subsequently referred to the Consultation and Negotiation where a national
commission as a third party will help the parties reach an agreement. As a second tier
mechanism, once local remedy of the Consultations and Negotiation has been
exhausted, the parties would be further referred to settle dispute before international
arbitration where Thailand has become a member. By a two-tier mechanism, the
State would be required to put great efforts to help the parties seek a resolution that
would both benefit the parties amicably.
Third, the Special Method would allow the State to exercise its power
over foreign investors or FDI under special circumstances provided that foreign
investors would be appropriately compensated. This means that even though the State
through its Government Agency enters into an agreement with the private party, the
State also reserves exclusive rights to unilaterally alter, amend, or terminate such an
agreement, for example, for expropriation. This is to affirm that the State still has and
reserves full permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources and selfdetermination of its people as recognised by the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1803 (XVII).
Based upon the proposal, the testing process of a "state contract
relating to qualifying FDI" can be divided into three (3) steps: testing criteria of the
foreign element; testing criteria and conditions of qualifying FDI; and testing criteria
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of qualifying FDI invested in a state contract. According to the testing process, a
prospective investment will be brought to the test according to these three (3) steps
respectively.

As to the first step, there are four (4) testing criteria: place of

incorporation; exclusive ownership; percentage of foreign shareholdings; and
controlling power in a corporation. By doing so, a prospective investment will be
tested with one testing criterion at a time, from the first criterion to the final criterion
respectively. When a prospective contract fails to meet the first criterion, the next
criterion will be applied to the contract until the final criterion will have been applied.
Only a contract representing FDI falling into one of these testing criteria will be
brought to the second step. The purpose of the second step is to examine whether a
prospective investment holding the foreign element qualifies as a foreign direct
investment, per se, "qualifying FDI." Then only qualifying FDI made in a state
project by a means of state contracts as specified in the third step will be defined as "a
state contract relating to qualifying FDI" and accordingly governed by the Special
Method.

The Flowchart of the Testing Process of "a State Contract Relating to

Qualifying FDI" is demonstrated in Appendix 8 of the Appendices.
4.1.

Testing Criteria of the Foreign Element
This step is to testify as to whether a prospective investment

constitutes or holds the foreign element. In fact, to seek whether the prospective
investment holds or carries the element of having foreign involvement is to seek
whether the investment's owner (both natural and juridical person) has foreign
nationality or alternatively the majority shareholder holds foreign nationality or
otherwise the foreigner has controlling power over such investment. In this process,
there are four (4) testing criteria: place of incorporation; exclusive ownership;
percentage of foreign shareholdings; and controlling power in a corporation. By this
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step, a prospective investment will be tested with one of these four (4) testing criteria
at a time until it meets conditions set forth by either criterion and as a result, it will
then be brought to the test in the next step. If a prospective investment fails to meet
conditions set forth by these four (4) testing criteria, such an investment will never
qualify as a state contract relating to qualifying FDI, thereby being outside the Special
Method's scope.
The first three criteria (place of incorporation and registration,
exclusive ownership, and percentage of foreign shareholdings) will look at or take
legal status or certification of the investment concerned into consideration.
Meanwhile, the fourth testing criterion of having effective voice in management will
look at de facto management over the investment in that who has an effective voice in
management over such investment. Upon the testing process, only an investment
holding the element of having foreign involvement will be further tested under the
second and third steps respectively.

4.1.1. Place of Incorporation and Registration
Although there are various criteria to determine the corporate
nationality according to international law and practice, the most widely accepted
method is by way of the incorporation or registered office. The place of incorporation
and registration has been traditionally seen as a classic test to determine the corporate
nationality. In other words, the location of a company's registered office determines
its nationality under the incorporation theory.333 It is further found that in determining

Christian Kersting, Comorate Choice of Law: A Comparison of the United States and European
Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 Brook. J. Int'! L.l,2,37 (2002).

333
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the corporate nationality, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands
. th eory. 334
·
end orse the InCorporatIOn
Additionally, the test of the place of incorporation has been largely
adopted by ICSID tribunal, for example in SOABi 35 :

The Tribunal has observed that the Convention does not define
the term "nationality," thus leaving to each State the power to
determine whether or not a company is possessed of its nationality. As a
general rule, States apply either the head office or the place of
incorporation criteria in order to determine nationality. By contrast,
neither the nationality of the company's shareholders nor foreign
control, other than over capital, normally govern the nationality of a
company, although a legislature may invoke these criteria in exceptional
circumstances. Thus, "a juridical person which had the nationality of
the Contracting State, party to the dispute, " the phase used in Article
25(2)(b) of the Convention, is a juridical person which, in accordance
with the laws of the State in question, has its head office or has been
incorporated in that State.
Such a reasoning is, in law, not in accord with the Convention.
Indeed, the concept of nationality is there a classical one, based on the
law under which the juridical person has been incorporated, the place of
incorporation and the place of the social seat. An exception is brought
to this concept in respect of juridical persons having the nationality,
thus defined, of the Contracting State Party to the dispute, where said
. 'd'lca I persons are un der forelgn
i ' con tro1.336
Jun

According to the first criterion, a company, which is incorporated and
registered in a country other than Thailand, is qualified as a foreign company having
its nationality of the state where it is incorporated and registered. Therefore, any
investment brought into Thailand by a company incorporated in a country other than

334 Nicole Rothe, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European Union: An Analysis
of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Uberseering Case, 53 Am.U.L.Rev. 1103, 1111
(2004).
335 Societe Ouest Africaine des Betons Industriels v Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/8211, p 181. See
also Autopista Concesuibada de Venezuela, c.A. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezula, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/5 at note 108, p 41. See also Bernardo M. Cremades, Arbitration between States and
investors: some jurisdiction issues, in Business Law International 157, 160-162 (May, 2001).
336 In Amco v Indonesia, Amco Asia Corporation, a U.S. corporation, submitted an application to the
Indonesia Investment Board for the establishment of a foreign business incorporated in Indonesia.
Upon the approval of the Indonesia Investment Board, Amco formed a local company to construct and
operate a hotel in Jakarta.
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Thailand is considered to be holding the foreign element, thereby being treated as a
foreign company under Thai law.
4.1.2. Exclusive Ownership
In terms of the second testing criterion, taking the ownership of foreign
investment or FDI into consideration is of great importance.

The place of

incorporation and registration of foreign investment or FDI will be disregarded.
Under the second testing criterion, if the investment or FDI is entirely owned by
foreign investors through or in a form of natural persons or juridical persons, the
investment would be considered to be holding the foreign element and shall be treated
as a foreign company under Thai law. An investment that is entirely owned by
foreign investors can be invested in a country in the following forms: through local
natural persons, local juridical persons, joint venture, consortium, etc.
The criterion of the exclusive ownership is without difficulty when it
comes to establishing of the degree of foreign involvement. On the contrary, the
jointly owned investment may bring some complications in finding the degree of
involvement of foreign investors. In a case where the ownership of an investment is
shared between local investors and foreign investors, it is essential to find out the
proportion of the ownership that will dictate whether the investment falls under the
third testing criterion.
4.1.3. Percentage of Foreign Shareholdings
By this criterion, any foreign investment or FDI, which is jointly
owned of more than fifty (50) per cent in value by foreign investors, would constitute
foreign involvement, thereby falling within the scope of having the foreign element.
In other words, a corporation, even one incorporated and registered under Thai law
but having shares of more than fifty (50) per cent held by foreign investors, would be
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considered a foreign corporation under Thai law. 337 This testing criterion simply
looks at the percentage or proportion of shareholdings of a company incorporated and
registered under domestic law. The investment of more than fifty (50) per cent of
shareholdings held by foreign investors will be simply within the scope subject to the
Special Method even though such an investment is invested in a company
incorporated and registered under domestic law.
4.1.4. A Voice in the Management/ Controlling Power
If an investment fails to meet the criteria set forth in (4.1.1.)-(4.1.3.),
the investment in question will be tested according to the final criterion.

This

criterion disregards the place of incorporation and registration of a company. It also
disregards the exclusive ownership as well as portions of shareholdings invested in a
corporation by foreign investors. This criterion does not pay much attention to the
legal status of a corporation making the investment in question under the above
testing criteria. On the contrary, it simply looks at de facto controlling management
or power over the investment.
This criterion, known as the "control" test in contrast with the
incorporation theory in (4.1.1.), is also referred to as the "real seat" doctrine. This test
requires that a company should abide by the law of the state where it carries on its
principal business and should not be able to escape the "legal, economic, and social
values" of that country.,,338 The real seat theory applies to many countries within the
European Union such as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. 339

337 Foreign Business Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) (Thai!.) is considered the most crucial law governing aliencontrolled businesses in Thailand as originally derived from the National Executive Council
Announcement No. 281 ofB.E. 2515 (1972) (Thai!.).
338 Werner F. Ebke, The Real Seat Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36 int'l Law. 1015,
1026-28 (2004).
339 Rothe, supra note 334 at 1103, 1111.
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Additionally, this "control test" (foreign control) corresponds to the
exception according to Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.

34o

It is reaffirmed

by the arbitral tribunal under the ICSID Convention by ruling that all locally
incorporated entities, which are subject to foreign control, can constitute the criteria of
being foreign nationals (nationals of another Contracting State).341 With this regard,
the ICSID's tribunal in Holiday Inns v Morocco 342 upheld that the Government of
Morocco itself had requested the foreign parties to form the companies in question
and that there was ample documentary evidence that Morocco had at all times treated
the H.I.S.A. companies (locally incorporated companies) as alter egos of their foreign
parent companies. 343
Likewise, even if a corporation was incorporated and registered under
Thai law, a corporation incorporated and registered under Thai law would be deemed
a foreign corporation provided that foreign investors had effective voice in the
management of a corporation. This testing criterion simply examines whether foreign
investors have controlling power over a company operated in Thailand. If it appears
that they have power to control the company's businesses, such investment would be

Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention provides:
any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the
dispute on that date and which, because offoreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated
as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
341 William Rand, Robert N. Hornick & Paul Friedland, ICSID's Emerging Jurisdiction: The Scope of
ICSID's Jurisdiction, 19 N.Y.U.J. Int'I L. & Pol. 33, 46 (1986).
342 In Holiday Inns V Morocco, the 1966 Joint Venture agreement was entered into between the
Government of Morocco and two U.S. companies (Occidental Petroleum Corporation "O.P.C." and
Holiday Inns) for construction of Gulf Oil Gasoline Station and four Holiday Inns hotels in Morocco
with an ICSID clause. In addition to this Joint Venture Agreement, these two (2) principal investors
formed Moroccan companies consisting of a Swiss subsidiary of Holiday Inns, Holiday Inns S.A. of
Glarus, and a subsidiary of O.P.C. as requested by the Government of Morocco because local law
limited the government to transact with foreign companies. Apparently, the agreement between the
Government of Morocco and these local subsidiaries did not contain an ICSID clause.
343 Id. at 46. See also Pierre Lalive, "The First World Bank Arbitration (Holiday Inns V Morocco) Some Legal Problem, 1980 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123.
340
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considered to be holding the foreign investment and treated as a foreign company
under Thai law.
In fact, this testing criterion is issued to close loopholes of the Foreign
Business Act, B.E. 2542 (1999). It is particularly true in a jointly owned company
where Thai investors hold fifty one (51) per cent and foreign investors hold forty nine
(49) per cent of a company's shareholdings. Under Thai law, to be eligible to operate
reserved businesses under alien business law, foreign investors usually keep their
shareholding ratio at forty nine (49) per cent but still have de facto controlling power
over a company. For example, when setting up a company, foreign investors would
stipulate some conditions in a memorandum of association requiring that certain
important matters must be approved by foreign shareholders even though they are
considered minority shareholders. In some cases, foreign shareholders are entitled by
a memorandum of association to appoint or discharge a managing director of a
company. Even having no exclusive ownership or being minority shareholders of a
company, foreign investors still have effective power in the management of a
company's operation.
4.2.

Testing Criteria and Conditions of Qualifying FDI
Once it becomes clear that a prospective investment holds the foreign

element, the next step is to testify that such an investment qualifies as "qualifying
FDL" In doing so, it is essential to lay down the definition and scope of these terms
"investment" and "FDI" as well as conditions of "qualifying FDL" The following is
the proposed definition and scope to these terms by adopting it from intemationallaw.
"Investment"
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To help understand the definition ofFDI better and more thoroughly, it
is necessary to define "investment," a term, which can be classified in three (3) ways:
a general open-ended definition; a non-exclusive list; and additional covered list.
As to the general open-ended definition, "investment" is defined as
every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the
characteristics of a long-term investment. The characteristics of an investment can be
found in a form of the commitment for providing capital, or other resources, or the
expectation of gain or profit from businesses invested, or etc.
In addition to the general open-ended definition, an illustrative list,
known as the non-exclusive list is provided in that investment is defined as every kind
of asset and in particular shall include, though not exclusively:
(1)

tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property and any

other proper right such as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges;
(2)

shares, stock and other forms of equity participation

(3)

bonds, debentures, other debt instruments and loans;

(4)

futures, options and other derivatives;

(5)

turnkey, construction, management, production, conceSSIOn,

III

a

corporation;

revenue-sharing and other similar contracts;
(6)

claims to money or to any performed under contract having a

financial value;
(7)

intellectual property rights and goodwill;

(8)

licenses, authorizations, permits and similar rights conferred

pursuant to domestic law; and
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(9)

business concessions conferred by law or under contract,

including concessions to search for, cultivative, extract, or exploit natural resources.
Finally, it includes additional covered investment, encompassing any
alteration of the form, in which the existing assets are invested, or reinvested, or
activities associated with the existing investment. However, the alteration must not
affect the characteristics of the investment and the alteration must be consistent with
Thai laws and regulations.
Examples of state contracts forming investments include a construction
..
i ' 345 a management and
contract,344 a Jomt
venture agreement f
or constructIOn,
construction contract,346 a turnkey construction and operation contract,347 or
investment licence through an investment application approved by the Investment
Board (like the Board ofInvestment of Thailand "BOI,,).348
"FDI"

The term "FDI" is therefore defined as an investment in all forms
having their economic value that is transferred from one country (a home state) into
another country (a host state) to obtain long-term interest and to gain an effective
voice in the management of businesses or enterprises invested.

In Alcoa v Jamaica, a U.S. corporation (Alcoa) and the Government of Jamaica, entered into an
agreement that Alcoa undertook to construct at its own expense an alumina refining plant in Jamaica
and the Government of Jamaica, in return, was to confer tax concessions upon Alcoa and grant Alcoa
long-term mining leases.
345 In Holiday Inns v Morocco, two U.S. companies and the Government of Morocco entered into a
joint venture agreement for the construction and operation of the Gulf Oil Gasoline Station and four
Holiday Inns hotels in Morocco. The Government of Morocco undertook to lend these companies a
loan needed for construction as well as to grant them foreign exchange transfer facilities, duties
exemptions, and other tax benefits.
346 Id.
347 In Klockner v Cameroon, a German multinational group and the United Republic of Cameroon
entered into a joint venture agreement for the construction and operation of a fertilizer factory in
Cameroon. In return, the Government of Cameroon undertook to furnish an appropriate site for the
factory and to guarantee payment of a loan covering the cost of the factory.
348 Autopista Concesuibada de Venezuela, c.A. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezula, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/5 at note 98, p 38. See also Bernardo M. Cremades, Arbitration between States and investors:
some jurisdiction issues, in Business Law International 157, 160-162 (May, 2001).
344

201

It is to be borne in mind that the proposed definition of investment and

FDI is mainly intended to provide general understanding of these terms. Therefore,
there would be channels open to developing and accommodating new forms of
investment into this definition.
Testing Criteria and Conditions of "Qualifying FDI"
Only the investment holding the foreign element that meets all of the
following testing criteria and conditions will be considered "qualifying FDI," thereby
falling within the scope of "a state contract relating to qualifying FDI."
4.2.1. Inward Investment
The investment to be governed by the Special Method must be an
inward investment. The inward investment is simply an investment brought into,
derived from, or directly connected with investment brought into Thailand of any
other countries by nationals or companies of any other countries.
4.2.2. Exclusion of Portfolio Investment
Long-term investment can most reflect real functions and objectives of
investment, which does not simply include purchasing shares in a company. From the
host states' perspective, long-term investment is considered much more beneficial and
preferable as it can help stabilize economic conditions as well as stimulate economic
growth in a country. Therefore, the definition of investment shall exclude portfolio
investment: a movement of capital for the purpose of buying shares in a company or
corporation formed or functioning in Thailand.
4.2.3. Investment Value Not Less Than One Billion Baht
Not every investment holding the foreign element qualifies as qualifying
FDI. Only investment worth up to the requiring minimum threshold shall be within
the scope of the Special Method. This requirement is for the benefit and effectiveness
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of the administration of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI under the Special
Method. To qualify as qualifying FDI, the value of the investment shall be worth not
less than one (1) billion Baht (equivalent to twenty eight (28) billion U.S. dollars).
Therefore, any investment holding the foreign investment worth less than one (1)
billion Baht shall not be subject to the Special Method.

4.2.4. Effective Management in Another Country
To be governed by the Special Method, it must appear that the
investment owned or controlled by foreign investors must have the place of effective
management in a country other than Thailand. This is to prevent foreign investors
from setting up a company outside Thailand as their nominees in order to enjoy
promotions and protections on investment under domestic law (including the Special
Method). This requirement also prohibits local investors from setting up a company
that is to be incorporated in a country other than Thailand and as a result, it would be
defined as a foreign company under Thai law in order to claim privileges under the
Special Method. Otherwise, there would be no real FDI brought into a country since
such an investment is owned by Thai nationals or local investors.

Under such

circumstance, the main purposes and functions of FDI would have never been
achieved unless there had been real long-term investment in a host state.
The adverse consequences of the application of nominees are
exemplified in a case of tax evasion by a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's
family tax-free sale of shares in the telecom giant Shin Corp to the Singaporean
government's investment arm Temasek Holding. Even though the facts in this case
do not directly raise investment issues, this case has implications for the application of
nominees in Thailand.
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Shin Corp is linked by stock control to the following companies: Shin
Satellite, Advance Info Services, Thai AirAsia, and ITV.349 All of these companies
have been granted and licensed by the State (the Government of Thailand) and are
now in the hands of Singapore's Temasek Holding. Shin Corp has been granted a
license from Thailand's Ministry of Transport and Communication to launch and
operate satellites in Thailand. Advanced Info Services has been granted a concession
by the Telephone Organization of Thailand ("TOT") to provide and operate mobile
phone network in Thailand.

Thai AirAsia has been granted a license to operate

domestic and international airlines in Thailand. lTV had been granted a concession
by the Office of the Permanent Secretary to the Office of the Prime Minister to
operate a free-to-air television station in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Spectrum at
510-790 MHz.
The case revolved around the fact that a former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra set up Ample Rich on April 12, 1999, which was registered in the
British Virgin Island but was headquartered in Singapore. He owned one hundred
(l00) per cent of Ample Rich and Ample Rich was considered part of the Shinawatra
and Damapong350 families' holdings. 351

Just before assuming the premiership in

2001, on June 11, 1999, he sold half of his holding in Shin Corp (three hundred
twenty nine and two tenths (329.2) million shares or approximately eleven and eight
hundred seventy five thousandths (11.875) per cent) to Ample Rich and kept his

Shin Corporation, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shin Corporation. (last visited June 13,
2009).
350 Damapong is Khun Ying Pojaman Shinawatra's maiden name.
351 On Shin Corp's website, as of August 26, 2005, the two (2) families were clearly reported to own
1,487,740,120 shares (approximately 49.61 per cent) of Shin Corp. The breakdown of this ownership
structure was as follows: Pinthongta, 440,000,000 shares (14.67 per cent); Bhanapot Damapong,
404,430,300 shares (13.49 per cent); UBS AG, Singapore Branch for the account of Ample Rich
Investments Ltd, 329,200,000 shares (10.98 per cent); Panthongtae, 293,950,220 shares (9.80 per cent);
Yingluck Shinawatra, 20 million (0.67 per cent); Busaba Damapong, 159,600 shares (0.01 per cent).
349
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remaining half (eleven and eight hundred seventy five thousandths (11.875) per cent)
of Shin Corp in his Thai portfolio.
Later the Shinawatra and Damapong families agreed to sell their forty
nine and sixty one hundredths (49.61) per cent stake in Shin Corp for seventy three
and two tenths (73.2) billion Baht to Temasek Holdings. The first transaction took
place on January 20, when Ample Rich unloaded all of its Shin stock by selling one
hundred sixty four and six tenths (164.6) million shares to Pinthongta352 and another
one hundred sixty four and six tenths (164.6) million shares to Panthongtae353 at one
(1) Baht354 a share (the selling price was much below the market value).

These

transactions between Ample Rich and Thaksin's children were tax-free because
Ample Rich did not realize any gain from these transactions.
On January 23 (three days later), Pinthongta and Panthongtae resold
these shares bought from Ample Rich to nominees of Temasek for forty nine and
twenty five hundredths (49.25) Baht a share (at the market value), turning a profit of
fifteen (15) billion Baht on their dealings with Ample Rich. They did not have to pay
tax because they bought the stocks from Ample Rich on the over-the-counter market
and resold the stocks on the stock exchange to enjoy exemption from capital gains tax
(tax exemption from the Revenue Department and stock market rulings).

The

Flowchart of Transactions' Arrangement in Transferring ShinawatraiDamapong
Families to Temasek arranged by a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's
family is demonstrated in Appendix 9 of the Appendices.
In the end, the ShinawatralDamapong families effectively sold
1,487,740,120 shares (forty-nine and sixty-one hundredths (49.61) per cent of Shin
Corp) to two nominees of Temasek: Cedar Holdings and Aspen Holdings and as a
One ofa former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's children.
One of a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's children.
354 The exchange rate of the U.S.-Thai currency at that time was one ($1) dollars to forty (40) Baht.
352
353
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result, netted seventy three (73) billion Baht tax-free. Such an arrangement put a
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra under intense pressure because the transfer
of Shin Group's ownership amounted to the State handing over all mobile phone,
satellite and television operations to Singapore.
Apart from the arrangement, it further appeared that there were several
nominee shareholders in Shin Corp: Kularb Kaew; Cedar Holdings; and Aspen
Holdings. These corporations were considered Thai-owned companies whereby fifty
one (51) per cent shareholdings held by Thai citizens and the remaining ratio held by
foreigners. Furthermore, all of them also held shareholdings in Shin Corp. As to
Kularb Kaew, it was found that even though foreigners held just forty nine (49) per
cent shareholdings in Kularb Kaew but they had voting rights up to ninety (90) per
cent.
The deal arranged by a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's
family became an unforgettably painful lesson for the Thai people and a case study
for the military Government and management-level government authorities to tackle.
The case sponsored an intense investigation by relevant departments and both civil
and criminal actions has been brought against persons (including government officers)
who were helping and being involved in Shinawatra's arrangement. At the very least,
the following issues came up in the investigation.
First, it was evident that just before transferring Shin Corp's shares to
Temasek, the Telecommunications Act was amended to raise foreign shareholding
limit in a Thai telecom firm from twenty five (25) per cent to forty nine (49) per cent.
Otherwise, the takeover by Temasek would violate foreign business law. The deal
also showed that foreign investors could now gain more than fifty (50) per cent
ownership of Thai firms through local nominees. This could have long-term, lasting
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effects on domestic media, which has traditionally imposed a limit on foreign
ownership. By using local nominees, Temasek, an investment arm of the Singapore
government, now controls more than eighty five (85) per cent of Shin Corp despite
Thai law banning foreigners from holding more than forty nine (49) per cent in key
businesses that affect national security.
Second, the arrangement of share transfer in Shin Corp was seen as an
example of flawed morality, a potential threat to national security, and could damage
bilateral relations with Singapore. It could also demonstrate the policy corruption in
Thaksin's premiership.
Third, the controversial takeover, which saw Thaksin' s family utilizing
legal loopholes to avoid paying tax, had caused "extensive permanent damage.,,355
The fact that legal loopholes were used for tax avoidance by a former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra's family, a State governor, would seemingly justify and reaffirm
the legality of such measure and accordingly encourage both Thai nationals and
residents in Thailand to enjoy legal loopholes for their own benefits. As a result, this
case raised the question of good governance since as a state governor, Thaksin
Shinawatra was supposed to abolish legal loopholes, not to enjoy them for his
personal benefits.
Fourth, it is now clear that the arrangement of share transfer in Shin
Corp is illegal.

As a result, the Revenue Department executives (including the

Director General of the Revenue Department) were sacked for being negligent in their
duty and also were charged in a criminal case on the ground of negligence in their

355

Somkiat Tankitvanijt, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI).

207

duty by not taxing the children of a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra over
the acquisition of Shin Corp shares from Ample Rich Investment. 356
Based upon this painful and unforgettable lesson for Thailand, this
dissertation proposes that only FDI, having its place of effective management in
another country, can enjoy promotions and protections offered by this Special
Method. It is because the FDI, having its place of effective management in another
country, can demonstrate the element of foreign involvement and represent the real
functions and objectives of FDI and as a result, FDI through its nominees should
never enjoy the same privileges.

4.3.

Testing Criteria of Qualifying FDI Invested in a State Contract
According to the testing process in the first and second steps, a

qualifying FDI will be then brought to a test whether such a qualifying FDI is
invested in the state projects by a means of state contracts. Only qualifying FDI
invested in a state contract will fall within the definition and scope of a "state contract
relating to qualifying FDI," and as a result, the Special Method will apply. Having
said that, the definition, characteristics, and scope of a state contract are as follows:

"State Contract"
A state contract is defined as a contract where the State through the
Government (or its Government Agency as acting on behalf of the State or exercising
the State's power as the one party) enters into an agreement or transacts with the
private party.

By this definition, a state contract must compose these three (3)

elements. 357 First, one party of a contract must always be the State acting through the
Government or its Government Agency or person acting on behalf of the State. A
Government Agency can be one of the main Government Agencies, (consisting of the

356
357

Decision of the Supreme Court No. 295312550 (2007) (Thai!.).
Nuntawat Boramanunt, supra note 47 at 105 ..
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Legislative Branch, Executive Branch, and Judicial Branch), Local Authorities (Local
Administrative Organizations), Independent Organizations, or State Enterprises.
Second, individual Government Agencies must have authority as designated by law to
enter into a contract or transact with the private party and as a result, a contract must
be within the scope, objectives, and mandates of their establishment. 358 Third, a
person acting on behalf of each Government Agency must be authorized or delegated
to exercise power by the law establishing such a Government Agency.
Therefore, according to the testing process, the term a "state contract
relating to qualifying FDI" refers to any type of state contracts where the one party of
the contract is the State and the other is the private party, and more importantly, a
contract must carry the characteristics of FDI. Only a state contract carrying the
characteristics of FDI that meets the above proposed testing criteria and conditions
will be defined as a "state contract relating to qualifying FDI" and will be accordingly
governed by the Special Method.
To sum up, only the qualifying FDI according to step one and two that
is invested in a form of state contracts in step three will be considered as a "state
contract relating to qualifying FDI" and as a result, it will be governed by the Special
Method as proposed in Chapter 5.

358 To find out the precise scope and objectives of individual government agencies, it is necessary to
look at the Restructuring of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.) and the royal
decree of each division.
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Chapter 4

Inconsistency and Incompatibility of Arbitration for Disputes
Arising Out of a State Contract

1.

Arbitration for Disputes Arising Out of a State Contract

Arbitration is considered to be the alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") that helps the disputing parties settle their disputes before institution of
formal remedy, per se, judicial process. Parties often prefer arbitration to judicial
process because arbitration provides the parties some flexibility that the latter does
not. Time and cost of arbitral proceedings may be significantly lower than that of
disputes relying upon the court process. Additionally, the parties are able to choose
the arbitral tribunal, choices of law, and arbitral proceedings, depending upon what
they consider appropriate.
In the Thai arbitration legal system, disputes ansmg out of state
contracts between the State and a private party can be also referred to arbitration359
like those between private parties and are therefore subject to domestic and
international arbitration law. In practice, the contracting government agency normally
includes an arbitration clause in a state contract by stipulating that where disputes
arising out of a contract occur, the parties request that the disputes shall be settled
before an arbitral tribunal.
Under domestic law, the arbitration legal system is mainly subject to
the Arbitration Act, B.B. 2545 (2002).

In addition to the Arbitration Act, the

following regulations are of significance: the Regulation of the Office of the Prime
Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992); the Regulation of the Office of the Prime
Minister on Compliance with Arbitral Awards B.B. 2544 (2001); and the Cabinet
Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thail.) provides:
"The parties of a contract between the State through its Government Agencies and private
parties may agree to apply arbitration as a means of their dispute settlement resolution and such
agreement is accordingly binding on the parties."
359
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Resolution Regarding the Execution of Concession Contracts between the State and
the Private Party.
Apart from domestic law, Thailand has also entered into several
international treaties and conventions with other countries or international
organizations, thereby enabling disputing parties (especially for foreign private
parties) to submit their disputes to international arbitration.

At the very least,

Thailand is specifically bound to the following conventions by virtue of her
membership to these international agreements: UNCITRAL; the New York
Convention; MIGA;36o and Thailand's BITs with other countries.
Despite such fact, international arbitration for disputes arising out of
state contracts is rarely found in the State sector. It is particularly true in cases of
international arbitration under the ICSID Convention that offers an investor-state
dispute settlement resolution for the parties. The reason is that Thailand has not
ratified the Convention yet even though Thailand already signed the ICSID
Convention since December 6, 1985. Thailand's hesitation in ratifying the ICSID
Convention demonstrates that Thailand has no confidence in the operation of
international arbitration and as a result, the application of international arbitration in
the State sector (especially state contracts) in Thailand has been obstructed, although
ICSID is considered to be the most suitable mechanism in settling disputes between
the State and the private party.
Due to non-ratification of the ICSID Convention, ICSID's obligations
are not apparently binding on Thailand. This dissertation is notwithstanding prepared
to address significant roles and functions of ICSID in addition to those international
360 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID"), the
1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention") and the
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA").
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conventions as well as to advise that Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention.
Before exploring Thailand's international obligations in respect to international
arbitration, the following is the existing legal methodology on arbitration according to
domestic law.

1.1.

Legal Methodology for Arbitration According to Thai Law
1.1.1. Arbitration Act, RE. 2545 (2002)
Arbitration has a long history in Thailand but arbitration went through

significant changes during the legal reform of the 1930s. The reform reiterated that,
at least, arbitration in both forms of court-annexed arbitration and out-of-court
arbitration had been adopted in the Civil Procedure Code. Despite such fact, the
application of arbitration in those days was still very rare in practice. The popularity
of arbitration became widespread in the Thai legal system later due to the
promulgation of the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2530 (1987) in 1987 and the establishment
of the Thai Arbitration Institute ("TAl") in 1990, which was at that time under the
supervision of the Ministry of Justice. However, TAI has been currently transferred
to be part of the Alterative Dispute Resolution Office, the Court of Justice due to the
separation between the Court of Justice and the Ministry of Justice under the 1997
Constitution. 361
The Arbitration Act, B.E. 2530 (1987) was subsequently preceded and
prevailed by the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002), the present arbitration statutory
act.

The current Arbitration Act adopted and embodied main principles of the

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration for its arbitration
rules and proceedings as well as the New York Convention for its enforcement of
arbitral awards. However, the significant difference between the Arbitration Act and
361 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2540 (1997), known as the 1997 Constitution,
was preceded by the Military Coup on September 19, 2006.
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these international instruments is that arbitration under the Arbitration Act seems to
work very closely under the Court of Justice's supervision, while arbitration tribunal,
as suggested by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, is free and independent from any
external authority.
Under the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002), the Court of Justice's
supervisory roles are predominant from the beginning of the process to the end. The
Court of Justice's supervisory authority starts when the parties, by themselves or
through their appointed arbitral tribunal, request some services or assistance from the
Court of Justice during the arbitration process or the enforcement of arbitral awards.
Since then the Court of Justice shall resume and exercise supervisory powers over
arbitral proceedings. The Court of Justice exercises its supervisory powers to ensure
that the arbitral proceedings have been undertaken with due process. However, the
Court of Justice working along with the arbitral proceedings throughout the
arbitration process is sometimes seen as a drawback to the existing arbitration system
since it can potentially deviate the concept and value of the arbitration, which should
be independent and flexible in settling disputes between the parties. As a result,
arbitration under the Court of Justice's supervision has been even viewed as a quasijudicial mechanism. 362
In the Thai arbitration system, the Court of Justice's involvement
consists either of an arbitral tribunal that come as a result of a request made by the
disputing party to the Court of Justice, which will issue a warrant to any person to
give oral statement, or deliver documentary evidence or objects to the arbitral
tribunal. 363 Furthermore, once an arbitral award is rendered, the objection and the

Narumol Kijsinthapachai, Interim Measures in International Arbitration, 19 (Chulalongkorn
University Publisher) (2004). Also see Giuditta Cordero Moss and Tano Aschehoug, International
Commercial Arbitration: Party Autonomy and Mandatory Rules 161 (1999).
363 Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.) § 33.
362
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enforcement of the arbitral award are directed to the Court of Justice. As to the
objection of an arbitral award, the disputing parties are entitled to request the Court of
Justice to nullify the arbitral award subject to certain grounds such as a lack of
capacity of arbitrators, illegality and invalidity of arbitration contracts, ultra vires
scope and jurisdiction of arbitration. 364 If the Court of Justice finds these to be
grounds valid, the Court of Justice shall annul the arbitral award. Additionally, as far
as the objection of the Court of Justice's decision in respect of arbitral proceedings is
concerned, the Arbitration Act allows the party dissatisfied with the Court of Justice's
decision to appeal such judgment to the Supreme Court or the Supreme
Administrative Court. 365
When arbitral awards are rendered, they are of course binding on the
parties. Under the Arbitration Act, arbitral awards shall be only enforced by the Court
of Justice. 366 With this regard, the Arbitration Act only assigns the Court of Justice,
not the Administrative Court, to assume the power to enforce arbitral awards.
Additionally, as far as international arbitration is concerned, the Court of Justice is
required to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made outside Thailand provided that
such international arbitral awards are made according to treaties, conventions, or
international agreements to which Thailand is bound and only to the extent that
Thailand has consented to be bound. 367
In Thailand, there are several arbitration institutes available for
disputing parties. Some serve very specific roles with limited areas of arbitration but
some like TAl, provide arbitration service with a very wide scope. To start with TAl,
TAl was established in 1990 and is now under the supervision of the Alternative

I d.
I d.
366 I d.
367 I d.
364
365

§ 40.
§ 45.
§ 41.
§ 41.
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Dispute Resolution Office, the Court of Justice. TAl has adopted the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules as its own rules. However, as its appealing features, TAl not only
offers the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as its own but also acts and performs the
function as the arbitral tribunal as well as administers arbitration proceedings. Apart
from the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, TAl also offers to administer disputes
governed by other rules of international ad hoc arbitration institution such as
International Chamber of Commerce rules ("ICC") for the parties. A very close
association with the Court of Justice by being under the supervision of the Court of
Justice undoubtedly promotes TAl's roles even more widely recognized in Thailand.
Second, the Thai Arbitration Committee was established in 1968 under
the supervision of the Board of Trade of Thailand. In fact, the Thai Arbitration
Committee is the oldest arbitration institution in Thailand but it is rarely recognized as
popular as TAL Due to the strong relationship with the Board of Trade of Thailand
and Thai-own business community, this arbitration institution obviously adopts ICC
as its own.
Third, the Casualty Insurance Company Association was founded in
1994 to handle disputes arising from insurance policy among its members, which is
tentatively limited to insurance area and to its members.
Fourth, likewise, the Security and Exchange Commission on
Arbitration was set up in 2001 under the Security and Exchange Commission.
Mandates of this arbitration institution are quite limited since it only deals with
disputes relating to security trading and mutual fund businesses among its member
compames.
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Fifth, the Intellectual Property Arbitration was established in 2002 to
arbitrate disputes relating to intellectual property. This arbitration institution is under
the supervision of the Department ofIntellectual Property, the Ministry of Commerce.
Last, the Thai Rubber Trade Association is the most specific
arbitration area and the numbers of its members are very small. The institution is
designed to deal with disputes arising out of rubber trade.
In Thailand, there are at least six (6) arbitration groups, most of which
deal with trade and investment in particular sectors. Some of them are rarely known
to the public due to the limited availability of arbitration services. Overall, these
arbitration agencies have played significant roles and contributed to the development
of the present Thai arbitration system, especially among private parties.
1.1.2. Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on
Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992)
In addition to the Arbitration Act, the 1992 Regulation is considered as
important as the secondary legislation for Government Agencies when they prepare to
enter into government procurement contracts with private parties. Surprisingly, as far
as arbitration process is concerned, the 1992 Regulation, however, provides none of
the step-by-step guidance on arbitration for Government Agencies.

The only

implication on arbitration that the 1992 Regulation provides is the sample arbitration
clause as the reference material that Government Agencies should look at.
following is the sample arbitration clause provided by the 1992 Regulation:
Settlement of Disputes
1. Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection .
with this Contract or the implementation of any of the provisions of
this Contract, which cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to
arbitration.
2. Unless both parties agree in the appointment of a single
arbitrator, either party shall serve upon the other a notice of intention
to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specify the name
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The

of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. Then the dispute or the
difference shall be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by
the issuing party as aforesaid and the other one to be appointed by
the other party within thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice.
If the two arbitrators are unable to agree on such dispute or
difference, an umpire shall be appointed by the two arbitrators within
thirty (30) days from the date of disagreement. The umpire so
appointed shall resolve the dispute or difference.
3. Should either party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or
in case of disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire,
each party is entitled to refer the matter to the Civil Court in
Bangkok, Thailand for the appointment of arbitrator or umpire as the
case may be.
4. Any decision or award given by the single arbitrator or
~~~~~~~M~~~~~~~~~~

disagree, shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the parties
hereto.
The arbitration proceedings shall follow the Rule of
Arbitration of the Ministry of Justice's Arbitration Office or any rule
as agreed by both parties and shall be conducted in Bangkok.
5.
Each party shall bear the cost of his own arbitrator's
service and share equally other cost of all proceedings. In case a
single arbitrator or an umpire is appointed, the cost of the single
arbitrator's service or the cost of the umpire's service shall be
decided by the arbitrator, or the umpire, as the case may be.
6. The submission of any matter in dispute or difference to
the arbitration proceedings as aforesaid, shall be a condition
precedent to the right of institution of court action.
7. Each party shall have the right to institute suit against the
other in the Civil Court in Bangkok, Thailand, to enforce any decision
· arb"ltratzon proceed'zngs. 368
or award ren d ered zn

Given the sample arbitration clause, it is noted that first, the sample
arbitration clause does not designate a step-by-step arbitration process on the rules of
arbitration for Government Agencies to comply with. There is no guidance as to how
to adopt this sample clause. The sample arbitration clause seems to be a finished
written product that can generally apply to any case. It, however, sounds reasonable
in that the 1992 Regulation and the sample arbitration clause are objectively designed
to apply for government procurement contracts carrying simple transaction in respect
of acquisition of ordinary goods and services that are necessary for the daily operation
Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai!.), supra
note 118, Sample Clause: Sale and Purchase Contract, clause 23.

368
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of individual Government Agencies. The sample arbitration clause is not designed for
the other contract types carrying special characteristics, for example, involving in the
exercising of the State's power, relating to FDI, etc.
Second, even though the sample arbitration clause is intended to apply
only for government procurement contracts, most Government Agencies however
adopt the sample arbitration clause as provided by the 1992 Regulation to state
contracts other than government procurement contracts in actual practice due to the
absence of step-by-step rules on arbitration,. This is seen as one of the main reasons
why the arbitration legal system in respect to state contracts is even more messy and
awkward. Such inconsistency and incompatibility will be discussed later.
Third, due to the lack of the step-by-step guidance on arbitration,
Government Agencies are required to exercise their own discretion as to whether,
how, and to what extent they should adopt the sample arbitration clause to their
contracts.

1.1.3. Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on
Compliance with Arbitral Awards B.E. 2544 (2001)
This Regulation was a consequence of Thailand becoming a member
of the MIGA Convention. By ratifying the MIGA Convention, Thailand has been
bound to abide by the MIGA's obligations. As a result, this Regulation was issued to
provide the conformity and regularity of the practical guidance on compliance with
arbitral awards for all Government Agencies. The Regulation lays down step-by-step
rules as to how the Government Agency shall act when facing arbitral awards,
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especially when the Government Agency is a losing party which is required by the
arbitral award to pay compensation to MIGA. 369
The scope of this Regulation is considered very wide in that it is
imposed on all Government Agencies, including State Enterprises, Local Authorities
(Local Administrative Organizations), and Independent Organizations. None of the
Government Agencies is excluded from this Regulation.
Under the Regulation, once the contracting government agency agrees
to apply arbitration as a dispute settlement resolution and as soon as the arbitration
tribunal renders an arbitral award, the award is binding on the contracting government
agency. As a result, it compels the contracting government agency to comply with the
arbitral award unless it appears that such arbitral award is contrary to effective and
enforceable law, derived from illegal actions or proceedings, or beyond arbitration
agreement. 370
The contracting government agency, which desires to declare the
invalidity of an arbitral award due to these grounds and refuses to comply with such
award, is required to inform the other party (the private party) accordingly within
fifteen (15) day since the date of acknowledging the award. 371 Meanwhile, the losing
agency is also required to submit the matter to the Ministry of Finance to forward it to
the Arbitral Awards Consideration Committee for consideration within fifteen (15)
days since the date of acknowledging the award. 372
The Committee consists of each of these representatives of the
Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Council of State, and the OAG together with a
MIGA was established to enhance the flow of investment (FDI) to developing countries by
providing an investor investment information, policies, and cooperative assistance with host countries
on the basis of fair and stable standard for the treatment of foreign investment.
370
Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Compliance with Arbitral A wards B.E. 2544
(2001), clause 5.
371 [d. clause 6.
372 [d. clause 7.
369
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secretary and a secretary-assistant from the Department of the Comptroller General as
appointed by the Director General of the Department of the Comptroller General. 373
The Committee is required to consider the matter and provide its
opinion within thirty (30) days since the date of receiving the matter. Upon the
consideration, the Committee shall inform the losing agency promptly. However, it is
important to bear in mind that the Committee's opinion is not automatically final and
legally binding on the losing agency. It simply carries strong advice that the agency is
supposed to take into account. Therefore, the result or opinion of the Committee is
not legally binding on the losing agency but in practice, the Agency most often
complies with the Committee's opinion.

Theoretically speaking, when the losing

agency receives the Committee's opinion, the losing agency must take the
Committee's opinion into consideration whether or not the losing agency should
comply with the arbitral award and if so, the losing agency shall proceed accordingly
within thirteen (30) days.374
Meanwhile, during the Committee's consideration process, it is very
possible to find that the wining private party seeking the enforcement of the arbitral
award may request the Court of Justice to enforce the arbitral award. If in the end, the
losing agency considers that it should comply with the arbitral award, the losing
agency shall proceed to negotiate with the private party promptly by showing that it is
willing to comply with the arbitral award. 375 If the arbitral award requires the agency
to make a payment to the private party, the agency shall proceed accordingly
promptly. 376

!d. clause 8.
clause 8.
375 !d. clause 9.
373

374Id.

376 Id.

clause 10.
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Regardless of the grounds or reasons, the losing agency cannot refuse
to comply with the arbitral award if such award is made to settle disputes between
MIGA and the losing agency according to the MIGA Convention.

Under such

circumstance, MIGA, which already paid compensation to the insured investor, shall
be subrogated the insured investor's right to pursue his claim against the losing
agency. In this case, the losing agency is required to comply with the arbitral award
promptly and prohibited from declaring the invalidity of the arbitral award as such.

377

1.1.4. Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Execution of a Concession
Contract Between the State and a Private Party
Before the issuance of this Cabinet Resolution, Government Agencies
are free to make any agreement with the private party in order to settle disputes
arising out of a state contract, and this dispute can be settled by arbitration -a rule
made effective before the Council of Ministers issued this Cabinet Resolution. 378
Upon the issuance, the Cabinet Resolution prohibits all Government
Agencies from concluding an arbitration clause in a concession contract. As a result,
disputes arising out of a concession contract shall be only settled by judicial process
(either by the Administrative Court, or the Court of Justice).

Otherwise, the

contracting government agency that desires to settle disputes with private parties by a
means of arbitration is required to ask for a specific approval from the Council of
Ministers prior to signing a contract with the private party.
The rationale behind the Cabinet Resolution is mainly derived from
the arbitral award made in the Expressway case. The Expressway case dramatizes
how the Thai government can suffer from an arbitral award rendered by the arbitral
tribunal.

377
378

In this case, the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand

Id. clause 11.
Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers, supra note 202.
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("ETA") and the BBCD Joint Venture (Bilfinger, Berger Bauaktiengesellschaft, CH.
Karnchang Public Company Limited, and Dyckerhoff & widmann AG) ("BBCD")
entered into the Construction Contract of Bangna-Bangpli-Bangpakong Project on
June 28, 1995.
Subject to the Construction Contract of Bangna-Bangpli-Bangpakong
Project, ETA hired BBCD to design, construct, and deliver the expressway facility to
ETA within forty two (42) months, which was due on February 27, 2001, with the
fixed cost of twenty five billion (25,000,000,000) Bath.

However, ETA delayed

handing over construction areas to BBCD for eleven (11) months. Consequently,
BBCD proposed to extend the target completion date of fifteen (15) months but only
eleven (11) months were approved by ETA without additional costs. Later BBCD
claimed that ETA was liable to pay an adjusted fixed price due to the foregoing
extension of the target completion date of sixty two billion (6,200,000,000) Baht
(equivalent to one hundred fifty five million U.S. dollars (US$155)) but ETA refused
to do so.
The parties brought a case toward the arbitral tribunal, consisting of
three (3) panels. On September 20, 2001, the arbitral tribunal rendered an award
requiring ETA to pay such amount as its adjusted fixed price to BBCD. To enforce
the arbitral award, BBCD requested the Civil Court (the Court of the First Instance) to
enforce the award. As a result, the Civil Court recognized the validity of the arbitral
award and enforced it accordingly. Then ETA appealed the Civil Court's judgment
toward the Supreme Court. Finally, the Supreme Court rendered the decision by
reversing the Civil Court's decision that ETA was not obligated to pay the amount to
BBCD on the grounds that the contract between ETA and BBCD was not legally
binding. It appeared that the ETA governor intentionally signed the construction
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contract in favour of BBCD even though he was aware that ETA could not deliver the
construction area to BBCD within the designated timeframe.

Apart from that, it

further appeared that some of the ETA's top management authorities (including the
ETA's governor) acquired shareholdings in CH. Karnchang Public Company Limited
(one of BBCD's partners) before ETA signed a contract with the BBCD and
eventually gained profits when they disposed of those shares. Upon such fact, the
Supreme Court further inferred that by bringing a lawsuit against ETA, BBCD had not
exercised its rights in good faith, which was considered a core principle of proceeding
civil cases. Given the Supreme Court's judgement, it is noted that even though ETA
was not obligated to pay the amount to BBCD due to invalidity of a contract between
BBCD and ETA, BBCD was not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision from
claiming any actual loss or damage (if any) against ETA
In the meantime (before the Supreme Court rendered the judgment on
this case), the Council of Ministers issued this Resolution prohibiting all Government
Agencies that were prepared to enter into a concession contract with the private sector
from concluding an arbitration clause in a concession contract unless it would be
specially approved by the Council of Ministers.
The reason that the Council of Ministers issued such a Resolution is
understandable.

First, the Thai government suffered the disappointment from an

extraordinary arbitral award in the Expressway case. The tribunal award requesting
ETA to pay BBCD of sixty two billion (6,200,000,000) Baht (equivalent to one
hundred fifty five million U.S. dollars (US$155)) was definitely inconceivable as a
local sovereign government to be condemned to pay a fine or a penalty to a
contracting party above and beyond normal compensation for actual damage or loss
suffered.
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Second, the arbitration tribunal's independence and impartiality in this
case was questionable. It appeared that one of the panels held shareholdings in CR.
Kamchang Public Company Limited, which has apparently been a major shareholder
of the BBCD Joint Venture without disclosing such information to ETA as the party
of the dispute. As a result, ETA was unable to withdraw this arbitrator out of the
tribunal panel as this member was associated with the other disputing party.
Third, the arbitration tribunal and the Civil Court only applied
principles of contract law, especially freedom of contract and privity of contract
according to private law and the burden of proof principle according to civil
procedure law to this case. The tribunal and the Civil Court did not even look at the
principal rules derived from administrative and public law even though the contract
between ETA and BBCD was manifestly an administrative contract under the
Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedures, B.E.
2542 (1999). No principles of administrative law (public law) were applied to this
case during the tribunal's and the Civil Court's hearings.
Fourth, as a general rule, arbitration proceedings must be undertaken
confidentially. Only the disputing parties are allowed in the tribunal hearings. All
information must be kept confidential. Disclosure of data and information without the
parties' consent to the public is prohibited. This closed procedure prevented the
public from monitoring and participating in the arbitral tribunal's conduct and arbitral
proceedings even though the consequence of this case could affect the public in
general.
Fifth, the contract between ETA and BBCD was evidently an
administrative contract under the Establishment of Administrative Court and
Administrative Court Procedures, B.E. 2542 (1999).
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The Administrative Court

seemed to be an appropriate institution to settle disputes between the parties according
to administrative law rather than the arbitral tribunal, in which disputes were settled
according to the parties' choices of law, and the agreements, and the Court of Justice,
in which disputes were purely settled according to private law.

Otherwise, the

Administrative Court would be able to raise the public interest theory or public policy
to a case. More importantly, the application of trial system or inquisitional system as
opposed to the accusatory system used in the Court of Justice is apparently used in the
Administrative Court so that the acquisition and collection of evidence of the case by
the Administrative Court was not necessarily limited to the burden of proof principle
according to civil procedure law.
To sum up, as far as domestic arbitration law is concerned, it is, at least
necessary, to scrutinize these laws and regulations: the Arbitration Act, the 1992
Regulation, the Regulation on Compliance with Arbitral Awards, and the Cabinet
Resolution Regarding the Execution of a Concession Contract between the State and
the Private Sector.

1.2.

Legal Methodology for Arbitration According to Thailand's

International Obligations
In addition to domestic arbitration law, some international conventions
and treaties have also been significantly influential on the shape of the Thai
arbitration system. Particularly, those international treaties and conventions that offer
an international arbitration forum for foreign investors when disputes arising out of
investment occur.
The availability of international arbitration as the dispute settlement
resolution between investors and the host state evidently offers great advantages to
both parties.

For investors, international arbitration ensures the impartiality and
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neutrality of an arbitral tribunal without local bias and pressure of the host state. For
host states, international arbitration can provide investors' confidence that their
investment will be protected and as a result, they will gain more confidence in
investing their capital in host states' territory, thereby enhancing the flow of FDI
toward the host state's territory. Further, international arbitration can help prevent
home states and host states from confrontation at the state level.
In addition to Thailand's BITs with other countries as previously
discussed in Chapter 2, there are at least four (4) international treaties and conventions
in particular that have directly influenced on the existing arbitration system in
Thailand: UNCITRAL; the ICSID Convention; the New York Convention; and the
MIGA Convention.
1.2.1. UNCITRAL
Preliminary Background

UNCITRAL was set up by the United Nations in 1966 as the General
Assembly recognized that "disparities in national laws and practice created obstacles
to the free flow of trade.,,379 Therefore, UNCITRAL was established to remove those
obstacles arising from international trade transactions as well as to improve laws,
procedures and practices for resolving disputes between parties.

By doing so,

UNCITRAL has issued several rules. Two of them are the 1976 UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules that are designed for private parties' reference and the 1985 Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration that is designed for states' adoption.
However, this dissertation only focuses on the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
because these rules outline a step-by-step process for international arbitration.

379 Howard M. Holtzmann, RECENT WORK ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW UNCITRAL 5 ILSA J. Int'l
&Comp. L. 425. Also see UNCITRAL Informational Release, p. 1 (Nov. 1996).
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UNCITRAL has been accepted and recognized as a worldwide dispute
settlement mechanism in relation to trade and commercial transactions. UNCITRAL
offers a measure of convergence and harmonization of arbitration rules, procedures,
and practices. Professor Pieter Sanders noted that "the UNCITRAL Rules were
designed for worldwide use, intended to be acceptable in both capitalist and socialist
systems, in developed and developing countries and in common law as well as civil
law jurisdiction.,,38o
Notwithstanding, it is noted that the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, unlike ICSID, were not tailored to resolve investor-state disputes or entertain
claiins for breach of customary or conventional intemationallaw?81 On the contrary,
the UNCITRAL Rules were rather designed to tackle disputes among private
commercial parties. 382
Significant Characteristics

The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules offers the parties the flexibility in
settling their disputes in that the parties are entitled to choose their arbitral tribunal,
choices of laws, place of arbitration, and so on.

To facilitate the flexibility, the

arbitral tribunal is required to conduct the arbitration in a manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of
the proceedings, each party must be given a full opportunity of presenting its case.,,383
Furthermore, the Rules also ensure that the arbitral proceedings shall be conducted in
appropriate manner. Having said that, arbitrators are required to be impartial and

Pieter Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 173 (II Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration) (1977).
381 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31198, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31198 (Apr. 28, 1976), art 1(1).
382 Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and
Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 13 L.&Bus. Rev. Am. 885, 887
(2007).
383 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 381, art. 5.
380
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independent, and they may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrators' impartiality or independence. 384
Scope of Application
The application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is entirely
subject to the parties' agreement.

To settle disputes in accordance with the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it must appear that the parties to a contract have
agreed in writing that disputes in relation to a contract shall be referred to arbitration
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

However, the application of the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be limited to certain extent depending on
modification as the parties may agree to in writing. 385 It is particular true where any
of these Rules are in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration
from which the parties cannot derogate. Under such a circumstance, the provision of
that law shall prevai1. 386
Appointing Authority
Appointing Authority is considered a key element of the effectiveness
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

In fact, the Appointing Authority is a key

person who ensures that arbitral proceedings under the Rules shall not be frustrated or
delayed due to the parties' failure or ignorance in participating in the arbitration
process.

As a result, Article 6(1) advises that the parties should designate the

Appointing Authority at the time that the arbitration agreement or arbitration clause is
being concluded.387

One of the Appointing Authority's significant roles is, for

example, that when either party fails to appoint his own arbitrator or the parties

[d. art. 10(1).
[d. art. 1(1).
386 [d. art. 1(2)).
387 Sanders, supra note 380 at 174.
384
385
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cannot reach an agreement on appointing a sole arbitrator or the third arbitrator, the
Appointing Authority shall be empowered to do so.388
Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal

The composition of the arbitral tribunal under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules must be in even numbers in order to reach majority votes.
Normally, the arbitral tribunal will be either comprised of a sole arbitrator or a threearbitrator panel. In a case where the parties have not previously agreed on the number
of arbitrators, the arbitral tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators. 389
Appointment of a Sole Arbitrator

To appoint a sole arbitrator, either party may propose names of persons
to the other party out of which one name will be selected to serve as the sole
arbitrator. 39o

If the parties have not reached agreement on the choice of a sole

arbitrator within thirty (30) days since the date the party received a proposal, the sole
arbitrator shall be appointed by the Appointing Authority subject to the parties'
agreement.
In a case that no Appointing Authority is selected or the Appointing
Authority refuses to act or fails to appoint the arbitrator within sixty (60) days of the
receipt of a party's request, either party may request the Secretary-General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to designate the Appointing
Authority.391 Then the Appointing Authority shall be empowered to appoint the
arbitrator for the parties. Otherwise, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague shall appoint the sole arbitrator accordingly.

388
389
390
391

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 381, art. 6(3).
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 6(1).
Id. art. 5 6(2).
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To perform this function, the Appointing Authority shall appoint the
sole arbitrator promptly and take into consideration the independence and impartiality
of the arbitrator. As a precautionary measure, the arbitrator shall be appointed from a
nationality other than the nationalities of the parties. 392

In order to make the

appointment of a sole arbitrator, the Appointing Authority shall use the list-procedure
unless both parties agree that the list-procedure should not be used or unless the
Appointing Authority determines in its discretion that the use of the list-procedure is
not appropriate for the case. Regardless of the reason, if the appointment of the sole
arbitrator cannot be made according to this list-procedure, the Appointing Authority
may exercise its discretion in appointing the sole arbitrator. 393
Appointment of a Three-Arbitrator Tribunal
Where three (3) arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint
one arbitrator and then the two arbitrators shall choose the third arbitrator who will act
as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal. 394 In a circumstance where either party fails
to appoint his own arbitrator or the parties cannot agree with the appointment of an
arbitrator. The Appointing Authority as appointed in accordance with Article 6(3)
shall come to play its significant roles in appointing the other arbitrator.
Likewise, in a case of no Appointing Authority or the Appointing
Authority refuses to act or fails to appoint the arbitrator, the Secretary-General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague may be requested by the parties to
appoint the Appointing Authority to select an arbitrator, or to appoint an arbitrator for
the parties.
Evidence and Hearings

Id. art. 6(4).
Id. art. 6(3).
394 I d. art. 7(1).

392
393
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As a basic rule, each party holds the burden of proof of his claim or
defence as well as to provide evidence to support it. 395 Notwithstanding, the arbitral
tribunal may require one party to deliver a summary of documents as well as other
evidence, which that party intends to present in support of his claim or defence, to the
tribunal and to the other party within a period oftime. 396
Upon the hearing, an oral hearing may be held but the arbitral tribunal
must give the parties adequate advance notice of the date, time and place of the
hearing. 397 For the rest of the process, the arbitral tribunal has full and complete
power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the
evidence as well as the manner in which witnesses are examined. 398
Place of Arbitration
The arbitral tribunal shall determine the place of arbitration by taking
the circumstances of the arbitration into consideration. 399
Defaulting Party
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules ensures that the proceedings shall
not be frustrated by the parties. For instance, where one of the parties, duly notified
under the Rules, fails to appear at a hearing without showing sufficient cause for such
failure, the arbitral tribunal may further proceed with the arbitration. 4oo Furthermore,
where one of the parties, duly invited to produce documentary evidence, fails to do so
within the established period of time, without showing sufficient cause for such
failure, the arbitral tribunal may make the award based upon the evidence before it. 401
Arbitral Awards
!d. art.
I d. art.
397 I d. art.
398 I d. art.
399 I d. art.
400 I d. art.
401 Id. art.
395

396

24(1).
24(2).
25(1).
25(4) and (6).
16(1).
28(2).
28(3).
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As a rule, the award shall be made at the place of arbitration.

402

In a

case of a three-arbitrator tribunal, any award or other decisions shall be made by a
majority of the arbitrators. 403 The award shall be made in writing and shall be final
and binding on the parties and as a result, the parties will be compelled to undertake
to carry out the award without delay.404

Furthennore, the award must be kept

confidential and can only be made public with the consent of both parties.

405

1.2.2. ICSID Convention
Preliminary Background
The ICSID Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966, and
opened for ratification since then.

Thailand has been a signatory state of the ICSID

Convention since December 6, 1985 but Thailand has not ratified the Convention yet.
As a result, the ICSID Convention is not legally binding on Thailand. Nonetheless, it
cannot refuse its significance as ICSID has been increasingly recognized as one of
worldwide international arbitration institutions in which it offers investor-state dispute
settlement resolution for the parties.
Significant Characteristics
Application of the ICSID arbitration is absolutely dependent on the
state's voluntary consent.

Ratification of the ICSID Convention by the state,

conferring the state on becoming a Contracting State to the Convention, does not
automatically constitute consent on part of the Contracting State to arbitration406 or
impose the Contracting State to submit disputes to ICSID. On the contrary, at the
time of ratification, acceptance, or approval of the Convention or at any time
art. 16(4).
art. 31(1).
404Id. art. 32(2).
405 I d. art. 32(5).
406 The ICSID Convention's Preamble declares that "no Contracting States shall by the mere fact of its
ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under
any obligation to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration.
402Id.
403Id.
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thereafter, the Contracting State may notify the Centre of the class or classes of
disputes, which would or would not consider submitting to ICSID's jurisdiction.

407

In order to submit a dispute to ICSID, the disputing parties must take
further action by giving their consent to arbitration under ICSID before a dispute
arises or at the time the dispute arises. Notwithstanding, the disputing party may be
required to exhaust local remedies before submitting the dispute to ICSID.

The

reason is that the Convention allows the Contracting State to require prior exhaustion
of domestic remedies as a condition of its consent to ICSID arbitration. 408

This

condition may be stipulated in investment agreements, BITs, or a declaration made by
the Contracting State at the time of its signature or ratification of the Convention.
Prerequisite Conditions Prior to Arbitration
ICSID shall assume jurisdiction over disputes provided that the
following criteria must be fulfilled: (1) it must be a legal dispute; (2) a dispute must
arise out of investment; (3) a dispute must be between a national of another
Contracting State (a foreign investor) and a Contracting State (through its
Government Agency); and (4) the parties must consent to settle their dispute before
arbitration in writing. 409 Once the parties' consent to ICSID's arbitration has been
given, the parties cannot unilaterally revoke their consent. 410
Choice of Substantive Law
The ICSID Convention is very advantageous to the parties in that it
allows the parties to choose applicable laws to govern their dispute as a result of their
agreement. In the absence of their agreement, the tribunal will apply laws of a host

ICSID
[d. art.
409 [d. art.
410 [d. art.

407
408

Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
26.
25.
25(1).
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state as well as rules of international law to a dispute. 411 This implication is unique
and different from that of the ICC and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in that the
ICC and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules designate rules of conflict of laws to
apply to a dispute that the arbitral tribunal thinks appropriate. 412
Arbitration Process

ICSID has recently become one of the most recognized international
arbitration institutions because it offers the parties the most flexibility of dispute
settlement resolution, per se, the appointment of arbitrators, or choices of law, etc. As
its advantages, the ICSID Convention, like the UNICITRAL Rules, also ensures that
the parties cannot frustrate the proceedings. For example, in a case where either party
fails to appoint his arbitrator, the Chairman of the ICSID's Administrative Council
shall be entitled to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. 413
Notwithstanding the fact that the party may fail to appear, present his case, or
participate in the proceedings, the ICSID Convention ensures that the proceedings
shall be continued and an award shall be rendered. 414
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

Under the ICSID Convention, once the arbitral tribunal renders an
award, it is binding on the parties and as a result, there must be no further appeal or
further remedy, per se domestic courtS. 415 Subject to limited exceptions, the party
may challenge the arbitral award on the following grounds: (1) interpretation of the
meaning or scope of the award; (2) revision of the award due to discovery of new fact;
(3) annulment of the award. Whereas issues of interpretation and revision of the

411

412

[d. art. 42.
David 1. Branson & W. Michael Tupman, Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective

International Arbitration, 24 VA.1.INTL.L. 917, 930 (1984).
413 ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 38.
414 !d. art. 45(2).
415 [d. art. 53.
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award will be heard by the original tribunal, the annulment of an award will be
brought before a new tribunal.
As to the enforcement of arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention,
ICSID provides effective measures of compelling the losing party to comply with the
arbitral award.

A losing party who refuses to comply with an arbitral award,

especially for the Contracting State (the host state), may face the following legal
sanctions. First, under the ICSID Convention, disputes between the Contracting State
and foreign investors regarding the interpretation and application of the Convention
that cannot be settled by negotiation may be referred to the ICJ. By this method, the
home state will possibly take further action on its nationals' behalf to bring a case to
IC} against the host state that refuses to comply with such an award unless those
states agree to another method of settlement. 416 Second, the home state may step in
its nationals' claim and bring some action against the host state by using diplomatic
protection or bringing about an international claim. This means is usually prohibited
during arbitration process under the ICSID Convention. 417 In fact, this is seen as the
ICSID Convention's suspension of the right of diplomatic protection and it works
well at avoiding an unnecessary confrontation between the home state and the host
state. As a result, ICSID can contribute to the depoliticization of investment disputes
at the international level.

The depoliticization, which is intended to promote an

atmosphere of mutual confidence between a Contracting State and foreign investors
favourable to increasing the flow of resources to developing countries, is a
fundamental objective of the ICSID system. 418

416
417

Id . art. 64.
Id. art. 27.

418 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965), para 9.
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Like the New York Convention, enforcement of arbitral awards is
subject to these two (2) steps: recognition and enforcement.

Regarding the

recognition of arbitral awards, a Contracting State is imposed to recognize an award
rendered subject to the rCsrD Convention as binding, provided that the party seeking
recognition or enforcement furnishes to a competent court a copy of the award
certified by the Secretary-General.

As to the enforcement of arbitral awards, a

Contracting State is obliged to enforce an award, especially relevant to pecuniary
obligations as if it was a final judgement of a court in that Contracting State.419
Further, a Contracting State must always recognize and enforce arbitral awards
rendered pursuant to the Convention even though they or their nationals are not
parties to arbitration.
1.2.3. New York Convention
Preliminary Background

Thailand acceded to the New York Convention on December 21, 1959
but later disputed the fact that the New York Convention might not be binding on
Thailand. The reason is that as a practice of Thailand, before international obligations
according to a particular treaty or convention becomes binding and effective in the
Kingdom of Thailand, the Parliament shall promulgate domestic legislation in
compliance with the treaty or convention. 420 However, at the time when Thailand
ratified the New York Convention, the Military government rather than the Parliament
enacted a royal decree to ratify the New York Convention on March 10, 1960.421 As a
result, there was a question as to whether Thailand was a member of the Convention
because from the perspective of the new government, the Parliament never justifiably

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 54.
Surakiart Sathirathai & Borwornsak Uwanno, Introduction to the Thai Legal System, 4
Chulalongkorn L. Rev. 108 (1985-86).
421Id.
419
420
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ratified it. 422 Notwithstanding, this question was later solved by judicial interpretation
in that, despite of improperly promulgated legislation, domestic courts construe and
accept Thailand as a member of the New York Convention and as such must abide by
its terms. 423
Significant Characteristics
The New York Convention becomes a universally satisfactory method
in recognizing and enforcing international arbitral awards in a commercial world. It is
even described as "the single most important pillar on which the edifice of
international arbitration rests,,424 because it provides a uniform and effective method
of obtaining recognition and enforcement of both arbitration agreement and arbitral
awards. 425
Besides, the scope of application of the New York Convention is
comparatively wide in that it can apply to both commercial and noncommercial
matters. 426 In addition, the New York Convention also allows the wining party to
enforce an award in a non-contracting state: a state other than disputing parties'
states427 in that the Convention does not require the parties' nationality. The only
requirement is that arbitral awards must be made in other states and those are not
considered to be domestic awards in the state where their recognition and enforcement
are sought. 428 As a result, it can be said that the New York Convention confers
legitimacy upon awards granted in any state, whether or not it is a contracting state

Id.
Id. Also see Jayavadh Bunnag, Arbitration Law in Thailand, 2 (1991) (this paper presented to the
Tokyo Conference on the Harmonization of Trade and Investment Practices in the Asia-Pacific Region
1991, on the file with the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
424 Wetter, supra note 230 at 91.
425 Orkun Akseli, Enforcement ofInternational Arbitration Awards-the New York Convention of 1958,
9 VJ 211 (2005).
426 Jan L. Volz, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 867,878 (1996).
427 New York Convention, supra note 232, art. 1(1).
428 !d. art. I
422
423
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(the disputing party's state) and whether or not the parties are subject to the
jurisdiction of different contracting states. 429 The only limitation to the application of
the New York Convention is subject to reciprocity and commercial reservations as
mentioned earlier.430
Application of the New York Convention

The New York Convention generally deals with international arbitral
awards of two aspects: enforcement of arbitration agreement; and recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
With the enforcement of arbitration agreement, domestic courts must
be aware of the existence of arbitration agreement between the parties in either form
of a separate written arbitration agreement or of an arbitration clause contained in a
contract or in an exchange of letters or telegrams. When domestic courts come across
disputes in which the parties have made agreement that their disputes shall be settled
before arbitration, domestic courts must refer the parties to arbitration, unless it is
found that such an agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed. 431
With the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
member states are compelled to recognize foreign arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon: that is, in accordance with local rules of procedure.

This

mechanism is seen that the New York Convention abolished the double exequatur. 432
To enforce foreign arbitral awards, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement simply submits (1) the duly authenticated original award or a duly

Silverstein, supra note 233 at 443, 454.
New York Convention, supra note 232, art. III.
431 Id. art. II.
432 Gusy, supra note 229 at 152.

429
430

238

certified copy thereof and (2) the original arbitration agreement to the court where the
enforcement is sought.433 After the arbitral award and agreement are submitted to the
court where the enforcement is sought, the party against whom the enforcement is
sought is responsible to prove refusal grounds under Article V that the award should
not be enforced.
Refusal of Arbitral Awards
The New York Convention provides certain grounds to be challenged
in that arbitral awards should not be enforced. The process of refusing arbitral awards
starts after the party seeking enforcement simply provides arbitral award as well as
arbitral agreement to an enforcing court. Subsequently, the party against whom the
enforcement is sought and who refuses the enforcement must raise and prove refusal
grounds according to Article V to the competent authority.

Then it becomes the

losing party's responsibility to demonstrate a ground that such an arbitral award
should not be enforced.

Due to such requirement, this provision is seen as the most

significant development of international arbitration as it shifts the burden of proof
from the party seeking the enforcement to the party against whom the enforcement is
sought.
Subject to Article V, there are two (2) channels by which arbitral
awards may be refused. As a first channel, the party against whom the enforcement is
sought must furnish the competent authority the following refusal grounds: (1)
incapacity of the parties or invalidity of arbitration agreement; (2) improper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings (violation of due
process); (3) lack of jurisdiction or matters beyond the scope of arbitration; (4)

433

New York Convention, supra note 232, art IV.
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procedural irregularities or irregularities in the composition of the arbitral tribunal;
and (5) non-binding award.
As a second channel, the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards may be refused if the competent authority finds that (1) the subject-matter of
the dispute is incapable of settlement by arbitration under the law of which the
enforcement is sought; or (2) arbitral awards would be contrary to the public policy of
such state. In fact, the public policy exception has been called the "safety valve" of
the New York Convention because it is subject to interpretation by each country's
legislative or judicial processes. 434 Regarding the public policy, the United States'
judicial policy views that the "public policy" must be construed narrowly.

In

Fotochrome, Inc. v. CopaZ Company, Limited,435 the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit noted that "[t]he public policy in favor of international arbitration is
strong ... ,,436 and "the public policy limitation on the Convention is to be construed
narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most
basic notion of morality and justice. ,,437
Overall, it can be claimed that the New York Convention promotes
advantages and effectiveness of international arbitration. The New York Convention
provides a uniform enforcement method for the commercial world, which most
nations have already accepted. Even though there are certain exceptions subject to
Article V, domestic courts of the state (where the enforcement of the arbitral award is
Heather R. Evans, The Nonarbitrability of Subject Matter Defense to Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts, 21 N.Y.U. 1. Int'!. L. & Po!. 329, 334-35 (1989).
435 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.1975). See also Parson & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (addressing that in response to an
attempt to declare an award invalid based on public policy arguments, the court held that awards should
be denied on this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice) and Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp. 656 F. Supp. 160, 163-65
(S.D.N.V. 1987) (affirming that although the public policy defense in Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention remains, the defense must be read narrowly to be effective only when international arbitral
award enforcement would violate the most fundamental notions of justice.)
436 I d.at516.
437 Id.

434
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sought) are likely to apply such exceptions very narrowly, thereby not circumventing
the concept of the New York Convention.
1.2.4. MIGA Convention
Preliminary Background
MIGA was created by the MIGA Convention, opened for signature on
October 11, 1985, and entered into force on April 12, 1988, with initial ratifications
by the Unites States and the United Kingdom.438 Subject to the MIGA Convention,
the Convention shall be entered into force only when at least five (5) signatories from
Category One (developed countries) and at least fifteen (15) signatories from
Category Two (developing Countries) ratify the Convention, in which the total
sUbscriptions of these signatories amount to at least one-third (1/3) of the authorized
capita1. 439 Thailand also ratified the MIGA Convention on October 3, 1996, being the
156th signatory country of MIG A (also known as the "Agency,,).440
The main goal of establishing MIGA is to enhance the flow to
developing countries of capital and technology for productive purposes under
conditions consistent with their development needs, policies and objectives, on the
basis of fair and stable standards for treatment of foreign investment. 441 By doing so,
MIGA provides insurance to investors against non-commercial risks arising out of
investments in developing countries, in which risks cannot be insured by national and
private risk insurance programs.
Eligible Investors

Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches To Improving The Investment Climate of Developing
Countries: The Cases ofICSI and MIGA, 33 Harv. Int'I L.J. 103 at 126.
439 MIGA Convention, supra note 253, art. 61(b).
440 MIGA, Thailand Signs MIGA Convention,
http://www.miga.orglnews/index sv.cfm?stid=1506&aid=375 (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
441 MIGA Convention, supra note 253, preamble.
438
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To be eligible to coverage subject to MIGA, the Convention requires
that an investor must be a national of a member country other than a host country. In
cases of a juridic\al person, it must be incorporated and has its principal place of
business in a member country, or the majority of its capital is owned by nationals of a
member country provided that it must be in a country other than the host country.
Generally speaking, an investor whose his state becomes a member country of MIGA
is entitled to insure his investment with MIGA. The Convention also allows nationals
of the host country to enjoy MIGA's coverage provided that assets invested are
transferred from outside the host country which is seen as to reverse capital flight.
Notwithstanding, it is to be borne mind that an investor who desires to insure his
investment with MIGA must operates his investment on a commercial basis. 442
Eligible Investments

The term of "investments" is not defined under the MIGA Convention.
On the contrary, the MIGA Convention rather exemplifies what could be included in
the scope of eligible investments subject to it. Apparently, MIGA primarily considers
equity interests of medium-long term loans made or guaranteed by holders of equity
in the enterprise concerned, and those forms of direct investment as may be
determined by the Board as eligible investments. 443
The scope of eligible investments may be additionally extended by
special majority of the Board to cover any other medium- or long- term form of
investments provided that they are relating to a specific investment covered or to be
covered by the Agency. The other forms of eligible investments can be exemplified

442
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[d. art. 13(a).
[d. art. I2(a).
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in management and service contracts, licensing and franchising agreements, turnkey
contracts, arrangements concerning the transfer of technology and know_how.

444

Apart from new investments, eligible investments subject to the MIGA
Convention may include any transfer of foreign exchange made to modernize,
expand, or develop the existing investment as well as the use of earnings from
existing investments, which could be otherwise transferred outside the host country.445
Prior to guaranteeing an investment, the Agency shall take all relevant
factors regarding the investment from both sides (an investor and the host country)
into consideration. These factors include: economic soundness of the investment,
contribution to the development of the host country by an investor, compliance of the
investment with the host country's laws and regulations, consistency of the
investment with the declared development objectives and priorities of the host
country, and investment conditions in the host country.446
Covered Risks
The objective of MIGA is aimed to provide eligible investors the
insurance on non-commercial risks. Non-commercial risks in accordance with this
Convention can be divided into the following types: (1) currency transfer;447 (2)
expropriation and similar measures;448 (3) breach of contract;449 (4) war and civil

444Id.
445

art. 12(b).

Id. art. 12(c).

art. 12(d).
Any introduction attributable to the host government of restrictions on the transfer outside the host
country of its currency into a freely usable currency or another currency acceptable to the holder of the
guarantee, including a failure of the host government to act within a reasonable period of time on an
application by such holder for such transfer.
448 Any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host government
which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a
substantial benefit from, his investment, with the exception of non-discriminatory measures of general
application which governments normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in their
territories.
449 Any repudiation or breach by the host government of a contract with the holder of a guarantee,
when (a) the holder of a guarantee does not have recourse to a judicial or arbitral forum to determine
the claim of repudiation or breach, or (b) a decision by such forum is not rendered within such
446Id.
447
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disturbance. 45o Apart from these types, the Board of the Agency by special majority
can approve the extension of eligible coverage based upon specific non-commercial
risks other than these risks. Nevertheless, the risk of devaluation or depreciation of
currency is excluded. It is noted that losses resulting from any host government
action or omission to which the holder of the guarantee has agreed or for which he has
been responsible, or any host government action or omission or any other event
occurring before the conclusion of the contract guarantee shall not be covered.

451

Prerequisite Conditions
Only investments that meet the following conditions may be
guaranteed under the Convention. First, investments must be made in the territory of
a developing member country.452 The rationale behind this requirement is that MIGA
was intended to enhance the flow of foreign investment to developing countries.
Second, the host government country must approve the issuance of guarantee by the
Agency prior to guaranteeing. 453

Third, as a rule, the guaranteed value shall not

exceed the total loss of the guaranteed investment. 454
Settlement of Investment Disputes under MIGA
Disputes under the MIGA Convention can be categorized into (four) 4
types:
(1) disputes over interpretation and application of the Convention
between a member and the Agency;455

reasonable period of time as shall be prescribed in the contracts of guarantee pursuant to the Agency's
regulations, or (c) such a decision cannot be enforced.
450 Any military action or civil disturbance in any territory of the host country to which this Convention
shall be applicable as provided in Article 66.
451 MIGA Convention, supra note 253, art. 11.
452 !d. art. 14.
453 !d. art. 15.
454 Id. art. 16.
455 I d. art. 56
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(2) disputes between the Agency as subrogee of an insured investor
and a member (a host country);456
(3) disputes arising under a contract of guarantee or remsurance
between the Agency and the contract parties;457
(4) disputes other than those according to (1), (2), or (3) between the
Agency and a member or former member. 458
However, this dissertation only focuses on disputes in Category 2
(disputes between MIGA as subrogee of an insured investor and a host country)
because disputes in Category 2 can raise issues of FDI and international arbitration as
dispute settlement resolution between the parties in which Thailand is the one party
and MIGA is the other party of the disputes.
Disputes in Category 2 occur when MIGA pays the insured investor
compensation upon the claim against the host country. As a result, MIGA shall step
in the insured investor's rights to pursue such a claim against the host country.459
According to the MIGA Convention, disputes between MIGA and the host country
due to the subrogated rights shall be settled in accordance with the procedures set
forth in Annex II to the Convention. As its initial resolution, the parties are required
to settle their dispute through negotiation. When the negotiation is failed, either party
will be entitled to request arbitration proceedings unless the parties reserve to resort
first to conciliation. 46o
In this regard, Thailand as a membership of the MIGA Convention has
issued the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Compliance with Arbitral
Awards B.E. 2544 (2001) providing a step-by-step guidance for Government
Id.
Id.
458 Id.
459 !d.
460 !d.
456
457

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

57(2).
58.
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18(a).
57(b).
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Agencies as to how to process when facing an arbitral award.

The Regulation

imposes that upon the arbitral award, the losing Government Agency is imposed to
strictly comply with the arbitral award especially where such an award is made to
settle disputes between MIGA and the Government of Thailand through its Agency.
Therefore, where a Government Agency is awarded by the arbitral tribunal to
compensate MIGA after MIGA has paid compensation to an insured investor and
after MIGA has assumed the insured investor's subrogated rights, the losing agency is
absolutely obligated to pay compensation to MIGA, no matter what excuse the losing
agency may have.
To sum up, MIGA is created to enhance capital flowing into
developing countries. Having said that, MIGA offers insurance coverage over noncommercial risks for foreign investors.

The application of MIGA is seen as an

advanced method that is perfectly fitted to the situation where national and private
insurance programs fail to provide insurance coverage in certain areas such as noncommercial risks, especially for those relating to eligible investors, eligible
investments, and large projects that require reinsurance coverage.
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2.

Inconsistency and Incompatibility of Arbitration for Disputes Arising out

of a State Contract
Having briefly outlined the existing arbitration legal system in both
aspects of domestic and international law, this study now turns to an analysis of the
arbitration legal system to look at the drawbacks and problems that can arise for
disputes arising under state contracts. The heart of this analysis is the idea that the
methods that the existing arbitration system has in place for dealing with disputes
from state contracts is awkward, inconsistent, incompatible and inappropriate.
Likewise, such inconsistency and incompatibility can be viewed from two (2)
perspectives: domestic law perspective and international law perspective.

2.1.

From Thailand (National) Perspective
2.1.1. The Arbitration Act and State Contracts' Functions
Apparently, disputes arising out of a state contract regardless of

whatever contract type can be settled by a means of arbitration. Having said that
Section 15 of the Arbitration Act provides that:

"Disputes arising out of a contract between the State as the
one party and the private party as the other party may be settled by
arbitration whether or not such a contract is an administrative
contract. "
Even the existing Section 15, the Arbitration Act does not seem to suit
well for disputes arising out of state contracts, especially those carrying the special
characteristics as follow:
First, when looking at the objectives of the Arbitration Act, it finds that
the Arbitration Act was initiatively invented as a dispute settlement mechanism for
private parties. Based upon the concept of the Arbitration Act, the disputing parties
shall be deemed as equal and have absolute rights to choose a means in settling their
disputes. They can choose a method that provides the flexibility that both of them
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satisfy.

Accordingly, they can choose the arbitral tribunal that they can trust as

impartial as well as choose the laws and arbitral proceedings that they think
appropriate.

Agreement on those matters between the parties is binding and

absolutely recognized by the Arbitration Act.

As a result, the arbitral award as

derived from the arbitral tribunal is also legally binding on the parties and the Court
of Justice hesitates to review the arbitral award rendered by the arbitral tribunal.
Under the Arbitration Act, the Court of Justice is unlikely to intervene or invalidate
the arbitral award unless the Court of Justice comes across refusal grounds that the
arbitral award should be annulled.

So far, it can be inferred that the concept of

arbitration seems to work well as dispute settlement resolution among private
parties

461

but not for disputes arising out of a state contract where one of the party is

the State.
In addition to the arbitration's purpose in settling disputes among
private parties, the application of arbitration is also aimed to help reducing the number
of civil cases that are to be brought into the Court of Justice. With this regard, the
Arbitration Act reaffirms that disputes between private parties are considered civil
cases and the arbitral tribunal may apply the Civil Procedure Code to a case during
arbitral proceedings.

This legal implication can be demonstrated in Section 25

providing that:

For the purpose of this chapter, the arbitral tribunal may apply
the provisions on witness and evidence of the Civil Procedure Code to
the arbitral proceedings mutatis mutandis.

Therefore, it is quite evident that the concept and purposes of
arbitration under the Arbitration Act does not work out well with disputes arising out

This is also in the line with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that are aimed to tackle disputes
among private commercial parties. See also Tuck, supra note 367 at 885, 887.

461
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of state contracts other than government procurement contracts.

Disputes arising

under state contracts other than government procurement contracts are unique and
different from disputes between private parties as disputes arising out of state
contracts can bring about issues of public policy or morals. More importantly, some
of those disputes are normally involved in the exercising of the State's power, the
provision of public service or utility, or the exploitation of natural resources, thereby
being inappropriate as being defined as civil cases that are subject to civil law
principles as appeared in the Arbitration Act.
Second, given Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, the term of "state
contract" is comparatively wide in that it is wide enough to cover all types of state
contracts where one party is the State, thereby including any state contract, which
carries special characteristics, other than government procurement contract, into the
provision's scope.

In other words, Section 15 can be interpreted as saying that

disputes arising out of any contract type, defined as a "state contract," whether it is
simply deemed to be a contract between private parties like a government
procurement contract or carrying special characteristics like FDI, can be arbitrated
subject to the Arbitration Act. According to Section 15, disputes arising out of a state
contract even involving in the exercising of the State's power, public policy or
morals, will be treated as civil cases and as a result are exclusively subject to civil law
principles. Such imposition does not sound right as far as disputes arising out of state
contracts other than government procurement contract are concerned. It is definitely
inappropriate that disputes arising out of state contracts involving in the exercising of
the state's power shall be treated as civil cases and subject to civil law principles. On
the contrary, state contracts carrying the special characteristics, for example ones
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involving in the exercising of the State's power, should be subject to administrative
and public law principles.
Third, state contracts under Thai law are classified into five (5)
categories: government procurement contracts, administrative contracts, concession
contracts, state-joint venture contracts and other.

Based upon these five (5)

categories, state contracts individually carry and serve their own functions and
objectives according to their contract types but when encountering arbitration issues,
these state contracts are nonetheless subject to the same legal implication in
accordance with the Arbitration Act. This would seem to be extremely inappropriate
in that state contracts carrying special characteristics shall be exclusively arbitrated
under the Arbitration Act, which was designed to help private parties settle their
disputes. At the very least, it is suggested that disputes arising out of state contracts,
which are deemed as contracts among private parties like government procurement
contracts can be treated as civil cases and subject to civil law principles, whereas
disputes arising out of state contracts carrying special characteristics, for example
involving in the exercising of the state power or relating to FDI, should not be treated
as civil cases.

These disputes should be subject to a Special Method where

administrative law principles apply.
Fourth, state contracts involving the State's power, the provision of
public service or utility, or natural resources, are also defined as administrative
contracts, thereby being subject to the Administrative Court's jurisdiction according
to the Establishment of the Administrative Court and the Administrative Court
Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999).

Therefore, a question regarding the Court's

jurisdiction may arise as to whether disputes arising out of an administrative contract
should be subject to the Court of Justice's jurisdiction or the Administrative Court's
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jurisdiction. Provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Administrative Court Act seem
to be in conflict. On the one hand, all types of state contracts can be arbitrated under
the Arbitration Act and accordingly, the Court of Justice shall assume jurisdiction
over issues or matters relating to arbitration. On the other hand, disputes under state
contracts, which are also defined as administrative contracts under the Administrative
Court Act shall be within the Administrative Court's jurisdiction. The conflict of
these two (2) statutory acts bring about great confusion to Government Agencies as to
whether disputes arising out of the defined state contract, which at the same time can
be defined as an administrative contract, should be subject to the Court of Justice's
jurisdiction or the Administrative Court's jurisdiction in practice.
Although there is a clash of legal implication between these two (2)
acts, this is not to suggest that disputes arising out of state contracts other than
government procurement contracts cannot be arbitrated at all.

On the contrary,

disputes from those state contracts can be arbitrated (subject to the special legal
treatment) in a way that is different from that of the Arbitration Act as designed to
settle disputes between private parties. The idea behind the special legal treatment is
that it would ensure that state contracts with special characteristics would be
appropriately treated without distortion and ignorance of the public interest theory.
Therefore, it can be said that the Arbitration Act's purposes and state
contracts' functions are individually unique and inconsistent.

The application of

arbitration under the Arbitration Act does not seem to work well with disputes arising
out of state contracts carrying special characteristics.

In consequence, this

dissertation proposes that arbitration as alternative means of dispute settlement for
disputes arising out of state contracts other than government procurement, per se,
disputes arising under state contracts relating to qualifying FDI, should be subject to
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the Special Method as a powerful alternative of dispute settlement resolution.
Alternatively, the Special Method should apply to disputes arising out of any state
contract that carry the functions of FDI, per se, a state contract relating to qualifying
FDI, for example, concession contracts, administrative contracts, construction
contracts etc.
2.1.2. Lack of Step-by-Step Guidance on Arbitration for Disputes
Arising out of a State Contract
As mentioned earlier, even though the Arbitration Act was enacted to
provide arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution between private parties but
disputes arising out of state contract can be also arbitrated under the Arbitration Act.
Surprisingly, the Arbitration Act does not provide step-by-step guidance on
arbitration for Government Agencies to comply with as far as disputes under state
contracts are concerned. The Arbitration Act imposes neither what contract type can
be arbitrated nor what contract type is prohibited from applying arbitration.
Moreover, the Arbitration Act does not designate to what extent those disputes arising
under state contracts can be arbitrated as well as provide procedural guidance as to
how to conclude an arbitration clause or arbitration agreement, how to initiate
arbitration process, or how to undertake arbitration proceedings, etc.
The lack of step-by-step procedure on arbitration jeopardizes
consistency, formality and regularity of the legal implication on arbitration, especially
for disputes arising under state contracts.

Under such circumstance, individual

Government Agencies are compelled to exercise their own discretion to tackle these
issues by themselves. Without step-by-step rules for disputes arising out of state
contracts having special characteristics, most Government Agencies are left with no
choice of what to do and where they should tum to. Without clues of what to do, they
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are urged to tum to the 1992 Regulation by applying the sample arbitration clause
provided by the 1992 Regulation to a case. They often tentatively apply the sample
arbitration clause to state contracts, no matter what contract type they transact with
the private party in practice.
As a result, the reference to the sample arbitration clause in state
contracts other than government procurement contract even causes further confusion
and difficulties. Specifically, this reference raises the question as to whether disputes
arising out of state contracts, which can be simultaneously defined as administrative
contracts, should be within the Court of Justice's jurisdiction or the Administrative
Court's jurisdiction. It is simply due to the fact that the Sample Clause provided by
the 1992 Regulation often refers disputes, whether or not they arise or relate to
arbitration, to the Court of Justice's jurisdiction even though those disputes at the
same time can be defined as disputes arising from an administrative contract under the
Administrative Court Act and as a result, they are subject to the Administrative
Court's jurisdiction.
This unusual practice inevitably causes irregularity of the legal
implication on arbitration as the practice can be variable depending on individual
Government Agencies, thereby even resulting in the greater inconsistency and
incompatibility of the entire legal arbitration system governing disputes arising out
state contracts in Thailand.

2.1.3. Confusion of the Jurisdiction between the Court of Justice
and the Administrative Court over Arbitration Issues
Before the Administrative Court was established in 1999, all relevant
matters regarding arbitration were referred to the Court of Justice. As a result, the
disputing parties could request the Court of Justice to issue a warrant to any person to
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give oral statement, or deliver documentary evidence or objects to the arbitral
tribunal462 and only the Court of Justice could enforce arbitral awards

463

under the

Arbitration Act. The reference of arbitration issues to the Court of Justice in those
days sounded reasonable because at that time, the Administrative Court did not exist.
Furthermore, the Arbitration Act was objectively issued to help settle disputes
between private parties. Therefore, disputes derived from arbitration between private
parties were considered civil cases and accordingly subject to the Court of Justice's
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice has never been in question until
the Administrative Court was established in 1999 by the Establishment of the
Administrative Court and the Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999).
The Administrative Court was set up as an independent court separate from the Court
of Justice having jurisdiction over administrative cases (disputes among Government
Agencies, or disputes between Government Agencies and private parties). It also
includes disputes arising out of the administrative contracts where one party is the
State.
The confusion of the jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the
Administrative Court first arose when the Administrative Court was established. It
appears that certain legal provisions on arbitration for disputes arising under state
contracts have not been updated in a manner consonant with the existence and
functions of the Administrative Court. The following issues are still in questions as to
whether certain disputes should be referred to the Administrative Court or the Court
of Justice.

462
463

Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.), supra note 363, § 33.
!d. § 41.
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(i) The Sample Arbitration Clause As It Pertains to State
Contracts Other Than Government Procurement Contracts
The sample arbitration clause as provided by the 1992 Regulation has
been playing a significant role in dispute settlement resolution for disputes arising out
of state contracts other than government procurement contracts. The reason is that
Government Agencies likely apply the sample arbitration clause to state contracts
other than government procurement contract, which is the only contract type within
the 1992 Regulation's scope, thereby causing the unexpected controversy in adopting
the sample arbitration clause. The application of the sample arbitration clause as
adopted by most Government Agencies makes for confusion in practice.

This

confusion stems in part out of 1992 Regulation, which refers all matters regarding
arbitration to the Court of Justice regardless of the existence of the Administrative
Court and regardless of what contract type they are transacting.
The following is the sample arbitration clause provided by the 1992
Regulation464:

1. Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection
with the Contract of the implementation of any of the provisions of the
Contract, which cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to
arbitration.
2. Unless both parties agree in the appointment of a single
arbitrator, either party shall serve upon the other a notice of intention
to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specifY the name
of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. Then the dispute or the
difference shall be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by
the issuing party as aforesaid and the other one to be appointed by
the other party within thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice.
If the two arbitrators are unable to agree on such dispute or
difference, an umpire shall be appointed by the two arbitrators within
thirty (30) days from the date of disagreement. The umpire so
appointed shall resolve the dispute or difference. "
3. Should either party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or
in case of disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire,
464 Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thai!.), supra
note 118, sample clause at 2-25.
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each party is entitled to refer the matter to the Civil Court in
Bangkok, Thailand for the appointment of arbitrator or umpire as the
case may be.
4. Any decision or award given by the single arbitrator or the
two arbitrators jOintly, or the umpire in case the two arbitrators
disagree, shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the parties
hereto.
The arbitration proceedings shall follow the Rule of
Arbitration of the Ministry of Justice's Arbitration Office or any rule
as agreed by both parties and shall be conducted in Bangkok.
5. Each party shall bear the cost of his own arbitrator's
service and share equally other cost of all proceedings. In case a
single arbitrator or an umpire is appointed, the cost of the single
arbitrator's service or the cost of the umpire's service shall be
decided by the arbitrator, or the umpire, as the case may be.
6. The submission of any matter in dispute or difference to
the arbitration proceedings as aforesaid, shall be a condition
precedent to the right of institution of court action.
7. The Contract shall be construed according to the laws of
the Kingdom of Thailand. Each party shall have the right to institute
suit against the other in the Civil Court in Bangkok, Thailand, to
enforce any decision or award rendered in arbitration proceedings.
The misuse of the sample arbitration clause inevitably brings about
inconsistency within the existing arbitration system governing disputes arising out of
state contracts.

This is especially true for those state contracts, which can be

simultaneously defined as "administrative contracts" and as a result, subject to the
Administrative Court's jurisdiction.

Under such circumstance, the question of

whether disputes arising out of these sorts of contract should be brought into the Court
of Justice due to the sample arbitration clause contained in a contract or they should
be submitted to the Administrative Court due to their transaction nature corresponding
to definition of administrative contracts arises. In such an event, it seems that the
Court of Justice is not appropriate to adjudicate those disputes but to submit disputes
to the Administrative Court may cause the Government Agency be condemned of
violating its contractual obligations. Therefore, even though the provisions of the
Administrative Court Act shall always overrule the contract's obligations, the
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consequence of this misuse is quite severe because it can cause the State to be liable
for compensation to the private contracting party for breach of contract.
Therefore, to respond to this drawback, the Special Method that this
dissertation suggests provides a new sample arbitration clause so as to help with the
confusions that stem from state contracts and the existence of the Administrative
Court.
(ii) Self-Contradictory Provision of the Arbitration Act

The Arbitration Act itself contains a contradictory provision that raises
the question as to how the Arbitration Act should be interpreted and implemented.
The reason is that the Arbitration Act generally refers all matters occurred during the
arbitration process to the Court of Justice. In the initial process, if the parties cannot
reach an agreement in appointing a sole arbitrator or umpire, either party can request
the Court of Justice to do SO.465 Likewise, the objection to arbitrators shall be referred
to the Court of Justice. 466 Furthermore, the disputing parties, who desire to protect
their rights during the arbitration process, are entitled to request the Court of Justice to
issue an interim measure either before or during the process.467 During the arbitration
process, the arbitral tribunal or the disputing parties with the arbitral tribunal's
consent can request the Court of Justice to issue a warrant to any person to give oral
statement, deliver any documentary evidence or objects to the arbitration. 468 After the
arbitral award is rendered, the arbitral award shall be only enforced through the Court
of Justice regardless of what contract type. 469 Moreover, the arbitral award may be
nullified through the Court of Justice with the request of the dissatisfied party.470

465

Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.), supra note 363, § 18.
§ 20.
§ 16.
§ 33.
§ 41.
§ 40.

466Id.
467Id.
468 I d.
469Id.
47°Id.
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The Court of Justice seems to have full and exclusive power and
jurisdiction over all matters relating to arbitration subject to the Arbitration Act.
Nevertheless, it is quite surprising to find that the Arbitration Act also empowers the
party who disagrees with the Court of Justice's decision to appeal the matter to either
the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court471 even though no provision
of the Arbitration Act confers the lower Administrative Court's jurisdiction at the
initial stage.

As a result, there would be no possibility that the party who is

dissatisfied with the Court of Justice's judgment would further appeal to the Supreme
Administrative Court because the lower Administrative Court itself has no jurisdiction
and authority over any matter relating to arbitration.
Therefore, this dissertation seeks to amend this self-contradictory
provision. Disputes between private parties and those arising out of state contracts
other than government procurement contracts should be differentiated. On the one
hand, disputes between private parties and those that are deemed as between private
parties, per se, government procurement contracts should be treated as civil cases and
subject to the Arbitration Act and the Court of Justice's jurisdiction. On the other
hand, disputes arising out of state contract carrying special characteristics, for
example involving the exercising of the State's power, the provision of public service
or utility, the exploitation of natural resources, or FDI should be treated appropriately
and subject to the proposed Special Method and the Administrative Court's
jurisdiction.
(iii)

Unclear Jurisdiction over Arbitration Issues derived

from the Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts

471

[d. § 45.
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In Thailand, where a question regarding jurisdiction arises, the
Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts, consisting of the President of the Supreme
Court of Justice, the President of the Administrative Court, the President of the
Military Court and any other Court (if any) shall have authority to deal with this
jurisdictional matter. The Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts shall decide which
court the disputes in question should be submitted. 472 However, the Commission's
decision on jurisdictional disputes, in some cases, may be challenged as the decision
can be too subjective depending on the Commission's discretion, thereby being
unjustified by legal principles that attempt to differentiate disputes within the Court of
Justice's jurisdiction according to the Arbitration Act from those within the
Administrative Court's jurisdiction according to the Administrative Court Act.
The Commission's decision, which is too subjective and far beyond the
legal justification, even brings about more confusion to Government Agencies in
practice. They do not know which practice they should follow. Unfortunately, if
their contracts cause damage or loss to the State (as seen in the Expressway case),
they would possibly assume responsibility for concluding such a contract
The challenge to the Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts can be
exemplified in the Expressway case where BBCD requested the Court of Justice to
enforce the arbitral award rendered by the arbitral tribunal. ETA with the OAG's
advice argued that the case should be transferred to the Administrative Court on the
ground that the enforcement of the arbitral award would give rise to the issues of
public policy or morals under administrative and public law principles.

The

Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts, however, concluded that disputes between
BBCD and ETA were within the Court of Justice's jurisdiction due to the fact that the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007), supra note 82. Also see the Act
Concerning the Settlement of Disputes on the Competent Jurisdiction among Courts B.E. 2542 (1999)
(Thail.).

472
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Court of Justice had previously issued a warrant requesting a witness to give oral
statement before the arbitral tribunal during the arbitral proceedings. 473

The

Commission on Jurisdiction of Courts' decision seemed very subjective as the
decision was too far beyond the legal justification of the Administrative Court Act.
With this regard, Julasing Vasantasing474 disagreed with the Commission on
Jurisdiction of Courts' decision by arguing that the disputes derived from a contract
between BBCD and ETA were considered to relate to the provision of public service
or utility and as a result, fell within the administrative contract's definition so as to be
subject to the Administrative Court accordingly. Therefore, the Administrative Court
should be more suitable and appropriate for handling disputes arising out of state
contracts, especially for those being involved in the exercising of the State's power.
The Administrative Court is considered the most suitable authority to
adjudicate or settle disputes arising out of administrative contracts because the
Administrative Court can apply principles (including the public interest theory) that
are not applicable in the Court of Justice to a case. Furthermore, the Administrative
Court is free from any restriction to acquire additional evidence as it considers
necessary rather than leave it to the disputing parties according to the burden of proof
principle.
To sum up, even with the establishment of the Administrative Court, it
is very likely to find that disputes arising out of administrative contracts continue to
be brought into the Court of Justice, not the Administrative Court. Part of the reason
for this is that the existing arbitration laws and regulations have not been updated in a
manner consistent with the Administrative Court's existence and functions.

Julasing Vasantasing, State Contracts: the Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Execution of A
Concession Contract between the State and the Private Party 29 (2004).
474 Julasing Vasantasing, at that time was the Director General of the Legal Counsel Department, the
Office of the Attorney General and was fully in charge of defending this case for ETA.
473
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Therefore, it is advised that on the one hand, disputes between the private parties and
those arising out of government procurement contracts should be governed by the
Arbitration Act, treated as civil cases and accordingly subject to the Court of Justice's
jurisdiction. On the other hand, disputes arising out of state contracts carrying special
characteristics, for example, involving in the exercising of the State's power, the
provision of public service or utility, the exploitation of natural resources, or FDI
should be defined as administrative contracts, treated by the Special Method, and
accordingly subject to the Administrative Court's jurisdiction.

2.1.4. Error of the 2004 Cabinet Resolution
It becomes clear that the existing arbitration laws and regulations

cannot serve their best functions in settling disputes arising under state contracts and
concession contracts in particular. The arbitral award in the Expressway case, which
was seen as the most disappointing and shocking award that Thailand has ever
experienced is another factor in what gave rise to the failure of arbitration for state
contracts. In the Expressway case, as demonstrated earlier, the Government as a
sovereign state was asked to pay the private party (BBCD) a fine (punitive damage) or
penalty above and beyond normal compensation for actual damage or loss suffered.
These circumstances were seen as crucial factors striking the
Government of Thailand to issue a Cabinet Resolution in 2004. The issuance of the
2004 Cabinet Resolution was derived from the arbitral award in the Expressway case
to prohibit all Government Agencies from concluding an arbitration clause in a
concession contract unless it is specially approved by the Council of Ministers. 475
Based upon the Cabinet Resolution, it clarifies that arbitration is inappropriate for
settling disputes arising under concession contracts.

475

Letter of the Secretary General to the Council of Ministers, supra note 202.
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In spite of the issuance of the 2004 Cabinet Resolution, it is very
unfortunate to find that there is an error of the 2004 Cabinet Resolution. Based upon
the nature of the contract transaction between BBCD and ETA, ETA hired BBCD to
construct the expressway facility and BBCD received a fixed amount in the form of a
promissory note in return.

BBCD was not eligible to collect toll fees from

expressway users. Therefore, the contract between BBCD and ETA was simply a
construction contract.

It was not a concession contract.

To be defined as a

concession contract, BBCD must have been granted a concession to provide the
expressway facility to public in general with its own risk and expense (including
constructing the expressway facility) in order for BBCD to directly collect toll fees
from users in return.

Therefore, a contract between ETA and BBCD was not a

concession contract so the drafter of the 2004 Cabinet Resolution must have
misunderstood that the construction contract between BBCD and ETA had been a
concession contract and the 2004 Cabinet Resolution was drafted as such.
Due to this error, the 2004 Cabinet Resolution cannot therefore solve
the problem like that arose in the Expressway case. More specifically, the 2004
Cabinet Resolution cannot prevent disputes arising out of state contracts, which are
not defined as concession contract (like a construction contract in the Expressway
case) from being arbitrated.

This definitely causes difficulties for Government

Agencies, and has brought uncertainty as to how they should comply with this 2004
Cabinet Resolution in practice.
Therefore, it is advised that the 2004 Cabinet Resolution should be
redrafted to provide for the specific conditions that a contract should carry rather than
expressly designate names of contract types because the categories of state contract
types under Thai law are overlapping and indistinguishable in practice.
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2.2.

From International Perspective
From international perspective, it appears that domestic legal

implications and practice on arbitration and international arbitration law are not
perfectly consistent and compatible.

The following are factors causing such

inconsistency and incompatibility.

2.2.1. ICSID Convention
Thailand has been a member of UNCITRAL, the New York
Convention and the MIGA Convention. For the ICSID Convention, Thailand already
signed the ICSID Convention but has not ratified the Convention yet, hence making
the entire arbitration system in Thailand even more incompatible and inconsistent.
Thailand's reluctance to ratify the ICSID Convention raises some
important questions as to the reasons behind the country's inaction. According to
Professor Sompong Sucharitkul, the inaction of non-ratification on the part of
Thailand might stem from political issues that are very sensitive for the Thai
government. It seems that her legal experts have not succeeded in convincing the
leadership of the Government of the advantages and absence of disadvantages of
becoming the party to the ICSID Convention. The Government is unaware of how
ICSID operates and how Thailand can benefit from the ratification of the ICSID
Convention.

The Thai government has not been informed and persuaded by her

expert advisers that there will be no unforeseen risk upon ratification. 476 Further, the
reluctance to ratify the ICSID Convention seems to be increasing due to the
disappointment of the domestic arbitral award in the Expressway case as well as the
disappointment of the international arbitral award under UNCITRAL in the Walter

476

From the discussion with Professor Sompong Sucharitkul on April 19,2006.
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Bau. 477 The arbitral awards of the Expressway case and Walter Bau reaffinned that

fears about being involved in dispute settlement outside of its national adjudication
system were justified. As a result, the Council of Ministers even issued a resolution
in 2004 to prohibit all Government Agencies from concluding an arbitration clause in
a concession contract unless it is specifically approved by the Council of Ministers
upon case-by-case basis.
If the ICSID Convention is not ratified, the arbitration system under
the Thai laws will remain inconsistent and incomplete, especially in regards with
international arbitration.

Due to Thailand's international obligations under

UNCITRAL, the New York Convention, and the MIGA Convention, it means that
Thailand's nationals and Thailand as a host state as happened in Walter Bau can be
brought to any ad-hoc international arbitration or international arbitration institution
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or any other rules. When the arbitral award
is rendered, Thailand is obliged to recognize and enforce such arbitral award made
outside Thailand whether or not the disputing party holds the Thai nationality in
accordance with the New York Convention. More importantly, in a case of disputes
between Thailand and MIGA where MIGA is subrogated to pursue the insured's
rights against Thailand as a host state before international arbitration, Thailand is
absolutely obliged to comply with the arbitral award. It is particularly true when the
arbitral tribunal awards Thailand to pay compensation or damages to MIGA. With
this regard, the Thai government has issued the Regulation of the Office of the Prime
Minister on Compliance with Arbitral Awards B.B. 2544 (2001), compelling the
Government Agency to pay compensation to MIIGA promptly and prohibiting it from
refusing to comply with the arbitral award.
The arbitral tribunal in Walter Bau vs. Thailand awarded in favour of WaIter Bau as a minority
shareholder holding ten (10) per cent of shareholdings in Don Muang Tollway ("DMT") and requested
the Government of Thailand to pay one and a half(1.5) billion Baht compensation to WaIter Bau.
477
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By such fact, it demonstrates that Thailand has already bypassed the
ICSID Convention because Thailand is obligated to recognize and enforce arbitral
awards made outside its territory under the New York Convention, and to pay
compensation to MIGA as an insurer for foreign investors under the MIGA
Convention. Under such circumstances, it is quite surprising to find that Thailand is
not entitled to submit disputes arising out of investments to international arbitration
under ICSID since it has not ratified the ICSID Convention even though ICSID is
considered the most suitable international arbitration providing investor-state dispute
resolution.
The unavailability of ICSID is extremely disadvantageous to Thai
investors, who desire to settle their disputes with other ICSID-member states, in that
they are not eligible to arbitrate their dispute before ICSID.

On the other hand,

nationals of other ICSID-member states can pursue their claims through international
arbitration institutions other than ICSID against Thailand and, of course, Thailand is
bound to comply with such international arbitral awards made outside Thailand due to
its commitment under the New York Convention and to pay compensation to MIGA
under the MIGA Convention. The Flowchart of the Existing International Arbitration
System in Thailand appears in Appendix 10 of the Appendices, showing how the
non-ratification of the ICSID Convention on part of Thailand can contribute to the
incompletion of the existing international arbitration system in Thailand because the
part of the accessibility to ICSID is missing. Additional justifications that Thailand
should ratify the ICSID Convention will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
2.2.2. 1992 Regulation
As mentioned earlier, the 1992 Regulation provides a sample
arbitration clause as the reference material for Government Agencies. Even though
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the sample arbitration clause is only intended to apply to a government procurement
contract but in the real practice, most Agencies likely apply the sample arbitration
clause to other types of state contracts. The sample arbitration clause itself is found
not corresponding to principles and concepts set forth in the UNCITRAL Rules and
the ICSID Convention as follows:
First, the sample arbitration clause allows a two panel of arbitrators to
serve as the arbitral tribunal,478 while both the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the
ICSID Convention recognize even numbers of arbitrators, per se, a sole arbitrator or a
three panel of arbitrators as the arbitral tribunal of a dispute because the latter enables
disputes to be settled by majority votes. In the latter case, each of the disputing
parties chooses his own arbitrator and these two arbitrators will appoint the third
arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator or umpire of a dispute.
Second, even though Government Agencies are free to choose any
arbitration rule for their arbitration proceedings, but in practice, Agencies are more
likely to apply the Rule of Arbitration of the Ministry of Justic~'s Arbitration Office
as suggested by the sample arbitration clause. 479

Due to such suggestion, the

application of international arbitration as a dispute settlement solution among
Government Agencies is found very rare in the State sector.

The Sample Arbitration Clause provides:
2. Unless both parties agree in the appointment of a single arbitrator, either party
shall serve upon the other a notice of intention to submit the dispute or difference to
arbitration and specify the name of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. Then the dispute
or the difference shall be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by the issuing party
as aforesaid and the other one to be appointed by the other party within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the said notice. If the two arbitrators are unable to agree on such dispute or
difference, an umpire shall be appointed by the two arbitrators within thirty (30) days from
the date of disagreement. The umpire so appointed shall resolve the dispute or difference.
479 The Sample Arbitration Clause:
"4. Any decision or award given by the single arbitrator or the two arbitrators
jointly, or the umpire in case the two arbitrators disagree, shall be final, conclusive and
binding upon the parties hereto. The arbitration proceedings shall follow the Rule of
Arbitration of the Ministry of Justice's Arbitration Office or any rule as agreed by both
parties and shall be conducted in Bangkok.
478
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Given the foregoing clarifications, it suggests that the Special Method
should be set up. The Special Method provides specific guidance on arbitration for
Government Agencies to ensure that disputes arising out of a state contract will be
handled correctly, efficiently and appropriately.

At the very least, the sample

arbitration clause provided by the 1992 Regulation should be amended in a manner
consistent with the principles set forth in those conventions and Thailand's BITs by
providing international arbitration as alternative dispute for foreign investors.
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3.

A Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration

The above sections illustrate that the existing arbitration laws and
regulations governing disputes arising out of a state contract (including one relating to
FDI) are inconsistent and contradictory. The overall domestic arbitration regime does
not correspond to international investment laws, thereby making it inappropriate in
dealing with disputes arising out of a state contract representing FDI, especially those
with special characteristics, for example, involving in the exercising of the State's
power, the provision of public service or utility, or natural resources.
Therefore, this dissertation proposes to establish a uniform and
standard methodology on arbitration to handle disputes arising out of a state contract
with special characteristics, per se, relating to qualifying FDI. The establishment of a
uniform and standard methodology on arbitration would adopt principles of protection
and promotion on investment in accordance with international law in order to help
foreign investors gain greater confidence that their capital and investment would be
protected. At the very least, in cases of disputes, foreign investors are not compelled
to only rely on domestic remedy system. On the contrary, foreign investors are also
eligible to submit their disputes to international arbitration. It is believed that once
foreign investors have confidence that their FDI would be protected in Thailand, they
would be convinced to invest their capital in Thailand.
With this regard, even though the BOI was established to accomplish
these missions and mandates in promoting FDI in a country, other agencies, for
example, the Ministry of Finance (the Fiscal Policy Office, the NESDB), the Ministry
of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and so on should work closely with the
BOI to achieve such goal. In part of the OAG's mandates in reviewing state contracts
to be executed by Government Agencies with private parties, it is believed that the
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OAG should perform its functions by ensuring that a state contract in question is well
written and fulfills the parties' intent and goals.

Especially for a state contract

representing FDI, the OAG must ensure that a state contract relating to qualifying FDI
is valid, enforceable, and corresponds according to both domestic and international
laws on investment.

The terms and conditions of a contract concerned must be

consistent with obligations under international investment law. At the very least, a
state contract relating to qualifying FDI must meet obligations as imposed by
UNCITRAL, the New York Convention, the MIGA Convention as well as BITs,
MITs, or FTAs that Thailand has entered into with other countries.
Therefore, to establish a uniform and standard methodology on
arbitration to handle disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI,
the following goals need to be implemented. First, Thailand should ratify the ICSID
Convention so that the missing piece of the existing arbitration regime on
international arbitration would be completed. Second, the Special Method governing
disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI should be
established. The Special Method would provide an alternative to dispute resolution,
for example consultation, negotiation, local arbitration or international arbitration for
the parties. The Special Method ensures that disputes between the State and foreign
investors would be treated appropriately subject to relevant domestic laws and
international laws on arbitration. Third, it is advised that the existing arbitration law
and regulations governing disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying
FDI should be updated and modified in a manner consonant with the existence of the
Administrative Court Act.

The details and rationales of this proposal will be

discussed in Chapter 5. In the end, it is believed that the establishment of a uniform
and standard methodology on arbitration to handle disputes arising out of a state
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contract relating to qualifying FDI would promote and enhance FDI flowing toward a
country.
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Chapter 5

Towards a Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration
Given the analysis of the arbitration legal system in Chapter 4, it finds

that the arbitration for state contracts, especially those relating to FDI, is
contradictory, inconsistent, incompatible and incomplete.

The inconsistency and

incompatibility derive from both aspects of domestic arbitration law itself as well as
divergence between domestic arbitration law and international arbitration law.
To fix the inconsistency and incompatibility as well as to harmonize
the arbitration domestic law and international arbitration law, this dissertation
proposes to set up a Uniform and Standard Methodology on Arbitration Governing
Disputes Arising out of a State Contract Relating to qualifying FDI.

The

establishment of the Uniform and Standard Methodology on Arbitration consists of
three (3) missions: the ratification of the ICSID Convention; the establishment of the
Special Method; and the modification of the existing arbitration laws and regulations
to accommodate the availability of ICSID, the Special Method, and the existence of
the Administrative Court.
At the first glance, Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention since
there is no doubt that arbitration is the preferred method of dispute settlement among
foreign investors since it offers flexibility, informality, time saving, ability to choose
the governing substantive and procedural law, and enforcement of arbitral awards.
Arbitration is even claimed as a contract-based substitute for court-supervised
litigation

48o

where true arbitration produces a decision that binds the parties and

carries the legal effect of a final court judgment. 481

lahan P. Raissi, Arbitrating in Thailand, 16 HSTICLR 99 (1992). Also see Henry P. de Vries,
International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts. 57 Tul. L. Rev.
42,43 (1982).
481 Henry P. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National
Courts, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 47 (1982).
480
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By not ratifying the Convention, Thailand creates an undesirable and
negative image of the country and disrupts the fluidity of relations at the international
level. When looking at the List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the
Convention as of November 4, 2007, very few countries have not yet ratified the
Convention and, of course, Thailand is one of them. 482 The List of Contracting States
and Other Signatories of the ICSID Convention appears in Appendix 11 of the

Appendices.
Therefore, Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention but with a
reservation and condition.

The reservation would ensure that Thailand as the

sovereign state still reserves the right to certain disputes, which are particularly
sensitive to Thailand as the host state. With the reservation, Thailand can opt out the
ICSID's jurisdiction over certain disputes to the extent that Thailand reserves this
right. Additionally, Thailand should set forth the condition that disputes should be
submitted to ICSID only if local remedy system has been exhausted.

This

requirement would ensure that the host state and the investor are given an opportunity
to try to settle disputes among themselves before they will be settled before
international arbitration, per se ICSID. The rationale behind this recommendation for
Thailand to ratify the ICSID Convention is illustrated subsequently in this Chapter.
Second, the Special Method governing disputes arising out of a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI should be established. The Special Method would
ensure that disputes arising out of a "state contract relating to qualifying FDI" would
be handled and treated by a mechanism to encourage both the contracting government
agency and the private investor to put great efforts to settle the disputes by amicable

The following signatory states have not ratified the rCSID Convention: Belize; Canada; Dominican
Republic; Ethiopia; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Kyrgyz Republic; Moldova; Namibia; Russian Federation;
Sao Tome and Principe; Thailand.
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agreement. The justifications of the establishment of the Special Method as well as
the model of the Special Method and its details about the function and process of the
Special Method will be subsequently explained.
Third, the existing arbitration laws and regulations governing disputes
arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI should be modified in a
manner consonant with the availability of the ICSID Convention (with the assumption
that Thailand would ratify the ICSID Convention), the establishment of the Special
Method, and the existence of the Administrative Court. With such modification, the
Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) needs to be altered to confer jurisdiction upon the
Administrative Court over disputes arising out of state contracts with special
characteristics, especially for those relating to qualifying FDI. It is also necessary to
draft a new regulation as well as a sample arbitration clause specially governing
disputes arising out of state contracts with special characteristics, per se relating to
qualifying FDI. The details of the proposal are discussed as follows:

1.

Ratification of the ICSID Convention (1965)
It is strongly recommended that Thailand should ratify the ICSID

Convention. The consequence of such inaction on the part of Thailand has been
previously discussed in Chapter 4.

Therefore, the following analysis reiterates

justifications so as to support that Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention:

1.1.

Justifications for Urgent Ratification ofthe ICSID Convention
1.1.1. Invention of International Arbitration Mechanism and the

Establishment of ICSID
International arbitration mechanism was initially invented to prevent
creditor states from intervening in debtor states' territories by the use of military force
to collect debts in a case where debtor states were facing sovereign default. In those
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days, such an intervention of military force was known as a so-called "self-help"
measure in the pursuit of justice for creditor states' nationals and accordingly
justifiable under international law. However, Latin American countries aggressively
opposed to such "self-help" methods and contended that all states (weaker or stronger
states) had "equality" in terms of sovereignty over their territories under international
law.

According to this argument, the principle of "equality of states" was a

fundamental principle of international law. This point of view contended that the use
of military force for sovereign default was unjustified and military force should only
be used for self-defense. 483 This concept of equality had been widely accepted and
recognized as the Drago Doctrine. As a result, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
("PCA") was established as compulsory international arbitration in 1907. Since then,
the application of international arbitration had gradually become more acceptable as it
provided a dispute settlement resolution between states (home states and host states)
in those periods.
International arbitration has continued to function along this path.
Particularly, the mechanism of international arbitration relating to trade and
investment has gradually evolved until ICSID was established in 1965. Nonetheless,
ICSID was seen little different from international arbitration in those days in that
ICSID was focused on disputes arising out of investments in particular.

ICSID

recognized that disputes arising out of investment could bring the confrontation
between host states and home states at the state level.

Therefore, to avoid such

confrontation, ICSID was designed to serve as an international mechanism for dispute
settlement between Contracting States and nationals of another Contracting State by a
means of conciliation or arbitration.

483

Cousens, supra note 8.
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The avowed purpose of ICSID was first aimed at resolving
international conflicts by removing ultimate judicial authority from domestic
jurisdiction because foreign investors were uncertain about bias and neutrality of the
host state's domestic remedy system. Consequently, ICSID provides an investor-state
mechanism in settling disputes between the investor and the host state. Second, the
dispute settlement mechanism according to ICSID provides the disputing parties a
forum to settle their dispute among themselves so both the host state and the home
state will not be compelled to get involved in the dispute by means of subrogation.
Therefore, ICSID's mechanism helps prevent the home state and the host state from
military or diplomatic conflict. Third, diplomatic protection and subrogation of a
foreign investor by the home state is no longer necessary as ICSID plays
"depoliticization" role-one of the major contributions of ICSID. The home state is
prohibited from formally participating in the dispute once a claim has been submitted
to ICSID. 484
1.1.2. Significant Role of International Arbitration

As its main feature, international arbitration (including ICSID) has
been recognized as an effective dispute settlement resolution for foreign investors
because it is considered to be flexible, fast, modem, efficient and independent from
national jurisdiction.485 International arbitration even plays greater roles nowadays
due to the pressure from insurance industries or financial institutions.

To have

investments insured with insurance or by financial institutions, foreign investors are
more likely to direct their investment into a country where international arbitration is
made available in a host state. By such a requirement, foreign investors seem to have
no option to determine where they should invest their capital. As a result, foreign

484
485

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 27(1).
Biggs, supra note 10.
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investors are technically compelled to export their capital from their home country to
a host country that offers international arbitration as a dispute settlement resolution.
Overall, international arbitration plays a huge role in promoting and
enhancing international trade and contributes to the investment incentives, the freeflow of goods, services and open markets to international competition. At the very
least, the benefits of opening the economies to international trade and investment
would not have materialized if the countries had insisted on submitting disputes
arising from these transactions to the exclusive jurisdiction of their domestic courtS. 486

1.1.3. ICSID as the Most Suitable International Arbitration
Mechanism for Investor-State Disputes
It is generally accepted that both ICSID and the UNCITRAL

Arbitration Rules have been recognized international arbitration mechanisms
employed to settle disputes regarding trade and investment.

Particularly, the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules has been recognized as the universal means by which
international arbitration deals with international trade and investment disputes among
commercial private investors.
However, in terms of investor-state dispute settlement, ICSID is
considered the most suitable dispute settlement resolution because ICSID directly
offers an investor-state arbitration that provides a forum designed to settle disputes
between a host state (Contracting State) as the one party and a national of another
Contracting State (a foreign investor) as the other party. ICSID is not intended to deal
with disputes among private parties like UNCITRAL or between states.
With the provision of the investor-state arbitration, ICSID serves the
benefit of both the foreign investor and the host state. From the investor perspective,

486

!d.
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the international mechanism for settlement of disputes can give a foreign investor
much more confidence that his capital and profits will be protected. When a dispute
arises, the investor can submit such a dispute to rCsrD where it provides a neutral,
independent and flexible forum for the parties.

The availability of international

arbitration under ICSID can put the investor's concern at ease because he is confident
that his investment will be protected or at least it will not be easily expropriated or
nationalized without just compensation. From the host state perspective, when a
foreign investor is confident that his investment in the host state will be protected, the
host state will accordingly enjoy the benefit of investment flowing into a country.
Through the rCSrD mechanism, the host state is further guaranteed that it will not be
subject to international claims or diplomatic intervention by foreign investors' home
state during the ICSID's arbitration process.487
Additionally, ICSrD has been currently considered one of the
worldwide international arbitration institutions and recognized as a preferred method
of alternative dispute resolution for foreign investors as well as international
investment guarantee and insurance industries.

Especially for the latter, most

insurance corporations or financial institutions tentatively require foreign investors to
insert an arbitration clause that establishes ICSrD as a dispute resolution mechanism
in their investment contracts.

The lack of availability of rCSID may deter

transnational investment flow into a country. Only host states that can provide such
international arbitration mechanism will be definitely more attractive and promising
for foreign investment than states that do not.
Last but not least, ICSID also issues the rCSrD Additional Facility
Rules administering certain types of proceedings between States and foreign
487 ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 27. See also William Rand, Robert N. Hornick and Paul
Friedland, "ICSID 's Emerging Jurisdiction: The Scope of ICSID's Jurisdiction," 19 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 33
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investors, which fall outside the scope and ICSID's jurisdiction. Circumstances that
are outside the scope of ICSID can be illustrated in those cases where either a host
state or a home state of foreign investors is not the Contracting State of ICSID or
where a dispute is not an investment dispute but relates to a transaction concerned,
which is not an ordinary commercial transaction. 488 The application of the Additional
Facility Rules can be found in the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), the Energy Charter Treaty, the Cartagena Free Trade Agreement and the
Colonia Investment Protocol of MercosUf.

It is to say that under the present

circumstance, ICSID is not only the recognized form of international arbitration
among Contracting States but also a preferred method for a dispute settlement among
non-Contracting States subject to the Additional Facility Rules.
Therefore, due to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, it is very
possible that Thailand (including Thai investors) may be forced to get involved in
international arbitration under ICSID one way or another even though Thailand is not
defined as a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention.
1.1.4. Institutional Arrangements
ICSID not only offers an investor-state settlement resolution, which is
applies to disputes between a host state and a foreign investor but it also offers
options to the disputing parties regarding the venue of arbitration where it is most
convenient to them. The reason is that ICSID has made some arrangements with
other international arbitration institutions allowing ICSID to use their offices to be a
place of arbitration under ICSID. In addition to ICSID's headquarters in Washington,
District of Columbia, the United States, the disputing parties may agree to hold their

488

!d. art. 27.
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proceedings at any other places subject to certain conditions of the following
institutions: 489
•

Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague;

•

Regional

Arbitration

Centres

of the

Asian-African

Legal

Consultative Committee at Cairo, at Kuala Lumpur and at Lagos;
•

Australian Commercial Disputes Centre at Sydney;

•

Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration at
Melbourne;

•

Singapore International Arbitration Centre;

•

Gulf Cooperation Council Commercial Arbitration Centre at
Bahrain; and

•

German Institution of Arbitration.

Such arrangements with other institutions even bring ICSID up to its
worldwide recognition as an international arbitration institution because it offers
venues covering regions of Europe, America, Asia-Pacific, and Africa.
1.1.5. Close Relations with the World Bank
It is generally accepted that ICSID has a very close link to the World

Bank. In fact, ICSID was initially established to relieve the President of the World
Bank's task in assisting in mediation or conciliation of investment disputes between
c··
·
governments an d pnvate
lorelgn mvestors: 490

On a number of occasions in the past, the World Bank as an
institution and the President of the Bank in his personal capacity have
assisted in mediation or conciliation of investment disputes between
governments and private foreign investors.
The creation of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in
1966 was in part intended to relieve the President and the staff of the
burden of becoming involved in such disputes.
But the Bank's
489
490

ICSID, Institutional Arrangements, www.worldbank.orglicsid (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
I d.
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overriding consideration in creating ICSID was the belief that an
institution specially designed to facilitate the settlement of investment
disputes between governments and foreign investors could help promote
increased flows of international investment.

With the World Bank's pronouncement, ICSID was established as an
international arbitration institution and was specially designed to offer a settlement
resolution of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors in order
to enhance FDI flow from home states to host states.
Additionally, ICSID becomes part of the World Bank Group
("WBG").

Among of them are (1) International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development ("IBRD"); (2) International Development Association ("IDA"); (3)
International Finance Corporation ("IFC"); (4) Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency ("MIGA"); and (5) International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID").
Apart from the fact that the World Bank established ICSID, it further
appears that the President of the World Bank becomes ex offcio Chairman of the
ICSID's Administrative Counci1. 491 Therefore, it is out of question that ICSID has
deeply associated with the World Bank.
The ICSID's affiliation with the World Bank technically contributes to
the efficiency of ICSID's functions in terms of how enforceable ICSID's arbitral
awards are. It appears that the parties (host states) in most cases are seemingly
willing to comply with ICSID's arbitral awards since this compliance may facilitate
host states' application of financial assistance from the World Bank. In other words,
the World Bank can technically press the parties (particularly host states) to comply
with ICSID's awards to certain extent. Due to the close association with the World

491

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 5.
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Bank, ICSID has become more effective, efficient and recognized as an international
arbitration institution.

1.1.6. Enforceability of Arbitral Awards under the New York
Convention (1958)
Thailand ratified the New York Convention on December 21, 1959,
with no reservation. 492 As a result, Thailand has obligations under the New York
Convention to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in other territories whether
or not Thailand ratifies the ICSID Convention. In fact, the non-ratification of the
ICSID Convention does not keep Thailand from being involved in international
arbitration.

On the contrary, due to the New York Convention, Thailand is still

obliged to recognize and enforce international arbitral awards made outside Thailand.
The consequence of non-ratification of the ICSID Convention is
preposterous since it prevents Thailand from being eligible from referring a dispute to
ICSID as a worldwide international arbitration institution.

The ineligibility of

ICSID's application will thereby bring about the contradiction of the application and
practice on the international arbitration system in Thailand. It is controversial that
Thailand is ineligible to submit a dispute to ICSID due to non-ratification of the
ICSID Convention but Thailand has already committed herself to recognize and
enforce arbitral awards made outside her territory regardless of the international
arbitration institution or an ad-hoc arbitration. 493
As a result, it is possible to find that Thailand may need to recognize
and enforce the arbitral award made under the ICSID Convention (including the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules) in her territory provided that the losing party has or
owns property in Thailand. This contradiction of the international arbitration can

492
493

The New York Convention was adopted on June 10, 1958
See also Annex 10 of the Appendices.
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make the entire arbitration legal system particularly relating to international
arbitration inconsistent and incompatible as has been mentioned earlier.
1.1.7. Enforceability of Thailand's Obligations under the MIGA
Convention
Subject to the MIGA Convention, Member Countries are obliged to
comply with arbitral awards when they have disputes with the Agency (MIGA).
Disputes between the Member Country as a host state and MIGA occur when MIGA
pays the insured investor compensation upon the claim where the insured investor has
against the host state. Upon compensation paid to the insured investor by MIGA,
MIGA will be subsequently subrogated the insured investor's rights to pursue such a
claim against the host state.494 Basically, disputes between MIGA and the host state
due to the subrogated rights shall be settled in accordance with the procedures set
forth in Annex II to the MIGA Convention. As its initial resolution, the parties are
required to settle their dispute through negotiation. When the negotiation has failed,
either party will be entitled to request arbitration proceedings unless the parties
reserve to resort first to conciliation. 495 In most cases, the arbitration proceedings
between the host state and MIGA will be referred to ICSID.
As Thailand becomes a membership of the MIGA Convention, Thailand
may be compelled to get involved in international arbitration with MIGA when MIGA
has defended the insured investor's right to pursue his claim against Thailand as a
host state. Under such a circumstance, the dispute between MIGA and Thailand is
likely to be submitted to international arbitration. More specifically, Thailand may be
requested by MIGA to refer the dispute to international arbitration under ICSID in

494
495

I d. art. 18(a).
I d. art. 57(b).
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accordance with the ICSID Additional Facility Rules,496 which can apply to disputes
outside the scope of ICSID's jurisdiction, for example, due to being non-Contracting
States. In the end, Thailand may not refuse the application of international arbitration
under ICSID even though Thailand has not ratified the ICSID Convention.
Therefore, due to being a membership of the New York Convention
and the MIGA Convention, it will be difficult for Thailand to avoid being involved in
international arbitration.

Despite of non-ratification of the ICSID Convention,

Thailand may be compelled to submit a dispute to ICSID under the ICSID Additional
Rules. In consequence, Thailand's obligations under the New York Convention and
the MIGA Convention make the overall international arbitration system in Thailand
even more contradictory and controversial. .
1.1.8. Thailand as a State Member of ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL
CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION ("AALCO")
In addition to the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, and
the MIGA Convention, Thailand also became a member of AALCO in 1961.497
Participation in AALCO is open to all Asian and African States.

In terms of

promotion and protection of investment, AALCO has concluded tentative
formulations in regard with model investment agreements. As to the question of
settlement of disputes, fair and expeditious procedures are established in the hope of
giving rise to greater stability, confidence and protection to transnational investors.
AALCO also recommended that the most appropriate modality for creating stability
and confidence for foreign investors in international transactions is the ICSID
Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, if applicable. Otherwise, the
rCSID has adopted the Additional Facility Rules authorizing the Secretariat of rCSID to administer
certain categories of proceedings between States and nationals of other States that fall outside the scope
of the ICSID Convention (Article 25(1)).
497 ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION (AALCO), List of Member
States, www.aalco.int (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
496
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UNCITRAL Arbitration and Conciliation Rules might be alternatively appropriate.

498

Therefore, Thailand, as a state member of AALCO, is expected to adopt AALCO's
policy as well as to take AALCO's recommendations into consideration. Otherwise,
there is no point for Thailand to be a member of such an organization.
1.1.9. Popularity of BITs
UNCTAD 499 defines the term of "BIT" as an agreement between two
(2) countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion, and protection of
investment in each other's territories by companies based in either country. 500
Apparently, the number of BITs has been growing dramatically in recent years as
demonstrated in the Figure below.

The Figure illustrates the extraordinary

proliferation of BITs in that in 2002, there were two thousand two hundred and sixty
five (2,265) BITs involving one hundred and seventy six (176) countries, as compared
to about three hundred eighty five (385) BITs in 1989. 501

AALCO, Promotion and Protection ofInvestment, http://www.aalco.int (last visited Apr. 24,2009).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development or UNCTAD was established in 1964.
UNCT AD promotes the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world
economy. UNCT AD has progressively evolved into an authoritative knowledge-based institution
whose work aims to help shape current policy debates and thinking on development, with a particular
focus on ensuring that domestic policies and international action are mutually supportive in bringing
about sustainable development.
500 UNCTAD, What are BITs?, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Pagel006.aspx (last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
501 !d.
498

499
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Figure: Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") and Double Taxation
Treaties ("DTTs") concluded per year and cumulative 1990-2002
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From the Figure, the extraordinary proliferation of BITs also
demonstrates the greater popUlarity and significance of international arbitration as
dispute settlement mechanism. The reason is that international arbitration is strongly
advised and concluded as dispute settlement resolution in BITs. Therefore, BITs have
brought about the development of international arbitration in many forms. One of
those forms is found in ICSID in which most BITs refer investment disputes to ICSID
as a disputes settlement mechanism between host states and foreign investors. For
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gives disputing
investors an opportunity to submit the claim to ICSID under the ICSID Convention or
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 502 As of 2002, there were six (6) cases of
disputes between Canada, Mexico and the United States subject to ICSID.

U.S. Department of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm
(last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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Therefore, it is evident that the growth of BITs can promote the
significance and popularity ofICSID's roles. It is believed that even though Thailand
has not ratified the ICSID Convention, Thailand may be compelled to refer a dispute
to ICSID by BITs sooner or later because ICSID also offers the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules to a dispute between States and nationals of other States outside the
scope ofICSID's jurisdiction, thereby forcing Thailand to be involved in international
arbitration under ICSID inevitably.
1.1.10. Sustainable Economic Development
To achieve sustainable economic development, the United Nations, in
the Action Programme of the United Nations Development Decade II, called upon all
parties (including developing countries as host states, developed countries as home
states) and foreign investors to be aware of the significant roles they each play:

Developing countries will adopt appropriate measures for
inviting, stimulating and making effective use of foreign private
capital, taking into account the areas in which such capital should be
sought and bearing in mind the importance for its attraction of
conditions conducive to sustained investment. Developed countries,
on their part, will consider adopting further measures to encourage
the flow of private capital to developing countries. Foreign private
investment in developing countries should be undertaken in a manner
consistent with the development objectives and priorities established
in their national plans. Foreign private investors in developing
countries should endeavour to provide for an increase in the local
share in management and administration, employment and training of
local labour including personnel at the managerial and technical
levels, participation of local capital and reinvestment of profits.
Efforts will be made to foster better understanding of the rights and
obligations of both host and capital-exporting countries, as well as of
individual investors. 503
Thailand as one of the United Nations members504 cannot escape from
such concerns. To adopt appropriate measures for inviting, stimulating and making

The Guidelines for International Investment were adopted unanimously by the Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce at its 120th Session on 29 November 1972.
504 Thailand has joined UN on December 16, 1946.
503
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effective use of foreign private capital as recommended by the United Nations Action
Program, it seems that Thailand cannot avoid the adoption of ICSID as a dispute
settlement mechanism sooner or later.

If Thailand does not accept ICSID as a

mechanism for settlement of investment disputes, Thailand will not be able to get
benefits of transnational investments that ICSID provides. Furthermore, due to the
pressure on foreign investors by insurance industries or financial institutions, it seems
there is no alternative for foreign investors to invest capital into a country where
international means for dispute resolution is provided.
1.2.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the ICSID Convention

Although it is very obvious that Thailand will benefit from the
ratification of the ICSID Convention, it is still indispensable to analyze the pros and
cons of the ICSID Convention in order to clarify how this might best be done. While
the benefits of the ratification of the ICSID Convention to Thailand are evident, such
a decision must be proceeded upon consideration of any foreseeable downside. The
following demonstrates the pros and cons of the ICSID Convention by starting with
the pros:
First, ICSID is an autonomous international arbitration institution
offering the investor-state dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention. With its
purposes, the Convention sought to remove major impediments to the free
international flow of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the
absence of specialized international methods for investment dispute settlement. 505
Therefore, ICSID is created to offer settlement mechanism of investor-state disputes
and is currently recognized as a worldwide and preferred dispute settlement resolution
for private foreign investors and insurance and financial institutions. As a result,
ICSID, About ICSID, http://icsid.woridbankorg/ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID Home.jsp (last visited
Apr. 24, 2009).
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ICSID's roles can attract and enhance FDI flow toward a country where ICSID is
made available as a dispute settlement resolution for private foreign investors.
Therefore, Thailand, were it to submit to ICSID, would more be able to attract and
motivate foreign investors to consider Thailand as a potential country where they
should direct their investment. Upon the ratification of the Convention, Thailand
would be able to enjoy benefits that the Convention provides.
Second, because Thailand has already ratified the New York
Convention and the MIGA Convention but has not yet ratified the ICSID Convention,
the entire arbitration legal system appears incomplete and contradictory, especially in
part of international arbitration. Under the New York Convention, Thailand is bound
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made outside her territory. Under the MIGA
Convention, Thailand is bound to compensate MIGA the full amount that MIGA has
paid an insured investor for loss or damages incurred by Thailand as a host state.
Obligations under the New York Convention and the MIGA Convention compel
Thailand to recognize, enforce and comply with arbitral award made outside Thailand
even though Thailand is ineligible to submit dispute to international arbitration under
ICSID. Therefore, the ratification of the ICSID Convention will provide Thailand the
eligibility and accessibility to ICSID with the benefit of investor-state dispute
settlement. The ratification of the ICSID Convention can fill a missing piece of the
overall picture of the arbitration legal system, especially with international arbitration.
The Flowchart showing the Incompletion of the Existing International Arbitration
System in Thailand appears in Appendix 10 of the Appendices.
Third, to be subject to the ICSID's jurisdiction, the parties' consent is
the cornerstone of the ICSID Convention.

The mere ratification of the ICSID

Convention does not confer upon the Centre jurisdiction over investment disputes
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automatically. The ratification of the Convention simply verifies that the state, which
ratifies the Convention, becomes the Contracting State to the ICSID Convention but it
does not constitute the consent on behalf of the Contracting State to submit a dispute
to the Centre automatically.506 If the Contracting State desires to submit disputes to
the Centre, the Contracting State is further required to give its consent in writing to
the Centre designating that the disputes shall be settled before ICSID. 507 In this sense,
the Convention requires two levels of consent. At the first level, it is deemed as the
parties giving consent to the Centre when the Contracting States, which agreed to be
bound by the Convention, ratify the Convention. At the second level, the parties'
consent can be given to the Centre when the parties (a host state and investor) have
agreed by a means of an agreement to ICSID arbitration. 508
Therefore, the mere ratification of the ICSID Convention on part of
Thailand does not give the Centre exclusive rights to assume jurisdiction over
investment disputes. Apart from the requirement of the two-level consent, the ICSID
Convention also allows the Contracting States to provide a class or classes of disputes
that would or would not consider submitting to ICSID. As a result, Thailand still
reserves the right not to submit certain disputes to ICSID if she thinks that those
disputes should not be settled by the Centre. Under such circumstance, Thailand can

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance, or approval of this
Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would
or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the
consent required by paragraph (1).
507 ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(1).
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.
508 Autopista Concesuibada de Venezuela, C.A. v Bolivarian Republic ofVenezula.
506
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make an agreement with a private investor that disputes arising out of the investment
concerned shall be settled by any other means.
On the other hand, even though it is evident that the ICSID Convention
would benefit Thailand as a host state that needs FDI flow toward her territory, the
downside of the ICSID Convention cannot be disregarded.

The following are

foreseeable disadvantages of the ICSID Convention that Thailand should take into
consideration. First, the ratification of the ICSID Convention means that Thailand has
to give sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over to ICSID regarding disputes
arising out of investment. However, this is not always absolutely true because this
drawback can be mended.

Under the ICSID Convention, Thailand can make a

reservation at the time of ratification of the ICSID Convention by notifying the Centre
of the class or classes of disputes, which would or would not be considered submitting
to ICSID's jurisdiction. 509 In other words, the ICSID Convention allows Thailand to
make a reservation to the Convention so that Thailand still has exclusive rights of the
jurisdiction over those disputes that carry sensitive issues to Thailand's nationals.
Therefore, regardless of this concern, Thailand should carefully assess what kind of
disputes should or should not be submitting to the Centre's jurisdiction rather than
being persistent of inaction of ratification of the ICSID convention.
Second, from a developing countries' perspective, international
arbitration may not always be a preferred method of settlement of disputes since it is
very costly to hire a qualified legal counsellor and to conduct international arbitration.
Notwithstanding, this obstacle can be overcome by reforming and establishing
domestic remedy system that is impartial, reliable and efficient to assure foreign
investors' confidence. It is believed that when private foreign investors satisfy and

509

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
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are confident with neutrality and efficiency of domestic remedy system, they would
choose a domestic remedy system over international arbitration because a domestic
remedy system would provide a cost-saving method of dispute settlement. Moreover,
it would be more convenient to enforce a domestic court judgement or domestic
arbitral award because assets or property involved the dispute are situated in the host
state.
Third, it has been argued that ICSID is considered an international
arbitration available only for foreign investors, not for host states. The reason is that
ICSID is seen more favourable to foreign investors than host states. Seymour even
claims that ICSID is a one-way court,5lO for almost invariably, the plaintiff is a
foreign private investor and the defendant is a state. It is very rare to find the case on
the other way because the host state seems to have hesitation to bring disputes against
foreign investors to ICSID as appeared in the Bolivia case.
In the Bolivia case, under the IMF's and the World Bank's financial
assistance programme, the Bolivian government had been pressed to sell off publicly
run water systems (in other words, to privatize rainwater) in the province of
Cochabamba.

As a result, the Bolivian government subsequently entered into a

privatization contract with Bechtel Corporation, a very powerful American firm, to
run water system in Cochabamba.

Within weeks, water bills skyrocketed to

unaffordab1e levels. Therefore, civic demonstrations had started in chasing Bechtel
away from public water and encouraging the government in response to break
contractual obligations arising from the privatization contract with Bechtel. During
the demonstration, it was found that a boy was killed.

As a result of such

Malcolm Seymour, World Bank's ICSID to Hear Case on Bolivia Water Privatization, Economic
Justice News, Vol. 5, No.3 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.50years.org/cms/ejn/story/85 (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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demonstration and pressure, Bechtel eventually decided to withdraw its investment in
Bolivia and bring this case against the Bolivian government to ICSID.
Hypothetically, Bolivia and its people through the
government could also sue Bechtel to ICSID.

Bolivian

However, suing a multinational

corporation like Bachtel would alienate Western lenders and investors, spelling
economic and political strangulation for the Bolivian government. As a result, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) brought together the Democracy Centre, the
Institute for Policy Studies, and Earth Justice and submitted a petition to ICSID
requesting civil participation in the suit even though they were not defined as eligible
party to submit application to ICSID under the ICSID Convention. However, on May
19, 2005, an ICSID tribunal for the first time decided that it had the power to accept
an amicus curiae brief from a civil society organization, even though these briefs
might not carry the same weight as the documents submitted by the actual parties. At
least, they gave citizens some voice before the tribunal. Nonetheless, before the
arbitral tribunal in this case would render an award, Bechtel decided to withdraw a
case from ICSID.
From the Bolivia case, it is noted that first, even though some argued
that ICSID was more favourable to foreign investors, the ICSID tribunal in the Bolivia
Case proved that it was not always true. At least, the ICSID tribunal in the Bolivia
Case reaffirmed that ICSID was the investor-state dispute settlement and accepted an
amicus curiae511 brief from the third party into a case as if he was representing on

Amicus curiae or amicus curire (plural amici curiae) is a legal Latin phrase, literally translated as
"friend of the court", that refers to someone, not a party to a case, who volunteers to offer information
on a point oflaw or some other aspect of the case to assist the court in deciding a matter before it. The
information may be a legal opinion in the form of a brief, testimony that has not been solicited by any
of the parties, or a learned treatise on a matter that bears on the case. The decision whether to admit the
information lies with the discretion of the court.
511
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behalf of the Bolivian government as the host state. At very least, the ICSID tribunal
..
. b elore
C
gave cItlzens
some vOIce
th e court. 512
So do the advantages of ratifying the Convention offset the
disadvantages?

This dissertation argues that the advantages far outweigh the

disadvantages because the potential drawbacks of the Convention can be solved and
corrected. Furthermore, Thailand's action to ratify the ICSID Convention herself
would overshadow the consequences of inaction and the unrecoverable repercussions
to the negative image that have ensued as a result of the present state of affairs.

1.3.

Ratification with a Reservation
This dissertation proposes that Thailand should ratify the ICSID

Convention with a reservation.

The ratification with a reservation is generally

allowable and justifiable in accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention and the
ICSID Convention. Pursuant to Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, all states
have rights to make a reservation when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty.513 Furthermore, Article 25 (4) of the ICSID Convention also
allows a Contracting State to notify the Centre of class or classes of disputes, which it
would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre at the time of
ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention. 514

Seymour, supra note 496.
Article 19 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969) [hereinafter the 1969
Vienna Convention]:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservation, which do not include the reservation in
question, may be made; or
(c) in cases offailing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.
514 ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance, or approval of this
Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would
or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the
consent required by paragraph (1).
512

513
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Subject to the ICSID Convention, the notification of those classes is
not only limited to the fact that it must be made at the time of ratification but the
Convention also allows the Contracting State to submit notification to the Centre at
any time thereafter. 515 When the time of ratification with a reservation has passed, the
Contracting State will be able to notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes,
which it would or would not be subject to the Centre's jurisdiction at any other times.
This provision is considered the advanced inventive measure and very beneficial to
the Contracting State in practice since it allows the Contracting State to alter the class
or classes of disputes that would or would not be within ICSID's jurisdiction from
time to time to serve the Contracting State's need.

With this provision, the

Contracting State will be able to accommodate new issues that become (or might
become) sensitive and substantial after the ratification of the ICSID Convention.
The followings are sample reservations to the ICSID Convention of
some Contracting States:
China adopted a similar stance when the Chinese government acceded
to the ICSID Convention. Upon the ratification, China made a reservation that:

[t} he Chinese Government would only consider submitting to the
jurisdiction of ICSID disputes over compensation resulting from
expropriation or nationalization. "
Given the ratification, China agrees that only disputes over
compensation resulting from expropriation or nationalization shall be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Centre. From the notification, it is implicitly understood that ICSID
only has jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation resulting from
expropriation or nationalization, while China still reserves rights to determine the
initial issues and remaining issues over those disputes. The Chinese Government,

515

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
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through her local authorities, still has exclusive rights to determine any potential
violation by the government as to whether there is any expropriation or
nationalization. As a result, the notification merely entitles foreign investors the right
to refer the matter of compensation to international arbitration to determine the
amount of compensation. S16
In another example, Jamaica declared that disputes arising directly out
of an investment relating to minerals or other natural resources would not be subject to
the jurisdiction of ICSID.S\7 In other cases, the reservation was very broad in scope
and as a result, the jurisdiction of ICSID was very limited. For instance, in Papua
New Guinea, the jurisdiction of ICSID was restricted to only disputes that were
considered fundamental to the investment itself would be subject to ICSID's
jurisdiction. S18 Turkey made a reservation that only disputes arising out of investment
activities that had obtained necessary permission in accordance with the relevant
Turkish law on foreign capital, and that had effectively started would be subject to
ICSID's jurisdiction. Moreover, it stated that disputes relating to property and real
rights upon real estates would be totally under the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts
and therefore would not be submitted to ICSID's jurisdiction.S\9 These tailored-made
reservations ensure that each state still reserve exclusive rights over certain disputes
that would or would not be submitting to ICSID.
1.4.

Proposed Reservation and Condition
This dissertation proposes that Thailand should ratify the ICSID

Convention with a reservation. Prior to the ratification of the ICSID Convention, it is

516 Notifications Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered Suitable or Unsuitable For Submission to
the Centre. See also Michael J. Moser and O'Melveny & Myers, "Treaty Claims, China: Do China's
BITs Have Teeth?" 1626 PU/Corp 283, 285.
517
518
519
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necessary for Thailand to fonnulate a reservation of the class or classes of disputes
that it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. In
this dissertation, it is advised that Thailand should make a reservation on natural
resources as natural resources are substantial and sensitive to individual sovereign
states. Individual states should be able to reserve and have full sovereign powers over
their natural resources according to their national interests and self-detennination of
their people.
The issue relating to natural resources is also in line with the United
Nations. The United Nations is aware of the significance of natural resources of each
state and accordingly the United Nations issued the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources stating
that:
.. , Considering that any measure in this respect must be based on
the recognition of the inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of
their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national
interests, and on respect for the economic independence of States,
Considering that it is desirable to promote international cooperation for the economic development of developing countries, and
that economic and financial agreements between the developed and the
developing countries must be based on the principles of equality and of
the right ofpeoples and nations to self-determination,
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest
of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the
State concerned"
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such
resources, as well as the import of the foreign capital required for these
purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which
the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities.

The foregoing excerpts demonstrate that based on the principles of
equality of states, all states (developed and developing countries) have full and
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permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.

As a result, they

should have inalienable rights to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
in accordance with their national interests, self-determination of their nations and their
people and the economic independence of their states. If any loss or damage occurs
from the exercise of the sovereign power of the host state over its natural resources to
foreign investors, such loss or damage would be compensated to those investors by
the host state.
Due to the fact that individual states have full and permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, they should accordingly have
exclusive rights on disputes over their natural wealth and resources. At least, they
should be able to decide whether those disputes over their natural wealth and
resources should be subject to domestic remedy system or submitted to the Centre's
jurisdiction. Therefore, this dissertation recommends that Thailand should reserve her
inalienable rights on disputes over her natural resources as subject to the jurisdiction
of her domestic judiciary system.

The following is the proposed reservation for

Thailand at the time of ratification of the ICSID Convention:

The Government of Thailand would not consider submitting to the
jurisdiction of ICSID disputes over natural resources.
After the ratification, if Thailand encounters any other disputes or
concerns that Thailand desires to reserve within domestic judiciary system (for
example, disputes relating to public service or utility), Thailand will be entitled to
submit notification of additional classes that would not consider sUbmitting to
ICSID's jurisdiction to the Centre thereafter. 52o

520

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 25(4).
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In addition to the ratification with a reservation, it is recommended that
Thailand should require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as
a condition of its consent to international arbitration under the ICSID Convention.
Government Agencies should set forth the condition of disputes to be submitted to
ICSID in that only disputes that have been exhausted by local administrative or
judicial remedies would be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre.

1.5.

Conclusion
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Thailand would

tremendously benefit from ICSID as a worldwide international arbitration institution
dealing with investor-state disputes.

Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt that

Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention. This suggestion is also in line with the
Policy Statement of the Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva delivered to the National Assembly on December 30, 2008, where Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva committed his support of international agreements
(bilateral and multilateral) that are beneficial to Thailand. According to the Policy
Statement, Veijaiva also made assurances that he would work to expedite the
ratification of agreements already signed like the ICSID Convention. 521
Aside from the immediate benefits Thailand might see as a result, the
ratification of the ICSID Convention would also have symbolic significance for
Thailand on the world stage. The development of international arbitration has been
driven various international organizations, for example, the United Nations, the World
Bank, IMF, ASEAN, or AALCO, etc. As part of the globalization, the ratification of
the ICSID Convention on part of Thailand would prove that Thailand's foreign policy

521

Abhisit Vejjajiva, supra note 94.
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has been implemented in a manner consonant with those international organisations in
that Thailand would move forward with the rest of the world.
On the contrary, by not ratifying the ICSID Convention, Thailand
continues to maintain a negative image at the international level. Especially, when
Thailand already signed and became a signatory state of ICSID without ratification, it
was assumed that the obligations arising out of the Convention as an international
agreement would be imposed on Thailand according to the Vienna Convention
because Thailand agreed to the substance of the ICSID Convention.

Therefore,

Thailand already has its obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, per
se the ICSID Convention, prior to its entry into force. 522 Otherwise, Thailand may be
accused of violating the rule of pacta sunt servanda under the 1969 Vienna
Convention.

Therefore, it seems inappropriate for Thailand not to ratify the

Convention in which more than half of the obligations are already binding on
Thailand.
To help Thailand gain more confidence in ratifying the Convention,
Thailand is encouraged to make a reservation while ratifying the Convention. By
ratifying the Convention, Thailand is allowed to reserve certain disputes substantial
and sensitive to Thailand from ICSID's jurisdiction. In the meanwhile, Thailand
should figure out how to reform and reinforce domestic remedy system to work
parallel with the availability of ICSID arbitration. By doing so, it is advised that the
Special Method to deal with disputes arising out of a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI as the initial settlement mechanism should be established.

522

The 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 515, art. 18.
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2.

The Special Method Governing Disputes Arising out of a State Contract

Relating to Qualifying FDI (the "Special Method")
In addition to making international arbitration under ICSID available
for foreign investors by ratifying the ICSID Convention, the establishment of the
Special Method is the second task of reforming the entire arbitration legal system in
Thailand. The proposition of establishing the Special Method is mainly to incorporate
the Calvo Clause as an alternative settlement resolution prior to institution of
international arbitration under ICSID.

By adopting the Calvo Clause, the Special

Method would require the parties (a host state through its contracting government
agencies and foreign investors) to recourse to local remedies system as their initial
settlement resolution. Only when the Special Method has failed, the parties would be
eligible to international arbitration.

2.1.

Adoption of the Calvo Clause to the Special Method
2.1.1

Use of Term "Calvo Clause"

The Calvo Clause originated from the Calvo Doctrine holding two (2)
key principles: equality of sovereign states and national treatment standard. The first
principle "equality of sovereign states," means that all sovereign states are
internationally equal, free and independent and as a result, enjoy the right on the basis
of equality, to freedom from interference of any sort by other states of either armed
force or diplomatic protection.

The second principle is the "national treatment

standard," which provides that foreign investors should not be granted more rights or
privileges than those accorded to nationals.

As a result, when they come across

conflicts, differences, or disputes with a host state, they must seek redress for loss or
grief only before local remedies prior to seeking help from their home states through
international claims or diplomatic protection.
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The Calvo Doctrine has been severely opposed by most developed
countries (including the United States) but the Calvo Doctrine in regard with the
national treatment standard has been partially accepted and accordingly it has known
as the Calvo Clause. By adopting the Calvo Clause, foreign investors are required to
seek local remedies before bringing a case to international arbitration.
2.1.2. Acceptance of the Calvo Clause at the International Level
Even though the complete principles of the Calvo Doctrine have been
repudiated by home states, the Calvo Doctrine is, however, not completely dead.523
The Calvo Clause still remains in effect in Latin American countries but the degree of
its application may vary according to the economic and social climate of negotiating
states. The Calvo Clause has been recently found in BITs with many developed states
(including the United States), requiring foreign investors to seek the exhaustion of
local remedies before the institution of international arbitration.

Despite this, the

complete Calvo Doctrine has not been recognized as part of international law but still
plays important roles internationally.

(i)

North American Dredging Company of Texas (U.S.) v

United Mexican States 524
The notion of this case demonstrated that International Tribunal has
partially accepted the Calvo Clause based on the status of the individual in
international law, not as a principle of international law.

This case was brought

before the U.S.-Mexican General Claims Commission and one of the central
questions in this case raised before this Commission was the validity of the Calvo
Clause in a contract between a state and foreign investor as to whether the Company

Wenhua Shan, IS CALVO DEAD?, 55 Am. 1. Compo L. 123, at 163 (2007).
North American Dredging Company a/Texas (U.S.) v United Mexican States, 4 Rev. Int'l Arb.
Awards 26 (1926).
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would be entitled to bring a case to the Commission before the Company exhausted
local remedies.
In this case, the Company suffered from personal and property injuries
from the Mexican revolution in 1910 so it sought to redress these injuries from a
breach of contract in the dredging of the port of Salina Cruz before the Commission.
In the end, the Commission held that the Calvo Clause in the said contract deprived
the Company of requesting diplomatic protection and required it to first seek redress
from local remedies system.
Nonetheless, the Commission's ruling in this case was not laid down as
a general rule to apply to each and every case. The Commission stated that neither
the Calvo Clause would be valid in any situation,525 nor the Calvo Clause would
always preclude diplomatic intervention, especially in cases of denial of justice under
international law.526

As a result, the application of the Calvo clause has been

presently interpreted and accepted to varying degrees while its complete validity has
been rejected under international law. 527

(ii) Application of the Calvo Clause in Latin American

Countries
Although the Calvo Doctrine has been opposed by developed
countries, most Latin American countries have, however, insisted and applied the
principles of the Calvo Clause in their countries. The application of the Calvo Clause
by these Latin American states can be found in their constitutions and statutes, for
example, the Bolivian Constitution, or the Venezuelan Constitution. Furthermore,
many Latin American countries continue to subject their investment contracts to the
Id. at 26.
I d. at 29.
527 Denise Manning-Cabrol, THE IMMINENT DEATH OF THE CALVO CLAUSE AND THE
REBIRTH OF THE CALVO PRINCIPLE: EQUALITY OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL
INVESTORS, 26 LPIB 1169 at 1191.
525
526
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Calvo Clause.528 They not only conclude the Calvo Clause in investment treaties
among themselves but the Calvo Clause also becomes conspicuous part of their
foreign policy with capital-exporting states.
(iii) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX):

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1974, establishing a new
system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and
interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries.529

The

Charter adopted the Calvo Clause to its system to certain degree by reaffirming that
each state has the right to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational
corporations within national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such
activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic
and social policies. 53O In cases of nationalization and expropriation, a dispute shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it
is freely and mutually agreed otherwise. 531 Therefore, this Resolution demonstrates
that the United Nations Charter has accepted and adopted the concept of the Calvo
Clause in respect to the national treatment standard as its rules in that a host state is
not compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment and as a result,
foreign investors are required to seek redress for loss or grief from local remedies.
(iv)

ICSID

The principles of the Calvo Clause can be also found in ICSID's
provisions to a certain degree. Given the equality of sovereign states' principle, the
Joseph J. Jova, Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 19 Tex. Int'l LJ. 3,
12 (1984) at 12.
529 G.A. Res. 29/3281, supra note 28, preamble.
530 Id. art. 2(b).
531Id. art. 2(c).
528
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Convention prohibits a home state to apply diplomatic protection or bring an
international claim in respect to disputes against a host state (especially where the
home state's nationals and the host state have consented to submit or shall have
submitted to arbitration under ICSID).532 For the national treatment standard, the
Convention allows the Contracting State to require the exhaustion of local
administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under
the Convention. 533
(v)

MIGA

The Calvo Clause can be found in the MIGA Convention, which
adopts both of the key principles in its operation: the diplomatic intervention and the
exhaustion of local remedies.

For the diplomatic protection, where MIGA is

subrogated the insured investor claims against a host state, MIGA requires the parties
to attempt to settle a dispute by negotiation before seeking conciliation or arbitration
rather than apply international claim or diplomatic protection right away.

If the

parties fail to reach a settlement within a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days
from the date of the request for negotiation, such negotiation shall be deemed to have
been exhausted. 534
For the national treatment standard, MIGA also allows members to
choose an alternative dispute settlement procedures other than those established under
the Convention. 535 By choosing an alternative dispute settlement procedure between
MIGA and a member as approved by MIGA's Board of Directors with a special
majority vote, a member can set forth the condition that local remedies must be
exhausted before seeking international arbitration.

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 27(1).
Id. art. 26.
534 Id. Annex II, art. 2.
535 MIGA Convention, supra note 253, art. 57(b).

532
533
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In such a case, the alternative

settlement procedure shall prevail on the established settlement procedures under the
Convention's terms.

2.2.

Concept and Model of the Special Method
The Special Method apparently adopts the concept of the Calvo

Clause. Having said that, the Special Method is invented as an alternative settlement
resolution requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. In addition to the adoption of
principles derived from the Calvo Clause,536 the Special Method also removes
obstacles that local remedies may have as well as strengthen the efficiency of local
remedies. The establishment of the Special Method demonstrates that Thailand put a
great deal of effort into providing an efficient local remedies system on which foreign
investors will satisfy and rely.
Generally speaking, the Special Method will provide a process that
encourages the disputing parties to settle their disputes among themselves and only as
a result, seek a third party to assist them reach an agreement if they have failed to do
so between themselves. Actually, the Special Method ensures that the parties will be
provided a mechanism that assists them in settling their disputes with the agreement
so that they can remain in good relations in order to perform their contractual
obligations until the completion of the project. The Special Method can be divided
into three (3) stages: Amicable Settlement Resolution; Consultation and Negotiation;
and Arbitration. 537
At the first stage, the Amicable Settlement Resolution is designed to
provide a channel for the parties to settle their disputes between themselves within a
536 The Calvo Doctrine requires the exhaustion of local remedies before the institution of international
arbitration.
537 Before the Special Method has been finally concluded, multi-methods of dispute settlement
resolution have been thoroughly scrutinized in order to seek the possible and efficient mechanism of
dispute settlement that most suits disputes arising out of state contracts relating to FDI. It is believed
that the availability of the effective and efficient method of dispute settlement can provide a morefriendly environment for FDI moving toward Thailand.
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period of time. The Special Method opens up an opportunity and encourages the
parties to talk and compromise until they are able to reach an agreement amicably. At
this stage, there is no involvement of any third party. When the settlement resolution
at this stage has failed, the parties will be directed to the Consultation and Negotiation
as the second stage.
In the second stage, the Consultation and Negotiation stage, which has
been widely accepted as an initial settlement resolution for the parties before they
seek further formal mechanism of dispute settlement in BITs and other investment
treaties, is adopted to be part of the Special Method. In normal practice, it appears
that many investment treaties contain a dispute settlement clause that provides for
consultation and negotiation between an investor and a State before a dispute may be
submitted to international arbitration. 538

The periods of the Consultation and

Negotiation are known as "waiting and cooling off' periods as they allow for good
faith consultations and negotiations that might lead to the settlement amicably before
the institution of formal proceedings. 539
Actually, the application of the Consultations and Negotiation is not
only found in BITs but also becomes normal practice between Singapore and Japan.
With the Singapore-Japan FTA ("JSEPA") approach, non-violation disputes are
subject to the General Consultations, while the violation disputes may be brought to
the Special Consultations. However, when those disputes cannot be resolved, nonviolation cases would be further submitted to the Consultative Committee, whereas
violation conflicts would then be submitted to Arbitral Tribuna1. 54o

Martina Polasek, The Consultation Period Requirement in Investment Treaties As A Matter of
Jurisdiction, Admissibility or Procedure, Newsletter Summer 2006, ICSID, Volume 23 No.1 at 14.
539 I d.
540 M. Matsushita & D. Ahn (eds.), WTP And East Asia: New Perspective 425 (Cameron 2004).
538
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Under the Special Method, the Consultation and Negotiation stage
definitely differs from the Amicable Settlement Resolution stage in that the former
will have the third party involved in helping the parties settle a dispute, whereas the
latter is designed as a stage to settle the dispute between the parties only.
In this stage, the Consultation and Negotiation forum should be
constituted in the form of commission, as a so-called National Consultation
Commission on State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI (the "Commission,,).541
The Commission shall be constituted from various Agencies that are directly in
charge of finance, economics, FDI, legal affairs from the macro perspective. The
Commission's functions are partly adopted from those of the Conciliation
Commission under the ICSID Convention. 542

The details of the Commission's

functions as well as the proceedings of the Consultation and Negotiation under the
Special Method will be discussed later.
As the third stage, when the Consultation and Negotiation stage has
failed for whatsoever reason, it shall be deemed that the local remedy system has been
exhausted. As a consequence, the disputing parties shall be eligible to refer their
dispute to arbitration. In this stage, the parties still have options to choose either
domestic arbitration or international arbitration. Of course, an arbitral award of this
arbitration is binding on the parties.
The overall requirement demonstrates the adoption of the Calvo Clause
to the Special Method's operation since the Special Method requires the parties to

541 Before the model of the Consultation and Negotiation stage has been finalized, a few questions have
been raised. Particularly, questions of how the forum for the Consultation and Negotiation should be
formed, how the Consultation and Negotiation shall be proceeded, and so on have been analyzed.
542 Under the ICSID Convention, it is the duty of the Conciliation Commission to clarify the issues in
disputes between the parties and to endeavor to bring about agreement between them upon mutually
acceptable terms. To that end, the Commission may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to
time recommend terms of settlement to the parties and as a result, the parties shall give their most
serious consideration to its consideration.
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exhaust local remedies pnor to a formal settlement of disputes by a means of
arbitration.

2.3.

The Special Method Dealing with Disputes Arising out of State

Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI
As its main objective, the Special Method is intended to help foreign
investors and Thailand as a host state (through Government Agencies) settle their
disputes amicably and promptly. The Special Method provides a process, which is
intended to open up channels of communication between the parties so they can reach
their own agreement in settling their disputes.
However, the Special Method is not intended to apply to all disputes
that arise out of state contracts. The Special Method only applies to a dispute arising
out of what is defined as "state contract relating to qualifying FDI." Only a state
contract meeting all criteria and conditions set forth by the testing process of "a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI" as demonstrated in Chapter 3 will be subject to
the Special Method; otherwise, such a contract will be governed by general relevant
laws. The Special Method dealing with disputes arising out of a state contract relating
to qualifying FDI can be divided into the following stages:

2.3.1. Stage 1 Amicable Settlement Resolution
When disputes arising out of a defined "state contract relating to
qualifying FDI" occur, the parties are usually directed to an amicable settlement
mechanism as an initial dispute settlement.

In a general practice, this amicable

settlement mechanism normally becomes part of a dispute settlement clause that has
been included in a state contract, thereby encouraging the parties to have a prompt
amicable settlement resolution. The following is a typical dispute settlement clause
found in most state contracts.
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1. Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with
this Contract or the implementation of any of the provisions of this
Contract, which cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to
[arbitration}. 543

By this amicable settlement measure, the disputing parties are
encouraged to have a conversation, talk over their disputes, and figure out together
how they can reach the settlement with agreement that will satisfy them both. The
period of this process normally ranges from thirty (30) days to sixty (60) days. After
these periods have elapsed, then such disputes will be brought into a so-called
"Consultation and Negotiation" stage.
This stage of Amicable Settlement Resolution is distinct from the other
stages of the Special Method in that the Amicable Settlement Mechanism encourages
only the disputing parties of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI to settle their
disputes among themselves. It is because most state contracts relating to qualifying
FDI are likely to be long-term projects and they probably last twenty (20) or thirty
(30) years. Therefore, during the initial periods of disputes, the parties should try to
solve problems and settle disputes between themselves in order to keep them remain
in good relations. Good relations between the parties are of great importance and
greatly contribute to the accomplishment of the project. Therefore, during the initial
periods of disputes, there is no third party involvement since this stage is designed to
assist the parties to seek the settlement between themselves.
2.3.2. Stage 2 Consultation and Negotiation

Once the Amicable Settlement Resolution between the parties (the
contracting government agency and the private party) has failed or the sixty (60) day
period of the first stage has elapsed, either party shall refer disputes to a national
This dissertation suggests that any dispute or difference arising out of the Contract that cannot be
settled amicably shaH be referred to the Special Method.

543

309

commission the "National Consultation Commission on State Contracts Relating to
Qualifying FDI," (the "Commission"). In this regard, the Special Method requires
that when the Amicable Settlement Resolution has failed, the contracting government
agency is compelled to submit a request for Consultation and Negotiation to the
Commission, whether or not the private party has done so. This is to ensure that the
disputes shall be forwarded into the Commission's consideration. It is believed that
after the disputes have been forwarded to the Commission's consideration, the
Commission -that consists of various authorities specializing in finance, economics,
foreign investment and laws from macro perspective-shall put great efforts towards
assisting the parties settle their disputes. It is believed that the Commission's role can
help prevent and minimize damages arising from such disputes and help bring the
process of negotiation to an end.

Request for Consultation and Negotiation
When the Amicable Settlement Resolution has failed, the contracting
government agency is required to submit a request for Consultation and Negotiation
to the Commission promptly.

A request for Consultation and Negotiation will

contain issues of the disputes as well as relevant information, facts and details
relevant to the disputes, for example, the claim of the disputes, a contract concerned,
or etc.

Periods for Consultation and Negotiation
The periods for the Consultation and Negotiation may take three (3)
months to twelve (12) months depending on complications and levels of the disputes.
If the disputes are not complicated and revolve around straightforward issues, the
Consultation and Negotiation may take just a few months, whereas a maximum of
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twelve (12) month period will allow the parties to put several great efforts to deal and
settle perplexing and multi-level issues successfully and satisfactorily.
Constitution of the Commission
The Consultation and Negotiation will take place in a commission
forum where a group of designated authorities will be appointed. Once the parties
have failed to reach an agreement in the Amicable Settlement Resolution as provided
in Stage One or if the time periods of such a stage have elapsed, the disputes will be
brought into the Commission's consideration. This Commission consists of various
authorities from relevant agencies:
(1) an authorized representative of the Ministry of Finance as a
Chairman;
(2) an authorized representative of the Office of the National
Economic and Social Development Board (the "NESDB");
(3) an authorized representative of the Fiscal Policy Office, the
Ministry of Finance (the "FPO");
(4) an authorized representative of the Board of Investment (the
"BOI");
(5) an authorized representative of the Department of Treaties and
Legal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
(6) an authorized representative of the OAG;
(7) an authorized representative of the Office of Council of State;
(8)-(10) three (3) independent and qualified persons from either
state sector or private practice; and
(11) an authorized representative from the Department of the Legal
Counsel, the OAG as a Commission member and secretary.
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The Commission comprises eleven (11) constituent panels constituted
from variable relevant agencies, who have knowledge and experience relating to FDI,
finance and economics, and legal aspects. These uneven numbers of the Commission
ensures that the Commission's resolution will be issued by a majority vote. The
following rationales demonstrate how the Commission subject to the Special Method
should be formed.
As a Chairman of the Commission, the Special Method requires an
authorized representative from the Ministry of Finance to be a part of constituent
panels and to act as the Chairman of the Commission. The reason that the Special
Method requires an authorized representative of the Ministry of Finance to act as a
Commission's Chairman is that this person possesses recognized competence in the
fields of finance and economics at the national level. Furthermore, the consequence
of the Commission's recommendation may potentially affect the national budget or
financial status of a country. As a result, it is strongly believed that an authority from
the Ministry of Finance is the most suitable to be a Chairman of the Commission and
to preside over the Commission's meeting.
For the constituent members from (2) and (3), the Special Method
requires authorized representatives from the NESDB and the FPO who are directly
responsible for and in charge of fiscal, financial and macro-economic policies. The
NESDB has key mandates to formulate the National Economic and Social
Development Plan and translate it into an implementation plan of every five (5)
years. 544

Currently, Thailand has the 10th National Economic and Social

The NESDB has key functions as follows:
(1) formulate the National Economic and Social Development Plan and translate it into action
plan within a five-year timeframe.
(2) make the National Agendas: alleviation of poverty and income distribution problems;
enhancing Thailand's competitiveness; promoting social capital development; and promoting
sustainable development.
544
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Development Plan covering from year 2007 to year 2011. Meanwhile, the FPO is an
instrumental government agency and has key mandates to formulate, make
recommendations for, and oversee implementation of fiscal and financial policies,
government borrowing, capital markets as well as macro-economic policies. 545
Overall, these Agencies have important roles in formulating the national fiscal and
economic policy and accordingly, they are needed to be part of the Commission.
For the constituent members from (4), the Special Method requires
that an authorized representative from the BOr also be a part of the Commission. The
reason is that the Bor is a key agency that has a direct association with FDr and
foreign investors. 546 The Bor has an authority to grant privileges depending on
promoted activities and investment zones. Privileges are variable ranging from an
exemption from rules restricting foreign ownership of companies; exemption from
corporate income tax for up to eight (8) years; exemption from import duties on
machinery and raw materials; exemption from rules restricting foreign ownership of
land; exemption from work permit and visa rules; to exemption from rules restricting
overseas remittances. Therefore, the BOr will be able to share its perspective as well
as practical advice relating to FDr to the Commission.
While the constituent members from (2)-(4) are distinguished
professionals in the fields of finance and economics, the constituent panels from (5)(7) are persons who specialize in legal aspects of both domestic and international

laws.

An authorized representative from the Department of Treaties and Legal

(3) formulate strategies for key government policies and major development projects.
(4) analyze budget proposals by state enterprises and government agencies.
(5) create an Economic Intelligence Database, especially on GDP data.
(6) develop development indicators.
545 Fiscal Policy Office, http://www.mof.go.thimofweb/org/fpo-org.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
546 Board ofInvestment of Thailand, supra note 97, http://www.boi.go.thienglishi (last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
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Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered a crucial part of the
Commission panels since this authority can help point out issues and international
obligations into which Thailand has entered, especially those treaties relating to FDI
such as BITs. For domestic laws and regulations, the OAG is a key agency that
reviews drafts of state contracts before a contracting government agency will enter
into with a private party. Typically, the main function of OAG is to ensure that a
contract is valid and binding and that a contract does not prejudice against the State's
benefits. In addition to authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OAG,
the Special Method also requires that a representative of the Office of Council of
State shall be formed as a part of the Commission.

Substantially, the Office of

Council of State helps the Government draft legislation, thereby possessing
knowledge pursuance to objectives of individual acts as well as knowledge about how
to interpret and apply them. It is believed that these key constituent panels of the
Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, the OAG, and the Office of Council of
State will greatly assist the Commission to cover all relevant visions, issues, and
aspects domestically and internationally that the Commission should be aware in
helping the disputing parties settle their disputes satisfactorily and practically.
In addition to authorities appointed from variable agencies, the Special
Method recommends that the Commission must have another three (3) members from
independent and recognized professionals. These persons can be appointed from both
State and private sectors (for example, from any agency, private practice,
organization, institution, or university).
Last, the Special Method recommends that an authority of the
Department of the Legal Counsel, the OAG should be appointed as a Commission as
well as a secretary. Under the Special Method, a secretary to the Commission is
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significant in that this key person shall fulfils the duty of preparing a meeting agenda,
analyzing the issues in dispute as well as legal consequence, and seeking all possible
terms of settlement to the Commission. The reason is that the Department of Legal
Counsel, the OAG, has been responsible for safeguarding national interests and public
policy. 547

As a result, the Department of the Legal Counsel has its mandates in

rendering legal advice to Government Agencies as well as reviewing draft contracts
that Government Agencies will enter into with the private party. 548 In practice, the
Department of the Legal Counsel (the OAG) is very familiar with and specializes in
terms and conditions of state contracts and routinely come across disputes, differences
and conflicts in respect to state contracts.
Overall, the Commission's structure demonstrates the advantage of
having individual constituent panels since they possess extensive knowledge and
experience in macro fiscal and economic perspective, trade and investment, and legal
expertise of both domestic and international laws and both private and public laws. It
is likely that these panels will be able to contribute their extensive knowledge and
experience to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Commission's roles in
helping the disputing parties settle their disputes amicably, successfully and
satisfactorily.

Proceedings of the Consultation and Negotiation
As soon as the Commission acknowledges the disputes between the
contracting government agency and the private party, either from the disputing
agency, or the private party, the Commission shall call upon a meeting to discuss the

Section 46 (9) of the Restructuring of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) (Thai!.) and
Section 4 of the Royal Decree on Division of the Office of the Attorney General, B.E. 2540 (1997)
(Thai!.) were issued by provisions of the Administration of Government Organization Act, B.E. 2534
(1991) (Thai!.).
548 Office of the Attorney General, supra note 112, http://www.ago.go.th/eng/pI.pdf(last visited Apr.
24,2009).
547
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disputes in order to recommend possible terms of settlement to the parties within
thirty (30) days. By doing so, the Commission is allowed to invite both disputing
parties to participate in the meeting. Such an invitation will give the disputing parties
another opportunity to talk to each other after the Amicable Settlement Resolution in
the initial stage has failed, while the Commission's panels are expected to put great
efforts to help them seek a solution in a way that satisfies both parties. Regardless of
whether these efforts succeed or fail, the Commission is expected to come up with
possible terms of settlement.
If the Commission cannot help the parties seek a resolution within a
single meeting, the Commission is entitled to provide the parties additional meetings.
These additional meetings will give both parties opportunities to put efforts together
to share their opinions, guide direction, and propose possible and practical solutions
to the parties that correspond with the Government Policy and the National Plan.
During the Consultation and Negotiation stage, the Commission has
the responsibility of clarifying the issues in dispute between the parties, to come up
with possible terms of settlement to them, and to endeavour to bring about the
settlement between them.

During this session, the Commission may give any

recommendation (for example, regarding terms of settlement) and the parties are
supposed to take such a recommendation into consideration accordingly.
In the final proceedings of the Consultation and Negotiation, the
Commission is obliged to draw up a report that describes whether or not the disputes
between the parties can be settled.

In a case where the parties can reach an

agreement, the Commission shall specify the issues in dispute and how the parties
agree to settle their disputes.
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However, during the Consultation and Negotiation, if the Commission
considers that it is unlikely that the parties can seek a solution with an agreement, the
Commission shall close the Consultation and Negotiation's proceedings and draw up
a report of the parties' failure to reach such an agreement. After a report has been
produced, the Commission shall hand out a report to the parties as well as submit
such a report to the Council of Ministers for approval (that is, whether the Council of
Ministers will agree with the Commission's recommendation and conclusion based
upon the report).
Commission's Recommendation

The Commission's recommendation is not binding on the parties. In
fact, the entire process of this Consultation and Negotiation stage is based on the
parties' agreement and consent. The Commission is designed to assist the parties to
seek the settlement with an agreement.

The legal status of the Commission's

recommendation will be the same as that of the Conciliation Commission's
recommendation under the ICSID Convention.
Submission of a Report to the Council of Ministers

Whether or not the Commission is able to help the parties seek the
settlement with agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report and submit it to
the Council of Ministers for approval. After the Council of Ministers receives a
report, the Council of Ministers is required to consider a report, issue a resolution
over the disputes, and notify the Commission of the Cabinet Resolution within sixty
(60) days, whether or not the Council of Ministers will agree with the parties'
agreement in settling their disputes as appeared in a report. In a case where the
Council of Ministers disagrees with the settlement, the Council of Ministers is
required to come up with alternative terms of settlement to the parties.
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This requirement is considered a significant measure, particularly
where the Commission has failed in helping the parties seek the settlement with an
agreement.

If the Consultation and Negotiation stage fails, the disputes shall be

forwarded to the Council of Ministers as the top-level authority of the Executive
Branch and, of course, the disputes now become the national issues that the Council
of Ministers must pay much attention and try to seek the most possible and practical
solution for the parties. If the Council of Ministers cannot come up with a solution
that satisfies the parties (the private party), it is very likely that the private party will
bring the disputes to international arbitration, thereby affecting the Thai government
inevitably.

Notification of the Cabinet Resolution to the Commission
The Council of Ministers shall consider a report, resolve the disputes
by issuing a Cabinet Resolution, and notify the Cabinet Resolution over the disputes
to the Commission within sixty (60) days since the Council of Ministers receives a
report.

Then the Commission shall notify the parties of the Cabinet Resolution

promptly. If the private party agrees with the Cabinet Resolution, the parties shall
comply with the Cabinet Resolution. However, if the private contracting party is
dissatisfied with the Cabinet Resolution, the private party is entitled to bring the
disputes against the contracting government agency for the purposes of arbitration.
Up to this point, it is not a question of whether or not the contracting government
agency will agree with the Cabinet Resolution because in the practice of Thailand, a
Cabinet Resolution is legally binding to all Government Agencies.
Once the Consultation and Negotiation stage subject to the Special
Method has failed, the private party is eligible to refer the disputes to arbitration (both
domestic and international arbitration).

At this stage, the disputes are considered
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exhausted by local administrative bodies. In other words, the condition of the Calvo
Clause has been completely fulfilled and the private party will accordingly have an
absolute right to bring a case into international arbitration.
2.3.3. Stage 3 Arbitration
When local remedies have been exhausted, the private contracting
party has the option of bringing the disputes before a domestic arbitration or
international arbitration subject to the parties' agreement (the contracting government
agency and the private contracting party). For arbitration, both parties are free to
tailor how they shall arbitrate the disputes (for example, they may agree to apply the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as their arbitration rules).
In regards

to

domestic

arbitration,

this

dissertation

strongly

recommends that in appointing the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal must have at
least one (1) member who has knowledge and experience with administrative or
public law. This requirement ensures that the principles derived from administrative
and public law will not be disregarded because the disputes arising out of a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI always contains an element of public policy.
Along with the arbitration process, the Administrative Court shall assume authority to
supervise the arbitration process and make sure that the proceedings follow due
process, rather than the Court of Justice.
As to international arbitration, even though the parties are entitled to
choose any arbitration rule to apply to their disputes, it is strongly recommended that
ICSID is used to settle disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying
FDI. The reason is that ICSID offers a state-investor arbitration mechanism, which is
able to settle disputes between the contracting government agency as the one party
and the private contracting party as the other party. As far as the recognition and

319

enforcement of arbitral awards are concerned, the Administrative Court is an
appropriate mechanism used to perform this function. The Flowchart of the Special
Method appears in Appendix 12 of the Appendices.
2.4.

Conclusion

Conceptually, the Special Method adopts the content of the Calvo
Clause and applies it to the Consultation and Negotiation stage. By adopting what in
effect is the Calvo Clause, the Consultation and Negotiation stage is designed as a
precedent stage before the parties seek a formal settlement mechanism of arbitration
(including international arbitration). During the Consultation and Negotiation phase,
the parties are required to bring the disputes to local administrative bodies ("National
Consultation Commission on State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI").

The

function of Commission in the Consultation and Negotiation stage provided by the
Special Method is to assist the parties in getting to an agreement so that there is no
need for the parties to bring their disputes to arbitration (particularly international
arbitration). Unless the Consultation and Negotiation has failed, the parties shall be
entitled to refer the disputes to international arbitration, especially for ICSID as
proposed by this dissertation.
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3.

Modification of Domestic Laws and Regulations on Arbitration
Given the establishment of a Uniform and Standard Methodology on

Arbitration, it is strongly advised that domestic laws and regulations on arbitration
should be modified in a manner consonant with the ratification of the ICSID
Convention, the establishment of the Special Method, and the existence of the
Administrative Court.
Actually, the ratification of the ICSID Convention, the establishment
of the Special Method, and the existence of the Administrative Court are not the only
grounds that bring about the need for having existing laws and regulations modified.
The self-contradictory provision of the Arbitration Act calls upon certain modification
so as to avoid confusion in practice. Besides, the painful lessons from the arbitral
awards in the Expressway case, Walter Bau and the mistakes of the 2004 Cabinet
Resolution are considered the other main factors leading to this proposition. Before
addressing how the existing laws and regulation on arbitration should be modified, it
is necessary to clarify justifications of its modification.

3.1.

Justifications of the Modification of Relevant Domestic Laws and

Regulations on Arbitration
Modification of the existing laws and regulations on arbitration as
addressed in this Chapter absolutely depends on an analysis of the arbitration legal
system in Chapter 4 that strongly suggests that the arbitration legal system governing
disputes arising out of a state contract is contradictory, inconsistent, incompatible, and
incomplete. Therefore, the modification as proposed by this dissertation is intended
to reconcile those of the contradictions mentioned in Chapter 4. Justifications of such
a modification are as follows:
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First, the concept of the Arbitration Act does not fit into state
contracts' functions since the Arbitration Act is aimed to help private parties settle
their disputes. Consequently, it is necessary to have the Arbitration Act modified in
such a manner consonant with the nature and function of state contracts. By doing so,
the Arbitration Act must accept that disputes arising out of state contracts are different
from those between private parties. As a result, the Arbitration Act should entitle the
arbitral tribunal to apply principles derived from administrative and public law to a
case rather than only those derived from private law, civil law, and civil procedural
law.
Second, the division of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and
the Administrative Court is still a question in practice, thereby leading to confusion
and uncertainty for Government Agencies as to whether they should submit disputes
with the private party to the Court of Justice or the Administrative Court. Therefore,
both the Arbitration Act and the Administrative Court Act should be amended to
make it clear that what disputes should be subject to the Court of Justice's jurisdiction
and what disputes should be referred to the Administrative Court. This dissertation
proposes that the Court of Justice should assume jurisdiction over disputes between
private parties and those treated as private parties such as government procurement
contracts, whereas the Administrative Court should assume its jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of state contracts other than government procurement contracts.
Third, even though the 2004 Cabinet Resolution becomes a
consequence of the disappointment of the arbitral award in the Expressway case, the
2004 Cabinet Resolution obviously contains an error and as a result, the 2004 Cabinet
Resolution cannot operate in a manner as intended. It was assumed that the 2004
Cabinet Resolution was issued to apply to any state contract in respect to the
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provision of public service or utility (as state contracts could impact on public policy,
or were involved in the exercising of the State's power).

However, instead of

providing conditions and requirements of state contracts to be governed by the 2004
Cabinet Resolution, the Council of Ministers, on the other hand, expressly designated
the name of a contract type, per se a "concession contract" even though the contract
between ETA and BBCD in the Expressway case was not a concession contract. It
was simply a construction contract. Therefore, to correct this error, it is advised that
the 2004 Cabinet should be repealed and replaced by the issuance of a new regulation
on arbitration.

The new regulation on arbitration will provide conditions and

requirement of what contract type can or cannot be arbitrated.
Fourth, it proposes that a new regulation on arbitration should be
issued. Having said that, this new regulation on arbitration will provide step-by-step
guidance from the beginning of the process to the end for Government Agencies to
comply with when they are facing arbitration issues. This guidance is not only to
provide the step-by-step reference material for Government Agencies, but it is also to
update relevant procedure in a manner consonant with the existence and function of
the Administrative Court.
The followings are the proposed modifications of domestic statutory
acts and regulations on arbitration applicable to disputes arising out of a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI.

3.2.

Modification of the Existing Statutory Acts on Arbitration
The objectives of the modification of the existing statutory acts on

arbitration is first to empower the Administrative Court to assume jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of state contracts, per se state contracts relating to qualifying FDI,
in addition to administrative contracts. Second, the Administrative Court should be
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empowered to assume jurisdiction over arbitration issues, especially those relating to
or as a result from disputes arising out of state contracts relating to qualifying FDI.
Third, in the cases of arbitrating disputes arising out of a state contract with special
characteristics (i.e., a state contract relating to qualifying FDI), it is unclear whether
the arbitral tribunal can apply principles of administrative and public law to a case.
There is no expressed provision of the Arbitration Act providing as such. Therefore,
it is advised to make it clear and certain by expressly providing that the arbitral
tribunal shall be entitled to apply principles derived from administrative or public law
to a case when coming across disputes arising out of a state contract with special
characteristics (i.e., state contracts relating to qualifying FDI).
3.2.1. Amendment of the Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002)
Rationales and Necessity
Currently, it is unclear whether disputes arising out of a state contract
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice or the Administrative
Court even though the there have been efforts to draw the dividing lines between them
in practice.

This dissertation proposes that while state contracts carrying simple

transactions such as government procurement contracts without the State's
involvement shall be subject to the Court of Justice's jurisdiction, state contracts with
the State's involvement (i.e., a state contract relating to qualifying FDI) shall be
subject to the Administrative Court's jurisdiction.
It would be more appropriate that disputes arising out of a state

contract relating to qualifying FDI should be designated under the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Court. The reason is that disputes arising out of such state contracts
contain an element of State's involvement. It further appears that disputes involving
in exercising the State's power may bring about some impact on its people or public
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in general. Furthermore, it will be extremely inappropriate that disputes carrying the
State's power or involvement shall be exclusively governed by private law principles
(for example, burden of proof, freedom of contract, or privity of contract under the
Court of Justice). In contrast, it is believed that principles of administrative and
public law should be applied to disputes where one of the parties is the State and the
disputes involving the exercise of State's power. Therefore, in a case of Thailand, the
Administrative Court is considered more appropriate to assume jurisdiction over
disputes involving in the State's power.
Concept of Amendment

To empower the Administrative Court to assume jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI where one of the
parties is the State or its delegates, it is proposed to alter the Arbitration Act, B.B.
2545 (2002). Having said that, there should be a new sub-section (Paragraph 2)
following Section 9.
To enable the arbitral tribunal to apply principles derived from
Administrative and Public law to disputes arising out of a state contract carrying
special characteristics (a state contract relating to qualifying FDI), it is proposed that
there should be a new sub-section (Paragraph 4) added to Section 25.
By adding these new provisions to Section 9 and Section 25, the
addition of these provisions will be consistent with the rest of the Arbitration Act.
Proposed Provisions
(i) Adding Paragraph 2 to Section 9

Section 9 The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade

Court, or the Regional Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, or a Court
having jurisdiction over arbitration cases, or a Court where either party has a domicile
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within its territory, or a Court having jurisdiction over disputes that have been
submitted to arbitration within its territory, shall have jurisdiction over cases as
designated by this Act.

[The Central Administrative Court or the Regional Administrative
Court as the case may be shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of a state
contract that has agreed to submit or has been submitted to the arbitration where at
least one of the parties is the State or its Government Agencies or persons acting on
behalf of the State and where a contract relates to the exercising of the State's power,
the provision ofpublic service or utility, the exploitation of natural resources, FDL or
relating matters.]
(ii) Adding Paragraph 4 to Section 25 Paragraph 3
Section 25 During arbitral proceedings, both parties shall be afforded
reasonable opportunities to give explanation and present evidence pertaining thereto.
In the absence of the parties' agreement or unless the law states
otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The arbitral
tribunal's authorities include matters relating to the acquisition of witnesses, evidence
as well as the weight of evidence.
The arbitral tribunal may apply civil procedure law to a case.

[For disputes arising out of a state contract involving in the exercising
of the State's power, the provision of public service or utility, the exploitation of
natural resources, FDL or relating matters, the arbitral tribunal shall take principles
of administrative and public law or rules of law regarding public interest or public
policy into consideration.]
3.2.2. Amendment of the Establishment of the Administrative
Court and the Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999)
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Rationales and Necessity
This alteration is to empower the Administrative Court to assume
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of state contracts, per se state contracts relating
to qualifying FDI, in addition to administrative contracts, and to assume jurisdiction
over arbitration issues, especially those relating to or as a result from disputes arising
out of state contracts relating to qualifying FDI.
Concept of Amendment
It is proposed to alter Article 9 by conferring upon the Administrative

Court to assume jurisdiction over disputes arising out of state contracts (other than
administrative contracts) as well as disputes arising out of or as a result of arbitration.
Consequently, it is necessary to alter Paragraph (4) of Article 9 and to add Paragraph
(7) to Article 9 as follows:
Proposed Provisions
(i) Amendment of Article 9
Article 9 The Administrative Court has the competence to proceed
with the trial, adjudicate, or give orders over the following matters:
(1)

a case involving disputes in relation to an unlawful act by an

administrative agency or government official, whether in connection with the issuance
of a rule or order or in connection with other acts, by reason of acting without or
beyond the scope of powers and duties or in a manner inconsistent with the law or the
form, process or procedure which is the material requirement for such act or in bad
faith or in a manner indicating unfair discrimination or causing unnecessary process
or excessive burden to the public or amounting to undue exercise of discretion;

327

(2)

a case involving disputes in relation to an administrative agency

or government official neglecting official duties required by law to be performed or
performing such duties with unreasonable delay;
(3)

a case involving disputes in relation to a wrongful act or other

liabilities of an administrative agency or government official arising from the exercise
of power under the law or from law, administrative order or other orders, or from the
neglect of official duties required by the law to be performed or the performance of
such duties with unnecessary delay;
(4)

a case involving disputes in relation to an administrative contract

or a state contract where at least one of the parties, is the State, or its Government
Agencies, or persons acting on behalf of the State and where a contract relates to the
exercising of the State's power, the provision of public service or utility, the
exploitation of natural resources, FDI, or relating matters;
(5)

a case prescribed by law to be submitted to the Court by an

administrative agency or government official for mandating a person to do a particular
act or refraining therefrom;
(6)

a case involving any matter prescribed by law to be under the

jurisdiction of the Administrative Court;

(7) a case arising from or as a result of arbitration conferred by a
contract where one of the parties is the State, its Government Agencies, or persons
acting on behalf of the State and where a contract relates to the exercising of the
State's power, the provision of public service or utility, the exploitation of natural
resources, FDI, or relating matters.
The following matters are not within the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Court:

328

(1) an action concerning military disciplines:
(2)

an action of the Judicial Commission under the law on judicial

(3)

a case within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Family Court,

servIce;

Labor Court, Tax Court, Intellectual Property and International Trade Court,
Bankruptcy Court or other specialized courts.

3.3.

Issuance of the Regulation of the Office of Prime Minister on

Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a State Contract Relating to
Qualifying FDI
Rationales and Necessity
This is to provide step-by-step guidance on arbitration as the reference
material for Government Agencies that are prepared to transact with the private party.
The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Arbitration not only provides
the step-by-step guidance but also provides the sample arbitration clause that is
appropriate for disputes arising out of a state contract with special characteristics (a
state contract relating to qualifying FDI). Therefore, Government Agencies are no
longer compelled to refer to the sample arbitration clause provided by the 1992
Regulation, which is in fact intended to only deal with disputes arising out of
government procurement contracts.

Draft Regulation
Basically, this Regulation adopts the concept and process as provided
by the Special Method to this step-by-step guidance.

The Regulation will help

provide a guide for Government Agencies as to how to process when they are dealing
with arbitration issues from the beginning of the process to the end. In addition to the
guidance on arbitration, the Regulation also provides a sample arbitration clause that
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is more appropriate to deal with disputes arising out of a state contract relating to
qualifying FDI unlike that of the 1992 Regulation. It is believed that this Regulation
will be practically helpful for Government Agencies that are prepared to enter into a
state contract relating to qualifying FDI with the private party in practice.
The issuance of the Draft Regulation of the Office of the Prime
Minister on Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a State Contract
Relating to Qualifying FDI is demonstrated in Appendix 13 of the Appendices. The
following are step-by-step rules provided by the Regulation of the Office of the Prime
Minister on Arbitration.
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- Proposed Draft Regulation The Regulation of the Office of Prime Minister on Arbitration Applicable to
Disputes Arising out of a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E.

Whereas it is appropriate to issue the Regulation of the Office of
Prime Minister on Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a State Contract
Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E ..... to govern disputes arising out of a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI.
Clause 1

This Regulation shall be referred as to "the Regulation

of the Office of Prime Minister on Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a
State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E ......
Clause 2

This Regulation shall come into force after sixty (60)

days from the date of its publication in the Government Gazette.
Clause 3

Where any regulation, rule, Cabinet Resolution, order is

inconsistent or in contrast with these provisions of this Regulation, this Regulation
shall prevail and apply.
Clause 4

The Permanent-Secretary of the Office of Prime

Minister shall be in charge of the application, interpretation and enforcement of this
Regulation.
Chapter I
General Definition and Scope
Clause 5

In this Regulation:

A State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI" means any state
contract having special characteristics that fulfills and meets criteria and conditions
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subject to the Testing Process "a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI" set forth
by Schedule 1.
Contracting Government Agency" means any of these types of
Government Agencies: the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, the Judicial
Branch, Independent Organizations, Local Authorities, and State Enterprises
transacting with the Private Party.
"Commission" means the National Consultation Commission on State
Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI.
"Government Agency" means any of these types of Government
Agencies: the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch,
Independent Organizations, Local Authorities, and State Enterprises.
"Parties" means the Contracting Government Agency and the Private
Party.
"Private Party" means the Private Party transacting with the
Contracting Government Agency.
"Prospective Contract" means a contract to be entered into by a
Contracting Government Agency with the Private Party.
Clause 6

Any Contracting Government Agency desires to apply

arbitration as dispute settlement resolution to disputes arising out of a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI shall comply with this Regulation.
Clause 7

Prior to signing any state contract relating to qualifying

FDI with the private party, a Contracting Government Agency shall conclude an
arbitration clause according to the sample arbitration clause as suggested by Schedule
2 of this Regulation into a contract.
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The sample arbitration clause may be adjusted and modified based
upon a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the Contracting Government Agency may
consult the Office of Attorney General for legal advice and its adjustment.

Chapter II
Amicable Settlement Resolution
Clause 8

Any dispute or difference ansmg out of or in

connection with this Prospective Contract or the implementation of any of the
provisions of this Prospective Contract shall be referred to the Amicable Settlement
Resolution where the Parties are encouraged to settle their dispute between
themselves amicably within sixty (60) days since the day of acknowledging the
dispute.

Chapter III
Consultation and Negotiation
Clause 9

In an event where the Amicable Settlement Resolution

between the Parties has failed or the sixty (60) day period of the Amicable Settlement
Resolution has elapsed, the Contracting Government Agency is required to submit a
request for Consultation and Negotiation to the National Consultation Commission on
State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI, (the "Commission") promptly, whether or
not the private party has done so.
A request for Consultation and Negotiation will contain issues of the
dispute as well as relevant infonnation, facts and details relevant to the dispute, for
example, the claim of the dispute, a contract concerned, etc.

Clause 10 The Commission consists of authorized representatives
designated from the Ministry of Finance as a Chainnan; the Office of the National
Economic and Social Development Board (the "NESDB"); the Fiscal Policy Office,
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the Ministry of Finance (the "FPO"); the Board of Investment (the "BOI"); the
Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the OAG;
the Office of Council of State; three (3) independent and qualified persons from either
state sector or private practice; and the Department of the Legal Counsel of the OAG
as a Commission member and secretary.
At least two-thirds (2/3) of the Commission members shall constitute a
quorum of the meeting.
The Commission's Resolution shall be issued by a majority vote.
Clause 11 When the Commission acknowledges the dispute between

the Contracting Government Agency and the Private Party, the Commission shall call
upon a meeting to discuss the dispute in order to recommend possible terms of
settlement to the Parties within thirty (30) days. The Commission shall be entitled to
invite both Parties to participate in a meeting. If necessary, the Commission may call
upon the Parties for additional meetings. The Parties shall facilitate the Commission
in settling the dispute.
The periods for the Consultation and Negotiation may be consumed
from three (3) months to twelve (12) months depending on the complication and
levels of the dispute. If the dispute is not complicated and carries straightforward
issues, the Consultation and Negotiation may take a few months whereas a maximum
of twelve (12) month period will allow the Parties to put several great efforts to deal
and settle perplexing and multi-level issues in dispute successfully and satisfactorily.
Clause 12 During the Consultation and Negotiation, the Commission

has the responsibility to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties, to come up
with possible terms of settlement to them, and to endeavour to bring about the
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settlement between them and the Parties are supposed to take such a recommendation
into consideration accordingly.
Clause 13 The Commission shall draw up a report of the Consultation
and Negotiation, whether or not the dispute between the Parties can be settled. In the
event where the Parties can reach an agreement, the Commission shall specify the
issues in dispute and how the Parties agree to settle their dispute.
In the event where the Commission considers that it is unlikely that the
Parties can seek a solution with an agreement, the Commission shall close the
Consultation and Negotiation's proceedings and draw up a report of the Parties'
failure to reach such an agreement.
After a report has been produced, the Commission shall hand out a
report to the Parties as well as to submit such a report to the Council of Ministers for
an approval as to whether the Council of Ministers will agree with the Commission's
recommendation and conclusion based upon the report.
Clause 14 Upon a report, the Council of Ministers shall consider a
report, issue a Cabinet Resolution over the dispute, and notify the Commission of the
Cabinet Resolution within sixty (60) days as to whether the Council of Ministers
agrees with the Parties' agreement in settling their dispute as appeared in a report. In
a case where the Council of Ministers disagrees with the settlement or where the
dispute cannot be settled in the Consultation and Negotiation process, the Council of
Ministers is required to come up with alternative terms of settlement to the Parties.
Clause 15 The Commission shall notify the Parties of the Cabinet
Resolution promptly. If the Private Party agrees with the Cabinet Resolution, the
Parties shall comply with the Cabinet Resolution accordingly.
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However, if the

Private Party dissatisfies with Cabinet Resolution, the Private Party is entitled to
bring the dispute against the Contracting Government Agency to arbitration.
Chapter IV
Arbitration
Clause 16 Once the Consultation and Negotiation has failed or the

periods of the Consultation and Negotiation have elapsed, the Parties shall be eligible
to refer the dispute to arbitration (either domestic or international arbitration).
Clause 17 In a case where the Parties have agreed to submit the

dispute to domestic arbitration, either Party shall serve upon the other a notice of
intention to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specify the name of an
arbitrator to be appointed by him. The other Party shall appoint the arbitrator within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice.
Notwithstanding, there shall be at least one (1) arbitrator who has
knowledge and experience background in administrative or public law. The two (2)
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator, a so-called umpire who will chair the
arbitral tribunal.
Should either Party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or in case of
disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire, each Party is entitled to
refer the matter to the Administrative Court for the appointment of an arbitrator or
umpire as the case may be.
Clause 18 In a case where the Parties have agreed to submit the

dispute to international arbitration, the Parties are strongly advised to submit their
dispute to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter
the "ICSID").
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Clause 19 The arbitral tribunal shall not be barred from applying the
principles of administrative and public law into a case.

Clause 20 The Administrative Court shall have jurisdiction over
dispute and relating matters arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI.

Given on this ... day of ................... B.E .... .
-signed-
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3.4.

Provision of a Sample Arbitration Clause for a State Contract

Relating to Qualifying FDI
Rationales and Necessity
This proposed model clause of settlement of disputes applies the Calvo
Clause in that before the parties shall refer their disputes to arbitration, the parties are
obliged to institute local remedies (the Consultation and Negotiation according to the
Special Method).

Until local administrative remedies have been exhausted, the

parties shall not be entitled to arbitrate their disputes. This Calvo Clause ensures that
the jurisdiction of international investment disputes lies with the country in which the
investment is located.

The Calvo Clause prohibits the parties from seeking

international arbitration before local remedies are exhausted. Therefore, by adopting
the Calvo Clause, Thailand should set up the condition requiring the parties to seek
local remedies within a certain period of time in order to settle disputes among
themselves. Unless the dispute resolution is reached within the limited period, the
parties will be subsequently entitled to submit an application before ICSID, which is
consistent with the ICSID Convention. 549
Concept of the Issuance of a Sample Arbitration Clause
This is to provide the reference material for Government Agencies as
to how they should conclude an arbitration clause in a state contract in question.
Unlike the sample arbitration clause issued by the 1992 Regulation, this proposed
clause is intended to be a model for other types of state contracts (such as state
contracts relating to qualifying FDI) other than government procurement contracts.

549

ICSID Convention, supra note 219, art. 26.
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Proposed Model Clause of the Settlement of Disputes
1.

Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with this

Contract or the implementation of any of the provisions of this Contract shall be
amicably settled between the parties within sixty (60) days
2.

When such amicable settlement between the parties has failed or

the periods of the amicable settlement have elapsed, either party shall submit a
request for Consultation and Negotiation to the National Consultation Commission on
State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI (the "Commission".) The parties shall
facilitate the Commission to have the dispute settled with the parties' agreement. The
periods for Consultation and Negotiation shall range from three (3) months to twelve
(12) months.
3. When the Consultation and Negotiation has failed or the periods of
the Consultation and Negotiation have elapsed, the parties shall be eligible to refer the
dispute to the arbitral tribunal consisting of three (3) arbitrators. The parties shall
agree upon the application of either domestic arbitration or international arbitration.
4.

For domestic arbitration, either party shall serve upon the other a

notice of intention to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specify the
name of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. The other party shall appoint the
arbitrator within thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice. Notwithstanding,
there shall be at least one (1) arbitrator who has knowledge and experience
background in administrative or public law. The two (2) arbitrators shall appoint the
third arbitrator, a so-called umpire who will chair the arbitral tribunal.
5. For international arbitration, the parties hereby consent to submit to
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter the
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"ICSID") any dispute arising out of or relating to this Contract for settlement by
arbitration.
6.

Should either party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or in case

of disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire, each party is entitled to
refer the matter to the Administrative Court for the appointment of the arbitrator or
umpire as the case may be.
7. Unless agreed by the parties otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall be
the judge of its own competence and shall apply the rules as it think appropriate. The
arbitral tribunal shall not be barred from applying principles of administrative or
public law to a case.
8.

The arbitral award shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the

9.

Each party shall have the right to institute suit against the other

parties hereto.

before the Administrative Court to enforce any decision or award rendered in arbitral
proceedings.
10. Each party shall bear the cost of his own arbitrator's service and
share equally other cost of all proceedings.
11. The submission of any matter in dispute or difference to the
arbitral proceedings as aforesaid, shall be a condition precedent to the right of
institution of court action.

3.5.

Conclusion

It is believed that the establishment of a Uniform and Standard
Methodology on Arbitration (the ratification of the ICSID Convention, the
establishment of the Special Method, and the modification of the existing laws and
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regulations on arbitration) would remove obstacles that the arbitration legal system
has encountered. In addition, a Uniform and Standard Methodology on Arbitration
would reform, reinforce and strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of a domestic
remedy system that private investors can trust and rely upon. It is believed that the
reinforcement and reform of local administrative bodies that are more reliable,
efficient and effective can provide a more friendly environment to transnational
investors, thereby making Thailand much more attractive to foreign investors. In the
end, the establishment of a Uniform and Standard Methodology on Arbitration will
enhance and promote FDI flow toward Thailand.
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Conclusion

FDI has played an important role in the history of Thailand. FDI has
and will continue to have a high priority in Thailand's national agenda. Currently,
FDI has a particular importance given that it is a time of global economic crisis.
Under such a circumstance, Thailand greatly needs capital inflow to stimulate her
economic growth due to a shortage of currency in the country.
There are several significant factors contributing to what has prevented
the inflow of FDI toward Thailand. One of those factors is that foreign investors
often doubt that the dispute settlement resolution in a local remedy system is impartial
or reliable.

Therefore, arbitration (preferably international arbitration) as an

alternative means of settlement of disputes arising out of foreign direct investments
becomes one of key issues found in BITS between Thailand and other countries. The
proliferation of BITs in recent years can well demonstrate the importance and
worldwide acceptance of arbitration (including international arbitraton) as an effective
means of dispute settlement resolution between foreign investors and host states.
Therefore, as one of the OAG's mandates in reviewing state contracts
introduced by the Government of Thailand as well as by Government Agencies, the
main objective of this dissertation is to explore and better understand how the OAG
can improve the fuctions and efficiency of state contracts relating to FDI in order to
enhance FDI inflow toward a country. From the study, it is advised that in addition to
a well-written contract, a state contract involving or relating to FDI should contain
FDI-friendly clauses that provide foreign investors an efficient and effective dispute
settlement resolution, offering arbitration (including international arbitration) as an
alternative means of settlement of disputes arising out of Thailand's state contracts
involving or relating to FDI between foreign investor and Thailad as a host state.
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However, when examining the existing arbitration system under Thai
law thoroughly, this study suggests that there are at least two (2) problems that make
the application of arbitration for state contracts in Thailand a continuous struggle.
They are the initial impediment to the arbitration system, and the inconsistency and
incompatibility of the arbitration system itself.
As to the former, the lack of the definition and recognized category of
"investment contract," or "a state contract relating to FDI" under Thai law as well as
the indistinguishable boundaries of the existing five (5) types of state contracts
(government procurement contracts, administrative contracts, concession contracts,
state-joint venture contract, and other) is the initial impediment to the arbitration legal
system. This study further finds that these five (5) contract types are overlapping,
thereby making it impossible in practice to differentiate an investment contract or a
state contract relating to FDI from the other.
As to the latter, it appears that the existing arbitration legal system
itself is contradictory, inconsistent, incomplete, and incompatible. The contradiction
and inconsistency of the arbitration legal system can be examined from two (2)
perspectives: domestic law perspective and international law perspective. As far as
domestic law is concerned, there are several substantial factors causing such
inconsistency and incompatibility.

The main factor is that arbitration under the

Arbitration Act, B.B. 2545 (2002) does not function well as an alternative dispute
resolution for disputes between the State and private parties. The reason is that the
Arbitration Act is aimed to help settle disputes among private parties, not between the
State and the private party. As a result, the existing arbitration laws and regulations,
which are aimed to help settle disputes between private parties, do not provide stepby-step guidance on arbitration as alternative dispute resolution for Government
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Agencies, thereby compelling them to adopt the 1992 Regulation to their cases.
Additionally, confusion of jurisdiction between the Court of Justice and the
Administrative Court is still unresolved regardless of the existence of the
Administrative Court.
In consequence, as a response to the former problem, this study advises
that the testing process of "a state contract relating to qualifying FDI" should be
established and the process is divided into three (3) steps: testing criteria of the
foreign element; testing criteria and conditions of qualifying FDI; and testing criteria
of qualifying FDI invested in a state contract. Under the testing process, a prospective
investment will be brought to the test according to these three (3) steps respectively.
As to the first step, there are four (4) testing criteria: place of incorporation; exclusive
ownership; percentage of foreign shareholdings; and controlling power in a
corporation. Only an investment that falls into one of the testing criterion shall be
deemed to have the foreign element and it will be accordingly brought to the second
step. The purpose of the second step is to examine whether a prospective investment
holding the foreign element qualifies as a foreign direct investment, per se,
"qualifying FDI." Then any qualifying FDI that is invested in a state project by a
means of state contracts as specified in the third step will be defined as "a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI" and accordingly governed by the Special Method.
Overall, the testing process is aimed to differentiate a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI from others. The differentiation of a state contract relating
to qualifying FDI from other contract types helps ensure that a state contract carrying
FDI functions will be treated appropriately, that is, in accordance with domestic
arbitration law as well as intemationallaw in which Thailand has entered into.
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As a response to the latter problem, this study proposes that a Uniform
and Standard Methodology of Arbitration should be set up. A Uniform and Standard
Methodology on Arbitration consists of three (3) missions: the ratification of the
ICSID Convention; the establishment of the Special Method; and the modification of
the existing arbitration laws and regulations to accommodate the availability of
ICSID, the establishment of the Special Method, and the existence of the
Administrative Court.
First, this dissertation strongly urges that Thailand should ratify the
ICSID Convention because it becomes very clear that international arbitration is the
preferred method of dispute settlement for foreign investors since it offers the parties
flexibility, informality, time saving, ability to choose the governing substantive and
procedural law, and enforcement of arbitral awards.

Furthermore, ICSID also

provides an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, which is perfectly right to
settle disputes between the State and the private party.

As a consequence, this

dissertation proposes that Thailand should ratify the ICSID Convention but with a
reservation and condition, namely, that Thailand as the sovereign state is still able to
reserve the right to certain disputes that are particularly sensitive to Thailand as the
host state. With the reservation, Thailand can opt out the ICSID's jurisdiction over
certain disputes to the extent that Thailand reserves this right. Additionally, Thailand
should set forth the condition that disputes should be submitted to ICSID only if
recourse to local remedy systems has been exhausted. This requirement would ensure
that the host state and the investor are given an opportunity to settle disputes between
themselves before they will be settled before international arbitration, per se ICSID.
By not ratifying the ICSID Convention, Thailand continues to maintain
a negative image at the international level. Particularly, Thailand already signed and
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became a signatory state of the ICSID Convention but Thailand has not ratified it yet.
Under such circumstance, it shall be deemed that Thailand has agreed to the substance
of the ICSID Convention and accordingly the obligations arising out of the ICSID
Convention as an international agreement seem to be imposed on Thailand according
to the Vienna Convention so that Thailand is not supposed to do anything to defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty, per se the ICSID Convention; otherwise, Thailand
may be accused of violating the rule of pacta sunt servanda under the 1969 Vienna
Convention. Therefore, it seems very inappropriate for Thailand not to ratify the
Convention in which more than half of the obligations are already binding on
Thailand. The inaction of ratification of the ICSID Convention on part of Thailand
stands in stark contrast with the Policy Statement of the Government under the
leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva delivered to the National Assembly on
December 30, 2008, where the Prime Minister committed to the work of expediting
the ratification of agreements already signed like it happened to the ICSID
Convention.
Instead of insisting on not ratifying the ICSID Convention, to help
Thailand gain more confidence in ratifying the Convention, Thailand should explore
how to formulate the particular conditions when ratifying it so as to reinforce and
strengthen her domestic remedy system (the Special Method as suggested by this
dissertation). This would go a long way to ensure the impartiality and reliability of
local remedies for foreign investors.

The mere non-ratification of the ICSIC

Convention on part of Thailand does not guarantee that Thailand will be no longer
involved in international arbitration. The reason is that Thailand may be pressed to
submit a dispute with foreign investors to international arbitration under ICSID
sooner or later because ICSID also provides the ICSID Additional Facility Rules for
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any dispute which is outside of the scope of the ICSID Convention (for example,
where the disputing party is not a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention).
Second, the Special Method governing disputes arising out of a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI should be established. Apparently, the Special
Method adopts the concept of the Calvo Clause, which requires the parties (the private
party) to first recourse to local remedies prior to the institution of international
arbitration. At the same time, the Special Method also removes obstacles surrounding
local remedies that may strengthen the efficiency of local remedies. The Special
Method ensures that the parties will be provided with a mechanism that assists them
in settling their disputes so that they can remain in good relations in order to perform
their contractual obligations until the completion of the contract. The Special Method
can be divided into three (3) stages: Amicable Settlement Resolution; Consultation
and Negotiation; and Arbitration.
At the first stage, the Amicable Settlement Resolution is designed to
provide a channel for the parties to settle their disputes between themselves within a
period of time. There is no involvement of any third party in this stage. When the
settlement resolution at this stage has failed, the parties will be directed to the next
stage.
In the second stage, the Consultation and Negotiation are known as the
"waiting and cooling off' periods that the parties are encouraged to participate in
good faith consultations and negotiations that might lead to the settlement amicably
before the institution of formal proceedings as mostly found in BITs and other
investment treaties. Here it is proposed that a Consultation and Negotiation forum in
the form of commission, a so-called National Consultation Commission on State
Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI, should be formed.
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This would consist of

designated Government Agencies that are directly in charge of finance, economics,
FDI, legal affairs from the macro perspective. The Commission's functions are partly
adopted from those of the Conciliation Commission under the ICSID Convention.
In the third stage, when the Consultation and Negotiation stage has
failed for whatsoever reason, it shall be deemed that the local remedy system has been
exhausted. As a consequence, the disputing parties shall be eligible to refer their
dispute to arbitration. At this point, the parties still have options to choose either
domestic arbitration or international arbitration.

If they choose international

arbitration, this dissertation strongly advises that the parties submit their disputes to
ICSID.
Overall, the Special Method would provide the appropriate legal
treatment and administration of state contracts relating to qualifying FDI according to
domestic investment law and international investment law, especially those that
Thailand has been bound through international investment agreements.

Only the

appropriate treatment like the proposed Special Method could bring about and
stimulate the efficiency and accomplishment of the functions of state contracts
relating to qualifying FDI, thereby resulting in enhancing capital flowing into a
country, which has instantly been in the Government's attention.
Third, the existing arbitration laws and regulations governing disputes
arising out of state contracts relating to qualifying FDI should be modified in a
manner consonant with the availability of the ICSID Convention (with the assumption
that Thailand would ratify the ICSID Convention), the establishment of the Special
Method, and the existence of the Administrative Court. With such modification, the
Arbitration Act, B.E. 2545 (2002), and the Establishment of the Administrative Court
and the Administrative Court Procedure Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) need to be altered to
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confer jurisdiction upon the Administrative Court over disputes arising out of a state
contract relating to qualifying FDI as well as matters relating to or as a result of
arbitration provided by a state contract. In addition to such modification, it is also
necessary to draft a new regulation on arbitration as well as a sample arbitration
clause specially governing disputes arising out of state contracts relating to qualifying
FDI. By doing so, there would be no need for Government Agencies to adopt the
1992 Regulation to state contracts other than government procurement contracts.
Based upon these proposals, it is believed that the achievement of these
three (3) missions would remove problems and obstacles that the arbitration legal
system has encountered and strengthened the entire domestic remedies system as an
alternative settlement mechanism for the disputing parties (the State and foreign
investors). Particularly, a Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration can
assure foreign investors that their investment will be protected in Thailand so that if
and when disputes arise, there is recourse to domestic law and international law,
especially international treaties and conventions that Thailand has entered into. The
outcome of the establishment of a Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration
should be positive that attracts foreign investors by cultivating greater confidence to
invest directly into Thailand and the inflow ofFDI toward Thailand will be increased.
At the very least, a Uniform and Standard Methodology of Arbitration
is also intended to help prevent Thailand from suffering the disappointment from what
happened in BBeD case and Walter Bau vs. Thailand. This lesson is particular true
for Walter Bau case, where Thailand was brought by Walter Bau to international
arbitration under UNCITRAL. In Walater Bau case, the arbitral tribunal reaffirmed
that Walter Bau, a minority shareholder holding just ten (10) per cent of DMT's
holdings could bring a dispute to international arbitration as Walter Bau had been
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granted such right under Thailand's BIT with Germany.

Therefore, this case

illustrates that Thailand will be absolutely unable to get away from being involved in
international arbitration, especially due to the fact that Thailand has currently entered
into at least forty-two (42) BITs with other countries, in which most Thailand's BITs
grant foreign investors to submit a dispute to international arbitration. Moreover,
regardless of the a Cabinet Resolution prohibiting Government Agencies from
applying arbitration (including international arbitration) for state contracts, foreign
investors are not deprived by such Cabinet Resolution of exercising their rights under
Thailand's BITs with other countries to submit a dispute to international arbitration.
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Appendix 1

The Chart of the Administrative Structure of the Government Organizations of Thailand
Government Organizations of Thailand

Independent Organizations

State Enterpr1zes

Office of the Attorney General

Etc.

(1) Central Administration level

Administrative court

Court of Justice

Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Tourism and Sports
Ministry of Social Development and Human Stabilization
Ministry of Agricultural and Cooperatives

Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment

Ministry of Technology, Infannation and Communication
Ministry of Energy
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Justice

Ministry of Labour
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Science and Technology
Ministry of Education

Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Industry

Special Forms

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration

Municipal Organizations

Tambol Administration Organizations
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Pattaya Administration

Appendix 2

The Chart of the Administrative Structure of the Government Organizations within A Province
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Iprovincial Administrative Organization of

I
Municipal Organizations

Mooban (Villages)

J

j
I

lambol Administrative Organizations

I

I

Mooban (Villages) in
Urban Areas

Mooban (Villages) in
Suburb Areas
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Appendix 3

A Summary of the Provincial Administration Structure in Thailand
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29 Cha~gwatAn~ThonJi
30 Changwat Bangkok (Krung Thep Maha Nakhon),
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

The Decentralized Adminstration Level

The Regional Administration Level
North Part
Chanawat Chi ana Mai
Changwat Chiang Rai
Changwat Lampan
Chanawat Lamphun
Changwat Mae Hong Son
Changwat Nan
Chanawat Phayao
Changwat Phrae
Changwat Uttaradit
Northeast Part
Chanawat Amnat Charoen
Chanawat Buri Ram
Changwat Chaiyaphum
Changwat Kalasin
Chanawat Khon Kaen
Changwat Loei
Changwat Maha Sarakham
Chanawat Mukdahan
Changwat Nakhon Phanom
Changwat Nakhon Ratchasima
Changwat Nong Bua Lamphu
Changwat Nong Khai
Changwat Roi Et
Chanawat Sakon Nakhon
Chanawat Si Sa Ket
Changwat Surin
Changwat Ubon Ratchathani
Chanawat Udon Thani
Changwat Yasothon
Central Part

Special Form of Local Administration
Changwat Chai Nat
Cha~gwat Kamphaeng Phet
Changwat Lop Buri
Changwat Nakhon Nayok
Chanawat Nakhon Pathom
Changwat Nakhon Sawan
Changwat Nonthaburi
Chanawat Pathum Thani
Changwat Phetchabun
Changwat Phichit
Changwat Phitsanulok
Changwat Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya
Chanawat Samut Prakan
ChanawatSamutSakhon
Changwat Samut Songkhram

Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization

of Chiang Mai
of Chiang Rai
of Lamp~n
of Lamphun
of Mae Hong Son
of Nan
of Phayao
of Phrae
of Uttaradit

Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization

of Amnat Charoen
of Buri Ram
of Chai~hum
of Kalasin
of Khon Kaen
of Loei
of Maha Sarakham
of Mukdahan
of Nakhon Phanom
of Nakhon Ratchasima
of Nong Bua Lamphu
of Nona Khai
of Roi Et
of Sakon Nakhon
of Si Sa Ket
of Surin
of Ubon Ratchathani
of Udon Thani
of Yasothon

Provincial Administrative Oraanization of Ang Thong

-

Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Oraanization
Provincial Administrative Organization
Provincial Administrative Organization
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of Chai Nat
of Kamphaeng Phet
of Lop Buri
of Nakhon Nayok
of Nakhon Pathom
of Nakhon Sawan
of Nonthaburi
of Pathum Thani
of Phetchabun
of Phichit
of Phitsanulok
of Phra Nakhon Si Ayutt
of Samut Prakan
of Samut Sakhon
of Samut Songkhram

Appendix 3

No.

46
47
48
49
50

The Regional Administration Level

Changwat Saraburi
Changwat Sing Buri
Changwat Sukhothai
Changwat Suphan Buri
Changwat Uthai Thani

The Decentralized Adminstration Level

Provincial Administrative Organization of Saraburi
Provincial Administrative Organization of Sing Buri
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Sukhothai
Provincial Administrative Organization of Suphan Buri
Provincial Administrative Org_anization of Uthai Thani

West Part

51
52
53
54
55

Changwat Kanchanaburi
ChanQwat Phetchaburi
Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan
Changwat Ratchaburi
Changwat Tak

Provincial Administrative Organization of Kanchanaburi
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Phetchaburi
Provincial Administrative Organization of Prachuap Khiri Khan
Provincial Administrative Organization of Ratchaburi
Provincial Administrative Organization of Tak

East Part

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

ChangwatChachoenQsao
Changwat Chanthaburi
Changwat Chon Buri
Changwat Prachin Buri
Changwat RayonQ
Changwat Sa Kaeo
ChanQwat Trat

Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Chachoengsao
Provincial Administrative Organization of Chanthaburi
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Chon Buri
Provincial Administrative Organization of Prachin Buri
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of RayonQ
Provincial Administrative Organization of Sa Kaeo
Provincial Administrative Organization of Trat

South Part

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

ChanQwatChumphon
Changwat Krabi
ChanQwat Nakhon Si Thammarat
Changwat Narathiwat
Changwat Pattani
ChangwatPhangNga
ChanQwat Phatthalung_
Changwat Phuket
Changwat Ranong
72 Changwat Satun
73 Changwat Songkhla
74 Changwat Surat Thani
75 Changwat Trang
76 ChanQwat Yala

Provincial Administrative Organization of Chum phon
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Krabi
Provincial Administrative Organization of Nakhon Si Thammarat
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Narathiwat
Provincial Administrative Organization of Pattani
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of PhanQ NQa
Provincial Administrative Organization of Phatthalung
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Phuket
Provincial Administrative Organization of Ranong
Provincial Administrative Organization of Satun
Provincial Administrative Organization of Songkhla
Provincial Administrative Organization of Surat Thani
Provincial Administrative OrQanization of Trang
Provincial Administrative Organization of Yala
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Appendix 4

Categories of State Contracts in Thailand

State Contracts

I
Government
Procurement
Contract

Administrative
Contract

Other

Concession
Contract
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State-Joint
Venture Contract

Appendix 5
Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Investments
between Thailand and Other Countries
Country

1. The NetherlSlnds
2. United Kinadom
3. China
4. ASEAN
5. Republic of Korea
6. Laos
7. Hunaarv
8. Vietnam
9. Peru
10. Poland
11. Romania
12. Czech Reoublic
13. Finland
14. Cambodia
15. The Philiooines
16. Sri Lanka
17. Taiwan
18. Canada
19. Indonesia
20. Switzerland
21. Araentina
22. Croatia
23. Eayot
24. Israel
25. SloYenia
26. Sweden
27. Zimbabwe
28. India
29. North Korea
30. Bahrain
31. Beloo-Luxemburo
32. Germany
33. Banaladesh
34. Russia
35. Bulaaria
36. Turkey
37. Taiikistan
38. Hona kona SAR
39. Jordan

Date of Signing

6-Jun-72
28-Nov-78
12-Mar-85
15-Dee-87
24-Mar-89
22-Aug-90
18-0et-91
30-0et-91
15-Nov-91
18-Dee-92
30-Apr-93
12-feb-94
18-Mar-94
19-Mar-95
30-Sep-95
3-Jan-96
30-Apr-96
17-Jan-97
17-feb-98
17-Nov-97
18-feb-00
18-feb-00
18-feb-00
18-feb-00
18-feb-00
18-feb-00
18-feb-00

Note
Date of Entry into
Force
Re-Negotiation in Progress
3-Mar-73

ll-Aug-79
13-Dee-85
12-Apr-89
29-Sep-89
7-Dee-90
18-0et-91
7-feb-92
15-Nov-91
1O-Aug-94
20-Aug-94
4-May-95
18-May-96
18-Apr-97
6-Sep-96
14-May-96
30-Apr-96
24-Sep-98
5-Nov-98
21-Jul-99
7-Mar-02
27-Feb-02
28-Aug-03
20-0et-02
23-Nov-02

lO-Jul-OO
1-Mar-02
21-May-02
12-Jun-02
24-Jun-02
9-Jul-02
17-0et-02
1l-Sep-03
24-Jun-05
9-Aug-05
19-Nov-05
15-Dee-05

13-Jul-01
24-May-02
17-Jul-02
19-5ep-04
20 Oet 2004
12 Jan 2003
12 Aug 2004

-

18-Apr-06

-

Farmeirfarntia\ ~anat
DvOOl d Irtaraicra Em [] ItRiicy
Q:pIh 1\11 d II"1a11fu1:i Ei:x:rari;.tffci1S
Ta: cmtmDet 4E, .{ffi, 4lD
Faccmtm47
e-mail: interecon03@mfa.go.th
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Appendix 6

Legislation Regarding the Execution of State Contracts Applicable to Government Agencies
Cabinet Resolution
Regarding a ContractMaking Process

Regulation of the
Office of the Prime
Minister on
Procurement, B.E.
2535 (1992)

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

2. Local Administration Organizations
2.1 Provincial Administrative Organizations
2.2 Municipal Organizations
2.3 Tambol Administrative Organizations
2.4 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
2.5 Pattaya Administration

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

x

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

x
x
x

!

!

3. State Enterprises

!

x

x

!

Types of Government Agencies

1. Main Government Agencies
1.1 Legislative Branch
1.2 Executive Branch
1.2.1 Central Administration
1.2.2 Regional Administration
1.3 Judicial Branch
1.4 Independent Organizations

!
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Regulation of the
Private Participation
Ministry of Interior on in State Undertakings
Procurement of Local Act, B.E. 2535 (1992)
Administrative
Organizations, B.E.
2535 (1992)

-

--

--

Appendix 7

A Summary of Definition and Scope of FDI under Modern International Instruments
Intemationallnstruments

An Open-ended
Definition

An Illustrative List Additional Covered
Investment

Conditions

Exclusion

I
I
I

1. A Working Group on the Relationship

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Between Trade and Investment, WTO

I

(short-term investment, .
~ortfolio investment)

(long-term investment)

2. 1987 ASEAN Agreement

I

I

x

I

x

3.1998 Framework Agreement

x

x

x

x

(portfolio investment)

I

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I

x

x

4.IMF

I

10%
5.0ECD

I

10%
6. U.S. Model BIT

I

I

(alteration of the
existing investment)

7. Thailand's BITs

I

I

(adopting the 1987
ASEAN Agreement)

I

I

(portfolio investment)
~-
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Appendix 8
Testing Process of "a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI"

I. Testing Criteria of the Foreign Element

1

1

Prospecrive Investment

1

1

Place of Incorporation and Registration

1

1....--_,.1""'-'--'

21

Exclusive Ownership

1

I . . . . - - _...r - - - - - '

3l

Percentage of Foreign Shareholdings

1

'----,.-----'

41

Having Controlling Power in a Corporation

1

I....--_r-----'
II. Testing Criteria and Conditions of Qualifying FOI

1
1

1

21

Prospective Investment Holding the Foreign Element

."Inward Investment

..

1
1

Exclusive of Portfolio Investment

..

3l

Investment Value of Not Less Than 1 Billion Baht

41

Having Its Place of Effective Management in Another Country

...

1

1
1

III. Testing Criteria of Qualifying FOllnvested In a State Contract

1

Prospective Qualifying FDI

1
1

l

Transacting with the State or its Government Agency

1
1

1
A State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI
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Appendix 9
Transactions' Arrangement in Transferring Shinawatra/Damapong Families' Shareholdings to Temasak

Shin Corp's Shareholdings

transferred 329.2 million shares (11.875%)

Ample Rich

unloaded shares
164.6 million shares at 1 Baht a share

Pinthongta

164.6 million shares at 1 Baht a share

Panthongtae

sold 329.2 million shares at 49.25 Baht a share

Nominees of T emasek

Cedar Holdings

Aspen Holdings
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Appendix 10

The Flowchart Showing the Incompletion of the Existing
International Arbitation in Thailand

(Missing Piece) Dispute
Dispute Settlement
Settlement Resolution
Resolution between
between the State and
Private Parties
the Private Party
(Thailand's Accessibility
(Thailand's Inaccessibility
to UNCITRAL)
to ICSID)

Arbitration Proceedings under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules

Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
under the New York Convention

Investment Insurance under the MIGA Convention
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Appendix 11
LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE ICSID CONVENTION

(as of November 4, 2007)
State
Afghanistan
Albania
Ailleria
Arllentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Banlliadesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bosnia and Herzellovina
Botswana
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Conllo
Congo, Democratic Rep. of
Costa Rica
Cote d'ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt Arab Reo. of
EI Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georllia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya

Signature
Sep.30 1966
Oct. 15, 1991
Apr. 17 1995
May 21, 1991
Sep. 16, 1992
Mar. 24 1975
Mav 17, 1966
Sep. 18, 1992
Oct. 19, 1995
Sep. 22, 1995
Nov. 20 1979
May 13, 1981
July 10,1992
Dec. 15, 1965
Dec. 19, 1986
Sep.10 1965
Apr. 25, 1997
Jan. 15, 1970
Sep.16 2002
Mar. 21, 2000
Sep.16 1965
Feb. 17, 1967
Nov. 5, 1993
Sep.23 1965
Dec. 15,2006
Aug. 26, 1965
Mav 12,1966
Jan. 25, 1991
Feb. 9 1990
May 18, 1993
Sep.26,1978
Dec. 27, 1965
Oct. 29, 1968
SeD. 29 1981
June 30, 1965
June 16, 1997
Mar. 9, 1966
Mar. 23,1993
Oct. 11 1965
Mar. 20, 2000
Jan. 15, 1986
Feb. 11 1972
June 9,1982
June 23, 1992
Sep.21,1965
July 1,1977
July 14 1967
Dec. 22, 1965
Sep. 21, 1965
Oct. 1,1974
AUll. 7,1992
Jan. 27 1966
Nov. 26, 1965
Mar. 16, 1966
May24 1991
Nov. 9,1995
Auo.27 1968
Sep.4,1991
July 3, 1969
Jan. 30 1985
May 28,1986
Oct. 1, 1986
July 25, 1966
Feb. 16, 1968
Auo.30 1966
June 16,1980
Nov. 18, 1965
June 23, 1965
Sep.23,1965
Julv 14 1972
J ulv 23, 1992
May 24,1966
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Deposit of
Ratification
June 25 1968
Oct. 15, 1991
Feb.21,1996
Oct. 19, 1994
SeD. 16, 1992
Mav 2,1991
May 25, 1971
Sep. 18, 1992
Oct. 19, 1995
Feb. 14, 1996
Mar. 27 1980
Nov. 1, 1983
JulV 10,1992
Aua.27,1970

Entry into Force of
convention
July 25 1968
Nov. 14, 1991
Mar. 22 1996
Nov. 18, 1994
Oct. 16, 1992
June 1 1991
June 24, 1971
Oct. 18, 1992
Nov. 18, 1995
Mar. 15, 1996
Anr. 26 1980
Dec. 1, 1983
Auo.9,1992
Sep.26,1970

Sep.61966
May 14,1997
Jan. 15, 1970
Sen. 16 2002
Ap-r. 13, 2001
Auo.291966
Nov. 5, 1969
Dec. 20, 2004
Jan. 3 1967

Oct. 14 1966
June 13, 1997
Feb. 14, 1970
Oct. 16 2002
May 13, 2001
Oct. 14, 1966
Dec. 5, 1969
Jan. 19,2005
Feb. 2 1967

Feb. 23, 1966
Aua.29,1966
Seo.24,1991
Jan. 7, 1993
Julv 15,1997
Nov. 7, 1978
June 23, 1966
Apr. 29, 1970
Apr. 27 1993
Feb. 16, 1966
Sep. 22, 1998
Nov. 25 1966
Mar. 23,1993
APr. 24 1968

Oct. 14, 1966
Oct. 14, 1966
Oct. 24, 1991
Feb. 6, 1993
Aua. 14, 1997
Dec. 7,1978
Oct. 14, 1966
Mav 29,1970
Mav 27 1993
Oct. 14, 1966
Oct. 22, 1998
Dec. 25 1966
Apr. 22, 1993
Mav 24,1968

Jan. 15, 1986
Mav 3 1972
Mar. 6,1984
June 23, 1992

Feb. 14, 1986
June 2 1972
Apr. 5,1984
JulY 23, 1992

Auo. 11, 1977
Jan. 9 1969
Aua. 21, 1967
Anr. 4,1966
Dec. 27, 1974
Auo. 7, 1992
Apr. 18 1969
Julv 13, 1966
Apr. 21,1969
May 24 1991
Jan. 21,2003
Nov. 4 1968

Sep. 10, 1977
Feb. 8 1969
Sep. 20, 1967
Oct. 14, 1966
Jan. 26, 1975
Sep. 6,1992
Mav 18 1969
Oct. 14, 1966
May 21,1969
June 23 1991
Feb. 20,2003
Dec.4 1968

JulY 11, 1969

Auo. 10, 1969

Feb. 14, 1989
Feb. 4, 1987
July 25, 1966
seD. 28, 1968
Anr.7 1981
June 22, 1983
Mar. 29, 1971
Sep.9,1966
Aua. 17, 1967
Oct. 30 1972
Seil. 21, 2000
Jan. 3, 1967

Mar. 16,1989
Mar. 6,1987
Oct. 14, 1966
Oct. 28, 1968
1 Mav7 1981
Julv 22, 1983
Apr. 28, 1971
Oct. 14, 1966
Sep. 16, 1967
Nov. 29, 1972
Oct. 21, 2000
Feb. 2, 1967

Appendix 11
State

Korea Rep. of
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Lithuania
LuxembourQ
Macedonia former Yugoslav Rep. of
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Micronesia
Moldova
MonQolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
NiQer
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
PortuQal
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
SinQapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
TOl1ga
Trinidad and TobaQo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
UQanda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Signature

Apr. 18 1966
Feb. 9 1978
June 9 1995
Auo.8 1997
Mar. 26 2003
Sep. 19 1968
Sep. 3, 1965
July 6, 1992
Sep.28,1965
Sep. 16, 1998
June 1 1966
June 9 1966
Oct. 22 1965
Apr. 9 1976
Apr. 24 2002
July 30, 1965
June 2 1969
June 24 1993
AUQ. 12, 1992
June 14, 1991
Oct. 11, 1965
Apr. 4,1995
Oct. 26 1998
Sep. 28 1965
May 25 1966
Sep.2 1970
Feb.4 1994
AlIg, 23 1965
Julv 13 1965
June 24 1966
May 5,1995
July 6, 1965
Nov. 22, 1995
Oct. 20,1978
July 27 1981
Sep.4 1991
Sep~ 26 1978
Auo.4 1983
Sep.61974
June 16 1992
Apr. 21 1978
Feb. 3 1978
Oct. 1, 1999
Sep.28,1979
Sep. 26, 1966
May 9,2007
Feb. 16 1978
SElQ, 27 1965
Feb. 2 1968
Sep. 27 1993
Mar. 7,1994
Nov. 12 1979
Sep.271965
Mar. 21 1994
AUQ. 30 1967
Oct. 14, 1994
June 4,1984
Aug.7,2001
Mar. 15 1967
Nov. 3 1970
Sep. 25 1965
Sep. 22 1967
May 25 2005
Jan. 10 1992
Dec. 6 1985
July 23 2002
Jan. 24 1966
May 1,1989
Oct. 5,1966
May 5,1965
June 24 1987
Sep. 26 1992
June 7 1966
A.Jlr. 3 1998
Dec. 23 1981
May 26 1965
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Deposit of
Ratification
Feb.21 1967
Feb. 2 1979

Entry into Force of
convention
Mar. 23 1967
Mar. 4 1979

AUQ.8 1997
Mar. 26 2003
July 8 1969
June 16, 1970
July 6,1992
July 30 1970
Oct. 27,1998
Sep.61966
AUQ.231966
AUQ.81966
Jan. 3 1978
Nov. 3 2003
Jan. 11 1966
June 2 1969
June 24 1993

Sep.7 1997
Apr. 25 2003
AUQ.7 1969
July 16, 1970
Aug. 5, 1992
Aug. 29, 1970
Nov. 26, 1998
Oct. 14 1966
Oct. 14 1966
Oct. 14 1966
Feb. 2 1978
Dec. 3 2003
Oct. 14 1966
JuJy 2 1969
Julv 24 1993

June 14, 1991
May 11, 1967
June 7 1995

July 14, 1991
June 10,1967
July 7, 1995

Jan. 7 1969
Sep.14 1966
Apr. 2 1980
Mar. 20 1995
Nov. 14 1966
AUQ. 23, 1965
AUQ. 16 1967
July 24 1995
Sep. 15,1966
Apr. 8, 1996
Oct. 20 1978
Jan. 7 1983
Aug. 9 1993
Nov. 17 1978
Ju.IY..2 1984
Sep. 12 1975

Feb. 6 1969
Oct. 14 1966
May 2 1980
Apr. 19 1995
Dec. 14 1966
Oct. 14 1966
Sep. 15, 1967
Aug. 23, 1995
Oct. 15, 1966
6 May 8,1996
Nov. 19, 1978
Feb. 6 1983
Sep.8 1993
Dec. 17 1978
AlJfI.1 1984
Oct. 12 1975

Oct. 15 1979
Apr. 25 1978

Nov. 14 1979
May25 1978

Mav 8,1980 J
Apr. 21,1967
May 9, 2007
Mar. 20 1978
Aug. 2 1966
Oct. 14 1968
Mav 27 1994
Mar. 7 1994
Sep.81981
Feb. 29 1968
Aug. 18 1994
Oct. 12 1967
AUQ. 4,1995
June 4,1984
Dec. 16,2002
Apr. 9 1973
June 14 1971
Dec. 29 1966
Mav 15 1968
Jan. 25 2006
May 18 1992

June 7,1980
May21,1967
June 8, 2007
Apr. 19 1978
Oct. 14 1966
Nov. 13 1968
June 26 1994
Apr. 6 1994
Oct. 8, 1981
Mar. 30 1968
ept. 17 1994
Nov. 11 1967
S8]).3,1995
July 4,1984
Jan. 15,2003
3 May 9,1973
July 14 1971
Jan. 28 1967
June 14 1968
Feb. 24 2006
June 17 1992

July 23 2002
AUQ.11 1967
Mar.21 1990
Jan. 3, 1967
June 22, 1966
Mar. 3 1989
Sep.261992
June 7 1966
June 7 2000
Dec. 23 1981
Dec. 19 1966

Aug. 22 2002
SElQ, 10 1967
Apr. 20, 1990
Feb. 2, 1967
Oct. 14, 1966
two 2 1989
Oct. 26, 1992
Oct. 14 1966
July 7 2000
Jan. 22 1982
Jan. 18 1967

Appendix 11
State
United States of America
UruQuay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yemen, Republic of
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Signature
AllQ. 27 1965
May 28,1992
Mar. 17, 1994
Aug. 18 1993
Oct. 28,1997
June 17, 1970
Mar. 25 1991

Deposit of
Ratification
June 10 1966
AUQ.9,2000
Julv 26, 1995
May 2 1995
Oct. 21, 2004
June 17, 1970
May 20 1994

Entry into Force of
convention
Oct. 14 1966
Sep. 8, 2000
Aug. 25, 1995
June 1 1995
Nov. 20, 2004
July 17, 1970
June 19 1994

Note: The Government of the Republic of BoliVia signed the ICSID Convention on May 3, 1991 and deposited its instrument
of ratification on June 23, 1995. The Convention entered into force for Bolivia on July 23, 1995. On May 2, 2007, the
depositary received a written notice of Bolivia's denunciation of the Convention. In accordance with Article 71 of the
Convention, the denunciation took effect six months after the receipt of Bolivia's notice, i.e., on November 3,2007.
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Appendix 12

The Flowchart of the Special Method

I

Disputes

•

Amicable Settlement
Resolution

~

yes
Disputes Settled

I

no

Consultation and
Negotiation

~
The National Consultation
Commission on State Contracts

~
Council of Ministers' Consideration

+
Cabinet Resolution

I

Notify the Disputing Parties

I
I

yes

I

Disputes Settled

I

I

no
Arbitration

~

~

Domestic Arbitration

International
Arbitration

~
ICSID

I

I

Arbitral Awards

Enforced by the
Administrative Court
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I
I I

~
Ad-hoc Arbitration

J

I

Appendix 13

- Proposed Draft The Regulation of the Office of Prime Minister on Arbitration Applicable to
Disputes Arising out of a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E . ....

Whereas it is appropriate to issue the Regulation of the Office of Prime
Minister on Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a State Contract
Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E ..... to govern disputes arising out of a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI.

Clause 1

This Regulation shall be referred as to "the Regulation

of the Office of Prime Minister on Arbitration Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a
State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI B.E ......

Clause 2

This Regulation shall come into force after sixty (60)

days from the date of its publication in the Government Gazette.

Clause 3

Where any regulation, rule, Cabinet Resolution, order is

inconsistent or in contrast with these provisions of this Regulation, this Regulation
shall prevail and apply.

Clause 4

The Permanent-Secretary of the Office of Prime

Minister shall be in charge of the application, interpretation and enforcement of this
Regulation.

Chapter I
General Definition and Scope
Clause 5

In this Regulation:

A State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI" means any state
contract having special characteristics that fulfills and meets criteria and conditions
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subject to the Testing Process "a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI" set forth
by Schedule 1.
Contracting Government Agency" means any of these types of
Government Agencies: the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, the Judicial
Branch, Independent Organizations, Local Authorities, and State Enterprises
transacting with the Private Party.
"Commission" means the National Consultation Commission on State
Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI.
"Government Agency" means any of these types of Government
Agencies: the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch,
Independent Organizations, Local Authorities, and State Enterprises.
"Parties" means the Contracting Government Agency and the Private
Party.
"Private Party" means the Private Party transacting with the
Contracting Government Agency.
"Prospective Contract" means a contract to be entered into by a
Contracting Government Agency with the Private Party.
Clause 6

Any Contracting Government Agency desires to apply

arbitration as dispute settlement resolution to disputes arising out of a state contract
relating to qualifying FDI shall comply with this Regulation.
Clause 7

Prior to signing any state contract relating to qualifying

FDI with the private party, a Contracting Government Agency shall conclude an
arbitration clause according to the sample arbitration clause as suggested by Schedule
2 of this Regulation into a contract.
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The sample arbitration clause may be adjusted and modified based
upon a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the Contracting Government Agency may
consult the Office of Attorney General for legal advice and its adjustment.
Chapter II
Amicable Settlement Resolution
Clause 8

Any dispute or difference arising out of or m

connection with this Prospective Contract or the implementation of any of the
provisions of this Prospective Contract shall be referred to the Amicable Settlement
Resolution where the Parties are encouraged to settle their dispute between
themselves amicably within sixty (60) days since the day of acknowledging the
dispute.
Chapter III
Consultation and Negotiation
Clause 9

In an event where the Amicable Settlement Resolution

between the Parties has failed or the sixty (60) day period of the Amicable Settlement
Resolution has elapsed, the Contracting Government Agency is required to submit a
request for Consultation and Negotiation to the National Consultation Commission on
State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI, (the "Commission") promptly, whether or
not the private party has done so.
A request for Consultation and Negotiation will contain issues of the
dispute as well as relevant information, facts and details relevant to the dispute, for
example, the claim of the dispute, a contract concerned, etc.
Clause 10 The Commission consists of authorized representatives

designated from the Ministry of Finance as a Chairman; the Office of the National
Economic and Social Development Board (the "NESDB"); the Fiscal Policy Office,
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the Ministry of Finance (the "FPO"); the Board of Investment (the "BOI"); the
Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the OAG;
the Office of Council of State; three (3) independent and qualified persons from either
state sector or private practice; and the Department of the Legal Counsel of the OAG
as a Commission member and secretary.
At least two thirds (2/3) of the Commission members shall constitute a
quorum of the meeting.
The Commission's Resolution shall be issued by a majority vote.
Clause 11 When the Commission acknowledges the dispute between

the Contracting Government Agency and the Private Party, the Commission shall call
upon a meeting to discuss the dispute in order to recommend possible terms of
settlement to the Parties within thirty (30) days. The Commission shall be entitled to
invite both Parties to participate in a meeting. If necessary, the Commission may call
upon the Parties for additional meetings. The Parties shall facilitate the Commission
in settling the dispute.
The periods for the Consultation and Negotiation may be consumed
from three (3) months to twelve (12) months depending on the complication and
levels of the dispute. If the dispute is not complicated and carries straightforward
issues, the Consultation and Negotiation may take a few months whereas a maximum
of twelve (12) month period will allow the Parties to put several great efforts to deal
and settle perplexing and multi-level issues in dispute successfully and satisfactorily.
Clause 12 During the Consultation and Negotiation, the Commission

has the responsibility to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties, to come up
with possible terms of settlement to them, and to endeavour to bring about the
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settlement between them and the Parties are supposed to take such a recommendation
into consideration accordingly.
Clause 13 The Commission shall draw up a report of the Consultation
and Negotiation, whether or not the dispute between the Parties can be settled. In the
event where the Parties can reach an agreement, the Commission shall specify the
issues in dispute and how the Parties agree to settle their dispute.
In the event where the Commission considers that it is unlikely that the
Parties can seek a solution with an agreement, the Commission shall close the
Consultation and Negotiation's proceedings and draw up a report of the Parties'
failure to reach such an agreement.
After a report has been produced, the Commission shall hand out a
report to the Parties as well as to submit such a report to the Council of Ministers for
an approval as to whether the Council of Ministers will agree with the Commission's
recommendation and conclusion based upon the report.
Clause 14 Upon a report, the Council of Ministers shall consider a
report, issue a Cabinet Resolution over the dispute, and notify the Commission of the
Cabinet Resolution within sixty (60) days as to whether the Council of Ministers
agrees with the Parties' agreement in settling their dispute as appeared in a report. In
a case where the Council of Ministers disagrees with the settlement or where the
dispute cannot be settled in the Consultation and Negotiation process, the Council of
Ministers is required to come up with alternative terms of settlement to the Parties.
Clause 15 The Commission shall notify the Parties of the Cabinet
Resolution promptly. If the Private Party agrees with the Cabinet Resolution, the
Parties shall comply with the Cabinet Resolution accordingly.
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Private Party dissatisfies with Cabinet Resolution, the Private Party is entitled to
bring the dispute against the Contracting Government Agency to arbitration.
Chapter IV
Arbitration
Clause 16 Once the Consultation and Negotiation has failed or the
periods of the Consultation and Negotiation have elapsed, the Parties shall be eligible
to refer the dispute to arbitration (either domestic or international arbitration).
Clause 17 In a case where the Parties have agreed to submit the
dispute to domestic arbitration, either Party shall serve upon the other a notice of
intention to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specify the name of an
arbitrator to be appointed by him. The other Party shall appoint the arbitrator within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice.
Notwithstanding, there shall be at least one (1) arbitrator who has
knowledge and experience background in administrative or public law. The two (2)
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator, a so-called umpire who will chair the
arbitral tribunal.
Should either Party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or in case of
disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire, each Party is entitled to
refer the matter to the Administrative Court for the appointment of an arbitrator or
umpire as the case may be.
Clause 18 In a case where the Parties have agreed to submit the
dispute to international arbitration, the Parties are strongly advised to submit their
dispute to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter
the "ICSID").
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Clause 19 The arbitral tribunal shall not be barred from applying the
principles of administrative and public law into a case.

Clause 20 The Administrative Court shall have jurisdiction over
dispute and relating matters arising out of a state contract relating to qualifying FDI.

Given on this ... day of ................... B.E ... ..
-signed-
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Schedule 1: Testing Process of a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI
Only a state contract that fulfils and meets the criteria and conditions
set forth by the "Testing Process of a State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI" shall
be defined as a state contract relating to qualifying FDI and accordingly shall be
governed by the Special Method in accordance with this Regulation as follows:

1.

Testing Criteria of the Foreign Element
A prospective investment will be tested with one testing criterion at a

time of the following criteria: place of incorporation and registration; exclusive
ownership; percentage of foreign shareholdings; and a voice in the management!
controlling power. When a prospective investment fails to meet the first criterion, the
next criterion will be brought to the test against such a prospective investment until
the final criterion will have been tested. Only a prospective investment falling into
one of these testing criteria is considered to be holding the foreign element and it will
be accordingly treated as a foreign investor, company, corporation or enterprise as the
case may be under Thai law.

1.1.

Place of Incorporation and Registration
Any investment that its company, corporation or enterprise

1S

incorporated and registered under law of the state other than Thailand, shall be
considered a company, corporation or enterprise holding the foreign element and shall
be treated as a foreign company, corporation or enterprise as the case may be under
Thai law. The state of incorporation and registration of a company or corporation
shall be the nationality of a company or corporation.

1.2.

Exclusive Ownership
F or any investment that is entirely owned by foreign investors through

or in a form of natural persons or juridical persons, the investment shall be considered
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to be holding the foreign element and shall be treated as a foreign investor, company,
corporation or enterprise as the case may be under Thai law.

1.3.

Percentage of Foreign Share holdings
Any investment, which is jointly owned of more than fifty (50) per

cent in value by foreign investors, shall be considered to be holding the foreign
element and shall be treated as a foreign company, corporation or enterprise under
Thai law.

1.4.

A Voice in the Management! Controlling Power
Any investment, in which foreign investors have de facto controlling

management or power over a company, corporation or enterprise making such an
investment, shall be considered to be holding the foreign element and shall be treated
as a foreign company, corporation or enterprise under Thai law.

2.

Testing Criteria and Conditions of Qualifying FDI
Any investment holding the foreign element subject to the Testing

Criteria of the Foreign Element in No.1 that meets all of the following criteria and
conditions set forth by the Testing Process shall be considered to be qualifying FDI
and shall be within the scope of the Special Method subject to the Regulation.

2.1.

Inward Investment
Any investment holding the foreign element must be an inward

investment in that the inward investment is simply an investment brought into,
derived from, or directly connected with investment brought into Thailand of any
other countries by nationals or companies of any other countries.

2.2.

Exclusion of Portfolio Investment
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For an investment to qualify for FDI, an investment holding the foreign
element shall exclude a portfolio investment: a movement of capital for the purpose of
buying shares in a company or corporation formed or functioning in Thailand.

2.3.

Investment Value Not Less Than One (1) Billion Baht
An investment holding the foreign element shall worth not less than

one (1) billion Baht.

2.4.

Having Its Place of Effective Management In Another Country
An investment holding the foreign element shall be owned or

controlled by foreign investors, who have the place of effective management in a
country other than Thailand.

3.

Testing Criteria of Qualifying FDI Invested in a State Contract
Qualifying FDI shall be invested in a state project through a state

contract. A state contract means a contract where the State (through the Government
or its Government Agency as acting on behalf of the State or exercising the State's
power as the one party) enters into an agreement or transacts with the Private Party.
By this definition, a state contract must compose these three (3) elements.

3.1. Having the State (Through Government Agencies) as the Contract
Party
One party of a contract must always be the State acting through the
Government or its Government Agency or person acting on behalf of the State.
Government Agency can be one of these main Government Agencies, (consisting of
the Legislative Branch, Executive Branch, and Judicial Branch), Local Authorities
(Local

Administrative

Organizations),

Independent Organizations,

Enterprises.
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3.2. The State (Through Government Agencies) Having Authority to
Transact with the Private Party
Individual Government Agencies must have authority as designated by
law establishing them to enter into a contract or transact with the Private Party and as
a result, a contract must be within the scope, objectives, and mandates of their
establishment.

3.3. The Person Having Authority to Act on Behalf of the State (Through
Government Agencies)
A person acting on behalf of each Government Agency must be
authorized or delegated to exercise power by the law establishing such a Government
Agency.
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Schedule 2: A Sample Arbitration Clause Applicable to Disputes Arising out of a
State Contract Relating to Qualifying FDI

Settlement of Disputes
1.

Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with this

Contract or the implementation of any of the provisions of this Contract shall be
amicably settled between the parties within sixty (60) days
2.

When such amicable settlement between the parties has failed or

the periods of the amicable settlement have elapsed, either party shall submit a
request for Consultation and Negotiation to the National Consultation Commission on
State Contracts Relating to Qualifying FDI (the "Commission".) The parties shall
facilitate the Commission to have the dispute settled with the parties' agreement. The
periods for Consultation and Negotiation shall range from three (3) months to twelve
(12) months.
3. When the Consultation and Negotiation has failed or the periods of
the Consultation and Negotiation have elapsed, the parties shall be eligible to refer the
dispute to the arbitral tribunal consisting of three (3) arbitrators. The parties shall
agree upon the application of either domestic arbitration or international arbitration.
4.

For domestic arbitration, either party shall serve upon the other a

notice of intention to submit the dispute or difference to arbitration and specify the
name of an arbitrator to be appointed by him. The other party shall appoint the
arbitrator within thirty (30) days after receipt of the said notice. Notwithstanding,
there shall be at least one (1) arbitrator who has knowledge and experience
background in administrative or public law. The two (2) arbitrators shall appoint the
third arbitrator, a so-called umpire who will chair the arbitral tribunal.
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5. For international arbitration, the parties hereby consent to submit to
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter the
tlICSID tI ) any dispute arising out of or relating to this Contract for settlement by
arbitration.
6.

Should either party be unable to appoint an arbitrator or in case

of disagreement as regards to the appointment of an umpire, each party is entitled to
refer the matter to the Administrative Court for the appointment of the arbitrator or
umpire as the case may be.
7. Unless agreed by the parties otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall be
the judge of its own competence and shall apply the rules as it think appropriate. The
arbitral tribunal shall not be barred from applying principles of administrative or
public law to a case.
8.

The arbitral award shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the

parties hereto.
9. Each party shall have the right to institute suit against the other in
the Administrative Court to enforce any decision or award rendered in arbitral
proceedings.
10. Each party shall bear the cost of his own arbitrator's service and
share equally other cost of all proceedings.
11. The submission of any matter

III

dispute or difference to the

arbitral proceedings as aforesaid, shall be a condition precedent to the right of
institution of court action.
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